CONLEY-REIFER v. MAJOR JEFFREY KENGERSKI et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SKYLAR ANNABELL CONLEY-REIFER, )
)
Plaintiff, 	) 	Civil Action No. 23-1804
)
v. 	) 	District Judge W. Scott Hardy
) 	Magistrate Judge Kezia O. L. Taylor
)
MAJOR JEFFREY KENGERSKI 	)
(FORMER CAPTAIN), et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Skylar Annabell Conley-Reifer’s
objections (Docket No. 196) to the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge
Kezia O. L. Taylor, entered on August 10, 2026 (Docket No. 194). The R&R recommends that
the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Docket No. 177),
filed by Defendant Tim Boden (“Defendant Boden”). Service of the R&R was made on Plaintiff
via U.S. Mail and on Defendant Boden via CM/ECF. 	(Docket No. 194 at 15 and docket entry
text). The parties were informed that any objections to the R&R were due by August 24, 2026,
for ECF users, and by August 27, 2026, for unregistered ECF users, and any responses opposing
such objections were due fourteen days thereafter. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff filed a “Motion for 30 Day
Extension” (“Motion for Extension”), dated August 27, 2026, requesting an extension of time to
file her objections to the R&R. 	(Docket No. 195). 	Nevertheless, Plaintiff filed her objections
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dated September 1, 2026, to the R&R. (Docket No. 196).1 Defendant Boden did not file a response
to Plaintiff’s objections, nor did he file objections of his own.
In her objections to the R&R, Plaintiff disagrees with Judge Taylor’s conclusion that
Plaintiff did not state a claim under the First Amendment, and that Defendant Boden’s Motion to
Dismiss her First Amendment free exercise claim should therefore be granted. (Docket No. 196
at 1). Plaintiff argues that she did, in fact, state a First Amendment claim because she was “denied
… access” to requested religious materials related to her Wiccanism by Defendant, who was at the
time the Chaplain of the Butler County Prison.2 (Id.) 	It is this denial of access to religious
materials, she argues, that serves as the basis of her claims, rather than any request to “use the
physical chapel at Butler County Prison.” (Id. at 1–2).
In resolving a party’s objections, the Court conducts a de novo review of any part of the
R&R that has been properly objected to. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The
Court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition, as well as receive further
evidence or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See id. Upon careful de
novo review of the R&R and Plaintiff’s objections, as well as the record in its entirety, the Court
will reject the R&R’s recommended disposition as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise
claim, 	but 	will 	accept 	the R&R’s 	recommended 	disposition 	as 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim. 	In so ruling, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections
1 	Because Plaintiff filed her objections before this Court ruled on to her Motion for Extension (Docket No.
195), her Motion for Extension no longer presents an issue for this Court to rule upon. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion
for Extension will be denied as moot.
2 	While Plaintiff, in her objections, alleges that she has stated claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (“RFRA”) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), her Third Amended
Complaint does not include claims under these statutes. (Docket No. 196 at 1–2). Therefore, the Court will only
consider Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendant Boden. (Docket No. 132, ¶ 30).
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undermine the R&R’s recommended disposition as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise
claim, but not as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Accordingly, the
Court will adopt the R&R, as modified herein, as the opinion of the Court, and Defendant Boden’s
Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part. 	Specifically, the Motion will be
denied as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim, and granted as to Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim.
With regard to Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim, while the Court agrees with
Judge Taylor that, as Prison Chaplain, Defendant Boden is not required to accommodate every
religious request made in the Butler County Prison, the Court does not agree that Defendant Boden
was not obligated to fulfill Plaintiff’s request for religious materials without citing a compelling,
and competing, penological interest.3 Defendant Boden claims that Plaintiff’s First Amendment
free exercise claim is based on her inability to access the Prison chapel to practice her religion.
Defendant Boden also cites Third Circuit authority to support the proposition that “[a] special
chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a
chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.” Sharp v.
Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2 (1972)).
However, Defendant Boden misconstrues the factual basis for Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim is not predicated upon a lack of access to the
3 	As a predicate matter, Plaintiff has first plausibly stated that Defendant Boden was acting under color of state
law when performing his duties as the Prison Chaplain, and, accordingly, is a state actor against whom First and
Fourteenth Amendment claims can be brought. See, e.g., Drew v. Walton, No. 18-1452, 2021 WL 2155448, at *6
(W.D. Pa. May 27, 2021) (“[T]he County of Westmoreland contracted with Chaplain Badamo to provide religious
services to prisoners, thereby delegating to him the responsibility to provide religious services to inmates and in doing
so, granted him broad access to the inmates when providing such services. Based on the summary judgment record
evidence, the Court has no hesitancy in finding that Defendant Badamo should be considered a state actor in this
case.”).
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Prison chapel. 	Instead, Plaintiff alleges in her Third Amended Complaint that she “requested
religious information and materials from Defendant Chaplain Tim Bogden[sp] in accordance with
her Wiccan faith,” and that in response to her request, Defendant Boden denied her access to those
materials, “admonished her for her choice in religion and berated her for being transgender,” and
“told her that she could not receive services from the prison’s chapel unless she converted to
Christianity.” (Docket No. 132, ¶ 18).4
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits prison officials from denying
an inmate “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith.” Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 & n.2. 	The
United States Supreme Court in O’Lone v. Shabazz established, however, that when a prison rule
or practice encroaches upon inmates’ constitutional rights, “the regulation is valid if it is
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987). Here, Defendant
Boden has not pointed to a regulation or rule meant to further legitimate penological interests that
prohibited him from allowing Plaintiff to access materials on Wiccanism, imposing a substantial
burden on her religious practice. Yates v. Painter, 306 F. App’x 778, 780 (3d Cir. 2009) (reversing
and remanding the dismissal of a free exercise claim after plaintiff’s religious materials were
confiscated because “limiting an inmate's access to the religious literature that he is required to
read as part of his practice constitutes a substantial burden on his religious exercise”) (emphasis
added)); McCollum v. Dauphin Cnty. Prison Bd., No. 1:22-CV-1710, 2024 WL 5173254 at *1
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2024) (refusing to dismiss Plaintiff’s free exercise claim when Plaintiff
4 Plaintiff, in her objections to Judge Taylor’s R&R (Docket No. 196), stated: “I never sought to use the physical
chapel as Butler County prison had no such chapel (let alone a “Christian” chapel).” (Id. at 2).
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requested literature related to his religious practice of Santeria and merely received two-week
access to one library book after a nine-month wait).
Furthermore, the cases that Defendant Boden cites to support his argument are all related
to the provision of religious spaces or personnel, which carry higher corresponding costs for
prisons than the provision of reading materials. 	See, e.g., Sharp, 669 F.3d at 160 (“The
requirement that a state interpose no unreasonable barriers to the free exercise of an inmate's
religion cannot be equated with the suggestion that the state has an affirmative duty to provide,
furnish, or supply every inmate with a clergyman or religious services of his choice.”) (emphasis
added)); Boretsky v. Corzine, No. 08 civ. 2265, 2011 WL 2610370, at *13 (D.N.J. June 30, 2011)
(holding that a Jewish inmate’s restriction from congregational services as well as communal
activities did not violate his constitutional rights); Palmer v. Rustin, No. 10 civ. 0042, 2011 WL
2489820, at *9 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2011) (dismissing a free exercise claim predicated on denial of
right to attend Muslim services). 	In light of Plaintiff’s fundamental First Amendment right to
exercise her religious beliefs without a substantial burden, and the correspondingly low cost to the
Butler County Prison to provide access to religious materials, this Court respectfully disagrees
with Judge Taylor’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim be
dismissed at this stage.5
However, the Court agrees with Judge Taylor that Plaintiff did not plead facts to support a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does
5 	The Court agrees with Judge Taylor, however, that Defendant Boden’s comments made after Plaintiff
requested religious materials, while inflammatory, cannot themselves serve as a violation of Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights. See Thompson v. Ireland, C.A. No. 13-150 Erie, 2014 WL 4187088, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 21,
2014) (finding that verbal harassment related to inmate's religion is insufficient to show defendants restricted or
interfered with plaintiff's free exercise of religion). The Court therefore agrees with Judge Taylor insofar as Plaintiff’s
First Amendment free exercise claim cannot be based on Defendant Boden’s comments about Plaintiff’s religion and
transgender status.
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not allege that she is a member of a protected class, which individuals would be similarly situated,
and how Plaintiff was treated differently than those individuals – all necessary showings to state a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. 	See Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322 (“[T]o state a claim
under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is a member of a protected
class and (2) he was treated differently from similarly situated inmates.”). Therefore, the Court
agrees with Judge Taylor’s recommendation that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim should be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.
Accordingly, the Court enters the following Order:
AND NOW, this 14th day of October, 2026,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that to the extent set forth above Plaintiff’s objections (Docket
No. 196) to the R&R (Docket No. 194) are SUSTAINED, and the R&R is ADOPTED, as modified
herein, as the Opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Boden’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third
Amended Complaint (Docket No. 177) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The
Motion is granted to the extent that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The dismissal of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is without prejudice
and with leave to amend. The Motion is otherwise denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension (Docket No. 195) is
DENIED AS MOOT.
If Plaintiff wishes to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, she shall do so by November 11,
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2026, in which case Defendant shall respond thereto by December 9, 2026. If Plaintiff does not
file an Amended Complaint by November 11, 2026, then Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection claim will be dismissed with prejudice.
/s/ W. Scott Hardy
W. Scott Hardy
United States District Judge
cc/ecf: The Honorable Kezia O. L. Taylor
All counsel of record
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