Gonzalez-Carpio v. Bracha & Success Enterprise LLC. et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
MARÍA 	ALEJANDRA 	GONZÁLEZ-
CARPIO,
Plaintiff,
V.
BRACHA 	& 	SUCCESS 	ENTERPRISE
LLC, et. al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB)
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
These proceedings concern plaintiff María Alejandra González-
Carpio’s attempts to collect a judgment issued after a jury verdict
in her favor on her employment discrimination claim. 	On October 7,
2026, 	Attorney 	Enrique 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez 	and 	law 	firm 	ECIJA 	SBGB,
representing defendants Bracha & Success Enterprise LLC, Infinite
Success 	LLC, 	AA 	Cosmetics 	LLC, 	and 	Ariel 	Cosmetics, 	Inc.
(collectively, 	the 	“Defendants”), 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	leave 	to
withdraw 	as 	counsel. 	(Docket 	No. 	302.) 	In 	his 	motion, 	Mr. 	Del
Cueto-Pérez 	specifically 	indicated 	that 	“Defendants 	remain
represented 	in 	this 	action 	by 	Waldemar 	Pérez-Lebrón, 	Esq. 	who
appeared 	for 	Defendants 	at 	trial 	and 	continues 	as 	counsel 	of
record, and who has been copied on ECIJA’s written communications
to defendants concerning this motion. 	ECIJA’s withdrawal does not
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	2
leave 	Defendants 	without 	counsel 	of 	record.” 	Id. 	The 	Court
granted the motion but stated that the only remaining attorney for
defendants, 	Attorney 	Waldemar 	Pérez-Lebrón 	of 	WP 	Law 	Offices,
would 	continue 	to 	represent 	defendants, 	precisely 	as 	Mr. Del
Cueto-Pérez indicated in his withdrawal motion. 	(Docket No. 303.)
Later 	that 	same 	day, 	however, 	Attorney 	Pérez-Lebrón 	also 	filed 	a
motion to withdraw as attorney for defendants. 	(Docket No. 304.)
On October 10, 2026, plaintiff moved to have defendants sanctioned
for 	their 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	Court’s 	post-judgment
discovery deadline at Docket No. 301. 	(Docket No. 306.)
The 	defendants’ 	dilatory 	conduct 	in 	these 	post-judgment
proceedings leaves the Court concerned that permitting defendants’
counsel 	to 	withdraw 	will 	prejudice 	plaintiff’s 	ability 	to 	duly
execute 	her 	judgment. 	For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Court, 	on
its 	own 	motion, 	VACATES 	its 	prior 	order 	granting 	Attorney 	Del
Cueto-Pérez 	and 	ECIJA 	SBGB’s 	leave 	to 	withdraw 	as 	attorney 	for
defendants, (Docket No. 303,) DENIES Attorney Del Cueto-Pérez and
ECIJA SBGB’s motion for leave to withdraw, (Docket No. 302,) DENIES
Attorney 	Pérez-Lebrón’s 	motion 	for 	leave 	to 	withdraw, 	(Docket
No. 304,) and ORDERS defendants to show cause why they should not
be 	sanctioned 	for 	their 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	post-judgment
discovery.
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	3
I. 	Background
After 	a 	jury 	trial 	on 	her 	employment 	discrimination 	claim,
plaintiff 	was 	awarded 	over 	$180,000 	in 	damages 	and 	post-judgment
interest. 	See Docket No. 256. 	When defendants failed to pay the
judgment, on July 30, 2026, the Court issued a Writ of Execution.
(Docket 	No. 	286.) 	That 	same 	day, 	defendants 	moved 	to 	stay
execution 	pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rule 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	(Fed. 	R.
Civ. P.) 62(b), and committed to posting a supersedeas bond in the
amount 	of 	$375,000 	by 	August 	10, 	2026. 	(Docket 	No. 	284.) 	On
August 	10, 	defendants 	moved 	for 	an 	extension 	of 	time 	by 	which 	to
post the supersedeas bond, claiming that the bond was still being
evaluated by the underwriter. 	(Docket No. 291.) 	The Court granted
a 	three-day 	extension 	and 	stated 	that 	if 	no 	bond 	was 	posted 	by
midnight 	on 	August 	13, 	2026, 	plaintiff 	would 	be 	permitted 	to
proceed with the execution of her judgment. 	(Docket No. 292.)
August 	13 	came 	and 	went, 	and 	defendants 	did 	not 	post 	the
promised 	bond, 	nor 	have 	they 	posted 	one 	as 	of 	the 	date 	of 	this
order. 	Accordingly, plaintiff proceeded to execute her judgment.
On August 17, 2026, plaintiff served post-judgment interrogatories
and requests for production of documents on defendants pursuant to
Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	Rules 	33, 	34, 	and 	69. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	300. 	On
September 	16, 	2026, 	defendants 	requested 	a 	one-week 	extension
through 	September 	23 	by 	which 	to 	respond 	to 	plaintiff’s 	post-
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	4
judgment discovery requests, to which plaintiff’s counsel agreed.
Id. 	As 	the 	extended 	deadline 	approached, 	defendants 	again
requested, 	and 	again 	plaintiff 	accommodated, 	an 	additional 	one-
week 	extension 	to 	September 	28 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	post-judgment
discovery requests. 	Id.
On 	September 	28, 	defendants 	sought 	yet 	another 	extension
through 	September 	30. 	On 	September 	30, 	however, 	defendants 	did
not provide responses to plaintiff’s discovery requests. 	Instead,
Attorney Del Cueto-Pérez, counsel for defendants, emailed counsel
for 	plaintiff 	saying 	that 	he 	would 	not 	be 	serving 	responses 	that
day and that “[w]ithin the next several days, I will file a motion
[unspecified] in the District Court that bears directly on how the
responses are addressed.” 	Id. at Ex. 1. 	Given that she received
no 	responses 	to 	her 	discovery 	requests, 	plaintiff 	filed 	a 	motion
to 	compel 	discovery 	on 	October 	1, 	2026. 	Id. 	The 	Court 	granted
plaintiff’s 	motion 	and 	ordered 	defendants 	to 	respond 	to
plaintiff’s 	discovery 	requests 	by 	October 	9, 	2026. 	(Docket
No. 301.)
On 	October 	7, 	2026, 	the 	motion 	to 	which 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-
Pérez 	presumably 	was 	referencing 	in 	his 	email 	to 	plaintiff’s
counsel 	was 	filed 	— Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez 	and 	his 	law 	firm,
ECIJA 	SBGB, 	moved 	for 	leave 	to 	withdraw 	as 	attorneys 	for
defendants. 	(Docket No. 302.) 	Without revealing client details,
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	5
Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez 	cited 	as 	grounds 	for 	withdrawal 	Model
Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association (“ABA
Model Rules”) Rule 1.16(b)(5), which permits withdrawal where the
client, having received notice, fails substantially to fulfill an
obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services, and Rule
1.16(b)(6), which permits withdrawal where the representation has
been 	rendered 	unreasonably 	difficult 	by 	the 	client. 	Id. 	at
pp. 1-2. 	Attorney Del Cueto-Pérez stated that he had transmitted
the 	Court’s 	discovery 	order 	to 	defendants, 	explained 	its
requirements and the consequences for non-compliance, but had not
yet received interrogatory answers from defendants. 	Id. at p. 3.
Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez 	also 	indicated 	that 	he 	would 	produce 	to
plaintiff 	what 	responsive 	documents 	defendants 	had 	delivered 	to
him 	by 	the 	Court’s 	discovery 	deadline 	of 	October 	9, 	2026. 	Id.
That production did not occur.
The Court granted Attorney Del Cueto-Pérez leave to withdraw
the same day, but ordered that defendants’ only remaining attorney
of 	record, 	Attorney 	Pérez-Lebrón, 	“will 	continue 	as 	counsel 	for
defendants.” 	(Docket 	No. 	303.) 	Several 	hours 	later, 	however,
Attorney Pérez-Lebrón also moved for leave to withdraw as counsel
for 	defendants, 	citing 	the 	same 	grounds 	that 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-
Pérez had indicated in his motion to withdraw. 	(Docket No. 304.)
Mr. 	Pérez-Lebrón 	also 	assured 	the 	Court 	that 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	6
Pérez 	and 	ECIJA 	SBGB, 	whom 	the 	Court 	had 	just 	permitted 	to
withdraw, 	would 	provide 	what 	responsive 	documents 	they 	had 	to
plaintiff by the discovery deadline of October 9. 	Id. at pp. 3-4.
That production did not occur either.
While Attorney Pérez-Lebrón’s motion to withdraw was pending,
the 	October 	9, 	2026 	discovery 	deadline 	came 	and 	went, 	and
defendants 	did 	not 	provide 	any 	response 	to 	plaintiff’s 	discovery
requests. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	306. 	Plaintiff 	has 	now 	moved 	for 	an
order 	to 	show 	cause 	why 	defendants 	should 	not 	be 	sanctioned 	for
their 	failure 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	Court’s 	order 	to 	produce 	the
discovery. 	Id. 	Plaintiff requests that defendants be ordered to
provide 	discovery 	responses 	within 	forty-eight 	hours, 	identify
officers with personal knowledge of defendants’ financial records,
be 	held 	in 	civil 	contempt, 	be 	fined 	with 	monetary 	penalties, 	and
be ordered to pay plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and expenses. 	Id.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Vacating 	the 	Court’s 	Order 	Granting 	Mr. 	Del 	Cueto-
Pérez’s Leave to Withdraw
“A 	district 	court’s 	power 	to 	modify 	its 	prior 	orders
. . . turns on the same distinction that generally governs whether
an order is appealable—that is, whether the order is interlocutory
or final.” 	United States v. Yalincak, 853 F.3d 629, 635 (2d Cir.
2017). 	While 	“the 	power 	to 	grant 	relief 	from 	erroneous
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	7
interlocutory 	orders, 	exercised 	in 	justice 	and 	good 	conscience,
has 	long 	been 	recognized 	as 	within 	the 	plenary 	power 	of 	courts,”
a district court lacks inherent authority to vacate its own final
orders. 	Id. 	The 	basis 	for 	the 	Court’s 	authority 	to 	vacate 	its
prior order granting Attorney Del Cueto-Pérez and ECIJA SBGB leave
to 	withdraw, 	then, 	depends 	on 	whether 	that 	order 	was 	merely
interlocutory or “final.”
“In 	postjudgment 	[sic] 	proceedings, 	the 	meaning 	of 	a
‘final decision’ is less clear because the proceedings necessarily
follow a final judgment.” 	Amara v. Cigna Corp., 53 F.4th 241, 249
(2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n,
594 	F.3d 	823, 	829 	(11th 	Cir. 	2010)). 	In 	determining 	whether 	a
post-judgment 	order 	is 	“final,” 	it 	“must 	be 	assessed 	on 	its 	own
terms,” and 	a 	“practical 	rather 	than 	a 	technical 	construction 	of
finality 	is 	especially 	appropriate 	in 	the 	post-judgment
context.” 	Id. 	at 	250 	(quoting 	McClendon 	v. 	City 	of 	Albuquerque,
630 	F.3d 	1288, 	1293 	(10th 	Cir. 	2011) 	(Gorsuch, 	J.)). 	As 	for
motions 	for 	leave 	to 	withdraw 	as 	counsel, 	courts 	of 	appeals 	have
generally 	treated 	such 	orders, 	both 	in 	the 	pre-and 	post-judgment
context, 	as 	final 	orders 	subject 	to 	appeal. 	See 	Lieberman 	v.
Polytop 	Corp., 	2 	F. 	App’x 	37, 	38 	(1st 	Cir. 	2001) 	(pre-judgment
motion 	to 	withdraw 	was 	appealable 	final 	order 	under 	collateral
order 	doctrine); 	Whiting 	v. 	Lacara, 	187 	F.3d 	317, 	320 	(2d 	Cir.
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	8
1999) 	(same); 	Erie 	Molded 	Plastics, 	Inc. 	v. 	Nogah, 	LLC, 	520 	F.
App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); Buschmeier v. G&G Invs., Inc.,
222 F. App’x 160, 162 n. 1 (3d Cir. 2007) (order denying motion to
withdraw in post-judgment collection proceedings final order under
collateral 	order 	doctrine); 	Ohntrup 	v. 	Firearms 	Ctr., 	Inc., 	802
F.2d 	676, 	678 	(3d 	Cir. 	1986) 	(same). 	In 	construing 	these 	orders
as 	“final,” 	courts 	have 	noted 	that 	the 	orders 	“conclusively
resolved an important question entirely separate from the merits”
and “that the matter will evade adequate review on appeal [because]
[a]n order requiring an attorney to continue representing a client
in a civil action without compensation may subject the attorney to
irreparable 	harm 	and 	amounts 	to 	an 	order 	of 	specific
performance.” 	Lieberman, 2 F. App’x at 38-39.
Here, 	the 	Court’s 	order 	granting 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-
Pérez 	and 	ECIJA 	SBGB 	leave 	to 	withdraw 	as 	counsel 	constitutes 	a
“final” 	order 	because 	it 	conclusively 	resolved 	the 	issue 	of
Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez’s 	representation 	of 	defendants 	and 	the
“aggrieved 	party[, 	here, 	plaintiff,] 	would 	for 	all 	practical
purposes 	be 	denied 	meaningful 	review” 	absent 	a 	direct 	appeal.
Ohntrup, 802 F.2d at 678. 	Accordingly, because the Court’s order
was “final” it lacks the inherent authority vacate it.
Though 	the 	Court 	may 	lack 	inherent 	authority 	to 	vacate
its 	own 	final 	order, 	the 	“final” 	nature 	of 	that 	order 	places 	it
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	9
within 	the 	scope 	of 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	Rule 	60. 	Rule 	60 	authorizes
a 	district 	court 	to 	modify 	or 	vacate 	its 	final 	orders 	in 	certain
circumstances. 	Specifically, 	Rule 	60(b) 	provides 	that 	“[o]n
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative 	from 	a 	final 	judgment, 	order, 	or 	proceeding” 	for
reasons such as mistake, newly discovered evidence, and fraud. 	In
addition 	to 	the 	enumerated 	grounds 	for 	relief, 	Rule 	60 	also
authorizes 	a 	district 	court 	to 	revisit 	its 	final 	judgments 	or
orders for “any other reason that justifies relief.” 	Fed. R. Civ.
P. Rule 60(b)(6).
While Rule 60(b) provides that relief may be granted “on
motion,” courts of appeals are divided over whether a motion need
be 	made 	by 	a 	party, 	or 	whether 	a 	court 	may 	also 	grant 	relief 	on
its own motion. 	See Ahuruonye v. United States Dep’t of Interior,
No. 	CV 	16-1767, 	2018 	WL 	11382921 	at 	n. 	8 	(D.D.C. 	Nov. 	1, 	2018)
(noting 	circuit 	split 	and 	collecting 	cases). 	While 	courts 	of
appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that sua sponte
action pursuant to Rule 60(b) is impermissible, see United States
v. 	Pauley, 	321 	F.3d 	578, 	581 	(6th 	Cir. 	2003), 	Dow 	v. 	Baird, 	389
F.2d 	882 	(10th 	Cir. 	1968), 	courts 	of 	appeals 	for 	the 	Second,
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that
Rule 60(b) does not prohibit a court from acting on its own motion,
see 	Fort 	Knox 	Music 	Inc. 	v. 	Baptiste, 	257 	F.3d 	108, 	111 	(2d 	Cir.
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	10
2001), United States v. Jacobs, 298 F.2d 469, 472 (4th Cir. 1961),
Chavez v. Balesh, 704 F.2d 774, 777 (5th Cir. 1983), Simer v. Ríos,
661 	F.2d 	655, 	663 	n. 	18 	(7th 	Cir. 	1981), 	Pierson 	v. 	Dormire, 	484
F.3d 	486, 	491 	(8th 	Cir. 	2007), 	opinion 	vacated 	in 	part 	on 	reh’g,
276 F. App’x 541 (8th Cir. 2008), Kingvision Pay–Per–View Ltd. v.
Lake 	Alice 	Bar, 	168 	F.3d 	347, 	351 	(9th 	Cir. 	1999).1 	The 	courts
approving of sua sponte action pursuant to Rule 60 have noted that
while 	the 	text 	of 	Rule 	60 	could 	permit 	of 	either 	construction,
practical 	considerations 	and 	the 	interests 	of 	justice 	favor 	the
more liberal view. 	See Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d at 352 (“The words
of 	the 	rule 	allow 	for 	either 	construction, 	and 	we 	conclude 	that
the 	Fourth 	and 	Fifth 	Circuit 	position 	makes 	better 	practical
1 Several circuits have premised their approval of sua sponte action pursuant
to Rule 60(b) on providing the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.
See Pierson, 484 F.3d at 491-92 (noting the reasoning of the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Circuits). 	The final judgments that were vacated or modified
in each of those cases, however, implicated due process concerns not at issue
here. 	For example, Chavez, 704 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1983), and Lake Alice Bar,
168 	F.3d 	347 	(9th 	Cir. 	1999), 	each 	dealt 	with 	the 	modification 	of 	money
judgments. 	The Ninth Circuit held that because the judgment was a property
interest, “due process generally requires notice and an opportunity to be heard
before governmental deprivation of that property interest.” 	Lake Alice Bar,
168 F.3d at 352. 	In Baptiste, 257 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2001), the district court
vacated its prior judgment on remand from the court of appeals ordering it to
conduct further hearings on personal jurisdiction, an issue it did not reach in
its 	original 	proceedings. 	By 	contrast, 	in 	Pierson, 	484 	F.3d 	486 	(8th 	Cir.
2007), the district court had amended its judgment finding petitioner’s habeas
petition untimely based on an intervening change in law. 	The court of appeals
held that any lack of notice was “at most harmless error” because the parties
had fully briefed the issue earlier and any further briefing would have been a
“mere 	formality.” 	Id. 	at 	492. 	Here, 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez’s 	motion 	to
withdraw 	does 	not 	implicate 	a 	property 	interest 	to 	which 	due 	process 	would
attach, and the parties have had an opportunity to be heard on the very legal
issue 	which 	the 	Court 	reconsiders, 	rendering 	further 	briefing 	a 	“mere
formality.”
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	11
sense.”); Jacobs, 298 F.2d at 472 (“The rule need not necessarily
be read as depriving the court of the power to act in the interest
of 	justice 	in 	an 	unusual 	case 	in 	which 	its 	attention 	has 	been
directed 	to 	the 	necessity 	for 	relief 	by 	means 	other 	than 	a
motion.”)
The Court will follow the majority of circuits that have
approved 	of 	sua 	sponte 	action 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	60(b) 	and, 	on 	its
own 	motion, 	VACATES 	its 	prior 	order 	granting 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-
Pérez 	and 	ECIJA 	SBGB 	leave 	to 	withdraw 	as 	counsel. 	The 	Court’s
order 	was 	issued 	prior 	to 	the 	motion 	made 	by 	defendants’ 	last
remaining attorney, Attorney Pérez-Lebrón, for leave to withdraw,
notwithstanding 	the 	Court’s 	order 	that 	he 	continue 	to 	serve 	as
counsel, and Mr. Del Cueto-Pérez’s statement that Mr. Pérez-Lebrón
would 	continue 	to 	serve 	as 	defendant’s 	counsel. 	In 	light 	of 	the
possibility 	that 	defendants 	would 	be 	left 	without 	any 	counsel 	in
this 	proceeding, 	and 	given 	their 	failure 	to 	cooperate 	in 	post-
judgment discovery, the Court finds it necessary that Attorney Del
Cueto-Pérez and ECIJA SBGB’s motion to withdraw be reconsidered to
ensure 	that 	plaintiff’s 	efforts 	to 	collect 	her 	judgment 	are 	not
prejudiced by defendants’ lack of counsel.
B. 	Motions to Withdraw as Attorneys
With 	the 	Court’s 	prior 	order 	granting 	Attorney 	Del
Cueto-Pérez 	and 	ECIJA 	SBGB 	leave 	to 	withdraw 	vacated, 	the 	Court
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	12
now considers (or in the case of Attorney Del Cueto-Pérez and ECIJA
SBGB, reconsiders) whether either of defendants’ attorneys should
be permitted leave to withdraw.
The Local Rules for the United States District Court for
the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	provide 	that 	ethical 	conduct 	before
the 	District 	of 	Puerto 	Rico 	is 	governed 	by 	the 	ABA 	Model 	Rules.
Loc. Civ. R. 83(E)(a). 	ABA Model Rule 1.16(b) governs withdrawal
from 	representation 	of 	a 	client 	and 	provides 	that 	a 	lawyer 	may
seek 	to 	withdraw 	if, 	among 	other 	reasons, 	“the 	client 	fails
substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the
lawyer’s 	services 	and 	has 	been 	given 	reasonable 	warning 	that 	the
lawyer 	will 	withdraw 	unless 	the 	obligation 	is 	fulfilled,” 	or 	if
“the representation . . . has been rendered unreasonably difficult
by 	the 	client.” 	ABA 	Model 	Rules 	Rule 	1.16(b)(5), 	(6).
Notwithstanding 	these 	grounds 	for 	withdrawal, 	Rule 	1.16(c) 	also
provides 	that 	“[w]hen 	ordered 	to 	do 	so 	by 	a 	tribunal, 	a 	lawyer
shall 	continue 	representation 	notwithstanding 	good 	cause 	for
terminating the representation.”
Whether 	to 	grant 	an 	attorney 	leave 	to 	withdraw 	his 	or
her 	representation 	of 	a 	client 	rests 	within 	the 	sound 	discretion
of 	the 	court. 	Reed 	v. 	Seguros 	Triple-S, 	Inc., 	No. 	96-1171, 	1997
WL 	711371 	at 	*1 	(D.P.R. 	Oct. 	24, 	1997) 	(Casellas, 	J.). 	“In
deciding 	whether 	to 	allow 	counsel 	to 	withdraw 	from 	a 	case, 	it 	is
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Civil No. 23-1256 (FAB) 	13
incumbent 	upon 	the 	trial 	court 	to 	ensure 	that 	the 	withdrawal 	of
counsel does not unduly prejudice the parties involved, as well as
the 	management 	and 	administration 	of 	the 	case.” 	Id. 	An
additional, and equally important, consideration in the context of
corporate 	defendants 	is 	the 	longstanding 	rule 	that 	corporations
may only appear in federal court through licensed counsel. 	Rowland
v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1993).
In 	considering 	the 	motions 	of 	both 	of 	defendants’
attorneys 	to 	withdraw 	their 	representation, 	the 	Court 	notes
defendants’ 	repeated 	failure 	to 	cooperate 	in 	these 	post-judgment
proceedings. 	First, 	though 	representing 	to 	the 	Court 	that 	they
would 	post 	a 	bond 	pending 	their 	appeal, 	they 	have 	failed 	to 	make
good on their word and no bond has been posted. 	Second, defendants
have 	repeatedly 	failed 	to 	comply 	with 	post-judgment 	discovery
requests, despite multiple extensions allowed by plaintiff and an
order 	from 	this 	Court. 	In 	light 	of 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez 	and
Attorney 	Pérez-Lebrón’s 	assertions 	that 	their 	representation 	has
been 	“rendered 	unreasonably 	difficult 	by 	the 	client,” 	the 	Court
thinks it likely that permitting both of defendants’ attorneys to
withdraw, 	without 	any 	affirmative 	commitment 	by 	defendants 	to
retain 	new 	counsel, 	would 	only 	further 	encourage 	defendants 	to
evade 	their 	obligations 	to 	this 	Court 	and 	prejudice 	plaintiff’s
ability to execute her judgment. 	Accordingly, the motions by both
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Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-Pérez 	and 	ECIJA 	SBGB, 	(Docket 	No. 	302), 	and
Attorney Pérez-Lebrón, (Docket No. 304), for leave to withdraw as
counsel are DENIED.
C. 	Conclusion
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Court’s 	prior 	Order 	at
Docket 	No. 	303 	is 	VACATED. 	The 	motions 	by 	Attorney 	Del 	Cueto-
Pérez and ECIJA SBGB, (Docket No. 302), and Attorney Pérez-Lebrón,
(Docket No. 304), for leave to withdraw as counsel are DENIED.
Additionally, 	plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	an 	order 	to 	show
cause why defendants should not be sanctioned for failure to comply
with 	the 	Court’s 	discovery 	order, 	(Docket 	No. 	306,) 	is 	GRANTED.
Defendants 	are 	ORDERED 	TO 	SHOW 	CAUSE 	no 	later 	than 	October 	28,
2026 	why 	they 	should 	not 	be 	sanctioned 	with 	contempt 	of 	court,
monetary sanctions, and an order to pay the reasonable attorney’s
fees 	and 	costs 	of 	plaintiff 	caused 	by 	their 	non-compliance 	with
the 	Court’s 	discovery 	order. 	If 	defendants 	fully 	respond 	to
plaintiff’s 	post-judgment 	discovery 	requests 	no 	later 	than
October 28, 2026, sanctions may be vacated.
A 	copy 	of 	this 	Opinion 	and 	Order 	shall 	be 	mailed 	to
Mr. Enrique Del Cueto-Pérez at his address of record.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, October 14, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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