USA v. Jose Montes, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
United States of America,
v.
Jose Montes,
Defendant.
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C.A. No. 20-cr-00106-MSM-LDA
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mary S. McElroy, United States District Judge.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Defendant Jose Montes (“Montes”), who is serving a 60-month prison sentence,
seeks compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as recently amended by
the First Step Act (FSA), Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (2018).
(ECF Nos 125 & 145). 	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits courts to reduce a term of
imprisonment, 	once 	administrative 	remedies 	are 	exhausted, 	if 	it 	finds 	that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”
	See 18 USC §
3582(c)(1)(A). There is no dispute that Mr. Montes has exhausted his administrative
remedies. 	The Court must therefore review his motion to determine whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to warrant a sentence reduction and, if
so, if such a reduction would be consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission. 	18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 	“Put another way, the
district court must find that the defendant's situation constitutes the type of ‘extreme
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hardship’ that the compassionate-release statute is designed to ameliorate.”
United
States v. Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting
United States v. Havener,
905 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1990)). Finally, “the district court must consider any applicable
section 3553(a) factors and ‘determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction . . . is
warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.’”
United
States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2022) (quoting
Saccoccia, 10 F.4th
at 4 (alteration in original).
For the reasons state below, the Defendant’s motion is DENIED.
II. 	BACKGROUND
On November 20, 2020, 	a federal grand jury returned a thirteen-count
indictment 	charging 	Mr. 	Montes 	with 	eleven 	federal 	felonies, 	three-counts 	of
conspiracy to engage in the interstate transportation of stolen property in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and eight counts of interstate transportation of stolen property in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
On May 12, 2021, Mr. Montes entered guilty pleas to all counts pursuant to a
binding plea agreement in which the parties agreed that a sentence of 60 months was
appropriate. 	Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). The agreed upon sentence was below the
advisory guideline sentencing range of 70 to 87 months that was established by the
Court at sentencing. On August 3, 2021, Mr. Montes was sentenced consistent with
the binding plea agreement. He filed the within motion on November 10, 2021. The
Court subsequently appointed counsel who then filed a supplemental memorandum
in support of Mr. Montes’ motion. 	(ECF No. 145.) 	The Government objects. 	(ECF
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No. 147.)
III. 	DISCUSSION
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), vests this Court with the authority to modify a
sentence of imprisonment if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction.” “[O]nce a defendant shows that he has exhausted the Bureau of Prisons’
administrative process for compassionate release, or thirty days have lapsed without
a decision, whichever occurs first, a district court may reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment provided the court determines: (1) extraordinary and compelling
reason warrant the reduction; (2) the defendant will not be a danger to the safety of
any other person or the community; and (3) the sentencing factors outlined in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) favor release.”
United States v. Saad, 2022 WL 35806, *1 (D.R.I. Jan.
4, 2022) (internal citations omitted).
The statute itself does not define “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that
justify a sentence reduction or modification, but the United States Sentencing
Commission has provided some guidance in its commentary. 	In relevant part, the
Commission notes that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist where:
(C) Family Circumstances.
(i) The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor
child or minor children.
(ii) The incapacitation of the defendant’s spouse or registered partner
when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or
registered partner
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(D) As determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the
defendant’s case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in
combination with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).
18 U.S.C.S. Appx § 1B1.13.
In this case Mr. Montes relies primarily on the “family circumstances” factor.
Namely he argues that his mother and fiancé both suffer from significant health
problems that require his assistance: both physical and financial. To determine if the
circumstances in any given case are extraordinary and compelling, the Court relies
on the plain meaning of the words.
	United States v. Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th 561,
566 (1st. Cir. 2021).
The plain meaning of "extraordinary" suggests that a qualifying
reason must be a reason that is beyond the mine-run either in
fact 	or 	in 	degree.
	See 	Webster's Third 	New
International Dictionary 	of 	the 	English 	Language
Unabridged 807 	(1981) 	(defining 	"extraordinary" 	as 	"going
beyond 	what 	is 	usual, 	regular, 	common, 	or customary");
see
also United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2021)
(suggesting that such reason must be "most unusual," "far from
common," or "hav[e] little or no precedent"). By the same token,
the plain meaning of "compelling" suggests that a qualifying
reason 	must 	be 	a 	reason 	that 	is 	both 	powerful 	and
convincing.
	See Webster's 	Third, supra at 	462 	(defining
"compelling" as "forcing, impelling, [or] driving [circumstance]"
and as "tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness
of evidence");
see also Hunter, 12 F.4th at 562.
Canales-Ramos, 19 F.4th at 566-67.
In describing his family circumstances Mr. Montes argues that, given their
health conditions and the ongoing pandemic, both his mother and fiancé are unable
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to work to support themselves. However, both women receive social security benefits
and have others who can help with their support: adult children and a husband in
the case of his mother and supportive family in the case of his fiancé. Neither one is
dependent on Mr. Montes for their financial support. 	Further, the conditions that
Mr. Montes cites were all present at the time that he entered into a binding plea
agreement with the Government. 	It is true that Mr. Montes’ absence during his
incarceration will make things more difficult for both women, but that fact is true for
every family in which a member is sentenced to incarceration. That type of difficulty
does 	not 	present 	the 	type 	of 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	circumstances
contemplated by Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission. 	Without
extraordinary and compelling circumstances, a reduction would be inconsistent with
the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission.
While the Court has found that compelling and extraordinary circumstances
do not exist and, as a result, it is not required to go further in its analysis, the Court
is mindful of the First Circuit’s admonition that its job is made easier when “the
district court takes the additional step of making a section 3553(a) determination.”
United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2022). 	When the Court
sentenced Mr. Montes just nine months ago it weighed all the sentencing factors to
determine if it agreed with the recommendation of the binding plea agreement he had
entered into with the Government. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets forth the factors that the
Court must consider to arrive at a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2).” The Court is not
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relieved of that responsibility by the agreement of the parties to a binding plea
agreement. 	In this case the Court considered, in accordance with § 3553(a)(2), the
nature of the offense and the defendant’s history and characteristics and sought to
impose a sentence:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
The facts underlying Mr. Montes’ conviction demonstrate that he was the
leader and organizer of a conspiracy to steal personal watercraft and other vehicles
from various local business in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Connecticut. Beginning in October 2019 and continuing until July 2021, Mr. Montes,
with his co-conspirators, broke into, stole, and sold various vehicles from businesses
and marinas. 	This conspiracy had twenty-two individual victims and an intended
loss of $687,511. When he appeared before this Court, at the age of 38, he had earned
a criminal history category of IV. His convictions included fraud, robbery, possession
of stolen motor vehicle parts and an assortment of other minor criminal convictions.
Previous shorter terms of imprisonment and periods of probation have not deterred
Mr. Montes’ criminal conduct. 	In fact, he was on probation when he committed the
offenses in this case.
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A sentence of 60 months, below the advisory guidelines and as the product of
an agreement between the Government and the defendant, was an appropriate
sentence that was sufficient but not greater than necessary in August of 2021 when
the Court sentenced Mr. Montes. 	He has shown no extraordinary and compelling
circumstances to support compassionate release. His Motion (ECF No. 125) therefore
is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
Mary S. McElroy
United States District Judge
May 16, 2022
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