USA v. Valentin-Vega et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
[2] RAFAEL A. RUIZ-
GARCÉS,
Defendant.
CRIM. NO. 26-186-2 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendant Rafael A. Ruiz-Garcés’s
(“Defendant” or “Mr. Ruiz-Garcés”) Motion for De Novo Hearing Bail
Review and Revocation of Detention Order (“Motion”). (Docket No.
238). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Motion
subject to the conditions specified herein and in the separate
order of release.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 8, 2026, a Grand Jury in this district returned an
Indictment charging Mr. Ruiz-Garcés and five co-defendants.
(Docket No. 3). Of the twenty-four count Indictment, Defendant was
charged with: racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
(Count One); racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(d) (Count Two); conspiracy to import cocaine into the United
States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), and
(b)(1)(B)(ii), 963 (Count Three); conspiracy to distribute and
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 2
possess with the intent to distribute controlled substances, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(D), and
846 (Count Four); importation of cocaine into the United States,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii)
(Count Seven); possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)
(Count Eighteen); and money laundering conspiracy, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Nineteen). Id.
On May 15, 2026, Magistrate Judge Marcos E. López held a
detention hearing and found that there were no conditions of
release that would reasonably assure Defendant’s future appearance
and the safety of the community. (Docket No. 170). On June 15,
2026, Defendant filed the present Motion seeking de novo review of
the Magistrate Judge’s detention order. (Docket No. 238). He
contends that although the charged offenses carry a rebuttable
presumption of detention under § 3142(e)(3)(A)-(B), he does not
pose a risk of flight or danger to the community and there are
conditions of release that could be crafted to ensure his
appearance before the Court and protect the community. Id. The
Court held a de novo hearing on October 1, 2026. (Docket No. 253).
At the hearing, the Government called three witnesses. First, the
Government called Puerto Rico Police Bureau (PRPB) Agent Felipe
Rivera-Rivera (“Agent Rivera”), assigned to Homeland Security
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 3
Investigations, who testified that he was present at the search of
the home in Añasco pursuant to a search warrant and as to the
evidence supporting the charges against Defendant. Id. Second, the
Government called United States Postal Inspection Service
Inspector Jorge Rios (“Inspector Rios”), who testified as to
packages seized and searched in early May that contained cocaine
and the Defendant’s fingerprints. Id. Third, the Government called
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) Agent Carlos Gómez (“Agent Gómez”),
who testified as to the Defendant’s exits and entries from ports
of entry in the United States during the past several years. Id.
The Government also proceeded by proffer and argued that Defendant
represents both a flight risk and danger to the community.
Defendant argued to the contrary.
After considering the evidence and the arguments of the
parties, the Court finds that Defendant has introduced sufficient
evidence to rebut the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3) presumption and that
the Government has not proven by the relevant standards that no
conditions of release could reasonably assure the safety of the
community and Defendant’s appearance as required.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of review for a detention or release order
A district court reviews a magistrate judge’s order of
detention or release under a de novo standard and “need not defer
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 4
to the magistrate judge’s findings or give specific reasons for
rejecting them.” United States v. Cidraz-Santiago, 18 F. Supp. 3d
124, 126 (D.P.R. 2014) (citations omitted). A district court may
also “take additional evidence or conduct a new evidentiary
hearing” when “the defendant has placed relevant facts at issue.”
Id.
B. The Bail Reform Act
Pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a judicial officer
must determine whether a person charged with an offense shall be
detained or released pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a).
Section 3142(e) of the Bail Reform Act provides that if, after
conducting a hearing, “the judicial officer finds that no condition
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required and the safety of any other person and
the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of
the person before trial.” Id. § 3142(e).
i. Standard of proof
The standard of proof for detention on the grounds of
dangerousness is clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 3142(f).
Clear and convincing evidence is “more than preponderance of the
evidence but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States
v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501, 509 (D.P.R. 1984) (citations
omitted), aff’d, United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 744 F.2d 203 (1st
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 5
Cir. 1985). This standard requires “a high degree of certainty
that the information presented supports the conclusion of
dangerousness or risk to the obstruction of justice.” Id. On the
other hand, the standard of proof for detention due to risk of
flight is preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1991).
ii. Factors the Court must consider
To determine whether there are conditions of release that
assure a defendant’s appearance and the safety of the community,
judicial officers must consider the following factors: (1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of
the evidence against the defendant; (3) the defendant’s personal
history and characteristics; and (4) the nature and seriousness of
the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by
the defendant’s release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).
iii. The 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) presumption
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) creates a rebuttable presumption that no
conditions can reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant
and the safety of the community where there is probable cause that
a defendant has committed one of the crimes listed in the statute
or in the other circumstances set forth therein. United States v.
Vargas-Reyes, 220 F. Supp. 3d 221, 225 (D.P.R. 2016) (citing 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)). A grand jury indictment alone suffices to
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 6
trigger the presumption. Id. (citing, inter alia, United States v.
Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 163 (1st Cir. 1986)).
In cases involving drug trafficking crimes, the presumption
comes from “Congress’s finding that drug traffickers often have
the resources and foreign contacts to escape to other countries”
and that “[f]orfeiture of even a large bond may be just a cost of
doing business, . . . hence drug traffickers pose special flight
risks.” United States v. Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d 15, 17 (1st
Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1416-
17 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting appellant-defendant remained risk of
flight where drug organization “probably could absorb the loss of
$200,000 worth of security”); United States v. Perez-Franco, 839
F.2d 867, 870 (1st Cir. 1988) (gravity of charges and non-citizen
status makes the risk of flight pronounced); United States v.
Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 385 (1st Cir. 1985) (reviewing the evidence
before Congress that drug offenders pose particular flight risk),
partially abrogated on other grounds by United States v. O’Brien,
895 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1990).
Once triggered, Section 3142(e)(3)’s presumption imposes on
the defendant a burden of production. See Vargas-Reyes, 220 F.
Supp. at 225. The defendant may satisfy the burden of production
by introducing at least some evidence contrary to the facts
presumed. Id. For that reason, “[t]he burden is not heavy.” Id.
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 7
Notably, the burden of persuasion always rests with the Government
in both presumption and non-presumption cases. Id.
However, Section 3142(e)(3)’s presumption does not simply
vanish once a defendant has produced some evidence. See Palmer-
Contreras, 835 F.2d at 18; Jessup, 757 F.2d at 383-84, 387.
Instead, judges must keep the presumption in mind as an additional
factor to the four listed in Section 3142(g). See Palmer-Contreras,
835 F.2d at 18; Jessup, 757 F.2d 383-84, 387. In drug trafficking
cases, the weight afforded to the presumption depends on how
closely the defendant resembles the paradigmatic drug trafficker
for whom the risk is particularly high; “the less those features
resemble the congressional paradigm, the less weight the [court]
will likely give to Congress’s concern for flight.” Jessup, 757
F.2d at 387; see also Palmer-Contreras, 835 F.2d at 18; Perez-
Franco, 839 F.2d at 870.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The nature and circumstances of the offense charged
Mr. Ruiz-Garcés was indicted on various counts of drug
trafficking offenses, racketeering, money laundering, and
conspiracy. (Docket No. 3). Here, the presumption comes from 18
U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A), i.e., probable cause to believe that
Defendant committed “an offense for which a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 8
Substances Act” as well as 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(B), i.e.,
probable cause to believe that Defendant committed “an offense
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), 956(a), or 2332b.” Given the severity
of the punishment provided by the relevant statutes, this factor
favors detention. However, as the Court will discuss, other factors
favor release.
B. The weight of the evidence against Defendant
The Government purports to have evidence that Defendant was
involved in international drug smuggling ventures whereby
Defendant was involved in the distribution, possession, and
importation of cocaine, in various counts that each total five (5)
kilograms or more of cocaine. The evidence includes witness
testimony; vast, unexplained wealth; a sworn statement from an
individual purporting to have heard that Mr. Ruiz-Garcés was
offering money to murder an individual (though Defendant was not
charged with any count involving violence); and links between
Defendant and battery boxes that were shipped with bricks of
cocaine stashed inside.
Regardless of the import or weight of the evidence proffered
by the Government, the Court is not concerned with Mr. Ruiz-
Garcés’s guilt or innocence at this stage. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j)
(“Nothing in this section shall be construed as modifying or
limiting the presumption of innocence.”). The Court’s task is to
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 9
assess whether there is a set of conditions that “will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). The Court
finds that such conditions exist.
C. Defendant’s personal history and characteristics
The third factor—Defendant’s personal history and
characteristics—favors release pending trial. Defendant is a
lifelong resident of Puerto Rico. He has a common law wife and a
teenage child, with whom he resides in the home that he and his
wife own together. Some of Mr. Ruiz-Garcés’s family members
attended the de novo hearing. Defendant carries a U.S. passport,
which is now in possession of the arresting agents, and his most
recent travel was via pleasure boat outside of Puerto Rico.
Finally, Defendant has no criminal history.
In support of its argument that Defendant is a risk of flight,
the Government avers that Mr. Ruiz-Garcés has access to vast,
unexplained wealth, likely from his drug trafficking ventures. For
example, the Government proffered that, although Defendant has a
reported income of $10,000-$16,000, he has recently traveled to
many exotic locations and has several luxury vehicles. The
Government further proffered Mr. Ruiz-Garcés frequently travels
outside of Puerto Rico via pleasure boat and is a high-level member
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 10
of an international drug trafficking organization with underworld
contacts in the Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Venezuela.
Defendant has established he has strong community ties to
Puerto Rico, rebutting the presumption under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
See United States v. Newton, 215 F.3d 1313 (1st Cir. 2020)
(defendant’s evidence of family and business ties to Puerto Rico,
no prior criminal convictions, and compliance with pretrial
release conditions sufficient to rebut presumption). The
Government’s proffer focused on the fact that the Defendant has
massive, unexplained wealth, with two homes, frequent travels via
pleasure boat and commercial aircraft, and several luxury vehicles
plus a horse trailer. The Government elicited testimony from CBP
Officer Gómez who testified that Defendant had traveled inbound to
the United States as recently as May 2026 via pleasure boat.
Further, Officer Gómez explained that exits via pleasure boat do
not have to be declared to Customs and Border Patrol. The nucleus
of Defendant’s family and business ties, however, lies in Puerto
Rico—including his wife, a thirteen (13) year old daughter with
whom he resides, and his close relationship with the rest of his
family, who also reside in Puerto Rico. Further, the Government
failed to show how certain conditions, such as electronic
monitoring, would be insufficient to ensure Defendant’s appearance
before the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Government
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 11
did not meet its burden of persuasion that Defendant is a risk of
flight.
D. The nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the
community that would be posed by Defendant’s release
The Government made several arguments as to Defendant’s
potential to be a danger to the community if released. It argued
that the presence of six firearms at Defendant’s residence, five
that are registered to Defendant and one that belongs to a third
party, an alleged friend of Defendant, supports the inference that
Defendant has potential to be a danger to the community if
released. In support of this argument, the Government presented
testimony from Agent Rivera who explained the evidence against
Defendant that was seized in the searches of Defendant’s homes in
Añasco, Puerto Rico and Kissimmee, Florida. The Government argued
further that the Defendant was trafficking ~four kilos of cocaine
through the USPS immediately before his arrest in May. In support
of this argument, the Government elicited the testimony of Postal
Service Inspector Rios who explained the seizure of the packages
that contained the batteries filled with cocaine, and Agent
Rivera’s testimony regarding the boxes containing the same type of
batteries found in Kissimmee, Florida, as were seized by the Postal
Service containing cocaine. However, Mr. Ruiz-Garcés argued that
none of the charges related to violence are brought against him,
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 12
that he had a license to carry all but one of the firearms found
in his home, which he alleges was left there by a friend
inadvertently, and that he has no criminal history, violent or
otherwise. The Government further noted that Defendant has a few
violent incidents that occurred in the 2020-2021 period. Defendant
highlighted that those incidents were some time ago with no
incident since, both before and after his arrest.
The only other evidence the Government presented regarding
Defendant’s continuing threat to public safety was the sworn
statement at Exhibit 41 given by Julio A. Aragones-Fred, allegedly
the driver involved in the double murder of two former kidnappers
of Valentin-Vega, the alleged head of the international drug
trafficking organization charged in the indictment. Mr. Aragones-
Fred was later murdered after beginning to cooperate with the
government. Specifically, on page 5 of the translation of the sworn
statement, Mr. Aragones-Fred stated that the word on the street
was that Defendant was offering $40,000 to murder one of the
individuals who had kidnapped Valentin-Vega. Defendant highlighted
during the hearing that this is a deceased declarant unexaminable
in court, and was discussing what amounted to a rumor.
Notably, the Government did not present any other police
reports, affidavits, testimony, or any other evidence that
Defendant poses a continuing threat to public safety. Accordingly,
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 13
the Government has not met its burden to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that there is no condition or combination of
conditions that would reasonably assure the safety of other persons
and the community.
The Court notes that the Government raises serious concerns,
and drug trafficking itself is a serious offense. However, “the
safety of the community can be reasonably assured without being
absolutely guaranteed.” United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880,
884 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887,
891-92 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). Accordingly, the Court imposes
herein and in the separate order of release a series of conditions,
including home incarceration and electronic monitoring, which,
together, can reasonably assure public safety and Defendant’s
appearance.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for DeNovo
Hearing Bail Review and Revocation of Detention Order is GRANTED.
Defendant Rafael A. Ruiz-Garcés SHALL be released subject to the
following conditions:
1. Defendant must not violate federal, state, or local law
while on release.
2. Defendant must cooperate in the collection of a DNA
sample if it is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 14135a.
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 14
3. Defendant must advise the Court, the U.S. Probation
Office, or the supervising officer in writing before
making any change of residence or telephone number.
4. Defendant must appear in court as required and, if
convicted, must surrender as directed to serve a
sentence that the Court may impose.
5. Defendant will execute a secured bond binding Defendant
to pay the United States the sum of $100,000 dollars in
the event of a failure to appear as required or to
surrender as directed for service of any sentence
imposed.
6. Defendant will submit a proposed third-party custodian,
as approved by the U.S. Probation Office. The third-
party custodian must agree to (a) supervise Defendant,
(b) use every effort to assure his appearance at all
court proceedings, (c) notify the Court immediately if
Defendant violates a condition of release or is no longer
in the custodian’s custody, and (d) surrender any
firearms he or she might possess.
7. Defendant shall reside at a suitable residence not
located in an isolated part of Añasco.
8. Defendant shall submit to location or electronic
monitoring as directed by the U.S. Probation Office or
supervising officer and comply with all the program
requirements and instructions provided.
9. Home incarceration with electronic monitoring: Defendant
shall be restricted to a 24-hour-a-day lock-down at his
home except for medical necessities and court appearance
or other activities specifically approved by the Court.
10. Defendant’s release is conditioned upon qualification of
the third-party custodian, as well as verification by
the United States Probation Office of electronic
monitoring device capability in the proposed residence.
11. Defendant shall avoid all contact, directly or
indirectly, with any person who is or may be a victim or
witness in the investigation or prosecution.
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 15
12. Defendant shall submit to supervision by and report on
a regular basis to the United States Probation Office.
13. Defendant will not use or unlawfully possess any
narcotic drug or other controlled substances defined in
21 U.S.C. § 802 unless prescribed by a licensed medical
practitioner.
14. Defendant shall refrain from the excessive use of
alcohol.
15. Defendant should participate in a program of inpatient
or outpatient substance abuse therapy and counseling as
deemed necessary by the United States Probation Office
or the Supervising Officer.
16. Defendant shall submit to testing for a prohibited
substance if required by the U.S. Probation Office or
the Supervising Officer. Testing may be used with random
frequency and may include urine testing, the wearing of
a sweat patch, a remote alcohol testing system, and/or
any form of prohibited substance screening or testing.
The defendant must not obstruct or attempt to obstruct,
or tamper with the efficiency and accuracy of prohibited
substance screening or testing.
17. Defendant shall not possess a firearm, destructive
device, or other dangerous weapon.
18. Defendant shall surrender any passport to the United
States Probation Office.
19. Defendant shall not obtain a passport or other
international travel document.
20. Defendant shall report, as soon as possible, to the
United States Probation Office or the Supervising
Officer any contact with any law enforcement personnel,
including, but not limited to any arrest or questioning.
21. Defendant shall abide by the following restrictions on
personal association, place of abode, and travel:
Defendant shall reside at the address of record and shall
not leave the jurisdiction of this District without
first obtaining written permission from the Court.
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Criminal No. 26-186-2 (RAM) 16
22. Defendant shall not enter any airport or pier.
23. As an exception, the Chief United States Probation
Officer or his designee, may authorize temporary changes
of address and overseas travels to the mainland U.S.
only, not exceeding 15 calendar days, provided the
United States Attorney has no objection to it. If
objected, request will have to be made in writing to the
Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 13th day of October 2026.
s/Raúl M. Arias-Marxuach_________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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