Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MICHAEL DELILLO, 	: 	Civil No. 4:25-CV-523
:
Plaintiff 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
FRANK BISIGNANO,1 :
Commissioner of Social Security, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
This case involves a recurring issue in Social Security litigation: The alleged
failure of the ALJ to incorporate a one-to-two step task limitation made by a medical
source the ALJ deems persuasive into a claimant’s residual functional capacity
assessment.
This can be an outcome determinative error since a claimant’s ability to
perform the mental demands of the workplace are often essential to the disability
determination. Therefore, when an individual’s ability to perform one-to-two step
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025.
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Frank Bisignano
should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No further action need be taken to
continue this suit by reason of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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tasks is at issue in a Social Security appeal, it is incumbent upon the Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) hearing this disability claim to provide a logical bridge between
the evidence and the ALJ’s legal conclusions and factual findings, a logical nexus
which addresses the claimant’s mental limitations in these areas and explains how
they do not preclude employment.
Although it is ultimately the ALJ who makes the RFC determination, and
determines which medical opinions and evidence deserve greater weight, it is also
well-settled that, when evaluating medical opinions, an ALJ should refrain from
substituting his own lay opinion in place of a medical opinion. See Morales v. Apfel,
225 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, while the ALJ may choose which
medical opinions are persuasive, “[f]or each limitation opined necessary by a
persuasive medical source, the ALJ is obligated to either: (1) incorporate that
limitation in the claimant's RFC, or (2) explain the basis for discounting that
limitation. Such an obligation ensures that any omission was intentional and
supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Cruz v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-
1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025) (citing Steinmetz v.
Colvin, Civ. No. 23-CV-2066, 2025 WL 36159, *7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2025);
Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979)). Applying these legal
benchmarks, a rising tide of caselaw has held that the unexplained failure of an ALJ
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to incorporate a one-to-two step task limitation set forth in a medical opinion deemed
persuasive constitutes error which may compel remand.
We are reminded of these familiar principles in the instant case. In this case,
the ALJ found that the plaintiff, Michael Delillo, was not disabled and was capable
of performing simple tasks. The ALJ reached this conclusion despite every treating
source finding that Delillo’s mental impairments were totally disabling. Instead, the
ALJ claimed to be persuaded by the opinion of a non-treating, non-examining state
agency expert. However, without explanation the ALJ failed to incorporate or
acknowledge a critical aspect of this state agency expert medical opinion which the
ALJ found persuasive; namely, the expert’s conclusion that Delillo could perform
one and two step tasks. (Tr. 86). The ALJ then identified occupations the plaintiff
could perform based on this RFC, all of which required a reasoning level of two, a
reasoning level which exceeded the one-to-two step task limitation prescribed by the
state agency expert.
The failure of the ALJ to acknowledge or account for this limitation is notable
because: (1) a limitation to simple tasks is not equivalent to a one-to-two step
limitation; and (2) numerous courts have concluded that occupations requiring a
reasoning level of 2 are not compatible with one-to-two task limitations. Here,
despite a treating source consensus that Delillo was totally disabled, the ALJ instead
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credited a non-treating, non-examining source. Yet, while the ALJ found the opinion
of the state agency mental consultant persuasive, he failed to adopt or acknowledge
the limitation to one- and two-step tasks opined by this expert. Thus, in our view,
the ALJ’s analysis does not provide a complete logical bridge for the decision
denying benefits to the plaintiff.
This was error. Therefore, we will remand this case for further consideration
by the Commissioner.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
On January 13, 2023, Michael Delillo filed an application for supplemental
security income benefits, alleging disability beginning July 2, 2020. (Tr. 22). In this
application Delillo alleged that he was disabled due to an array of physical and
mental impairments, including bipolar II disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD); stimulant use disorder (cocaine); alcohol use disorder; major depressive
disorder (MDD); adult antisocial behavior; and right-side sciatica. (Tr. 24). Delillo
was born on October 1, 1978 and was 44 years old on the date the application was
filed, making him a younger worker under the Commissioner’s regulations. (Tr. 33).
He had a high school education, attended some college courses, but had no
significant prior employment history. (Id.)
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On appeal, Delillo has focused upon his emotional impairments, and the
ALJ’s alleged failure to adequately consider the degree to which those impairments
limited him to one-to-two step tasks. With respect to these issues, the clinical
record—while equivocal—contained substantial evidence documenting significant,
on-going mental health conditions which resulted in at least one hospitalization. As
the ALJ noted:
In terms of the claimant’s mental impairments, a review of the medical
evidence of record reveals psychiatric treatment through medications
and office visits at the Scranton Counseling Center for bipolar II
disorder, PTSD, stimulant use disorder (cocaine), and alcohol use
disorder, 	as 	of 	December 	2021 	(Exhibits 	1F; 	9F/14; 	18F).
Subsequently, the record shows the claimant was admitted to Wilkes-
Barre Behavioral Hospital for three days in May 2022 on a voluntary
commitment for anxiety, depression, hopelessness, helplessness, mood
swings, a lot of racing thoughts, lack of sleep and self-care, and
substance abuse (Exhibits 2F/1; 14F/53). The record then shows that
the claimant treated with Tiffany Griffiths, Psy.D., starting June 6, 2022
with weekly individual psychotherapy sessions for MDD, PTSD, and
adult antisocial behavior (Exhibits 11F; 22F; 31F). The record further
shows that the claimant treated with Matthew Berger’s. M.D., office in
2022 for his bipolar disorder and PTSD, with mental status exams
revealing anxiety and depression at times, along with overproductive
and repetitive speech (Exhibit 5F). Upon mental status exams during
October 2023, December 2023, and April 2024 psychiatric telehealth
visits, the claimant exhibited poor concentration and attention span
(Exhibit 27F/3, 12, 21). Finally, the record shows that the claimant had
stress related to school that caused depression/anxiety, as he was having
difficulty with his focus/concentration in current English class in
college program, and was in danger of failing the course in April 2024
(Exhibit 27F/1).
(Tr. 29).
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Given this clinical history, three medical sources opined on the severity of
Delillo’s psychological impairments. Two of these medical sources had treatment
histories 	with 	Delillo; 	both 	of 	these 	treating 	caregivers 	described 	Delillo’s
impairments as disabling. A third source—a non-treating, non-examining state
agency expert—stated that Delillo could perform one-to-two step tasks.
On 	May 	20, 	2024, 	Delillo’s 	counselor 	Amy 	Pusateri 	at 	the 	Scranton
Counseling Center provided a medical statement describing Delillo’s emotional
impairments. (Tr. 1313-1317). According to Ms. Pusateri, Delillo suffered from
depression, anxiety and agoraphobia. (Tr. 1313). He experienced impaired focus,
concentration and memory along with extreme anxiety in unfamiliar settings. (Tr.
1316). Ms. Pusateri found that Delillo was seriously limited in multiple spheres of
workplace activity including responding appropriately to changes in a routine work
setting; dealing with normal work stress; being aware of workplace hazards;
understanding 	and 	remembering 	detailed 	instructions; 	carrying 	out 	detailed
instructions; setting realistic goals; dealing with stress of semiskilled and skilled
work; traveling and using public transportation. (Tr. 1315-1316). She opined that he
would miss two days of work each month. (Tr. 1317).
On April 16, 2024, a second treating source, Dr. Daniel Shust, provided a
medical questionnaire describing Delillo’s impairments. (Tr. 872-877). According
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to the doctor, Delillo suffered from depression and panic attacks. (Tr. 872). As a
result, Dr. Shust opined that Delillo would miss more than four days of work per
month due to his impairments, (Tr. 876); and suffered from psychological conditions
which were work preclusive in virtually all realms of workplace activity. (Tr. 873-
874).
In addition to these treating source opinions, a non-treating, non-examining
state agency expert, Dr. Karen Plowman, described her view of Delillo’s limitations
on February 24, 2023. (Tr. 85-86). Dr. Plowman stated that Delillo was moderately
impaired in a number of respects when it came to meeting the emotional demands
of the workplace. (Id.) According to Dr. Plowman, Delillo “is able to meet the mental
demands for simple, one to two step tasks on a sustained basis despite the limitations
associated with his impairments.” (Tr. 86) (emphasis added).
Dr. Plowman’s opinion that Delillo could perform one-and-two steps tasks is
significant. The reference to one-to-two step tasks is a term of art in Social Security
practice which connotes jobs limited to reasoning level 1 since the definition of this
reasoning 	level 	is 	confined 	to 	jobs 	which 	entail: 	“Apply[ing] 	commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step instructions.” Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, Appendix C - Components of the Definition Trailer, 1991 WL
688702. Thus, the state agency expert’s opinion that Delillo could perform one-and-
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two step tasks was tantamount to a finding that she was limited to reasoning level 1
jobs.
Accordingly, every source that examined the plaintiff concluded his mental
impairments would significantly limit his ability to perform work-related activity.
The treating source consensus indicated that these impairments were disabling.
Moreover, the state agency medical expert clearly opined Delillo would be limited
to performing one- and two-step tasks.
It was against this medical backdrop that Delillo’s disability claim came to be
heard by the ALJ on May 28, 2024, at which Delillo and a Vocational Expert (VE)
testified. (Tr. 42-76). Notably, the ALJ’s hypothetical questions posed to the VE did
not include limitations to one- and two-step tasks. (Tr. 71-73). The VE then
identified several jobs which he opined Delillo could perform. All of these tasks
entailed reasoning level two, a reasoning level which exceeded the one-to-two step
task limitations recommended by Dr. Plowman. See 727.687-054 Final Inspector,
DICOT 727.687-054, 1991 WL 679672 (G.P.O. 1991); garment sorter, DICOT
222.687-014, 1991 WL 672131 (G.P.O. 1991); masker, DICOT 726.687-034, 1991
WL 679638 (G.P.O. 1991).
Following this hearing, on August 27, 2024, the ALJ issued a decision
denying Delillo’s application for benefits. (Tr. 22-34). In that decision, the ALJ first
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concluded that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
January 13, 2023, the application date. (Tr. 24). At Step 2 of the sequential analysis
that governs Social Security cases, the ALJ found that Delillo had the following
severe impairments: bipolar II disorder; post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD);
stimulant use disorder (cocaine); alcohol use disorder; major depressive disorder
(MDD); adult antisocial behavior; and right-side sciatica. (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ
determined that these impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of
any listed impairments. (Tr. 24-27).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ fashioned a residual functional capacity
(“RFC”), considering the plaintiff’s limitations from her impairments, stating that:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) with the following limitations.
The claimant can climb ramps and stairs occasionally, never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, balance occasionally, stoop occasionally,
kneel occasionally, crouch occasionally, and never crawl. The claimant
can work at unprotected heights frequently, moving mechanical parts
frequently, in extreme cold frequently, and in vibration frequently. The
claimant is able to perform simple work but not at a production rate
pace (e.g., assembly line work). The claimant is able to interact with
supervisors frequently. The claimant is able to interact with the public
frequently. The claimant is able to tolerate few changes in a routine
work setting defined as occasional changes in routine work setting.
(Tr. 27).
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Notably, this RFC did not include any limitation to one-to-two step tasks. In
formulating the RFC, the ALJ stated that he considered the medical opinions of those
experts who opined on Delillo’s mental RFC. On this score, the ALJ found the
treating source consensus that these impairments were disabling unpersuasive. (Tr.
31-32). Instead, the ALJ embraced the opinion of the non-treating, non-examining
state agency expert, Dr. Plowman, explaining:
The undersigned also considered the opinion of the State agency
psychological consultant at the initial level, Karen Plowman, Ph.D.,
who indicated that the claimant has the following mental functioning
limitations: moderate in understanding, remembering, or applying
information; 	moderate 	in 	interacting 	with 	others; 	moderate 	in
concentrating, 	persisting, 	or 	maintaining 	pace; 	and 	moderate 	in
adapting or managing oneself. Dr. Plowman further indicated that the
claimant can understand and remember simple tasks; attend and
complete simple tasks; interact appropriately with others; adapt to
simple changes in routine; and meet the mental demands for simple, one
to two step tasks on a sustained basis despite the limitations associated
with his impairments (Exhibits 2A). The undersigned finds this opinion
persuasive . . . .
(Tr. 31).
Nonetheless, despite finding this state agency mental consultant opinion
persuasive—which the ALJ conceded included a restriction to one- and two-step
tasks—the ALJ did not incorporate this limitation in the RFC or explain why it was
not necessary. In fact, the ALJ did not further analyze, address, or acknowledge this
limitation.
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Having made these findings, the ALJ concluded that Delillo could perform
work in the national economy, including the occupations of Final Inspector, Garment
Sorter, and Masker Electronic Components, all of which were SVP-2 occupations
that exceeded the one-to-two step task mental limitations found by Dr. Plowman.
(Tr. 33). The ALJ then determined that the plaintiff did not meet the stringent
standard for disability set by the Act and denied this claim. (Id.)
With the ALJ’s decision cast in this enigmatic fashion, this appeal followed.
(Doc. 1). On appeal, Delillo contends, inter alia, that the ALJ erred in failing to
address the opinions of the state agency psychologist, that limited him to one- and
two-step tasks and then relying upon jobs which exceeded these mental limitations
in finding that Delillo was not disabled. After a review of the evidence, we agree
that the ALJ’s omission of this limitation was divorced from any medical opinion
and unexplained in the ALJ’s analysis, leaving the factual, legal and logical bridge
between the evidence and the ALJ’s findings lacking. Therefore, we will remand
this case for further consideration by the Commissioner.
III. 	Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review – the Role of this Court
When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, this Court’s review is limited to the question of whether the
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findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200
(3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp.2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012).
Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial
evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not
substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a
conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.
1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be
“something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ’s decision]
from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n,
383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In determining if the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.”
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in
this field, noting that:
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The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout
administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency
factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. ––––, ––––,
135 S.Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-
evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record
and asks whether it contains “sufficien[t] evidence” to support the
agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis
deleted). And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts,
the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
evidence, this Court has said, is “more than a mere scintilla.” Ibid.; see,
e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It means—and means only—“such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S.Ct. 206. See Dickinson v.
Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999)
(comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-
erroneous standard).
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
The question before this Court, therefore, is not whether the claimant is
disabled, but rather whether the Commissioner’s finding that she is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application
of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ’s errors of law denote
a lack of substantial evidence”) (alterations omitted); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.
Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The Secretary’s determination as to the status of
a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal
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matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp.2d at 536 (“[T]he court has plenary review
of all legal issues . . . .”).
Several fundamental legal propositions which flow from this deferential
standard of review. First, when conducting this review “we are mindful that we must
not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777
F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d
Cir. 2005)). Thus, we are enjoined to refrain from trying to re-weigh the evidence.
Rather our task is to simply determine whether substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s findings. However, we must also ascertain whether the ALJ’s decision meets
the burden of articulation demanded by the courts to enable informed judicial
review. Simply put, “this Court requires the ALJ to set forth the reasons for his
decision.” Burnett v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
As the Court of Appeals has noted on this score:
In Burnett, we held that an ALJ must clearly set forth the reasons for
his 	decision. 	220 	F.3d 	at 	119. 	Conclusory 	statements 	. 	. 	. 	are
insufficient. The ALJ must provide a “discussion of the evidence” and
an “explanation of reasoning” for his conclusion sufficient to enable
meaningful judicial review. Id. at 120; see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d
501, 505 & n. 3 (3d Cir.2004). The ALJ, of course, need not employ
particular “magic” words: “Burnett does not require the ALJ to use
particular language or adhere to a particular format in conducting his
analysis.” Jones, 364 F.3d at 505.
Diaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Thus, in practice ours is a twofold task. We must evaluate the substance of the
ALJ’s decision under a deferential standard of review, but we must also give that
decision careful scrutiny to ensure that the rationale for the ALJ’s actions is
sufficiently articulated to permit meaningful judicial review.
This principle applies with particular force to legal challenges, like the claim
made here, based upon alleged inadequacies in the articulation of a claimant’s
mental RFC. In Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 212 (3d Cir. 2019), the
United States Court of Appeals recently addressed the standards of articulation that
apply in this setting. In Hess the court of appeals considered the question of whether
an RFC which limited a claimant to simple tasks adequately addressed moderate
limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace. In addressing the plaintiff’s
argument that the language used by the ALJ to describe the claimant’s mental
limitations was legally insufficient, the court of appeals rejected a per se rule which
would require the ALJ to adhere to a particular format in conducting this analysis.
Instead, framing this issue as a question of adequate articulation of the ALJ’s
rationale, the court held that: “as long as the ALJ offers a ‘valid explanation,’ a
‘simple tasks’ limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has ‘moderate’
difficulties in ‘concentration, persistence, or pace.’ ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 931
F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2019). On this score, the appellate court indicated that an ALJ
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offers a valid explanation a mental RFC when the ALJ highlights factors such as
“mental status examinations and reports that revealed that [the claimant] could
function effectively; opinion evidence showing that [the claimant] could do simple
work; and [the claimant]’s activities of daily living, . . . . ” Hess v. Comm’r Soc.
Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2019).
In our view, the teachings of the Hess decision are straightforward. In
formulating a mental RFC the ALJ does not need to rely upon any particular form
of words. Further, the adequacy of the mental RFC is not gauged in the abstract.
Instead, the evaluation of a claimant’s ability to undertake the mental demands of
the workplace will be viewed in the factual context of the case, and a mental RFC is
sufficient if it is supported by a valid explanation grounded in the evidence.
B. Initial Burdens of Proof, Persuasion, and Articulation for the ALJ
To receive benefits under the Social Security Act by reason of disability, a
claimant must demonstrate an inability to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A); see also 20
C.F.R. §404.1505(a). 	To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe
physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous
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work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national economy. 42
U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. §404.1505(a). To receive benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she contributed to the
insurance program, is under retirement age, and became disabled prior to the date on
which he or she was last insured. 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
In making this determination at the administrative level, the ALJ follows a
five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a). Under this process,
the ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3)
whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether
the claimant is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant
is able to do any other work, considering his or her age, education, work experience
and residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4).
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also assess a claimant’s residual
functional capacity (RFC). RFC is defined as “that which an individual is still able
to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).” Burnett v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1). In making this assessment, the ALJ considers all of
the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including any non-severe
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impairments identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 	20 C.F.R.
§404.1545(a)(2).
There is an undeniable medical aspect to an RFC determination, since that
determination entails an assessment of what work the claimant can do given the
physical limitations that the claimant experiences. Yet, when considering the role
and necessity of medical opinion evidence in making this determination, courts have
followed several different paths. Some courts emphasize the importance of medical
opinion support for an RFC determination and have suggested that “[r]arely can a
decision be made regarding a claimant's residual functional capacity without an
assessment from a physician regarding the functional abilities of the claimant.”
Biller v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 962 F. Supp. 2d 761, 778–79 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
(quoting Gormont v. Astrue, Civ. No. 11–2145, 2013 WL 791455 at *7 (M.D. Pa.
Mar. 4, 2013)). In other instances, it has been held that: “There is no legal
requirement that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts
in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11
(3d Cir. 2006). Further, courts have held in cases where there is no evidence of any
credible medical opinion supporting a claimant’s allegations of disability that “the
proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a medical opinion from a
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physician is misguided.” Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D.
Pa. 2015).
These 	seemingly 	discordant 	legal 	propositions 	can 	be 	reconciled 	by
evaluation of the factual context of these decisions. Those cases which emphasize
the importance of medical opinion support for an RFC assessment typically arise in
the factual setting where a well-supported medical source has identified limitations
that would support a disability claim, but an ALJ has rejected the medical opinion
which supported a disability determination based upon a lay assessment of other
evidence. Biller, 962 F.Supp.2d at 778–79. In this setting, these cases simply restate
the commonplace idea that medical opinions are entitled to careful consideration
when making a disability determination, particularly when those opinions support a
finding of disability. In contrast, when an ALJ is relying upon other evidence, such
as contrasting clinical or opinion evidence or testimony regarding the claimant’s
activities of daily living, to fashion an RFC courts have adopted a more pragmatic
view and have sustained the ALJ’s exercise of independent judgment based upon all
of the facts and evidence. See Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App'x 6, 11 (3d Cir.
2006); Cummings v. Colvin, 129 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214–15 (W.D. Pa. 2015). In either
event, once the ALJ has made this determination, our review of the ALJ's assessment
of the plaintiff's RFC is deferential, and that RFC assessment will not be set aside if
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it is supported by substantial evidence. Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d
Cir. 2002); see also Metzger v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1483328, at
*5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Metzgar
v. Colvin, No. 3:16-CV-1929, 2017 WL 1479426 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2017); Rathbun
v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-00301, 2018 WL 1514383, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12,
2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-301, 2018 WL 1479366
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2018).
At Steps 1 through 4, the claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the existence of a medically determinable impairment that prevents him or her in
engaging in any of his or her past relevant work. Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064. Once this
burden has been met by the claimant, it shifts to the Commissioner at Step 5 to show
that jobs exist in significant number in the national economy that the claimant could
perform that are consistent with the claimant’s age, education, work experience and
RFC. 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(f); Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
The ALJ’s disability determination must also meet certain basic substantive
requisites. Most significant among these legal benchmarks is a requirement that the
ALJ adequately explain the legal and factual basis for this disability determination.
Thus, in order to facilitate review of the decision under the substantial evidence
standard, the ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory
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explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d
Cir. 1981). Conflicts in the evidence must be resolved and the ALJ must indicate
which evidence was accepted, which evidence was rejected, and the reasons for
rejecting certain evidence. Id. at 706-07. In addition, “[t]he ALJ must indicate in his
decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for
his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir. 1999).
C. Legal Benchmarks for the ALJ’s Assessment of Medical Opinions
The plaintiff filed this disability application following a paradigm shift in the
manner in which medical opinions were evaluated when assessing Social Security
claims. Prior to March 2017, ALJs were required to follow regulations which defined
medical opinions narrowly and created a hierarchy of medical source opinions with
treating sources at the apex of this hierarchy. However, in March of 2017, the
Commissioner’s regulations governing medical opinions changed in a number of
fundamental ways. The range of opinions that ALJs were enjoined to consider were
broadened substantially, and the approach to evaluating opinions was changed from
a hierarchical form of review to a more holistic analysis. As one court as aptly
observed:
The regulations regarding the evaluation of medical evidence have been
amended for claims filed after March 27, 2017, and several of the prior
Social Security Rulings, including SSR 96-2p, have been rescinded.
According to the new regulations, the Commissioner “will no longer
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give any specific evidentiary weight to medical opinions; this includes
giving controlling weight to any medical opinion.” Revisions to Rules
Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence (“Revisions to Rules”),
2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867–68 (Jan. 18, 2017), see
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the Commissioner
must consider all medical opinions and “evaluate their persuasiveness”
based 	on 	the 	following 	five 	factors: 	supportability; 	consistency;
relationship with the claimant; specialization; and “other factors.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c), 416.920c(a)-(c).
Although the new regulations eliminate the perceived hierarchy of
medical sources, deference to specific medical opinions, and assigning
“weight” to a medical opinion, the ALJ must still “articulate how [he
or she] considered the medical opinions” and “how persuasive [he or
she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(a) and
(b)(1), 416.920c(a) and (b)(1). The two “most important factors for
determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are consistency and
supportability,” 	which 	are 	the 	“same 	factors” 	that 	formed 	the
foundation of the treating source rule. Revisions to Rules, 82 Fed. Reg.
5844-01 at 5853.
An ALJ is specifically required to “explain how [he or she] considered
the supportability and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20
C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520c 	(b)(2), 	416.920c(b)(2). 	With 	respect 	to
“supportability,” the new regulations provide that “[t]he more relevant
the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented
by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§
404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The regulations provide that with
respect to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.” Id. at §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
Under the new regulations an ALJ must consider, but need not
explicitly discuss, the three remaining factors in determining the
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persuasiveness of a medical source's opinion. Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),
416.920c(b)(2). However, where the ALJ has found two or more
medical opinions to be equally well supported and consistent with the
record, but not exactly the same, the ALJ must articulate how he or she
considered those factors contained in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5).
Id. at §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).
Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020 WL 5848776, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020).
Oftentimes, as in this case, an ALJ must evaluate various medical opinions.
When presented with a disputed factual record, it is well-established that “[t]he ALJ
– not treating or examining physicians or State agency consultants – must make the
ultimate disability and RFC determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667
F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). However, the ALJ must still fully articulate the basis
of this medical opinion evaluation. Thus, when evaluating medical opinions “the
ALJ may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the
wrong reason.’” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mason,
994 F.2d at 1066). It also follows that “when a medical opinion is found persuasive
and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the ALJ is obligated to either:
(1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant to reasoning level one
occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the ALJ is relying on in
rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8.
These legal benchmarks guide us in the instant case.
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D. This Case Should Be Remanded.
After a review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s failure to address or
incorporate the state agency consultant’s opinion that Delillo would be limited to
one- and two-step tasks despite finding this opinion persuasive was error. At the
outset, in reviewing this ALJ’s decision we find ourselves at the intersection between
two well-settled paradigms in the Social Security field. First, our highly deferential
standard of review empowers “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining physicians or
State 	agency 	consultants 	– 	[to] 	make 	the 	ultimate 	disability 	and 	RFC
determinations.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361. Thus, our decision in this case in no
way undercuts the legal tenet that an ALJ is not required to adopt every limitation
opined by the experts but “can formulate an RFC based on different parts from the
different medical opinions.” Durden, 191 F.Supp.3d at 455. However, at base, an
ALJ must draft a reviewable opinion that is grounded in the evidence and provides
the court with an adequately articulated rationale for the limitations adopted. Here,
without the benefit of an explanation by the ALJ, we are unable to determine whether
the ALJ’s failure to address the limitation to one- and two-step tasks in the sole
medical opinion the ALJ found persuasive was inadvertent or based upon the
substantial evidence of record.
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This assessment by the ALJ runs afoul of several well-settled legal tenets.
First, as enumerated above, an ALJ's decision must be accompanied by “a clear and
satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.” Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704.
Furthermore, the ALJ must also “indicate in his decision which evidence he has
rejected and which he is relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck, 181 F.3d
at 433. Moreover, it is well-settled that an ALJ should refrain from substituting his
own lay opinion in place of a medical opinion. Morales 225 F.3d at 319. These
mandates apply here in the context of the ALJ’s assessment of medical opinion
evidence limiting a claimant to one-to-two step tasks. Indeed, this court, and others,
have applied these paradigms in specifically concluding that “when a medical
opinion is found persuasive and contains a limitation to one- and two-step tasks, the
ALJ is obligated to either: (1) include the limitation in the RFC and limit the claimant
to reasoning level one occupations, or, (2) identify the substantial evidence that the
ALJ is relying on in rejecting the limitation.” Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *8. See
also Rita R. v. Kijakazi, No. 21 C 5631, 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
8, 2023) (“Indeed, an ALJ is required to provide a thorough and appropriate
explanation for rejecting a state agency psychologist's opinion that a claimant is
limited to one-to-two step tasks.”) The ALJ’s decision in Delillo’s case neither
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included the one-to-two step limitation, nor explained why it was not incorporated
into the RFC. This was error.
This error is not harmless here since the ALJ’s conclusion that Delillo was not
disabled is based upon his ability to perform work in occupations requiring a
reasoning level of 2 which is inconsistent with a limitation to one- to two-step tasks.
As this court explained:
The 	DOT 	defines 	occupations 	by 	reasoning 	level 	and 	defines
“reasoning 	level 	one” 	as 	the 	ability 	to 	“apply 	commonsense
understanding to carry out simple one-or two-step instructions.” The
similarity of that language to “one- and two-step tasks,” leads us to
conclude that an individual limited to “one-and two-step tasks” is
likewise limited to “reasoning level one” occupations. Importantly, this
limitation is dischargeable: an ALJ may find otherwise, so long as they
rely on and cite to substantial evidence that adequately explains why
they are omitting the limitation in the claimant's RFC despite having
found the relevant medical opinion to be persuasive.
Additionally, courts in eight of the eleven circuits where a District court
has considered this issue have held that “simple repetitive tasks” and
“one- and two-step tasks” are legally distinct limitations. And all but
one of these cases also found that a limitation to “one- and two-step
tasks” 	necessarily 	limits 	the 	claimant 	to 	reasoning 	level 	one
occupations.
Cruz, 2025 WL 2813882, at *7. See also Id. at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2023). See
also Rita R., 2023 WL 2403139, at *3–4 (“The ALJ's error is of crucial importance
because a limitation to ‘simple tasks’ (the RFC limitation the ALJ found here)
encompasses jobs that may involve complexity beyond one-to-two step tasks”);
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Daniel M. v. Kijakazi, No. 2:21-CV-243, 2023 WL 154909, at *3 (D. Vt. Jan. 11,
2023) (collecting cases) (concluding reasoning Levels 2 and 3 are not consistent with
“simple, one-to-two step tasks”).
Simply put, more was needed here by way of explanation on the ALJ’s part.
Indeed, a rising tide of caselaw supports the view that the ALJ erred in failing to
address the one and two step task limitation opined by the expert whose opinion he
found persuasive.2 Since the ALJ’s burden of articulation is not met in the instant
case, this matter will be remanded for further consideration by the Commissioner.
Yet, while we find that these errors compel a remand in this case, nothing in
this Memorandum Opinion should be deemed as expressing a judgment on what the
ultimate outcome of any reassessment of this evidence should be. Instead, that
judgment should remain to province of the ALJ. Finally, because we have vacated
and remanded the decision of the Commissioner on these grounds, we decline to
address any other issues since “[a] remand may produce different results on these
2 See e.g., Whitney v. Bisignano, No. 4:24-CV-1950, 2026 WL 522922, at *10 (M.D.
Pa. Feb. 25, 2026); 	Cruz v. Bisignano, No. 1:24-CV-1966, 2025 WL 2813882, at
*7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2025); Michelle M. v. Bisignano, No. 3:23-CV-02163, 2025
WL 2713737, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2025); Warren v. Dudek, No. 1:24-CV-635,
2025 WL 1168276, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2025); Shipman v. Kizakazi, No. 3:22-
CV-00636, 2023 WL 5599607, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2023).
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claims, making discussion of them moot.” Burns v. Colvin, 156 F.Supp.3d 579, 598
(M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2016).
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons the plaintiff’s request for a new administrative
hearing will be GRANTED, the final decision of the Commissioner denying these
claims will be vacated, and this case will be remanded to the Commissioner to
conduct a new administrative hearing.
An appropriate order follows.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: March 2, 2026
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