USA v. Worster et al

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
v. )
) CR. No. 21-cr-111-JJM-PAS
DAVID WORSTER, )
Defendant. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., Chief United States District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant David Worster’s Motion to Suppress. ECF No.
44. Mr. Worster moves on the grounds that his Fifth Amendment right to counsel,
and thereby against self-incrimination, were violated. ECF No. 44:1 at 1. The
government responds in opposition by arguing that Mr. Worster’s assertion of his
Fifth Amendment right to counsel was not unequivocal, and therefore he did not
invoke his constitutional rights. ECF No. 48.

I, BACKGROUND

Law enforcement executed a search warrant at 386 Hilton Street in
Pawtucket. Jd. at 1. Mr. Worster was located, handcuffed, and brought to Task
Force Officer (““TFO”) Matthew Smith’s car. Jd. at 2. TFO Smith had Mr. Worster
sit behind the front passenger’s seat, where TFO Smith buckled Mr. Worster’s
seatbelt. Jd. at 2. Though the rear passenger seat where Mr. Worster sat remained

open, TFO Smith stood beside Mr. Worster outside the car, /d at 2.

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Special Agent Rachel Robinson entered the car, sat in the front passenger
seat, turned around, and informed Mr. Worster of the situation: “that a search
warrant had been obtained for [My. Worster’s] apartment and told him that she had
some questions.” /d. at 2-3. Agent Robinson then read Mr. Worster his Miranda
rights. Jd, at 3. Mr. Worster signed the Miranda rights form. fd. at 3.

Agent Robinson turned her recorder on and began questioning Mr. Worster.
Td. at 3. In response to her first question, Mr, Worster responds: “I -- I don’t know.”
ECE No. 44-1 at 1-2. Agent Robinson then said to Mr. Worster: “You just said, I'll
tell you exactly how it happened.” Jd. at 2. While Agent Robinson is saying this
statement, Mr. Worster raises his voice over hers and says: “Yeah, but -- but I just --
I want my lawyer, though.” Jd at 2. Nonetheless, Agent Robinson continued to
interrogate Mr. Worster for an hour.
II. DISCUSSION

“We sometimes forget how long it has taken to establish the privilege against
self-incrimination, the sources from which it came and the fervor with which it was
defended.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S, 436, 458 (1966). “As a noble principle
often transcends its origins, the privilege has come right-fully to be recognized in
part as an individual's substantive right... . That right is the hallmark of our
democracy.” Jd. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). To evaluate the
applicability of this privilege, courts undertake a two-step process: the first step is
whether the defendant was in custody, and the second is whether there was an

interrogation. See id. at 460. In fact, the First Circuit has held that Afiranda

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warnings are only required when these two conditions are met. See United States
v. Hinkley, 803 F.3d 85, 30 (ist Cir. 2015). If there was a custodial interrogation,
properly invoked Miranda protections must be respected by law enforcement. See
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370,
388-89 (2010).

A. Custodial Interrogation

“The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable
during a period of custodial interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460. As alluded
to, before the Court can address Mr. Worster’s arguments, it must first determine
whether he was subject to a custodial interrogation. The nature of a custodial
interrogation, as conveyed by its semantics, can be divided into two parts. The
Court now addresses those two parts in turn,

1. Custody

Several factors are relevant to whether a suspect is in custody, including, but
not limited to, “the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made
during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the
questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.”
Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012) (citations omitted). Once such factors are
taken under consideration, “[t]he question is whether, viewed objectively, those
circumstances constitute the requisite ‘restraint on freedom of movement of the

degree associated with a formal arrest.” Hinkley, 803 ¥.3d at 90 (quoting United

States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 435 (1st Cir. 2011).

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“fT]n order to determine how a suspect would have ‘gaugeld]’ his ‘freedom of
movement,’ courts must examine ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation.” Howes, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (omission in original) (citing Stansbury v.
California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 325 (1994) (per curiam)). Nonetheless, as alluded,
this inquiry is still an objective one. See /.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270
(2011) (“As we have repeatedly emphasized, whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ is an
objective inquiry.”); Stansbury, 511 U.S, at 322 (same). Objective inquiries are
evaluated using the reasonable person standard. Here, that inquiry requires
examining whether a “reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 US.
99, 112 (1995).

This restriction of movement is not a dispositive consideration, however. See
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984). Courts “instead ask[] the
additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently
coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.”
Howes, 565 U.S. 499, 509. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s “cases make clear... that
the freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for Miranda custody.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010).

It is hard to imagine a universe in which a court finds that Mr. Worster was
not in custody. As the government states in their brief, Mr. Worster “was brought
in handcuffs to TFO Smith’s car... . TFO Smith reached across Defendant to buckle

his seatbelt and then stood to Defendant’s side, outside the car.” ECF No, 48 at 2.

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Indeed, it was not simply that Mr. Worster was physically restrained: TFO Smith's
presence outside the car imbued a psychological restraint, further signifying that
Mr. Worster was not free to leave. A reasonable person in Mr. Worster’s position
would not believe that they were free to leave, nor end the interrogation. As a
result, the Court finds that Mr. Worster was in custody while being questioned.
2, Interrogation

The second inquiry in an analysis under Miranda is whether there was an
interrogation. “[T]he term “interrogation” under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Hhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). The Supreme Court elucidates on what an
incriminating response entails, defining it as “any response-—whether inculpatory
or exculpatory—that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.”! /d at 301 n.6
(1980) (emphasis in original).

Much like the custody inquiry, the interrogation inquiry is an objective one.
See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 282 n.6 (1980) (“Rejection of an objective
test in this context is not inconsistent with Rhode Island v. Innis... since ‘the
policies underlying the two constitutional protections [Fifth and Sixth

Amendments] are quite distinct.” (quoting Janis, 446 U.S., at 300 n.4 (alterations in

1 As the Supreme Court notes in Jnnis, “the definition of interrogation can
extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they shou/d have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Hhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980) (emphasis in original).

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original)); United States v. Sanchez, 13 F.4th 1063, 1074-75 (10th Cir. 2021), cert.
denied, 142, S. Ct. 842 (2022) (“This inquiry is objective, focusing ‘on the perceptions
of a reasonable person in the suspect's position rather than the intent of the
investigating officer.” (quoting United States v. Yepa, 862 F.3d 1252, 1257 (10th
Cir. 2017)). As a result, “beyond an objectively defined ‘pressure point,’ statements
will be deemed presumedly compelled and therefore properly excluded, absent the
countercoercive effect of Miranda warnings.” Henry, 447 U.S. at 282 n.6 (citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).

One notable carveout is known as the public safety exception, a doctrine
enumerated in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). Under this exception,
Miranda, and its protections, are not applicable when “police officers ask questions
reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.” Quaries, 467 U.S. at 656.
Indeed, the Supreme Court “conclude [d] that the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self:
incrimination.’” Jd. at 657. As a result, “[tlhe prophylactic Miranda warnings . .
are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [arel instead measures
to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination lis] protected.” Ja. at

654 (alterations in original) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).

2 The term “reasonable,” as it often does, bears significant weight, indicating
that reviewing court must look objectively to the circumstances presented to the
officer or officers. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 663 (1984) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

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From the very beginning of her conversation with Mr. Worster, Agent
Robinson’s questions were designed to elicit an incriminating response. When Mr.
Worster responded with “I don’t I don’t know” to Agent Robinson’s first question,
the next thing that Agent Robinson says is: “You just said I'll tell you exactly how it
happened...” ECF No. 48 at 4. This statement by Agent Robinson reveals that her
goal in recording their conversation was to get what Mr. Worster told her onto the
tape recorder. It is incredibly unlikely that Agent Robinson would have pushed so
hard to get Mr. Worster to say what was said if it did not have some incriminating
nature to it. Cf Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (“Confessions remain a
proper element in law enforcement.”).

There is no question that Mr. Worster was interrogated within the definition
of Miranda. This is the precise situation Miranda foresaw. See Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499, 508 n.5 (2012) (noting that lower courts have “applied the traditional
context-specific analysis to determine whether the circumstances of [the
defendant’s] interrogation gave rise to ‘the coercive pressure that Miranda was
designed to guard against” (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)).
Its “safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of
protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the
underlying intent of the police.” Ahode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

Custodial interrogations are inherently coercive and can create an even more

3 The Court does not address, nor is it before us, whether these prior
statements were given before or after Mr. Worster was Mirandized.

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coercive atmosphere when an investigating officer presses on a defendant to tell
that officer what they want to hear. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 507 n.4 (2012).

The government’s argument that the public safety exception applies is
without merit. This exception applies to situations in which an individual is in
custody, is subject to an interrogation, and gives an incriminating response without
being Mirandized. Mr. Worster, was in custody and was Mirandized, even signing a
document confirming that he was read his rights. The facts are quite different from
Quarles, too. In Quarles, the officer “asked only the question necessary to locate the
missing gun before advising [Quarles] of his rights.” New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 659 (1984). Here, Agent Robinson put a tape recorder in between herself and
Mr. Worster to document the interview. That she was even able to do so indicates
that there was not a concern for public safety. It further suggests that she had
more questions than would be necessary to locate the alleged weapon.

The Court finds that Mr. Worster was subject to a custodial interrogation. As
a result, the Court must find that Mr. Worster was entitled to the protections under
Miranda. For those protections to apply, however, they must be properly invoked.
The Court now turns to this question.

B. Invocation

Once a defendant has been given their Miranda warnings, they may invoke
those rights at any time throughout a custodial interrogation. See Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).

If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation

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must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his
Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person
invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion,

subtle or otherwise.

Td. at 473-74, “The requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a
person’s exercise of that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial
setting.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). Thus, the relevant inquiry
becomes whether the “right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored.” /d.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Relevant factors evaluating whether an
invocation was “scrupulously honored” include whether the interrogation
immediately ceased. See zd. at 106.

For this right to be honored, it must be invoked unequivocally. “Invocation of
the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
attorney.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (quoting McNeu/ v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991)). That is, “Lilf an accused makes a statement
concerning the right to counsel ‘that is ambiguous or equivocal’ or makes no
statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation . . . or ask questions
to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights.” Berghuis
y. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 459). Courts have
held that, even if there is some equivocation, the relevant inquiry is whether “a
reasonable officer would have understood that [a defendant] was clearly and
unequivocally invoking the right to counsel.” Abela v. Martin, 380 F.3d 915, 926

(6th Cir. 2004) Ginternal quotation marks omitted). In light of these circumstances,

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the Court must evaluate whether Mr. Worster’s statement is one “that can
reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an
attorney in dealing with custodial interrogation by the police.””+ See McNeil v.
Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991) (emphasis in original).

“An accused in custody, ‘having expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him,’ unless he validly waives his earlier
request for the assistance of counsel.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1984)
(per curiam) (citing Hdwards, infra, 451 U.S. at 484-85). Yet “a valid waiver of that
right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-
initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Zdwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). A proper invocation represents the stopping
point, such that nothing after the point of invocation shall be deemed admissible.
“Under Miranda and Edwards... an accused’s postrequest responses to further
interrogation may not be used to cast doubt on the clarity of his initial request for
counsel.” Smith, 469 U.S. at 105.

There can be no question that the statement “I want my lawyer” constitutes
an unequivocal invocation of ones right to counsel during a custodial interrogation.
It would be paradoxical for the Court to find, on the one hand, that Mr. Worster’s
statement that “I want my lawyer” constitutes an unequivocal invocation of one’s

right to immediately terminate an interrogation, and yet on the other hand find

4 Though admittedly redundant, it bears repeating that the term
“reasonably” reflects an objective inquiry. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

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that very invocation could not (or should not) be “reasonably construed as being an
expression of a desire” to end that interrogation. Mr. Worstex’s invocation is not
only obvious from the transcript of his interview, but it can also clearly be heard on
the recording. ECF No 48-2; see also ECF No 48 at 4 (verifying same in transcript).
The Court finds that it would be unreasonable to construe Mr. Worster’s invocation
as anything but an unequivocal expression of his desire to end the conversation
with Agent Robinson.

Often in matters such as this, it is the defendant who failed to properly
invoke their right (as defined by the Supreme Court). See, e.g., Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 462 (1994) (affirming the lower courts’ rulings that “Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer’ was not a request for counsel”), Here, there was not
scrupulous adherence to the proper invocation. The reason that the interrogation
continued is because Agent Robinson failed to adhere to Mr. Worster’s invocation.

But this conclusion is clouded by the fact that Agent Robinson talked while
this invocation occurred.6 Agent Robinson talked over Mr. Worster’s invocation.
The government’s contention that Agent Robinson did not hear the invocation and
therefore that the invocation was ambiguous misses the mark. Whether the right to

counsel has been invoked is an “objective inquiry.” Jd at 458-59. This Court

5 The government relies significantly on United States v. Dudley, 804 F.3d
506 (Ist Cir. 2015). Dudley presents factually dissimilar circumstances from the
instant matter. In that case, as the government states in their brief, “lalt issue...
was whether police heard a suspect tell his wife to call his attorney.” ECF No. 48 at
8. Regardless of whether police heard the suspect tell his wife to call his attorney,
the First Circuit rested their decision on the fact that informing one’s wife to
contact an attorney would not constitute an unequivocal invocation of one’s

constitutional right to an attorney.

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listened to the recording of the custodial interrogation of Mr. Worster. Agent
Robinson was in the front seat, turned around and was looking straight at Mr.
Worster when he said, “I want my lawyer.” The Court finds that a reasonable
person would have heard the unequivocal and unambiguous invocation of the right

to counsel by Mr. Worster.®

lil. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Mr. Worster’s constitutional right against self
incrimination was violated when Agent Robinson did not end the interrogation after
Mr. Worster unequivocally and unambiguously invoked his Fifth Amendment right
to counsel. All statements following Mr. Worster’s invocation (“Yeah, but ~ but I
just -- I want my lawyer, though.”) are inadmissible. As a result, the Court

GRANTS Mr. Worster’s Motion to Suppress. ECF No. 44.

ave

John J. McConnell, Jr.
United States Chief District Judge

June 16, 2022

6 The Government suggests that “the agents will testify that they did not
hear the burst as a request for counsel.” ECF No. 48 at 1. There is no need for an
evidentiary hearing because whether the agents heard it or not is a subjective
analysis and the United States Supreme Court instructs us to apply an objective
standard.

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