Carrero Romero v. Lowe et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MAURO LUIS CARRERO ROMERO,
Petitioner,
v.
CRAIG A. LOWE, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 4:26-CV-00009
(Chief Judge Brann)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
FEBRUARY 4, 2026
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mauro Luis Carrero Romero, currently a detainee of the United States
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),
has filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition seeking his release from ICE custody or, in
the alternative, an order directing that ICE provide him with a bond hearing. 1
Romero is currently detained at the Pike County Correctional Facility within the
Middle District of Pennsylvania. 2
Romero, a citizen and native of the Republic of Colombia, entered the United
States of America in June of 2022 and was later paroled while his application for
asylum was pending.3 He then obtained an employment application document and
1 	Doc. 1.
2 	Id. at 2.
3 	Id.
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was lawfully employed in this country.4 On December 31, 2025, Romero was
arrested in his home and ICE has since refused him a bond hearing, asserting that he
is subject to mandatory detention. 5
In January 2026, Romero filed this § 2241 petition asserting that he is entitled
to a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).6 Specifically, Romero asserts that,
because he was detained inside of the United States, his detention is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), and the Government is incorrect that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)—which
provides for mandatory detention without a bond hearing—applies to him. 7
The Government initially responded that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider Romero’s petition, because 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) jointly
deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider a challenge to any matter relating to the
commencement of removal proceedings against Romero, and strip jurisdiction from
district courts to review Romero’s order of removal and vest such jurisdiction
exclusively with the relevant court of appeals. 8 Respondents also contend that
Romero does not have standing to pursue any claim under the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”), as there is another adequate remedy for Romero.9
4 	Id.
5 	Id.
6 	Id. at 3.
7 	Id. at 5-14.
8 	Doc. 5 at 15-23.
9 	Id. at 23-24.
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Respondents further argue that § 1225(b) applies to all individuals who are
not inspected and lawfully admitted to the country, regardless of whether they
manage to enter the country surreptitiously, and Romero is therefore subject to
mandatory detention without a bond hearing.10 Finally, Respondents assert that
Romero’s continued detention does not violate his due process rights.11
This Court conducted a telephonic status conference call and heard argument
from the parties on January 13, 2026. Shortly thereafter, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision in Khalil v. President, United States
of America, which addressed when district courts have jurisdiction to consider
certain immigration issues.12 Because that case may have implicated jurisdiction in
this matter, the Court placed this case in abeyance pending a final judgment in
Khalil.13
Respondents have since filed a letter withdrawing any argument related to
jurisdiction and “conced[ing] that that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to
rule on the merits of the petition.”14 For the reasons discussed below, the Court
agrees and will therefore lift the stay in this matter and address the merits of
Romero’s § 2241 petition. For the following reasons, the petition will be granted.
10 	Id. at 4-12, 24-43.
11 	Id. at 43-47.
12 	__ F.3d __, __, No. 25-2162, 2026 WL 111933, at *9 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2026).
13 	Doc. 9.
14 	Doc. 10.
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents initially argued that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider
Romero’s § 2241 petition,15 pointing to three sections of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”)—Sections 1252(g), 1252(b)(9), and 1252(a)(2)—that they
asserted strip district court of jurisdiction to hear such petitions.16 As just discussed,
Respondents have now withdrawn that argument and concede that this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over Romero’s petition.17 The Court agrees that it
possesses jurisdiction over this matter.
Numerous 	courts, 	including 	several 	judges 	in 	the 	Middle 	District 	of
Pennsylvania, have had occasion to address the issue of whether the INA strips
district courts of jurisdiction over challenges to administrative detention.18 Those
courts have been nearly unanimous in their determination that the INA does not strip
district courts of jurisdiction to hear and decide such claims. 19 Further, the Third
15 	Id. at 15-23.
16 	Doc. 5 at 15-23.
17 	Doc. 10.
18 	For a more extensive discussion on the jurisdiction of district courts over these matters see the
Report and Recommendation authored by United States Magistrate Judge Sean A. Camoni and
adopted by the United States District Judge Jennifer P. Wilson. See Santana-Rivas, v. Warden
of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 3:25-CV-01896, 2025 WL 3522932 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13,
2025) (the jurisdictional section of this report was adopted in its entirety).
19 	See Patel v. O’Neill, 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“federal
district courts to consider this issue have almost universally held that they have jurisdiction to
consider habeas petitions like the one filed by Petitioner”); Quispe v. Rose, No. 3:25-cv-02276,
2025 WL 3537279 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025); Cunin v. Brian, No. 3:25-CV-1887, 2025 WL
3542999 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025).
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Circuit has stated unambiguously that Section 1252(g) “does not sweep broadly.”20
Rather, Section 1252(g) “directs other courts not to hear challenges to three of the
Attorney General’s ‘decision[s] or action[s]’: those that ‘commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”21 Section 1252(g) “reaches only these
three specific actions, not everything that arises out of them.” 22
As Magistrate Judge Camoni succinctly stated: “Petitioner does not ask this
Court to review the decision or action to commence immigration proceedings against
her, nor to adjudicate her case, nor to impose or eventually execute a removal order.
Petitioner only seeks review of her ongoing detention, a heartland habeas corpus
claim.” 23 This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) to hear habeas
corpus cases for persons alleging that they are in custody in violation of the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 24
20 	Tazu v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 975 F.3d 292, 296 (3d Cir. 2020).
21 	Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
22 	Id. See also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
Respondents’ arguments under Section 1252(b)(9) fare no better as their application of the
section would lead to the “staggering results” discussed by the United States Supreme Court
in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 293 (2018). “Under such a regime of unreviewable,
indefinite executive detention, any person could be taken into custody and held for any amount
of time, without recourse.” Santana-Rivas, 2025 WL 3522932, at *5. Needless to say, such a
regime should surely be avoided, and can easily be avoided with a finding that district courts
have the jurisdiction to hear these cases. Further, “Section 1252(b)(9) also does not divest this
Court of jurisdiction over the habeas petition, because it ‘does not reach claims that are
independent of, or wholly collateral to, the removal process.’” Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *7
(quoting E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d. Cir. 2020)).
23 	Santana-Rivas, 2025 WL 3522932, at *4.
24 	Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 (2004).
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The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Khalil emphasizes this point. There, the
Third Circuit considered when questions of law and fact arise from a removal
proceeding and would therefore divests district courts of jurisdiction to hear 28
U.S.C. § 2241 petition, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9).25 It observed that it had
previously “read the ‘arising from’ phrase to require courts to ‘ask: If not now,
when? If the answer would otherwise be never, then § 1252(b)(9) poses no
jurisdictional bar.’”26 Consequently, if an individual “can get review later—by
litigating before an immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and then
by way of a PFR to a court of appeals—they must do so.”27 That court then held that
“[a] now-or-never claim must raise legal or factual questions that a court of appeals
will not later be able to review meaningfully on a PFR. It is not enough to assert an
injury that cannot be remedied later.” 28
The Third Circuit observed that, although the petitioner brought a detention-
specific claim, he simply “repackage[d] his challenges to his removal” and such a
claim cannot therefore be raised in a § 2241 petition.29 However, the Third Circuit
was careful to emphasize that “some claims can be detention-specific, like . . .
25 	Khalil, 2026 WL 111933 at *8.
26 	Id. (quoting E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2020)).
27 	Id.
28 	Id. at *9.
29 	Id. at *11.
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length-and conditions-of-confinement claims” and may be brought in § 2241
petitions.30
Romero brings just such a challenge here. He does not challenge the decision
to initiate removal proceedings, or the decision to initially detain him. Rather, he
challenges only his continued detention without a bond hearing, pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b), and asserts that he is entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a).31 Because Romero challenges only to his continued detention, and given
that Romero is detained within this Court’s jurisdiction and by a custodian within
this jurisdiction when he filed the Petition, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the
claims within the petition.32
B. 	Merits of the Petition
Romero brings his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which provides, as
relevant here, that it applies to any individual who “in custody for an act done or
omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree
of a court or judge of the United States.”33 As the Supreme Court of the United States
has 	emphasized, 	when 	ICE 	detainees 	challenge 	“their 	confinement” 	pending
30 	Id.
31 	Doc. 1.
32 	Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (noting jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions” lies
in the district of confinement).
33 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2).
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removal, “their claims fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus and thus
must be brought in” a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. 34
The determination of whether Romero is improperly detained requires an
examination of two separate provisions in immigration law: 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) and
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Section 1225(b) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an
alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained” pending removal hearings.35 In contrast, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) states only that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” In accordance with
that language, “[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a)
receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” 36 These two provisions therefore
provide for opposite outcomes: under § 1225(b) Romero may not receive a bond
hearing, but under § 1226(a) he must receive such a hearing. The Court therefore
examines each statute to determine which applies to Romero.
Turning first to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as the Honorable Karoline Mehalchick
recently observed, “[t]o trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining immigration officer
must determine that an individual is (1) an applicant for admission, (2) seeking
34 	J.G.G., 604 U.S. at 672.
35 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
36 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018).
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admission, and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 37
“Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is both an ‘applicant for
admission’ and ‘seeking admission.’”38
Section 1225 defines “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether
or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the
United States after having been interdicted in international or United States
waters).” 39 While applicable federal law does not define “alien seeking admission,”
courts construe the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe “active and
ongoing conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a
border or port of entry.”40
As courts have observed, such a “reading comports with the Supreme Court’s
finding in Jennings v. Rodriguez,” 41 wherein the Supreme Court “noted [that]
§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” 42 That
reading of “seeking admission” further “preserves a distinction between ‘seeking
admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’ ensuring that each phrase
37 	Ramirez-Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22,
2025).
38 	Id.
39 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
40 	Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (collecting cases).
41 	Id.
42 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297.
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carries independent meaning.”43 In sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates
that it applies to individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those
already within the country.
With respect to § 1226, the Supreme Court has been explicit that “§ 1226
applies to aliens already present in the United States.” 44 That section “creates a
default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General
to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings” and
“permit[ting] the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” 45 Therefore,
while § 1225 applies to individuals detained while entering or attempting to enter
the country, § 1226 applies generally to those who are detained within the country.
These definitions create dual tracks: if an individual is detained attempting to
enter the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for inspection
and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225. If they are
arrested after having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under
§ 1226 and are entitled to a bond hearing.
Applying that distinction here, Romero must be detained pursuant to § 1226
and is therefore entitled to a bond hearing. Romero entered the United States in June
of 2022 and, at that time, he could reasonably have been construed seeking
43 	Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4.
44 	Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303.
45 	Id.
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admission and therefore as an individual governed by § 1225.46 However, he was
not arrested and detained until late in December 2025 47 after having resided “in the
United States for an extended period of time”; accordingly he is no longer an seeking
admission and “§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to” Romero during his
detention.48 Because § 1226(a) applies, mandatory detention is not warranted, and
he must be provided with a bond hearing. 49
Having determined that Romero is being detained under the wrong section of
immigration law and is improperly being denied a bond hearing, the Court must next
determine whether Respondents’ actions violate Romero’s Fifth Amendment Due
Process rights.50
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
That Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent,” 51 and
therefore individuals “facing removal are entitled to due process.” 52
46 	Doc. 1 at 2.
47 	Id.
48 	Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5.
49 	See, e.g., Patel v. O’Neil, No. 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025)
(finding in similar circumstances that § 1226(a) applies).
50 	Romero brings claims under the Fifth Amendment, the INA, certain regulations, and the
Administrative Procedures Act. Doc. 1 at 9-14. Because this Court will resolve the issue on
the constitutional question, it need not address the remaining three claims, nor address
Petitioners’ arguments related to the APA.
51 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
52 	Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001).
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This Court applies the balancing test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge,53 to
determine whether the failure to provide Romero with a bond hearing under
§ 1226(a) violates his due process rights.54 Under that test, courts must consider
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional 	or 	substitute 	procedural 	safeguards; 	and 	finally, 	the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.55
The first factor weighs heavily in favor of concluding that Petitioners’ actions
have deprived Romero of his due process rights, as “[f]reedom from imprisonment—
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the
heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” 56 The second factor likewise favors
Romero, “as he is presently and erroneously detained under the mandatory detention
provisions of § 1225, without an opportunity for a bond hearing.” 57
Finally, as other courts have observed, the Government does have an interest
in detaining noncitizens to ensure “‘the appearance of aliens at future immigration
53 	424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
54 	Cf. Sewak v. I.N.S., 900 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying that test to determine whether
applicable deportation regulations were capable of protecting an individual’s due process
rights).
55 	Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
56 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6; Ramirez-Montoya, 2025
WL 3709045, at *6.
57 	Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (quoting Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, No. 25-CV-16200, 2025
WL 2976572, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)).
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proceedings’ and ‘prevent[] danger to the community.’”58 These interests certainly
justify detaining individuals in appropriate circumstances. But they cannot weigh in
favor of Respondents when they are denying wholesale a bond hearing when the
very purpose of a bond hearing is to establish whether an individual “poses [a] flight
risk [or a] danger to the community.”59 In balancing these three factors then, it is
clear that Romero’s continued detention without a bond hearing violates his due
process rights. Consequently, the Court will grant his § 2241 petition.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Respondents have violated
Romero’s due process rights by holding him without a bond hearing. Accordingly,
his petition will be granted, and the Government will be required to provide Romero
with a bond hearing or release him from custody.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
s/ Matthew W. Brann
Matthew W. Brann
Chief United States District Judge
58 	Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
59 	Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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