Ruiz-Romero v. Hotel Aloft Ponce et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
ERNESTO RUIZ-ROMERO,
Plaintiff,
v.
HOTEL ALOFT PONCE, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB)
OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
BESOSA, Senior District Judge.
Before 	the 	Court 	is 	defendant 	JRC 	Consolidated, 	Inc. 	d/b/a
Aloft Ponce Hotel & Casino (the “Hotel”)’s motion to set aside the
default 	judgment 	(Docket 	No. 	106) 	and 	writ 	of 	execution 	(Docket
No. 	117) 	pursuant 	to 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure 	55(c) 	and
60(b). 	(Docket 	No. 	118.) 	Plaintiff 	Ernesto 	Ruiz-Romero
(“plaintiff”) 	opposes. 	(Docket 	No. 	128.) 	For 	the 	following
reasons, the Hotel’s motion is DENIED.
I. 	Background
Plaintiff sued the Hotel along with co-defendants JJ Security
Corp. 	and 	A.L. 	Sports 	Events 	Corp. 	(collectively, 	the
“defendants”) 	alleging 	violations 	of 	the 	Americans 	with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Puerto Rico Laws Ann.
tit. 	1, 	§ 501 	et 	seq. 	(“Law 	44”), 	Puerto 	Rico 	Laws 	Ann. 	tit. 	29,
§ 185a et seq. (“Law 80”), and Puerto Rico Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194
et seq. (“Law 115”). 	See Docket No. 1; Docket No. 64. 	He claimed
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	2
that 	he 	used 	to 	work 	as 	a 	security 	guard 	for 	the 	defendants 	and
that 	the 	defendants 	failed 	to 	provide 	a 	reasonable 	accommodation
for 	his 	medical 	conditions, 	causing 	him 	to 	lose 	his 	job. 	See
Docket No. 1 at pp. 2-6.
The 	Hotel 	appointed 	attorney 	Fredeswín 	Pérez-Caballero 	to
represent 	it. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	24. 	Through 	counsel, 	the 	Hotel
sought dismissal of the complaint based on late service of process.
See 	Docket 	No. 	26; 	Docket 	No. 	36. 	The 	Court 	denied 	the 	motion.
(Docket 	No. 	32; 	Docket 	No. 	40.) 	The 	Hotel 	and 	the 	other 	co-
defendants 	subsequently 	missed 	the 	deadline 	to 	answer 	the
complaint, and default was entered against each of them. 	(Docket
No. 	45.) 	The 	Hotel 	requested 	that 	the 	entry 	of 	default 	be 	set
aside, but the Court denied the request. 	See Docket No. 47; Docket
No. 50.
On 	May 	20, 	2025, 	at 	plaintiff’s 	request, 	the 	Court 	held 	a
jury 	trial 	on 	liability 	and 	damages. 	Plaintiff’s 	case 	consisted
solely of his own testimony; no documentary evidence was presented.
See 	Docket 	No. 	96 	at 	pp. 	1-2. 	None 	of 	the 	defendants 	presented
any evidence or testimony. 	Representatives from JJ Security Corp.
and A.L. Sports Events Corp. sat in the public viewing area for a
portion 	of 	plaintiff’s 	testimony 	but 	left 	partway 	through.1 	Id.
1 No attorney ever entered an appearance on behalf of JJ Security Corp.
or A.L. Sports Events Corp.
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	3
As 	for 	the 	Hotel, 	the 	courtroom 	deputy 	clerk 	contacted 	attorney
Pérez via telephone on the morning of the trial, and he confirmed
that 	he 	would 	not 	attend. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	1. 	The 	jury 	found 	for
plaintiff on each of his claims, awarding him back pay of $37,128
from the Hotel, $18,564 from A.L. Sports Events Corp., and $61,880
from JJ Security Corp. 	See Docket No. 104 at p. 3. 	The jury also
awarded him compensatory damages of $100,000 and punitive damages
of 	$250,000 	from 	each 	defendant. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	3-4. 	Judgment 	was
entered 	on 	May 	20, 	2025, 	the 	same 	day 	as 	the 	trial. 	See 	Docket
No. 106.
On 	March 	12, 	2026, 	the 	Hotel, 	represented 	by 	new 	counsel,
moved 	to 	set 	aside 	the 	judgment. 	(Docket 	No. 	118.) 	The 	Hotel
informed 	the 	Court 	that 	attorney 	Pérez 	failed 	to 	provide 	updates
on 	the 	status 	of 	the 	case 	after 	his 	attempt 	to 	dismiss 	based 	on
late 	service 	of 	process 	was 	denied. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	7-8. 	The 	Hotel
only learned that it was on the hook for $387,128 when, a few days
before 	the 	Hotel 	filed 	the 	current 	motion, 	a 	friend 	of 	Hotel
president 	Joel 	Rodríguez-Rivera 	stumbled 	across 	the 	final
judgment. 	Id. at p. 2; Docket No. 122-1. 	The Hotel has also filed
an ethical complaint against attorney Pérez before the Puerto Rico
Supreme Court. 	See Docket No. 131.
The 	Hotel 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	set 	aside 	the 	default
judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 55(c) (“Rule
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	4
55(c)”) 	and 	60(b) 	(“Rule 	60(b)”). 	The 	Hotel 	argues 	that 	its
default 	was 	not 	willful 	– 	rather, 	after 	not 	hearing 	any 	updates
from attorney Pérez, it believed that the case had been dismissed.
Id. 	at 	pp. 	10-12. 	The 	Hotel 	also 	argues 	that 	it 	has 	meritorious
defenses 	to 	plaintiff’s 	claims. 	First, 	the 	Hotel 	argues 	that
plaintiff’s 	service 	of 	process 	was 	inadequate 	because 	it 	was
addressed 	to 	the 	wrong 	legal 	entity 	and 	not 	served 	on 	a 	person
authorized 	to 	receive 	process. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	13. 	Second, 	the 	Hotel
argues that plaintiff was never actually an employee of the Hotel,
which means it cannot be liable for employment discrimination under
Title 	VII. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	13-14. 	Third, 	the 	Hotel 	argues 	that
plaintiff 	never 	suffered 	any 	discrimination. 	Id. 	at 	p. 	14.
Plaintiff responded, positing that the Hotel’s reasons do not merit
the 	extraordinary 	remedy 	of 	setting 	aside 	the 	judgment. 	(Docket
No. 	128.) 	Plaintiff 	argues 	that, 	as 	the 	Hotel’s 	agent, 	attorney
Pérez’s negligent management of the case should be imputed to the
Hotel. 	Id. 	at 	pp. 	2-3. 	Plaintiff 	also 	argues 	that 	service 	of
process 	was 	adequate 	and 	that 	the 	Hotel 	does 	not 	dispute 	having
actual notice or show how it was prejudiced. 	Id. at pp. 7-17. 	As
for whether plaintiff was an employee of the Hotel, he argues that
the Hotel was responsible for enough of his employment conditions
that 	it 	may 	be 	considered 	a 	joint 	employer 	even 	if 	he 	was
technically employed by the other codefendants. 	Id. at pp. 5-7.
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	5
II. 	Legal Standard
Rule 55(c) provides that “[t]he court may set aside an entry
of 	default 	for 	good 	cause, 	and 	it 	may 	set 	aside 	a 	final 	default
judgment 	under 	Rule 	60(b).” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	55(c). 	Rule 	60(b)
allows 	the 	Court 	to 	relieve 	a 	party 	from 	a 	final 	judgment 	for 	a
list 	of 	enumerated 	reasons, 	including 	“mistake, 	inadvertence,
surprise, 	or 	excusable 	neglect.” 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	60(b)(1).
“[R]elief 	under 	Rule 	60(b) 	is 	extraordinary 	in 	nature 	and 	[]
motions invoking that rule should be granted sparingly.” 	Karak v.
Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2002). 	“[A] party who
seeks recourse under Rule 60(b) must persuade the trial court, at
a 	bare 	minimum, 	that 	his 	motion 	is 	timely; 	that 	exceptional
circumstances 	exist, 	favoring 	extraordinary 	relief; 	that 	if 	the
judgment 	is 	set 	aside, 	he 	has 	the 	right 	stuff 	to 	mount 	a
potentially 	meritorious 	claim 	or 	defense; 	and 	that 	no 	unfair
prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be
granted.” 	Id. 	The 	exceptional 	circumstances 	inquiry 	“is 	an
equitable 	one, 	and 	the 	critical 	factor 	is 	the 	reason 	for 	the
movant’s neglect and whether it excuses the neglect.” 	J&J Sports
Prods. 	v. 	Luu, 	No. 	14-cv-14336, 	2016 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	136269, 	at
*5 	(D. 	Mass. 	Sept. 	30, 	2016) 	(citing 	Nansamba 	v. 	N. 	Shore 	Med.
Ctr., Inc., 727 F.3d 33, 38-39 (1st Cir. 2013)). 	When the judgment
in 	question 	is 	a 	default 	judgment, 	the 	court 	must 	also 	“balance
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	6
the importance of finality in litigation against the desirability
of deciding cases on the merits.” 	Id. (quoting Ungar v. Palestine
Liberation 	Org., 	599 	F.3d 	79, 	83 	(1st 	Cir. 	2010)) 	(internal
quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	“Although 	the 	First 	Circuit 	Court 	of
Appeals 	has 	taken 	a 	somewhat 	‘harsher 	tack’ 	than 	other 	circuits,
[] 	district 	courts 	nonetheless 	have 	wide 	discretion 	in 	deciding
Rule 60(b) motions[.]” 	Id. (quoting Dávila-Álvarez v. Escuela de
Medicina Universidad Central del Caribe, 257 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir.
2001)).
III. Discussion
A. 	Personal Jurisdiction & Service of Process
The 	Court 	will 	first 	address 	the 	Hotel’s 	argument 	that
it 	was 	not 	adequately 	served 	with 	process. 	Because 	the 	Court’s
personal 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	Hotel 	depends 	on 	adequate 	service
of 	process, 	the 	Court 	must 	vacate 	the 	judgment 	if 	the 	Hotel’s
argument has merit. 	See Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
484 	U.S. 	97, 	104 	(1987) 	(“Before 	a 	federal 	court 	may 	exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement
of service of summons must be satisfied.”)2
2 The Hotel previously unsuccessfully argued that service of process was
improper, see Docket Nos. 26, 36, 47, but the arguments they raise this
time around are new. 	Because the Court finds that the arguments lack
merit, there is no need to address plaintiff’s assertion that the Hotel
waived these arguments by failing to raise them in its original motion
to dismiss.
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	7
“In 	the 	federal 	courts, 	service 	of 	process 	is 	governed
by 	Rule 	4 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil 	Procedure.” 	Vázquez-
Robles 	v. 	CommoLoCo, 	Inc., 	757 	F.3d 	1, 	4 	(1st 	Cir. 	2014). 	Rule
4(h)(1) 	allows 	service 	of 	process 	against 	a 	corporation 	to 	be
achieved “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to 	an 	officer, 	a 	managing 	or 	general 	agent, 	or 	any 	other 	agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process
and — if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so
requires 	— 	by 	also 	mailing 	a 	copy 	of 	each 	to 	the 	defendant[.]”
Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	4(h)(1)(B). 	Service 	of 	process 	may 	also 	be
achieved by “following state law for serving a summons in an action
brought 	in 	courts 	of 	general 	jurisdiction 	in 	the 	state 	where 	the
district 	court 	is 	located 	or 	where 	service 	is 	made[.]” 	Fed. 	R.
Civ. P. 4(e)(1); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A). 	Puerto Rico law
is 	roughly 	similar, 	though 	apparently 	broader, 	than 	the 	federal
rule for service of process on corporations, stating that service
of process:
[S]hall 	be 	made 	by 	delivering 	a 	copy 	personally 	to 	any
officer 	or 	director 	of 	the 	corporation 	in 	the
Commonwealth, or the registered agent of the corporation
in 	the 	Commonwealth, 	or 	by 	leaving 	it 	at 	the 	dwelling
house or usual place of abode in the Commonwealth of any
officer, director or registered agent (if the registered
agent be an individual), or at the registered office or
other 	place 	of 	business 	of 	the 	corporation 	in 	the
Commonwealth.
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14, § 3781(a).
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	8
In this case, the United States marshals served process
on 	Ms. 	Maritza 	Rodríguez, 	who 	is 	the 	human 	resources 	manager 	at
the Hotel. 	See Docket No. 118-1 at p. 2. 	Shortly afterward, she
gave 	the 	summons 	and 	complaint 	to 	Joel 	Rodríguez, 	the 	Hotel
president, 	who 	then 	solicited 	the 	services 	of 	attorney 	Pérez 	to
defend 	the 	Hotel 	in 	the 	case. 	Id. 	The 	name 	on 	the 	service 	of
process 	was 	“Hotel 	Aloft 	Ponce” 	rather 	than 	the 	corporate 	entity
name, JRC Consolidated, Inc., or Aloft Ponce Hotel & Casino, which
is the name under which the Hotel does business. 	See Docket No. 23;
Docket 	No. 	30.3 	The 	Hotel 	argues 	that 	service 	of 	process 	was
improper 	because 	(1) 	Maritza 	Rodríguez 	is 	not 	an 	officer 	or
authorized 	agent 	to 	receive 	process, 	and 	(2) 	the 	entity 	name 	on
the service of process form was incorrect.
The 	Court 	disagrees 	with 	the 	Hotel. 	The 	service 	of
process form states that it was delivered to Ms. Rodríguez at the
address “Ponce By Pass [sic] #2 Street, Santiago de los Caballeros
Avenue, 	Ponce 	PR 	00780.” 	See 	Docket 	No. 	23. 	Although 	the 	Hotel
disputes 	that 	this 	is 	its 	actual 	address, 	it 	appears 	to 	point 	to
the 	intersection 	of 	the 	Ponce 	Bypass 	(also 	known 	as 	PR-2) 	and
Santiago de los Caballeros Avenue (also known as PR-12), which is
3 It 	appears 	from 	the 	record 	that 	the 	U.S. 	marshals 	served 	process 	on
the Hotel twice, once on March 21, 2023, and a second time on May 10,
2023.
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	9
in 	fact 	where 	the 	Hotel 	is 	located. 	Plaintiff 	provided 	evidence
to 	the 	Court 	that 	the 	Hotel 	has 	used 	the 	address 	listed 	on 	the
process form in promotional materials, social media accounts, and
travel 	websites. 	See 	Docket 	Nos. 	140-4, 	140-5, 	140-6, 	140-7,
140-8. 	The Hotel concedes that Ms. Rodríguez did in fact receive
the 	service 	of 	process, 	and 	she 	did 	so 	at 	the 	“place 	of 	business
of the corporation in the Commonwealth.” 	P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 14,
§ 	3781. 	It 	is 	hard 	to 	imagine 	how 	she 	would 	have 	received 	the
summons if the process server went to the completely wrong address.
Indeed, 	the 	postal 	services 	Form 	3811, 	Domestic 	Return 	Receipt,
shows 	delivery 	at 	1925 	Ponce 	By 	Pass, 	Ponce, 	PR 	00917-5555, 	the
address the Hotel has indicated as its correct address. 	See Docket
Nos. 135 at pp. 3-4, 135-1, and 143-1. 	Plaintiff also argues, and
the 	Court 	considers 	it 	plausible, 	that 	Ms. 	Rodríguez 	may 	be
considered 	an 	officer 	for 	service 	of 	process 	purposes 	due 	to 	her
role as human resources manager for the Hotel. 	Regardless, service
of process was proper because it was delivered at the Hotel’s place
of business.
As 	for 	the 	apparently 	incorrect 	entity 	name 	on 	the
process 	form, 	“the 	root 	purpose 	underlying 	service 	of 	process 	is
to 	ensure 	that 	a 	defendant 	receives 	fair 	notice 	of 	the 	suit 	and
adequate 	opportunity 	to 	protect 	[its] 	interests.” 	Libertad 	v.
Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 440 (1st Cir. 1995). 	“When an alleged defect
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	10
in 	service 	is 	due 	to 	a 	minor, 	technical 	error, 	only 	actual
prejudice to the defendant or evidence of a flagrant disregard of
the requirements of the rules justifies dismissal.” 	Id. 	The Hotel
does 	not 	suggest 	that 	it 	did 	not 	have 	adequate 	notice 	or 	was
prejudiced 	by 	either 	the 	manner 	of 	service 	or 	the 	entity 	name
appearing 	on 	the 	process 	form. 	There 	is 	only 	one 	Aloft 	Hotel 	in
Ponce 	and 	the 	Hotel 	correctly 	understood 	that 	it 	was 	being 	sued.
Mr. 	Rodríguez 	hired 	an 	attorney 	without 	delay 	– 	attorney 	Pérez
made an appearance in the case seven days after process was served.
See Docket No. 23; Docket No. 24. 	Accordingly, the Court rejects
the Hotel’s contention that service of process was inadequate and
will proceed to address the rest of its arguments for setting aside
the judgment.
B. 	Rule 60(b) Motion
To warrant setting aside the default judgment, the Hotel
must show that (1) the motion is timely, (2) setting aside judgment
would 	not 	unfairly 	prejudice 	the 	plaintiff, 	(3) 	the 	Hotel 	has
meritorious 	defenses 	that 	could 	have 	been 	raised, 	and
(4) exceptional 	circumstances 	justify 	this 	exceptional 	form 	of
relief. 	See Karak, 288 F.3d at 19. 	The Court finds that the first
three requirements are satisfied, but that the Hotel fails to show
exceptional circumstances for relief.
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	11
The first two requirements are clearly met. 	A Rule 60(b)
motion 	is 	timely 	if 	it 	is 	filed 	within 	one 	year 	of 	entry 	of 	the
final 	judgment. 	See 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	60(c)(1). 	Judgment 	was
entered 	in 	this 	case 	on 	May 	20, 	2025 	and 	the 	Hotel’s 	motion 	was
filed on March 12, 2026. 	See Docket No. 106; Docket No. 118. 	As
for 	the 	lack 	of 	prejudice 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	relatively 	little
evidence was provided at the default trial; merely plaintiff’s own
testimony was heard. 	There is no indication that any evidence or
witness 	testimony 	was 	lost 	in 	the 	time 	between 	the 	judgment 	and
the 	Hotel’s 	motion. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that 	plaintiff
would not be prejudiced if the judgment were set aside.
Next, the Hotel argues that it has meritorious defenses
that 	could 	have 	been 	raised 	against 	plaintiff’s 	claims. 	The
Hotel’s first argument is that it was not plaintiff’s employer and
therefore 	not 	subject 	to 	liability 	under 	Title 	VII. 	Plaintiff
counters that even if the hotel was not technically his employer,
it may be considered a joint employer along with the co-defendants.
See Rivas v. Fed. de Asociaciones Pecuarias, 929 F.2d 814, 819-21
(1st Cir. 1991) (outlining when a defendant may be deemed a joint
employer based on “whether an entity exercised sufficient control”
over the employee). 	The Hotel also argues that plaintiff was never
discriminated against for his medical condition.
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	12
The 	Court 	finds 	that 	the 	Hotel 	presents 	cognizable
meritorious 	defenses. 	Although 	plaintiff 	may 	ultimately 	be 	able
to 	show 	that 	the 	Hotel 	controlled 	enough 	of 	his 	employment
conditions 	to 	be 	classified 	as 	an 	employer 	under 	Title 	VII, 	this
is far from a foregone conclusion given the sparsity of the factual
record. 	Simply 	holding 	plaintiff 	to 	his 	burden 	of 	proof 	may
constitute a meritorious defense. 	See Tamaki v. Tamaki, No. 2:23-
cv-00312-LEW, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139919, at *10 (D. Me. Aug. 2,
2024) 	(recognizing 	the 	possibility 	of 	“mount[ing] 	a 	potentially
meritorious 	defense 	by 	holding 	the 	Plaintiff 	to 	her 	burden 	of
proof”). 	Similarly, 	the 	Hotel 	may 	have 	a 	meritorious 	defense 	in
holding plaintiff to his burden of proof on discrimination. 	Given
the paucity of evidence presented at the trial, it is very possible
that 	the 	Hotel 	may 	have 	prevailed 	by 	challenging 	plaintiff’s
version of events and whether it satisfies the necessary elements
of 	employment 	discrimination. 	Accordingly, 	the 	Court 	finds 	that
the Hotel may have had meritorious defenses to plaintiff’s claims.4
4 Because these two meritorious defenses exist, the Court need not address
the Hotel’s argument that plaintiff’s failure to provide evidence of his
EEOC right to sue letter in his complaint could have been a meritorious
defense. 	It appears that plaintiff did in fact receive such a letter,
see Docket No. 141-12. 	In any case, complying with this administrative
process 	is 	a 	claim-processing 	rule 	rather 	than 	a 	jurisdictional
requirement, and a defendant can forfeit it by failing to raise it as a
defense. 	See Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 548-52 (2019).
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	13
This 	leaves 	whether 	the 	Hotel 	has 	shown 	exceptional
circumstances which justify setting aside the judgment. 	The Hotel
argues that setting aside the default judgment is warranted because
its failure to litigate was not willful. 	Rather, it was attorney
Pérez’s 	negligence 	and 	lack 	of 	communication 	that 	caused 	the
default, and had the Hotel known about what was happening, it would
have presented its meritorious defenses and would never have been
subject to the adverse judgment.
“[I]t 	is 	settled 	beyond 	hope 	of 	contradiction 	that 	the
neglect 	of 	an 	attorney 	acting 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	his 	or 	her
authority 	is 	attributable 	to 	the 	client.” 	Rivera-Velázquez 	v.
Hartford 	Steam 	Boiler 	Inspection 	& 	Ins. 	Co., 	750 	F.3d 	1, 	6 	(1st
Cir. 2014) (quoting Nansamba, 727 F.3d at 38) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). 	The Hotel argues that its neglect was nonetheless
excusable 	because 	attorney 	Pérez’s 	silence 	was 	fairly 	understood
to mean that the case was dismissed without incident. 	For what it
is worth, this point is supported by the fact that plaintiff files
many meritless cases that get dismissed quickly, including against
the 	Hotel. 	Indeed 	in 	2024, 	two 	years 	after 	this 	case 	was 	filed,
plaintiff was deemed a vexatious litigant and is barred from filing
additional 	complaints 	in 	this 	court. 	See 	Ruiz-Romero 	v. 	Indus.
Comm’n 	of 	P.R., 	Inc., 	Civ. 	No. 24-01385 	(MAJ), 	2024 	U.S. 	Dist.
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	14
LEXIS 172876, at *2-6 (D.P.R. Sept. 23, 2024) (Antongiorgi-Jordán,
J.) (designating plaintiff as a vexatious litigant).
The Court, however, is not convinced that the Hotel has
shown 	its 	reasons 	for 	failing 	to 	litigate 	this 	case 	constitute
excusable 	neglect. 	The 	Hotel’s 	effort 	to 	present 	itself 	as 	not
having willfully defaulted is, at best, only partially convincing.
Although 	the 	Hotel 	had 	been 	sued 	by 	the 	plaintiff 	in 	the 	past,
this was the very first case litigated by attorney Pérez on behalf
of the Hotel. 	See Docket No. 131-1 at p. 5. 	Prior to the default,
the Hotel was communicating with Pérez and keeping abreast of the
case, 	even 	going 	so 	far 	as 	reminding 	Pérez 	about 	the 	deadline 	to
file 	an 	answer 	to 	the 	complaint. 	Id. 	After 	May 	2023, 	however,
the 	Hotel 	inexplicably 	stopped 	communicating 	with 	Pérez, 	despite
never receiving assurance that the complaint had been answered or
the 	case 	dismissed. 	And 	although 	the 	Hotel 	claims 	to 	have 	been
completely 	ignorant 	of 	the 	entry 	of 	default 	prior 	to 	filing 	the
current 	motion, 	it 	did 	in 	fact 	receive 	a 	copy 	of 	the 	application
for 	default 	via 	mail. 	See 	Docket 	No. 	141-1 	at 	p. 	1; 	Docket
No. 141-2. 	Even if this was missed, the Hotel’s failure to check
in 	with 	its 	attorney 	for 	almost 	two 	years 	was 	“neglect 	on
steroids.” 	Nansamba, 	727 	F.3d 	at 	38. 	Had 	the 	situation 	been
different, and had the Hotel been completely blindsided by attorney
Pérez’s 	negligence, 	its 	neglect 	may 	have 	been 	excusable, 	but 	its
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	15
position 	is 	much 	less 	persuasive 	given 	it 	was 	also 	negligent 	in
keeping abreast of the case.
The 	Court 	acknowledges, 	as 	discussed 	above, 	that 	the
Hotel 	may 	have 	meritorious 	defenses 	to 	plaintiff’s 	claims, 	which
heightens 	the 	interest 	in 	hearing 	the 	case 	on 	the 	merits. 	When
evaluating a Rule 60(b) motion, however, the chief focus is not on
the theoretical merits of the movant’s un-raised arguments, but on
its reasons for neglecting to raise them. 	See Nansamba, 727 F.3d
at 	39 	(“Within 	the 	constellation 	of 	relevant 	factors, 	the 	most
important 	is 	the 	reason 	for 	the 	particular 	oversight.”) 	And 	the
Hotel 	did 	not 	simply 	make 	one 	oversight, 	but 	left 	its 	entire
defense in the hands of an attorney who had never before litigated
on 	its 	behalf 	and, 	after 	not 	hearing 	from 	him 	for 	months, 	never
bothered 	to 	request 	an 	update. 	Ultimately, 	the 	Court 	is 	not
convinced 	that 	the 	Hotel’s 	explanation 	of 	its 	neglect 	is
sufficiently 	persuasive 	to 	merit 	the 	extraordinary 	relief
requested, 	even 	considering 	the 	relative 	desirability 	of 	trying
cases on the merits.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Hotel’s motion to set aside
default judgment is DENIED. 	(Docket No. 118.)
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Civil No. 22-1526 (FAB) 	16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
San Juan, Puerto Rico, April 10, 2026.
s/ Francisco A. Besosa
FRANCISCO A. BESOSA
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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