Gomes v. Brown University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
JOHN GOMES,
Plaintiff,
v.
BROWN UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 1:23-cv-219-JJM-PAS
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., Chief United States District Judge.
John Gomes brings this action against his former employer, Brown University
(“Brown”), for damages arising out of Brown’s alleged violations of the Family Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601,
et seq., the Rhode Island Fair Employment
Practices Act (“FEPA”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1,
et seq., and the Rhode Island Civil
Rights Act (“RICRA”), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1. ECF No. 1. 	Additionally, Mr.
Gomes alleges Brown wrongfully terminated him in violation of public policy. Brown
has moved to dismiss the claims alleging violation of FEPA, RICRA, and wrongful
termination.1 ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth here, the Court DENIES Brown’s
Motion to Dismiss the FEPA and RICRA claims.
1 In his response, Mr. Gomes states that he is willing to dismiss his wrongful
termination suit. ECF No. 6.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
In April 2019, Mr. Gomes was hired to work as an Administrative Assistant at
Brown University’s School of Public Health Center for Statistical Sciences. 	His
annual salary for this position was about $33,000. Before or during the time that Mr.
Gomes was employed at Brown, he was diagnosed with several disabilities, including
borderline personality disorder, depression, anxiety, and substance abuse disorder.2
From March 29, 2021, through June 1, 2021, Mr. Gomes alleges that he was in and
out of different medical treatment programs to help him manage his disabilities.
Mr. Gomes requested leave from Brown to seek treatment for his health
conditions. 	Mr. Gomes officially began to use his accrued paid time off (“PTO”) on
March 29, 2021. 	Mr. Gomes’ direct supervisor, Ms. Diane Deignan, approved this
initial PTO request. From March 29 through April 8, 2021, Mr. Gomes continued to
use his accrued PTO. 	When that ended, Mr. Gomes received a doctor’s note from
Sean Rebello, a nurse practitioner at Miriam Hospital, ordering Mr. Gomes to remain
out of work for three more days.
The next day, Mr. Gomes was admitted to an Outpatient Day Program at
Butler Hospital (“Butler”), a mental health institution located in Providence, Rhode
Island, to treat his mental health conditions. 	Upon his admission to Butler, Mr.
Gomes received another doctor’s note from Dr. Edward Sheehan, a psychiatrist,
which permitted him to remain out of work until April 27, 2021. He shared this note
2 	Both the Rehabilitation Act, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
the Affordable Care Act recognize these diagnoses as disabilities.
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with Ms. Deignan on the same day that he was admitted. Mr. Gomes applied online
for Temporary Disability Insurance (“TDI”). Samantha St. Onge, a Human Resources
(“HR”) Representative from Brown, contacted Mr. Gomes to provide him with an
FMLA form that a doctor needed to complete and return to her department. 	Mr.
Gomes met with Dr. Sheehan to discuss his treatment and how they could submit
Mr. Gomes’ completed forms to Brown.
Mr. Gomes alleges that he mailed both the completed Leave of Absence and
FMLA forms to Brown’s HR Department on April 26, 2021. 	About two weeks later,
Ms. Deignan emailed Mr. Gomes to find out when Mr. Gomes would be returning to
work and to let him know that Brown’s HR Department had not yet received his
“completed medical certification for his leave request” that needed to be submitted by
May 13, 2021. 	That same day, Mr. Gomes responded to Ms. Deignan and told her
that all the necessary paperwork had been completed and that he would be “out for
at least another 2 to 3 weeks.” Mr. Gomes also explained that to play it safe, he could
not 	fax 	his 	completed 	paperwork 	and 	had 	instead 	mailed 	it 	to 	Brown’s 	HR
Department.
Mr. Gomes claims to have completed the intake process for an Intensive
Outpatient Treatment Program at Butler. The next day, Ms. Deignan responded to
Mr. Gomes’ email three separate times within the same hour. 	First, Ms. Deignan
responded to thank Mr. Gomes for the updates and to wish him well during his
healing process. Second, Ms. Deignan wrote to suggest that Mr. Gomes take pictures
of his completed forms and submit them via “virtu,” a financial software company
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presumably used by Brown. Third, Ms. Deignan emailed Mr. Gomes to let him know
that she notified Ms. St. Onge about Mr. Gomes’ need to extend his absence “another
two to three weeks” and to remind Mr. Gomes that he also needed to extend his leave
date in Workday, a software used by Brown employees.
On May 13, 2021, Mr. Gomes forwarded a doctor’s note written by Amy Snyder,
a physician assistant at Butler, to Ms. Deignan that advised Mr. Gomes to remain
out of work until June 1, 2021. Ms. Synder’s note also invited Brown to reach out to
her with any “questions or concerns” regarding Mr. Gomes. 	On May 24, 2021, Ms.
Pamela Donnelly a Benefits Specialist at Brown, sent a communication to Mr. Gomes
to notify him that as of that date, Brown had not received his completed Leave of
Absence and FMLA forms. In this communication, Ms. Donnelly also stated that Mr.
Gomes’ absence would not be designated as protected under the FMLA and that it
may be considered unapproved. Brown also alleges in this communication that they
had sent a letter to Mr. Gomes, informing him that he had seven days to submit the
completed “Certification of Health Care Provider” form and that as of that date they
had not received it. A copy of this communication was shared with Ms. Deignan. On
June 1, 2021, Brown terminated Mr. Gomes for job abandonment.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
When the Court reviews a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, it accepts all Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true to decide
whether they “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
	Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp.
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v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court may not consider “conclusory legal
allegations.”
	Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013)
(citing
Morales-Cruz v. Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224 (1st Cir. 2012)). Additionally,
“bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the
like need not be credited.”
Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A.
FEPA Accommodation Claim.
Mr. Gomes alleges that Brown violated parts of the FEPA that prohibit a
failure to accommodate and retaliation. 	The FEPA states that “[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for any employer to refuse to reasonably accommodate
an 	employee’s 	or 	prospective 	employee’s 	disability 	unless 	the 	employer 	can
demonstrate that the accommodation would pose a hardship on the employer’s
program, enterprise, or business.” R.I. G EN . LAWS § 28-5-7(1)(iv) (1949). In order to
establish a claim for failure to accommodate under FEPA, a plaintiff must show “(1)
that he suffers from a disability or handicap, as defined by the ADA and Chapter
151B, (2) that he was nevertheless able to perform the essential functions of his job,
either with or without reasonable accommodation, and finally that (3) [his employer]
took an adverse employment action against him because of, in whole or in part, his
protected disability.”
Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 237–38 (1st Cir. 2002).
Additionally, the First Circuit has held that “[a] leave of absence and leave extensions
are reasonable accommodations in some circumstances” and that “[w]hether the leave
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request is reasonable turns on the facts of the case.”
Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d
437, 443–44 (1st Cir. 1998). Furthermore, “requesting an accommodation is protected
activity for the purposes of § 12203(a) [the ADA]”.
	Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352
F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003).
Here, Mr. Gomes alleges that Brown failed to accommodate his disability by
not granting his reasonable request for medical leave. Mr. Gomes’ uses a plethora of
plausible factual details to support his allegation against Brown and his claim that
he requested a Leave of Absence and FMLA separately. 	Brown points out that
several other circuit courts have held that a request for FMLA leave is not considered
a “reasonable accommodation.” Mr. Gomes responds that courts recognize a request
for a general medical leave of absence (unrelated to FMLA leave) as a request for a
reasonable accommodation under FEPA.
Mr. Gomes is correct. The First Circuit has held that a “leave of absence and
leave extensions are reasonable accommodations.”
Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437,
443 (1st Cir. 1998). Additionally, since Mr. Gomes alleges that he requested medical
leave separately from his request for FMLA leave, this point is moot. Mr. Gomes says
that Brown was aware of his disabilities, that he first requested PTO to seek
treatment for them in March 2021, and that several medical professionals have
confirmed his diagnoses and need for treatment. Both parties agree that Mr. Gomes
was a Brown employee and that he was terminated on June 1, 2021. 	Taking Mr.
Gomes’ allegations as true as we must at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court finds
that Mr. Gomes has alleged plausible facts to support a cause of action that Brown
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failed to reasonably accommodate Mr. Gomes’ disabilities. 	As a result, Brown’s
Motion to Dismiss as it pertains to Mr. Gomes’ FEPA accommodation claim is denied.
B.
FEPA Retaliation Claim
To establish a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show “(1) that [he] engaged
in protected conduct; (2) that [he] was discharged; and (3) that there is a causal
connection between [his] protected conduct and the discharge.”
Kelly v. Verizon
Servs. Corp., C.A. No. 08–282–ML, 2008 WL 4547493, 4 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2008). 	Once
again, Mr. Gomes has met this standard. 	Brown does not allege that they had
experience any performance issues with Mr. Gomes prior to his request for leave in
March 2021. In his Complaint, Mr. Gomes plausibly alleges that Brown terminated
him after he asked for an extended medical leave. 	As a result, Brown’s Motion to
Dismiss as it pertains to Mr. Gomes’ FEPA retaliation claim is denied.
C. RICRA Claim
The RICRA statute explicitly states that discrimination based on a person’s
disability is prohibited.
	See R.I. G EN . LAWS § 42-112-1(a) (1990). 	Although the
statues are similar, the First Circuit has held that “the two statutes [RICRA and
FEPA] were meant to provide separate, if sometimes converging, avenues to relief.”
Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2004). The First Circuit has gone
further to expound upon the differences, stating that FEPA makes it illegal for any
applicable employer to discriminate against an employee on account of several
protected classes, including a person’s disability, while RICRA “sweeps more broadly”
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and 	has 	been 	“authoritatively 	determined 	to 	forfend 	against 	all 	forms 	of
discrimination in all phases of employment.”
Id. at 71.
Here, Mr. Gomes alleges that after he received approval from his supervisor,
while he was out on leave to treat his disabilities, Brown terminated him. Mr. Gomes
has alleged many facts that lend plausibility to his contention that his termination
by Brown was a form of discrimination. As a result, Brown’s Motion to Dismiss as it
pertains to Mr. Gomes’ RICRA claim is denied.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Since Mr. Gomes has alleged substantial facts to support both his FEPA claim
and his RICRA claims, the Court DENIES Brown’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 5.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
John J. McConnell, Jr.
Chief United States District Judge
November 27, 2023
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