Angelica Sue Botti

1
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
__________________________________________
)
In re: ) Bankruptcy No. 21-21934-CMB
)
ANGELICA SUE BOTTI, ) Chapter 13
)
Debtor. ) Related to Doc. Nos. 146, 155, 156,
) 159, and 180
__________________________________________)
)
ANGELICA SUE BOTTI, )
)
Movant, )
)
v. )
)
DONALD L. LAMPUS, JR., )
)
Respondent. )
__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Three years after the Court approved a settlement jointly presented by the above-captioned
Debtor, Angelica Sue Botti (“Botti”), and her former business associate, and nearly three years
after the Court dismissed the case due to her request, Botti, pro se, filed this within Motion seeking
to reopen her case to obtain relief from two orders, the Court’s Order Approving Settlement (Doc.
No. 126) and the Order Dismissing Case (Doc. No. 134).1 Upon consideration of the Motion, the
Response in Opposition filed by Donald L. Lampus, Jr. (“Lampus”), and the records developed at
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§157 and 1334, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Further, this is a core proceeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(2)(A). Although procedurally a court will resolve a motion to reopen first, without the
need to resolve the merits of the underlying relief sought, as explained herein the ability to vacate the Court’s Orders
is discussed in the context of whether it is futile to reopen this case.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 11

2
the initial hearing held on May 20, 2026 and the evidentiary hearing held on June 17, 2026, the
Court finds that the Motion must be denied.2
During the course of her bankruptcy case while represented by counsel, Botti entered into
a settlement agreement with Lampus to resolve litigation surrounding the alleged defaults on a
debt that she co-guaranteed with him for their business entity, Gemini Beverage LLC (“Gemini
Beverage”), a beer distributor, and a debt that she guaranteed on behalf of Gemini Beverage for
working capital provided by Lampus. See Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release (Doc. No.
119). The settlement agreement involved Botti transferring her interest in the entity completely to
Lampus, removing any association with Gemini Beverage, and making certain payments pursuant
to the settlement agreement. See id.
This Court approved the settlement on November 8, 2022, after the parties presented their
Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Agreement. See Order granting Motion to Approve Settlement
(Doc. No. 126). Botti personally requested that her bankruptcy case be dismissed after the
settlement agreement was entered. See Status Report (Doc. No. 130). It was dismissed without
prejudice on February 23, 2023, and it was subsequently closed on August 11, 2023.
And now, Botti is seeking through a motion to reopen her case to overturn the settlement
agreement that she willingly entered into and seeking to vacate the order dismissing her case after
she had urged that it be dismissed. She asserts that there is newly discovered evidence which shows
the settlement was based on “materially incomplete and inaccurate information,” and she states
that she has filed her Motion promptly after discovering this evidence. See Motion at ¶2 and ¶16.
2 Per the request of Botti, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on June 17, 2026, during which Botti did not testify,
call any witnesses to testify, or present any exhibits. The Court, nonetheless, reviewed exhibits Botti had submitted
prior to the evidentiary hearing to the Court. The Court finds that these exhibits have no impact on the outcome of
its decision.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 11

3
Under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 5010, a debtor may seek to reopen her case.
Section 350(b) provides that a case may be reopened to administer assets, to accord relief to the
debtor, or for other cause. Reopening a closed case rests within the Court’s sound discretion. See
In re Roberts, 659 B.R. 271, 278 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2024) (citing In re Lazy Days’ RV Ctr., Inc.,
724 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2013)). Courts consider various factors to determine whether to
reopen a closed case:
(1) the length of time the case has been closed; (2) whether the [moving]
party may obtain relief in an alternative forum; (3) whether any party would be
prejudiced by the reopening of the bankruptcy case; (4) any benefit that may accrue
to the debtor as a result of reopening; and (5) whether, if the case was reopened, the
[moving] party is entitled to any relief.
See id. Here, the first and third factors enumerated above weigh heavily against granting the
Motion. The case has been closed for almost three years, and Lampus would be heavily prejudiced
by reopening and rehashing issues that have already been resolved through their joint settlement.
As to the second factor, the underlying relief sought may only be obtained in this Court, as it relates
to vacating the Orders. However, in consideration of the fourth and fifth factors, there appears to
be no benefit to Botti in reopening where, as discussed infra, the underlying relief she seeks is
futile.
The fifth factor turns on the futility of reopening, requiring an assessment of whether the
Court can provide the underlying relief that Botti is ultimately seeking in a reopened case or
whether it would be a waste of judicial resources to reopen if such relief is unavailable. See id. at
280 (citing Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d 793, 803 (7th Cir. 2010)). As recognized in
Roberts, there is no definitive standard applied by courts as “to the quantum of proof that a movant
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 11

4
must provide in order to overcome a claim of ‘futility.’” See Roberts, 659 B.R. at 280. While the
burden is logically less than that imposed upon the movant in the adjudication of the merits of the
ultimate relief sought, the standard has been set forth in various ways. Id. at 280-81. As succinctly
put in Roberts, a movant “must demonstrate that the chance of success in the underlying litigation
is materially more than negligible, but need not be certain.” Id. at 281. In some cases, the answer
may be as simple as “it [being] ‘clear at the outset that the debtor would not be entitled to any
relief if the case were reopened.’” Id. (quoting In re Antonius, 373 B.R. 400, 405-06
(Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2007)). In this instance, the Court need not weigh in on the precise terminology to
describe the standard. As discussed herein, Botti is unable to show any negligible chance of success
with respect to the ultimate relief she seeks upon reopening. Rather, here, it is patently clear that
she would not be entitled to any relief even if the case were reopened.
The Court begins by addressing the underlying relief sought and the applicable rules. Botti
is seeking relief from the Orders under Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9024 which incorporates Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b), and she specifically seeks to vacate these Orders under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2), (3), and (6).3
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) provides grounds for a court to provide relief from a final order, including in
relevant part: (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; and (6) any other
reason that justifies relief.
Further applicable is Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c) setting a time limit for when a motion under Rule
60(b) must be filed—it “must be made within a reasonable time.” Specifically, under the time limit
3 Botti, in her Debtor’s Brief in Support of Motion (Doc. No. 180), makes only passing mention of Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b)(1) as an additional basis to challenge the Orders. See Brief at 8. She does not discuss how her “evidence”
constitutes mistake or elaborate to any degree, nor does it fit the facts presented by Botti. Regardless, any challenge
under Rule 60(b)(1) would be barred by the passage of time under Rule 60(c). Moreover, this challenge was not
raised in the Motion, and thus, opposing counsel was not given the opportunity to respond.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 11

5
pertinent to Rules 60(b)(2) and (3), the motion must be made no more than a year after the entry
of the order. In this case, the Orders from which Botti seeks relief were entered in 2022 and 2023.
Multiple years have elapsed before Botti moved to challenge the Orders on the basis of Rule
60(b)(2) or (3), and the time limitation of Rule 60(c) makes those challenges futile.
Consequentially, under application of either Rule 60(b)(2) or (3), evaluating the fifth Roberts
factor ultimately supports denial of the Motion. 4
Nevertheless, for the benefit of Botti, the Court shall analyze the facts presented by her to
determine whether, even in the absence of the applicable time limitation, Botti has shown that
there is newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) or fraud by Lampus under Rule 60(b)(3)
sufficient to show a likelihood of success that would necessitate reopening. Botti in her Motion
discusses newly discovered and previously concealed facts and “fraud on the Court” based on what
was not presented to the Court when Botti and Lampus jointly presented their settlement for
approval. See Motion at ¶¶17-37.
To the extent Botti now asserts that the Court did not approve the settlement with a full
record, Botti seems to misunderstand the nature of the Court’s settlement approval. Id. at ¶32.
When approving a settlement, the Court simply decides whether the settlement was “fair and
equitable.” See In re U Lock, Inc., No. 25-1177, 2025 WL 3776122, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 30, 2025).5
Utilizing certain factors enumerated by the Third Circuit, the parties present information to the
Court to make that determination.6 However, the parties are not required to produce all information
exchanged during negotiations in order for the Court to make this assessment.
4 See infra for the Court’s discussion on Rule 60(b)(6).
5 The court in In re U Lock observed as follows: “Rather than execute a comprehensive claim clean-up, the
Bankruptcy Court simply had to decide whether the settlement was ‘fair and equitable[.]’” See 2025 WL 3776122 at
*3 (quoting In re Nutraquest, Inc., 434 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 2006)).
6 There are four criteria that a bankruptcy court should consider in striking the balance between “the value of the
claim that is being compromised” against the value to the estate of the acceptance of the settlement: “(1) the
probability of success in litigation; (2) the likely difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 11

6
One of the key advantages of settlement is the avoidance of litigation. To approve the
settlement, the Court considers the debtor’s probability of success and risk in the underlying
litigation, yet the Court is “not supposed to have a ‘mini-trial’ on the merits” to resolve the
underlying claims. See Key3media Grp., Inc. v. Pulver.Com, Inc. (In re Key3media Grp., Inc.),
336 B.R. 87, 92-93 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005); see also In re Martin, 212 B.R. 316, 319 (8th Cir. BAP
1997) (noting that it is “not necessary for a bankruptcy court to conclusively determine claims
subject to a compromise, nor must the court have all of the information necessary to resolve the
factual dispute, for by so doing, there would be no need of settlement”). The parties simply only
present sufficient information to lend to whether the settlement falls within “the reasonable range
of litigation possibilities” although this is not a burden of proof for the underlying claim.
Key3Media, 336 B.R. at 93.
At the hearing held on November 8, 2022, to address the Joint Motion for Approval of
Settlement, Botti’s counsel emphasized why entering the settlement was in the best interest of
Botti and why she would agree to such settlement. See Transcript regarding Hearing Held
11/8/2022 (Doc. No. 156) at 4-8 (“Transcript”). Botti was in attendance at the hearing.7 The
benefits were comprehensively explained on the record, specifically the resolution of possible
costly litigation. Id. at 12-13. The Court held that the parties had met their burden under the Martin
factors and approved the settlement. Id. at 14-15.8
involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount interest of the
creditors.” In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d Cir. 1996).
7 Illustrating that she was comfortable speaking up during the hearing, Botti corrected her counsel at one point
during the hearing on a factual matter, yet she never broached any disagreement or unhappiness with the settlement.
See Transcript at 8.
8 At the same hearing, Botti urged that her case be dismissed. See Transcript at 9. Moreover, if the Chapter 13 case
was reopened and the Order dismissing her case was vacated, Botti does not elaborate as to whether she would
continue with her Chapter 13 Plan or what her intention is exactly.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 11

7
In her Motion, Botti asserts that complete bank records for Gemini Beverage were not
produced by Lampus before she entered into the settlement and that her counsel advised her those
records could not be produced. See Motion at ¶19. She has since obtained copies of checks and
allegedly obtained the complete bank record. Id. at ¶21; see also Exhibit A of Motion. However,
she admittedly knew of the existence of these records and chose to proceed to settlement without
them as opposed to pushing for production through a motion to compel.9 Another exhibit
demonstrates that Botti and her counsel were aware of potential issues regarding the financial
condition of Gemini Beverage prior to the time of the settlement being approved.10 Further, as
indicated above, in assessing the factors for approving a settlement, the Court is not presented with
evidence to resolve the parties’ dispute. Countering any likelihood of success on the underlying
relief sought, it is not newly discovered evidence to be considered under Rule 60(b)(2) nor is there
any evident fraud or misconduct by Lampus under Rule 60(b)(3).
Next, Botti discusses a confession of judgment in state court which was filed before she
agreed to settlement and for which her motion to strike was granted late last year.11 See Motion at
¶24-25. The premise, according to Botti, of the motion to strike was improper service. Id. However,
regardless of what steps Botti has taken after-the-fact, the risks of the litigation, particularly the
chance of Botti’s success, were specifically assessed in the context of the settlement as addressed
9 Parties may choose to settle prior to lengthy discovery to save costs, and the Court will not draw conclusions from
any alleged lack of documentation prior to the settlement where the parties agree to proceed in that way.
10 In Debtor’s Supplemental Exhibits in Support of Motion to Reopen Case (Doc. No. 159), Botti includes as the
Exhibit A to this document, an email dated May 23, 2022, from her CPA to her counsel identifying potential
financial issues and making recommendations. This email further demonstrates that Botti was aware that there were
potential issues regarding the financial condition of Gemini Beverage prior to her agreeing to the settlement. This
email also directly refutes the allegations in the Motion at ¶¶21 and 22 as the CPA directly questioned the use of
company funds for legal expenses prior to the approval of the settlement.
11 Exhibit B of the Motion presumably shows two separate screenshots of state court dockets with case numbers of
GD-21-005345 (Lampus Jr. v. Botti et al) and GD-21-005788 (SSB Bank v. Botti). It appears from the docket entries
at GD-21-005788 that a Confession of Judgment was entered on May 24, 2021, in favor of SSB Bank which was
subsequently stricken on November 21, 2025. It does not appear that Lampus is identified as a party to that action.
Additionally, it appears that the docket entries at GD-21-005345 represent the state court litigation between Lampus,
Botti, and Gemini Beverage.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 11

8
on the record with the intent of a desired global resolution. See Transcript at 6. It was represented
to the Court by counsel at the Settlement Hearing that “there may be some potential litigation on
the issue of the guaranty with SSB,” and that the settlement intended that “[the] Judgment from
SSB [goes] away.” Id. at 6-7. The litigation with SSB was known at the time of the settlement,
assessed at the time of settlement, and referenced within the settlement. No attempt is made to
demonstrate how action taken on the state court docket years after settlement constitutes newly
discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) or fraud by Lampus under Rule 60(b)(3) that would
support the likelihood of success in vacating approval of the settlement.12
Botti also argues that she was pressured into settlement based on the alleged existence of
affidavits accusing her of misconduct even though said affidavits were never produced. With
respect to the “affidavits,” Exhibit C indicates that she knew in December 2022 that affidavits or
testimony could be obtained if needed, not that affidavits already existed. See Motion at ¶¶26-28.
Regardless, to the extent she contends she was pressured into settlement on this ground, she
nonetheless proceeded to enter into the settlement without first obtaining the alleged affidavits.
She chose to proceed without them. No attempt is made to demonstrate how the failure to produce
affidavits constitutes newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) or fraud by Lampus under
Rule 60(b)(3) that would justify vacating approval of the settlement. These affidavits simply do
not provide any basis to aid in the likelihood of success in the underlying relief sought.
As an additional argument, Botti also states that she discovered that a notary who notarized
“a document” lost her licensure as a notary. See id. at ¶¶29-30. According to Botti, the document
was “used against her.” Id. at ¶29. Within the Motion, Botti fails to identify the document, its
12 Further, the striking of the confession of judgment due to improper service does not necessarily speak to the
ultimate question of liability on the debt. To the extent Botti had some valid defense at the time of the settlement that
would have impacted the negotiations, Botti nonetheless chose to proceed to settlement.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 11

9
purported significance, and how the issue with the notarization would invalidate the document.13
Exhibit D to the Motion is a notification from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania dated May 19,
2025, advising of the surrender of the notary commission. No attempt is made to demonstrate how
this constitutes newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2) or fraud by Lampus under Rule
60(b)(3) that would rationalize vacating approval of the settlement. In result, the revocation of a
notary’s licensure does not provide any basis for success in the underlying relief sought.
In her Supplemental Exhibits, Botti also asserts that her counsel misrepresented at the
settlement hearing that she would be relying on family contributions to make payments under the
settlement. See Supplemental Exhibits at 2 (Doc. No. 159). As Botti was present at the hearing,
she could have corrected her counsel, as she later did during the hearing. See Transcript at 8. Most
significantly, it is not clear how this would undermine the validity of the settlement or how this
would provide any justification in the underlying relief sought. When challenging the Orders on
the basis of Rule 60(b)(2) or (3), even in absence of the time constraint of Rule 60(c), it is clear
from the outset that Botti does not have a successful chance of seeking relief from the Orders.
On to consideration of challenging the Orders under Rule 60(b)(6), Botti simply does not
meet the heavy burden. The Court may relieve a party from a final order for “any other reason that
justifies relief” under Rule 60(b)(6). Relief in this manner is only appropriate in “extraordinary
circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” See
In re Butko, 624 B.R. 338, 371-72 (Bankr.W.D.Pa. 2021) (citing Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989
F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)). Moreover, the Third Circuit has explained that “extraordinary
circumstances rarely exist when a party seeks relief from a judgment that resulted from the party’s
13 It appears within the exhibits submitted prior to the evidentiary hearing that the document identified is an
agreement between Lampus and Botti. However, the exhibit was not presented at the evidentiary hearing, and the
Court is unaware of any challenge other than the subsequent loss of the notary license. Further, it was never clarified
on the record in a way for opposing counsel to respond to it.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 11

10
deliberate choices.” Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008).14 Here, Botti
chose to enter into the settlement, and she requested that her case be dismissed. She is seeking
relief from both Orders of which she deliberately chose to pursue. Unfortunately, her buyer’s
remorse does not amount to the extraordinary circumstances envisioned by Rule 60(b)(6).
Furthermore, as discussed above, a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) must be brought within a
reasonable time. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c). “The reasonableness of the delay is assessed on a case-
by-case basis…informed by many factors, including ‘finality, the reason for delay, the practical
ability for the litigant to learn of the grounds relied upon earlier, and potential prejudice to other
parties.’” Butko, 624 B.R. at 372.15 In this case, Botti’s Motion is not timely when she has waited
over two years to bring her Motion. Although the Court sympathizes with Botti’s allegations of
physical and mental health conditions as reason for her delay, many of the issues raised by Botti
were within her knowledge at the time of the settlement. Therefore, her delay is not justified. She
knew the Gemini Beverage bank records had not been produced, the affidavits were not produced,
and her CPA recommended to investigate the finances of Gemini Beverage, yet she chose to agree
to the settlement. Every other piece of information is irrelevant. Moreover, prejudice exists to
Lampus who is now incurring additional litigation costs to rehash issues resolved by the settlement,
which was entered into willingly, on advice of counsel, and then approved by the Court. On this
record, Botti’s Motion was not brought within a reasonable time. Therefore, challenging the Orders
under Rule 60(b)(6) would be a pointless exercise and consequently futile, and thus, under the fifth
Roberts factor, the Motion should not be granted.
14 See also Coltec Industries, Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 274 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that “courts have not
looked favorably on the entreaties of parties trying to escape the consequences of their own ‘counseled and
knowledgeable’ decisions”).
15 In Butko, the Court held that a debtor’s motion brought under Rule 60(b)(6) was untimely when the debtor failed
to appeal the order, litigated in state court for two years, and returned to the bankruptcy court to “rehash the same
issues anew.” Butko, 624 B.R. at 372.
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 11

11
For all of the above reasons, the Motion must be denied. In this case, it is clear from the
outset that the underlying relief sought by Botti cannot be achieved. An appropriate Order will be
entered consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: July 20, 2026 __/s/ Carlota M. Böhm ________________
Carlota M. Böhm
United States Bankruptcy Judge
Copy mailed to:
Angelica Sue Botti
132 Harrison Avenue
Robinson, PA 15949
SIGNED
CLERK
U.S. BANKRUPTCY
COURT - WDPA
7/20/26 1:24 pm
Case 21-21934-CMB Doc 182 Filed 07/20/26 Entered 07/20/26 13:29:09 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 11