Lara-Nieves v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ÁLIDA IROMI LARA-NIEVES
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO ET
AL.
Defendants.
Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM)
OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	Defendant 	Inspector 	Luis 	Díaz-Muñoz
(“Díaz-Muñoz” 	or 	“Defendant”)’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	for 	Failure 	to
State 	a 	Claim 	and 	for 	Joinder 	(“Motion” 	or 	“Motion 	to 	Dismiss”).
(Docket No. 57). For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby
GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On 	August 	12, 	2024, 	Plaintiff 	Álida 	Iromi 	Lara-Nieves
(“Plaintiff” 	or 	“Lara-Nieves”) 	filed 	a 	Complaint 	against 	the
Secretary 	of 	Public 	Safety 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	Alexis 	Torres-Ríos
(“Torres-Ríos”), the Commissioner of the Puerto Rico Police Bureau
Antonio 	López-Figueroa 	(“López-Figueroa”) 	(collectively, 	the
“Supervisory 	Defendants”), 	the 	Commonwealth, 	and 	Díaz-Muñoz 	for
alleged 	employment 	discrimination 	and 	sexual 	harassment. 	(Docket
No. 1).
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On 	August 	13, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	an 	Amended 	Complaint.
(Docket 	No. 	54). 	Therein, 	she 	states 	that 	on 	September 	26, 	2023,
she 	was 	sexually 	harassed 	and 	assaulted 	by 	Díaz-Muñoz, 	the
Assistant 	Director 	of 	the 	Licensing 	Investigations 	and 	Firearm
Inspections Bureau of the Puerto Rico Police Bureau (“PRPB”). Id.
at 	1, 	9. 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz 	possessed 	supervisory
authority 	over 	her, 	as 	she 	was 	then 	an 	attorney 	at 	the 	Legal
Affairs 	office 	of 	the 	PRPB. 	Id. 	Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	PRPB
leadership 	did 	not 	adequately 	protect 	her 	from 	Díaz-Muñoz 	and
likewise failed to timely investigate or discipline Díaz-Muñoz as
required 	by 	PRPB 	policy. 	Id. 	at 	12-13. 	She 	avers 	that 	she 	was
terminated on June 30, 2024, in retaliation for filing complaints
about Díaz-Muñoz’s alleged harassment. Id. at 2.
Against 	this 	alleged 	factual 	backdrop, 	Plaintiff 	asserts
claims 	under 	Title 	VII 	of 	the 	Civil 	Rights 	Act 	of 	1964 	(“Title
VII”); Section 1983; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 1321 et seq. (1985)
(“Law 	69”); 	P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	29, 	§ 	155 	et 	seq. 	(1988) 	(“Law
17”); Puerto Rico tort statutes; and provisions of the Constitution
of 	the 	Commonwealth 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	including 	on 	a 	supervisory
liability 	theory 	against 	co-defendants 	Torres-Ríos 	and 	López-
Figueroa. 	Id. 	at 	23-27, 	38-39. 	Plaintiff 	seeks 	damages,
reinstatement, 	and 	injunctive 	relief 	requiring 	Defendants 	to
better 	enforce 	anti-sexual 	harassment 	policies. 	Id. 	at 	38-39.
Against Díaz-Muñoz in particular, she brings counts alleging that
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	3
he 	deprived 	her 	Equal 	Protection 	rights 	under 	Section 	1983; 	that
he violated Puerto Rico Laws 69 and 17 by sexually harassing her;
and that he is liable under Puerto Rico constitutional protections
and the Puerto Rico Civil Code’s general tort statute for the same
underlying conduct. Id. at 20-38.
On 	August 	27, 	2025, 	the 	Commonwealth 	and 	Supervisory
Defendants 	filed 	a 	Motion 	for 	Partial 	Dismissal 	of 	Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint; Díaz-Muñoz similarly filed a Motion to Dismiss.
(Docket Nos. 56, 57). Before the Court today is Díaz-Muñoz’s Motion
to Dismiss. (Docket No. 57). He argues for dismissal on a variety
of 	grounds, 	including 	because: 	(1) 	the 	one 	incident 	between 	him
and Plaintiff was “episodic” and allegedly insufficient to create
a 	hostile 	work 	environment; 	(2) 	Plaintiff’s 	contemporaneous
complaint paints a less alarming picture of the incident than the
Amended 	Complaint; 	(3) 	the 	Amended 	Complaint 	allegedly 	fails 	to
plead 	an 	alteration 	of 	the 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	Plaintiff’s
employment; 	(4) 	Plaintiff’s 	general 	tort 	causes 	of 	action 	are
duplicative 	of 	her 	claims 	under 	more 	specific 	laws; 	(5) 	he 	is
entitled 	to 	qualified 	immunity; 	(6) 	and 	this 	Court 	need 	not
exercise 	supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	remaining 	state 	law
claims. Id.
On 	September 	30, 	2025, 	Plaintiff 	filed 	a 	Response 	to
Defendant’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss. 	(Docket 	No. 	65). 	Therein, 	she
retorts that the Amended Complaint establishes the existence of a
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	4
hostile 	work 	environment 	under 	the 	applicable 	case 	law; 	that 	an
alternative 	theory 	based 	on 	quid 	pro 	quo 	independently 	proves
sexual 	harassment; 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz 	does 	not 	have 	qualified
immunity because it is undisputed that sexual harassment violates
Section 1983; that Díaz-Muñoz violated Puerto Rico Laws 69 and 17
by sexually harassing Plaintiff as her supervisor; that the general
tort 	claims 	are 	not 	barred; 	and 	that 	the 	Court 	should 	elect 	to
exercise 	its 	supplementary 	jurisdiction. 	Id. 	at 	3, 	10-26. 	In
particular, Plaintiff points out that “courts have recognized that
single 	incidents 	that 	are 	sufficiently 	severe 	can 	constitute 	a
hostile work environment.” (Docket No. 65 at 10) (internal citation
omitted). 	She 	cites 	a 	number 	of 	circuit 	and 	district 	court 	cases
from around the country in support of this proposition. See id. at
10-18.
On January 29, 2026, Díaz-Muñoz filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s
Response. (Docket No. 78). Therein, he insists that the Court can
consider 	his 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	without 	construing 	it 	as 	a
“successive” 	motion. 	Id. 	at 	3-6. 	He 	then 	distinguishes 	the 	cases
cited 	by 	Plaintiff, 	arguing 	that 	they 	all 	involve 	underlying
conduct 	indicative 	of 	“severe 	conditions, 	none 	of 	which 	present
themselves in the instant case.” Id. at 6-9. Díaz-Muñoz avers that
he 	had 	no 	authority 	or 	involvement 	in 	firing 	Plaintiff, 	and 	so
claims 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	quid 	pro 	quo 	theory 	of 	sexual 	harassment
does not pass muster. Id. at 9-12.
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On February 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Surreply in opposition
to 	Defendant’s 	Reply. 	(Docket 	No. 	84). 	In 	it, 	she 	clarifies 	that
she 	is 	not 	arguing 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz’s 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	is 	an
impermissible 	successive 	motion. 	Id. 	at 	2-3. 	She 	rejects 	Díaz-
Muñoz’s 	assertion 	that 	the 	alleged 	incident 	does 	not 	match 	the
severity 	of 	the 	cited 	cases, 	saying 	that 	“it 	is 	loaded 	with 	the
long-abandoned 	notion 	that 	sexual 	battery 	is 	not 	really 	that
abusive 	or 	humiliating.” 	Id. 	at 	4. 	Furthermore, 	she 	points 	to
similarities 	between 	the 	incidents 	underlying 	the 	Amended
Complaint 	and 	those 	condemned 	in 	the 	case 	law. 	Id. 	at 	3-5.
Plaintiff avers that she brought forth a quid pro quo claim in her
Amended 	Complaint 	and 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz’s 	conduct 	constitutes 	quid
pro 	quo 	sexual 	harassment. 	Id. 	at 	5-7. 	Lastly, 	she 	argues 	that
some 	of 	the 	matters 	raised 	by 	Díaz-Muñoz 	are 	relevant 	to 	the
summary judgement stage as opposed to the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. Id.
at 7-8.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
When ruling on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
“[t]he 	sole 	inquiry 	... 	is 	whether, 	construing 	the 	well-pleaded
facts 	of 	the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most 	favorable 	to 	the
plaintiffs, 	the 	complaint 	states 	a 	claim 	for 	which 	relief 	can 	be
granted.” 	Ocasio-Hernandez 	v. 	Fortuno-Burset, 	640 	F.3d 	1, 	7 	(1st
Cir. 2011). The Court must first “isolate and ignore statements in
the 	complaint 	that 	simply 	offer 	legal 	labels 	and 	conclusions 	or
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	6
merely 	rehash 	cause-of-action 	elements.” 	Schatz 	v. 	Republican
State 	Leadership 	Committee, 	669 	F.3d 	50, 	55 	(1st 	Cir. 	2012)
(internal 	citations 	omitted). 	Then, 	the 	Court 	takes 	“the
complaint's 	well-pled 	(i.e., 	non-conclusory, 	non-speculative)
facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader’s
favor,” 	to 	determine 	“if 	they 	plausibly 	narrate 	a 	claim 	for
relief.” 	Id. 	(internal 	citations 	omitted). 	One 	of 	the 	grounds
allowing a complaint to be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
is for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
When 	evaluating 	a 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	pursuant 	to 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
12(b)(6), Courts may consider: “(a) ‘implications from documents’
attached 	to 	or 	fairly 	‘incorporated 	into 	the 	complaint,’ 	(b)
‘facts’ susceptible to ‘judicial notice,’ and (c) ‘concessions’ in
plaintiff’s ‘response to the motion to dismiss.’” Schatz, 669 F.3d
at 55–56 (quoting Arturet–Vélez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 429
F.3d 10, 13 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)).
III. DISCUSSION
Díaz-Muñoz advances four arguments as to why various portions
of 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	must 	be 	dismissed. 	They 	are
effectively 	that: 	(i) 	Count 	2 	is 	not 	properly 	pled; 	(ii) 	Count 	4
is not properly pled; (iii) Counts 9 and 10 are not properly pled;
and 	(iv) 	Díaz-Muñoz 	enjoys 	qualified 	immunity. 	See 	(Docket 	No.
57). The Court addresses each in turn.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	7
A. Count 2
The 	second 	count 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	pleads
under 	Section 	1983 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz 	violated 	the 	Equal 	Protection
Clause by sexually harassing Plaintiff. (Docket No. 54 at 20-23).
a. Applicable law
i. 	Section 1983
42 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1983 	(“Section 	1983”) 	allows 	individuals 	to 	sue
state 	and 	local 	government 	officials 	who 	deprive 	them 	of 	“any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It “is not itself a source of substantive
rights,” 	but 	merely 	provides 	“a 	method 	for 	vindicating 	federal
rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-
94 	(1989) 	(quoting 	Baker 	v. 	McCollan, 	443 	U.S. 	137, 	144 	n.3
(1979)).
Section 	1983 	is 	meant 	to 	provide 	redress 	for 	constitutional
violations 	by 	state 	and 	local 	government 	actors, 	including 	in
Puerto Rico. “The traditional definition of acting under color of
state 	law 	requires 	that 	the 	defendant 	in 	a 	§ 	1983 	action 	have
exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.’” 	West 	v. 	Atkins, 	487 	U.S. 	42, 	49 	(1988) 	(quoting 	United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also Billings v.
United 	States, 	57 	F.3d 	797, 	801 	(9th 	Cir. 	1995) 	(citing 	Daly-
Murphy 	v. 	Winston, 	837 	F.2d 	348, 	355 	(9th 	Cir. 	1987)) 	(Ҥ 	1983
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	8
provides 	no 	cause 	of 	action 	against 	federal 	agents 	acting 	under
color of federal law”). “For purposes of section 1983, Puerto Rico
is the functional equivalent of a state,” and Puerto Rico officials
are 	treated 	like 	state 	officials. 	See 	Cruz-Arce 	v. 	Mgmt. 	Admin.
Servs. 	Corp., 	19 	F.4th 	538, 	541 	n.1 	(1st 	Cir. 	2021); 	42 	U.S.C. 	§
1983 (creating 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	allowing 	individuals 	to 	sue 	for
violations 	of 	federal 	rights 	“under 	color 	of 	any 	statute,
ordinance, 	regulation, 	custom, 	or 	usage, 	of 	any 	State 	or
Territory”).
ii. 	Equal Protection
The 	Equal 	Protection 	Clause 	of 	the 	Fourteenth 	Amendment
states 	that 	“[n]o 	State 	shall 	deny 	to 	any 	person 	within 	its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV. 	It 	“is 	essentially 	a 	direction 	that 	all 	persons 	similarly
situated 	should 	be 	treated 	alike.” 	City 	of 	Cleburne 	v. 	Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). In the First Circuit, if “a
state 	official 	directly 	engaged 	in 	sexual 	harassment 	or 	sexual
discrimination, 	he 	would, 	of 	course, 	be 	subject 	to 	section 	1983
liability.” 	Lipsett 	v. 	Univ. 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	864 	F.2d 	881, 	901
(1st Cir. 1988) (emphasis in original).
Workplace sexual harassment can be established via a showing
of 	a 	hostile 	work 	environment. 	Id. 	at 	897. 	A 	hostile 	work
environment 	exists 	when 	supervisors 	or 	coworkers 	“create 	an
atmosphere 	so 	infused 	with 	hostility 	toward 	members 	of 	one 	sex
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	9
that they alter the conditions of employment for them.” Id. (citing
Meritor 	Sav. 	Bank, 	FSB 	v. 	Vinson, 	477 	U.S. 	57, 	67 	(1986) 	(“[f]or
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and 	create 	an 	abusive 	working 	environment”) 	(internal 	quotation
omitted)). 	The 	sexual 	harassment 	must 	be 	“both 	objectively 	and
subjectively 	offensive, 	such 	that 	a 	reasonable 	person 	would 	find
it hostile or abusive and [the plaintiff] in fact did perceive it
to 	be 	so.” 	Pérez-Cordero 	v. 	Wal-Mart 	P.R., 	Inc., 	656 	F.3d 	19, 	27
(1st 	Cir. 	2011). 	“[T]he 	determination 	of 	whether 	such 	an
environment 	exists 	must 	be 	made 	by 	the 	trier 	of 	fact 	in 	light 	of
the record as a whole and the totality of circumstances.” Lipsett,
864 F.2d at 901 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). “In
performing 	this 	inquiry, 	a 	court 	must 	mull 	the 	totality 	of 	the
circumstances, 	including 	factors 	such 	as 	the 	frequency 	of 	the
discriminatory 	conduct; 	its 	severity; 	whether 	it 	is 	physically
threatening 	or 	humiliating, 	or 	a 	mere 	offensive 	utterance; 	and
whether 	it 	unreasonably 	interfered 	with 	an 	employee’s 	work
performance.” 	Maldonado-Catala 	v. 	Municipality 	of 	Naranjito, 	876
F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2017) (citation modified).
A solitary, sufficiently severe instance of sexual harassment
can 	create 	a 	hostile 	work 	environment. 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	has
recognized 	that 	an 	extremely 	serious 	incident, 	even 	if 	isolated,
can amount to a discriminatory change in the terms and conditions
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	10
of 	employment. 	See 	Faragher 	v. 	City 	of 	Boca 	Raton, 	524 	U.S. 	775,
788 (1998). The First Circuit has recognized that a “single act of
harassment 	may, 	if 	egregious 	enough, 	suffice 	to 	evince 	a 	hostile
work environment.” Gerald v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 707 F.3d 7, 18
(1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 84
(1st 	Cir. 	2005)). 	First 	Circuit 	precedent 	has 	further 	explained
that while a single-incident hostile work environment claim could
even 	be 	based 	on 	solely 	verbal 	conduct, 	“successful 	single-
incident 	claims 	typically 	have 	involved 	unwanted 	physical
contact.” 	Pomales 	v. 	Celulares 	Telefonica, 	Inc., 	447 	F.3d 	79, 	84
(1st 	Cir. 	2006) 	(citing 	Barbara 	Lindemann 	and 	Paul 	Grossman,
Employment Discrimination Law 795 n. 240 (3d ed. 1996) (collecting
cases)).
b. Plaintiff 	plausibly 	pleads 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	hostile
work environment
Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	plausibly 	alleges 	that 	Díaz-
Muñoz 	subjected 	Plaintiff 	to 	harassment 	sufficiently 	severe 	that
it evinced a hostile work environment. (Docket No. 54 at 20-23).
First, she alleges conduct that goes well beyond the kind of
“mere 	offensive 	utterance” 	or 	workplace 	incivility 	that 	is
disregarded 	by 	the 	case 	law. 	Faragher, 	524 	U.S. 	at 	787-788
(recognizing 	that 	the 	standard 	for 	“judging 	hostility” 	in 	such
claims is demanding to ensure that sexual harassment laws are not
transformed 	into 	a 	“general 	civility 	code”). 	Specifically,
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	11
Plaintiff 	avers 	that 	her 	acting 	supervisor, 	Díaz-Muñoz, 	entered
the room in which she was standing, grabbed her from behind, held
her 	hands 	in 	place 	to 	render 	her 	immobile, 	and 	then 	forcefully
thrust his private parts onto her before rubbing them against her
buttocks. 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at 	10). 	Taken 	as 	true, 	these 	averments
describe 	severe 	and 	intimate 	contact, 	physical 	restraint, 	and
humiliation 	by 	a 	supervisor 	in 	front 	of 	the 	subordinate 	victim’s
coworkers. Id. The Court rules that this isolated alleged incident
is 	sufficiently 	severe 	to 	alter 	the 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment and create a hostile working environment. Faragher, 524
U.S. at 787-788 (isolated incidents can suffice as discriminatory
changes 	in 	the 	“terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	employment” 	if 	they 	are
sufficiently 	serious); 	Pomales, 	447 	F.3d 	at 	84 	(noting 	that
“successful 	single-incident 	claims 	typically 	have 	involved
unwanted physical contact”); Gerald, 707 F.3d at 18 (a “single act
of harassment may, if egregious enough, suffice to evince a hostile
work environment”); Noviello, 398 F.3d at 84 (same).
Second, 	the 	broader 	context 	merits 	the 	Court’s 	further
attention. Plaintiff avers that Díaz-Muñoz was a high-ranking PRPB
officer 	with 	supervisory 	authority 	over 	her, 	since 	she 	was 	the
PRPB 	Legal 	Affairs 	Office’s 	liaison 	to 	the 	bureau 	led 	by 	Díaz-
Muñoz. 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at 	8-10). 	Moreover, 	she 	maintains 	that 	the
director of that bureau was not present on the date of the alleged
sexual battery, rendering Díaz-Muñoz the officer in command at the
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	12
time. 	Id. 	at 	10. 	The 	First 	Circuit 	has 	recently 	recognized 	that
harassment from a supervisor with authority over the victim has a
greater impact and is more concerning in a hostile work environment
analysis than harassment from a different coworker. Pike v. Budd,
133 	F.4th 	74, 	90 	(1st 	Cir. 	2025). 	Lastly, 	Plaintiff 	pleads 	facts
related 	to 	the 	PRPB’s 	failure 	to 	discipline 	Díaz-Muñoz 	or 	to
confiscate his “duty firearm, taser, pepper spray and baton during
the Department of Justice’s investigation into the alleged acts of
criminal 	misconduct 	perpetrated 	by 	him” 	until 	the 	alleged
termination 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	employment 	with 	the 	PRPB 	seven 	months
later. 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at 	9, 	13, 	18). 	These 	support 	Plaintiff’s
claim that Díaz-Muñoz’s rank within the PRPB and the PRPB’s alleged
failure to meaningfully restrain him magnified the coercive impact
of the incident and plausibly contributed to an objectively hostile
environment. See Maldonado-Catala, 876 F.3d at 10 (explaining that
“a 	court 	must 	mull 	the 	totality 	of 	the 	circumstances, 	including
factors 	such 	as 	the 	frequency 	of 	the 	discriminatory 	conduct; 	its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or
a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered
with an employee’s work performance” (citation modified)).
Díaz-Muñoz’s 	principal 	rebuttal 	is 	that 	cases 	recognizing
single-incident 	hostile 	work 	environments 	always 	involve 	“severe
conditions, none of which present themselves in the instant case.”
(Docket 	No. 	78 	at 	6-9). 	This 	argument 	is 	unavailing 	given 	the
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	13
above-described 	severity 	of 	the 	sexual 	battery 	he 	is 	alleged 	to
have 	committed. 	Moreover, 	the 	case 	law 	has, 	in 	fact, 	recognized
workplace 	sexual 	harassment 	in 	cases 	involving 	conduct 	much 	less
severe 	than 	presently 	alleged. 	See, 	e.g., 	Howley 	v. 	Town 	of
Stratford, 	217 	F.3d 	141, 	154 	(2d 	Cir. 	2000) 	(suggesting 	that 	a
reasonable jury could deem a single incident of verbal harassment
in front of coworkers as evincing a hostile work environment).
Finally, 	the 	issues 	of 	what 	exactly 	occurred, 	how 	forceful
the 	contact 	was, 	how 	humiliating 	or 	threatening 	a 	reasonable
observer would deem it, and how thoroughly it altered Plaintiff’s
working 	conditions 	are 	all 	the 	province 	of 	the 	jury. 	Marrero 	v.
Goya 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	Inc., 	304 	F.3d 	7, 	18 	(1st 	Cir. 	2002)
(explaining 	that 	“it 	is 	for 	the 	jury 	to 	weigh” 	the 	alleged
harassment’s 	frequency, 	severity, 	physically 	threatening 	or
humiliating nature, and unreasonable interference with work). The
Court 	will 	not 	make 	these 	fact-intensive 	determinations 	at 	this
juncture, 	since 	they 	are 	reserved 	for 	the 	factfinder 	at 	a 	later
stage.
Accordingly, the Court rules that Plaintiff plausibly pled an
Equal Protection violation related to a hostile work environment.
Hence, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s alternate quid pro quo
theory. 	(Docket 	No. 	65 	at 	18-21). 	The 	Court 	DENIES 	Díaz-Muñoz’s
Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	as 	it 	relates 	to 	Count 	2.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	14
B. Count 4
The 	fourth 	count 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint 	pleads
under Puerto Rico Laws 69 and 17 that Díaz-Muñoz sexually harassed
Plaintiff. (Docket No. 54 at 27-28).
a. Applicable law
P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	29, 	§ 	1321 	et 	seq. 	(1985) 	(“Law 	69”)
prohibits 	employers 	from 	“discriminat[ing] 	against 	a 	person...on
account of his or her sex.” P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 155 et seq.
(1988) 	(“Law 	17”) 	defines 	sexual 	harassment 	in 	employment 	as
including:
any type of undesired sexual approach, demand
for 	sexual 	favors 	and 	any 	other 	verbal 	or
physical behavior of a sexual nature... [w]hen
submission to or rejection of such conduct by
the 	person 	becomes 	the 	grounds 	for 	making
employment 	decisions...that 	affect 	that
person [or] [w]hen the conduct has the effect
or 	purpose 	of 	interfering 	unreasonably 	with
the performance of such person’s work or when
it 	creates 	an 	intimidating, 	hostile 	or
offensive work environment.
In 	the 	1990s, 	courts 	in 	this 	District 	dealing 	with 	Puerto
Rico 	Laws 	69 	and 	17 	sometimes 	held 	that 	they 	did 	not 	support 	a
cause of action against individual defendants. Matos Ortiz v. Com.
of Puerto Rico, 103 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.P.R. 2000) (noting that
“[c]onsiderable 	authority 	construing 	Law 	17 	and 	the 	closely
analogous Law 100 suggests that neither Law 17 nor Law 69 supports
a 	cause 	of 	action 	against 	individual 	defendants”); 	Canabal 	v.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	15
Aramark 	Corp., 	48 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	94, 	99 	(D.P.R. 	1999) 	(“nothing 	in
Law 	17 	leads 	the 	Court 	to 	conclude 	that 	sexual 	harassment 	was 	to
be 	singled 	out 	as 	the 	only 	form 	of 	employment 	discrimination,
including other forms of sex discrimination, for which supervisors
or 	agents 	could 	be 	individually 	liable”) 	(citation 	modified);
Santiago v. Lloyd, 33 F. Supp. 2d 99, 104–05 (D.P.R. 1998) (holding
that 	Law 	17 	does 	not 	support 	a 	cause 	of 	action 	against
individuals); Garcia Pantoja v. General Instruments, Inc., 1996 WL
790102, *1 (D.P.R. 1996) (same).
All 	this 	changed 	with 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Supreme 	Court 	case 	of
Rosario 	Toledo 	v. 	Distribuidora 	Kikuet, 	Inc. 	(“Kikuet”) 	in 	2000.
151 	P.R. 	Dec. 	634 	(2000). 	As 	multiple 	decisions 	in 	this 	District
have since recognized, “the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held [in
that 	case] 	that, 	contrary 	to 	the 	most 	popular 	interpretation 	of
Title 	VII, 	Puerto 	Rico’s 	laws 	against 	discrimination 	in 	the
workplace, namely, Laws No. 17, 69 and 100, impose civil liability
on the agent, official, administrator or supervisor of an employer
in 	his/her 	personal 	capacity 	for 	the 	acts 	of 	sexual 	harassment
complained 	of 	when 	he/she 	is 	the 	direct 	author 	of 	the 	conduct 	in
question.” Rivera Maldonado v. Hosp. Alejandro Otero Lopez, 614 F.
Supp. 	2d 	181, 	197 	(D.P.R. 	2009) 	(citing 	id.); 	see 	also 	Mercado-
Aponte 	v. 	Med 	Health 	Hospice, 	Corp., 	203 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	240, 	242
(D.P.R. 	2016). 	In 	Kikuet, 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Supreme 	Court 	reviewed
the statutory definition of the word “employer” in Laws 69 and 17.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	16
Mercado-Aponte, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 242. It then framed the question
of 	law 	before 	it 	as 	“whether 	the 	term 	‘employer’ 	includes 	its
agents, 	officials, 	administrators 	and 	supervisors...when 	it 	is
alleged...and 	subsequently 	proven, 	that 	these 	incurred 	in 	the
conduct 	prohibited.” 	Id. 	(quoting 	Kikuet, 	151 	P.R. 	Dec. 	634).
Ruling 	that 	Puerto 	Rico 	legislators 	“could 	not...have 	had 	the
intention of promoting behavior that is proscribed by the statute
by 	way 	of 	granting 	immunity 	to 	the 	supervisors, 	officials,
administrators and agents of the employer so that they could engage
in 	such 	behavior 	with 	impunity,” 	the 	Kikuet 	court 	concluded 	that
Laws 	69 	and 	17 	impose 	individual 	liability 	on 	any 	person 	who
commits sexual harassment in the workplace. Id.
b. Applicable case law forecloses Díaz-Muñoz’s request for
dismissal of claims under Laws 69 and 17
Under the post-2000 case law in Puerto Rico and this District,
Plaintiff may raise a claim for individual liability against Díaz-
Muñoz under Puerto Rico Laws 69 and 17. See (Docket No. 54 at 27-
28).
Because this Court’s jurisdiction over the claims under Laws
69 	and 	17 	is 	supplemental 	to 	its 	federal 	question 	jurisdiction
over 	the 	Title 	VII 	claims, 	the 	Court 	applies 	Puerto 	Rico
substantive law here. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938) (“[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or 	by 	acts 	of 	Congress, 	the 	law 	to 	be 	applied 	in 	any 	case 	is 	the
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	17
law of the state”); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 	726 	(1966) 	(explaining 	that 	federal 	courts 	adjudicating
supplemental jurisdiction claims are “bound to apply state law to
them”).
The question, then, is whether Plaintiff may bring a cause of
action against Díaz-Muñoz pursuant to Puerto Rico Laws 69 and 17.
The 	answer 	is 	yes. 	In 	Kikuet, 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Supreme 	Court 	held
that 	Laws 	69 	and 	18 	impose 	personal 	capacity 	civil 	liability 	on
the “agent, official, administrator or supervisor of an employer”
when he is the “direct author” of the sexual harassment. 151 P.R.
Dec. 	634 	(2000); 	see 	also 	Mercado-Aponte, 	203 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	242
(applying 	the 	rule 	in 	federal 	court); 	Rivera 	Maldonado, 	614 	F.
Supp. 	2d 	at 	197 	(same). 	Here, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz
personally 	subjected 	her 	to 	sexual 	harassment. 	(Docket 	No. 	54 	at
27-28). 	These 	allegations 	position 	Díaz-Muñoz 	as 	the 	“direct
author” 	of 	the 	prohibited 	conduct. 	Hence, 	Plaintiff 	may 	pursue 	a
personal capacity civil liability claim against him under Kikuet.
Díaz-Muñoz’s argument for the dismissal of Count 4 is largely
based on the contrary construction of Laws 69 and 17 that prevailed
prior 	to 	Kikuet. 	(Docket 	No. 	57 	at 	19); 	see, 	e.g., 	Matos 	Ortiz,
103 F. Supp. 2d at 64; Canabal, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 99; Santiago, 33
F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	104–05; 	Garcia 	Pantoja, 	1996 	WL 	790102 	at 	*1. 	The
Puerto Rico Supreme Court rejected this construction more than two
decades 	ago 	and 	courts 	in 	this 	District 	have 	repeatedly 	adopted
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	18
the 	modern 	construction. 	Kikuet, 	151 	P.R. 	Dec. 	634 	(2000); 	see
also 	Mercado-Aponte, 	203 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	at 	242 	(applying 	the 	Kikuet
rule 	in 	federal 	court); 	Rivera 	Maldonado, 	614 	F. 	Supp. 	2d 	at 	197
(same). 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	DENIES 	Díaz-Muñoz’s 	Motion 	to
Dismiss as it relates to Count 4.
C. Counts 9 and 10
Counts 9 and 10 of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint bring claims
premised on the Puerto Rico Civil Code’s general tort statute and
Puerto Rico constitutional protections. (Docket No. 54 at 31-38);
P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	31, 	§ 	10801; 	see, 	e.g., 	Rivera-Lopez 	v.
Clinical Med. Servs., Inc., 2025 WL 3653805, at *4 (D.P.R. 2025).
Díaz-Muñoz argues that these causes of action ought to be dismissed
because 	the 	underlying 	conduct 	of 	employment 	discrimination 	and
harassment 	is 	concurrently 	covered 	by 	local 	antidiscrimination
statutes. (Docket No. 57 at 20). Plaintiff answers that dismissal
of these claims would be improper because “a worker in Puerto Rico
may 	claim 	additional 	remedies 	than 	those 	prescribed 	in 	specific
labor laws if his or her termination has the intent or the effect
of frustrating a public policy grounded in a constitutional right.”
(Docket 	No. 	65 	at 	24-25) 	(internal 	citation 	omitted).
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	19
a. Applicable law
iii. Articles 1536, 1538, and 1540 of the Civil Code
Article 	15361 	is 	Puerto 	Rico’s 	general 	tort 	statute, 	and
states 	that 	a 	person 	who 	“through 	fault 	or 	negligence, 	causes
damage 	to 	another, 	is 	obliged 	to 	repair 	it.” 	P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit.
31, 	§ 	10801; 	see, 	e.g., 	Rivera-Lopez, 	2025 	WL 	3653805 	at 	*4. 	To
succeed 	on 	an 	Article 	1536 	tort 	claim, 	the 	plaintiff 	must
demonstrate 	“(1) 	evidence 	of 	physical 	or 	emotional 	injury, 	(2) 	a
negligent 	or 	intentional 	act 	or 	omission 	(the 	breach 	of 	duty
element), and (3) a sufficient causal nexus between the injury and
defendant’s 	act 	or 	omission 	(in 	other 	words, 	proximate 	cause).”
Gonzalez-Caban v. JR Seafood Inc., 48 F.4th 10, 14 (1st Cir. 2022)
(quoting Vázquez-Filippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43,
49 (1st Cir. 2007)).
Article 	1538 	allows 	for 	the 	imposition 	of 	punitive 	damages
“whenever 	the 	act 	or 	omission 	constitutes 	a 	crime, 	is 	committed
intentionally or with serious disregard for the life, safety, and
property 	of 	others.” 	P.R. 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	31, 	§ 	10801; 	see, 	e.g.,
Rodriguez 	Perez 	v. 	Abreu 	Garcia, 	2024 	WL 	808654, 	at 	*6 	(D.P.R.
2024).
This 	District 	has 	repeatedly 	held 	that 	“provisions 	of 	the
1 The Puerto Rico Civil Code was amended in 2020; Articles 1536 and 1540 were
previously titled Articles 1802 and 1803, respectively. See González-Ortíz v.
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 2024 WL 3759659, at *10 (D.P.R. 2024).
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	20
Puerto 	Rico 	Civil 	Code 	are 	supplementary 	to 	special 	legislation
like 	Title 	VII, 	and 	that 	a 	special 	law 	prevails 	over 	a 	general
law.” Orellano-Laureano v. Instituto Medico del Norte, Inc., 2023
WL 	4532418, 	at 	*6 	(D.P.R. 	2023) 	(internal 	citation 	omitted);
Torres-Figueroa 	v. 	Televicentro 	of 	Puerto 	Rico, 	LLC, 	2024 	WL
4769756, at *2 (D.P.R. 2024) (explaining that “laws such as Title
VII [and local Puerto Rico laws] are special laws” and so supplant
Article 1536). Tort claims under Articles 1536 and 1538 are to be
dismissed when they are entirely duplicative. See Santana-Colon v.
Houghton Mifflin Harcout Pub. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d 129, 140 (D.P.R.
2014). 	The 	Puerto 	Rico 	Supreme 	Court 	and 	courts 	in 	this 	District
have held that, “to the extent that a specific labor or employment
law covers the conduct for which a plaintiff seeks damages, he is
barred 	from 	using 	the 	same 	conduct 	to 	also 	bring 	a 	claim 	under
Article [1536].”2 Id.
iv. 	Puerto Rico constitutional protections
Puerto 	Rico’s 	Constitution 	provides 	that 	“[t]he 	dignity 	of
the human being is inviolable,” P.R. Const. art. II, § 1; protects
all 	against 	“abusive 	attacks 	on 	[their] 	honor, 	reputation 	and
private 	or 	family 	life,” 	Id. 	§ 	8; 	and 	protects 	workers 	against
“risks to [their] health or person in [their] work or employment,”
Id. § 16.
2 The Santana-Colon case referred to the former Article 1802. See supra note
1; 81 F. Supp. 3d at 140.
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	21
However, 	this 	District 	has 	repeatedly 	held 	that
constitutional claims based on these provisions are not available
in the employment discrimination context when they are duplicative
of 	specific 	labor 	and 	antidiscrimination 	statutes. 	See, 	e.g.,
Galarza-Cruz v. Grupo HIMA San Pablo, Inc., 2018 WL 324863, at *1
n.2 (D.P.R. 2018); Televicentro of Puerto Rico, 2024 WL 4769756 at
*2. 	When 	Puerto 	Rico 	constitutional 	claims 	“are 	essentially
predicated on allegations covered by specific labor or employment
statutes, 	plaintiff[s 	are] 	barred 	from 	using 	the 	same 	conduct 	to
also 	bring 	a 	claim 	under 	other 	provisions” 	and 	constitutional
claims 	attempting 	to 	do 	so 	must 	be 	dismissed 	with 	prejudice.
Galarza-Cruz, 	2018 	WL 	324863 	at 	*1 	n.2; 	Televicentro 	of 	Puerto
Rico, 	2024 	WL 	4769756 	at 	*2. 	This 	District 	has 	in 	the 	past
dismissed 	claims 	based 	specifically 	on 	Sections 	1, 	8, 	and 	16 	of
the 	Commonwealth’s 	Constitution 	because 	the 	workplace
discrimination-related 	conduct 	alleged 	was 	covered 	by 	“specific
labor or employment statutes.” Galarza-Cruz, 2018 WL 324863 at *1
n.2.
b. Plaintiff’s tort-based and constitutional claims must be
dismissed
i. 	Counts 	9 	and 	10 	are 	duplicative 	of 	counts 	brought
under special legislation
Plaintiff’s infliction of emotional distress cause of action
in 	Count 	9 	and 	constitutional 	causes 	of 	action 	in 	Count 	10 	are
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	22
barred 	as 	to 	Díaz-Muñoz. 	This 	is 	so 	because 	specific 	employment
statutes cover the conduct upon which these claims rest.
As 	Plaintiff’s 	own 	Amended 	Complaint 	confirms, 	Counts 	9 	and
10 seek additional avenues of relief for the same nucleus of facts
concerning 	workplace 	harassment 	and 	her 	firing 	that 	Plaintiff
discusses under the special antidiscrimination statutes invoked in
her Amended Complaint, including Title VII and Puerto Rico Laws 69
and 	17. 	(Docket 	No. 	54). 	Plaintiff’s 	recital 	of 	the 	actions
perpetrated against her under Counts 9 and 10 does not differ from
the 	conduct 	with 	which 	she 	pleads 	the 	antidiscrimination 	counts
based 	on 	Title 	VII 	and 	Puerto 	Rico 	Laws 	69 	and 	17. 	Id. 	at 	15-38.
Put 	differently, 	the 	“discriminat[ion]” 	and 	“attack[]...[on 	her]
honor 	and 	reputation... by 	sexually 	harassing 	her” 	that 	Plaintiff
used 	to 	plead 	Counts 	9 	and 	10 	is 	the 	very 	conduct 	that 	animates
her earlier statutory claims. Id. at 35-38.
That 	overlap 	is 	dispositive; 	it 	requires 	the 	dismissal 	of
Counts 	9 	and 	10 	as 	to 	Díaz-Muñoz. 	This 	District 	has 	repeatedly
held 	that 	“provisions 	of 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Civil 	Code 	are
supplementary 	to 	special 	legislation 	like 	Title 	VII, 	and 	that 	a
special law prevails over a general law.” Orellano-Laureano, 2023
WL 	4532418 	at 	*6 	(internal 	citation 	omitted); 	Televicentro 	of
Puerto 	Rico, 	2024 	WL 	4769756 	at 	*2. 	Similarly, 	this 	District 	has
often ruled that constitutional claims under Article II’s Sections
1, 8, and 16 are not available where they simply restate workplace
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	23
discrimination and retaliation already governed by specific labor
statutes. See Galarza-Cruz, 2018 WL 324863 at *1 n.2. Here, Count
9 	expressly 	invokes 	the 	Puerto 	Rico 	Civil 	Code 	general 	tort
framework. (Docket No. 54 at 34-36). Count 10 pleads constitutional
claims 	under 	Article 	II’s 	Sections 	1, 	8, 	and 	16. 	Id. 	at 	36-38.
Neither 	of 	these 	claims 	identify 	any 	distinctly 	tortious 	or
unconstitutional 	act, 	duty, 	or 	injury 	independent 	of 	the 	alleged
harassment Plaintiff challenges through Title VII and Puerto Rico
Laws 	69 	and 	17. 	Id. 	at 	34-38. 	For 	these 	reasons, 	Counts 	9 	and 	10
are hereby DISMISSED as to Díaz-Muñoz.
D. Qualified immunity
The last of the defenses Díaz-Muñoz mounts is the “shield” of
qualified immunity. See (Docket No. 57 at 5, 20-22).
a. Applicable law
Qualified 	immunity 	is 	a 	doctrine 	that 	protects 	government
officials 	from 	civil 	lawsuits 	unless 	they 	violate 	a 	“clearly
established 	statutory 	or 	constitutional 	rights 	of 	which 	a
reasonable 	person 	would 	have 	known.” 	Harlow 	v. 	Fitzgerald, 	457
U.S. 	800, 	818 	(1982). 	The 	doctrine 	reasons 	that 	judges 	may
appropriately 	examine, 	at 	early 	stages 	of 	litigation, 	whether 	an
official could in fact have been reasonably expected to understand
the 	law 	at 	issue 	or 	subsequent 	legal 	developments 	that 	outlawed
conduct not previously deemed unlawful. Id. “If the law was clearly
established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	24
reasonably competent public official should know the law governing
his conduct.” Id.
“As 	the 	qualified 	immunity 	defense 	has 	evolved, 	it 	provides
ample 	protection 	to 	all 	but 	the 	plainly 	incompetent 	or 	those 	who
knowingly 	violate 	the 	law.” 	Malley 	v. 	Briggs, 	475 	U.S. 	335, 	341
(1986). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests--the
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly 	and 	the 	need 	to 	shield 	officials 	from 	harassment,
distraction, 	and 	liability 	when 	they 	perform 	their 	duties
reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
Courts 	usually 	apply 	a 	two-pronged 	inquiry 	to 	a 	qualified
immunity defense, considering: (1) whether the government official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the
right was “clearly established” at the time. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,
563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011); see also Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78,
81 	(1st 	Cir. 	2011); 	Pike, 	133 	F.4th 	at 	91-92. 	Courts 	have
discretion 	as 	to 	which 	of 	the 	two 	prongs 	they 	tackle 	first.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established
law 	when, 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the 	challenged 	conduct, 	the 	contours 	of
a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
have 	understood 	that 	what 	he 	is 	doing 	violates 	that 	right. 	We 	do
not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must
have 	placed 	the 	statutory 	or 	constitutional 	question 	beyond
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debate.” 	Ashcroft, 	563 	U.S. 	at 	741 	(citation 	modified) 	(internal
citations omitted).
b. The 	right 	was 	clearly 	established 	at 	the 	time 	of 	the
alleged conduct
Díaz-Muñoz’s 	qualified 	immunity 	defense 	fails 	the 	second
prong of the test, because the unlawfulness of his alleged conduct
was clearly established at the time.
Díaz-Muñoz focuses his argumentation as to qualified immunity
on 	Plaintiff’s 	alleged 	failure 	to 	plead 	a 	constitutional
violation--arguments 	we 	have 	already 	rejected 	above. 	(Docket 	No.
57 	at 	22). 	In 	the 	First 	Circuit, 	“it 	is 	clearly 	established 	that
a 	state 	actor 	violates 	the 	Equal 	Protection 	Clause 	upon 	creating
a 	hostile 	work 	environment.” 	Pike, 	133 	F.4th 	at 	92. 	In 	Pike, 	the
Circuit listed cases demonstrating that sexual harassment violates
the Constitution, that “on-the-job sexual harassment is actionable
under Section 1983 as a violation of the equal protection clause,”
and that “if a state official directly engages in sexual harassment
or 	sexual 	discrimination, 	he 	would, 	of 	course, 	be 	subject 	to
section 	1983 	liability.” 	Id. 	(collecting 	cases) 	(citations
modified).
Here, 	Díaz-Muñoz 	cannot 	plausibly 	claim 	that 	the
constitutional 	right 	in 	question 	was 	uncertain. 	Any 	reasonable
police inspector in his position as a supervisor would have known
that forcibly grabbing, restraining, and committing sexual battery
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Civil No. 24-1358 (RAM) 	26
against 	a 	subordinate 	would 	be 	deemed 	by 	the 	authorities 	to 	be
unlawful. (Docket No. 54 at 8-10). Like in Pike, “we are convinced
by 	the 	consensus 	of 	binding...authority 	referenced 	above 	that
[Díaz-Muñoz] 	was 	on 	notice 	that 	his 	position 	of 	authority 	over
[Plaintiff] 	could 	further 	contribute 	to 	the 	coerciveness 	of 	his
actions, 	even 	when 	the 	alleged 	hostile 	conduct 	is 	limited 	in
number.” 133 F.4th at 95 (internal citations omitted).
In 	short, 	this 	is 	not 	the 	kind 	of 	close 	call 	mistake 	that
qualified immunity was designed to forgive. See Pearson, 555 U.S.
at 231. Taking the allegations as true, Díaz-Muñoz’s alleged acts
fit 	squarely 	within 	the 	category 	of 	clearly 	established 	unlawful
conduct. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	rules 	that 	Díaz-Muñoz 	is 	not
entitled to qualified immunity.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Díaz-Muñoz’s Motion to Dismiss at
Docket 	No. 	57 	is 	hereby 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	DENIED 	IN 	PART.
Plaintiff’s claims in Counts 9 and 10 as to Díaz-Muñoz are hereby
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Díaz-Muñoz’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED
as to all other counts.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan Puerto Rico, this 9 th day of March 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH_____
United States District Judge
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