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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAURIE J. HOLLOBAUGH,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, 1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
: 	NO. 4:24-CV-00405
:
:
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying 	Plaintiff 	Laurie 	Hollobaugh’s 	claim 	for 	disability 	and
supplemental security income benefits under Title II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction to review this matter
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by
reference). For the reasons stated herein, the Court will affirm the
decision of the commissioner.
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May
7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the defendant in this suit. No
further action is needed to continue this suit by reason of the last
sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
On September 24, 2018, Hollobaugh applied for disability benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability as
of June 15, 2018. Transcript, Doc. 9-3 at 2-3. Two weeks later, Hollobaugh
applied for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act. Doc.
Id. 	at 	13-14. 	The 	Social 	Security 	Administration 	denied 	both
applications. Id. at 12, 23.
After exhausting administrative appeals, Hollobaugh filed a prior
action in this Court, challenging the agency’s denial. See Hollobaugh v.
Kijakazi, No. 21-159, Complaint, doc. 1. The Court issued an order to
remand in that case. Hollobaugh, No. 21-159, December 22, 2021, Order,
doc. 22-2. After remand and further proceedings, the ALJ decided on
June 7, 2023, that Hollobaugh has not been under a disability. See doc.
9-11 at 71.
Hollobaugh filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which
the Appeals Council denied. Doc. 9-10 at 2 (declining jurisdiction). The
ALJ’s decision, therefore, became the final decision of the Commissioner.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pending before this Court is Hollobaugh’s action
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seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. Complaint, Doc.
1. This case is fully briefed (docs. 10, 14, 15) and ripe for resolution. The
parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge
to conduct all proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, including entry of final judgment.
Consent Form, Doc. 7.
B. 	The Disability Determination Process
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”),
a claimant must be unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable . . . impairment which can . . .
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Under the Act, a claimant is disabled “only if his . . . impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 	§ 423(d)(2)(A). 	An 	impairment 	is 	one 	that 	“results 	from
anatomical, 	physiological, 	or 	psychological 	abnormalities 	which 	are
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demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” § 423(d)(3).
Social 	Security 	regulations 	provide 	a 	“five-step 	sequential
evaluation process” to determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4), 	416.920(a)(4). 	The 	claimant 	bears 	the 	burden 	of
persuasion through step four, while at step five, the burden shifts to the
Secretary to show that the claimant can perform substantial gainful
employment other than the claimant’s past relevant work. Williams v.
Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987)).
At the first step, the claimant must establish that he has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged
disability. See §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). At the second step,
claimant 	must 	establish 	that 	he 	suffers 	from 	a 	“severe 	medically
determinable . . . impairment that meets the duration requirement . . .
(“impairment . . . must have lasted or must be expected to last for a
continuous 	period 	of 	at 	least 	12 	months”).” 	§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),
416.920(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the claimant must provide evidence
that his impairment “meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1.”
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§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates his
impairments meet those listings, he is considered to be disabled. See id.;
§§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If he cannot establish severity of impairment
at the third step, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four in which
the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) 	allows 	the 	claimant 	to 	continue 	his 	previous 	employment.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most [a claimant] can
still do despite” impairments. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). To prevail
on step four, claimant’s “impairment(s) must prevent [him] from doing .
. . past relevant work.” §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). At the fifth step, the
Commissioner bears the burden to demonstrate that the claimant’s RFC
and his “age, education, and work experience . . . [allows] adjustment to
other work.” §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the Commissioner
cannot 	satisfy 	this 	burden, 	the 	claimant’s 	claim 	is 	granted. 	See
§§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g).
C. 	The ALJ’s Decision
Here, the ALJ determined that Hollobaugh “has not been under a
disability, . . . from June 15, 2018, through the date of this decision.” Doc.
9-11 at 71. The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the
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five-step 	sequential 	analysis 	required 	by 	the 	Social 	Security 	Act.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v); see Doc. 9-11 at 53-71.
At step one, the ALJ determined that Hollobaugh “has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since June 15, 2018, the alleged onset
date.” Doc. 9-11 at 53. At step two, the ALJ found that Hollobaugh has
the following severe impairments: Degenerative disc disease, chronic
obstructive 	pulmonary 	disease 	(COPD)/emphysema, 	migraines,
osteoarthritis, optic neuropathy, carpal tunnel syndrome status post
carpal tunnel release, anxiety and depression/bipolar disorder. Id. At
step three, the ALJ determined that Hollobaugh “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in” 20 C.F.R. part
404, subpart P, appendix 1. Id. at 54.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Hollobaugh has
the following RFC:
[T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) except no limitations on stand or sit, but walking
limited 	to 	each 	interval 	[throughout] 	the 	workday 	at 	15
minutes. 	The 	claimant 	could 	occasionally 	balance, 	stoop,
crouch, crawl, kneel, and climb but never on ladders ropes or
scaffolds. The claimant could frequently push or pull with the
upper 	extremities 	and 	frequently 	perform 	fine 	and 	gross
manipulation. The claimant is limited to frequent exposure to
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temperature extremes of cold and heat, wetness, humidity,
fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation and vibrations,
and no exposure to hazards, including dangerous moving
machinery and unprotected heights, but would be able to
avoid ordinary hazards in the workplace, such as boxes on
floor, 	doors 	ajar, 	or 	approaching 	people 	or 	vehicles. 	The
claimant can see regular size print, but if very small print
required should be provided magnify or oral explanation. The
claimant can work with computer screens and monitors, but
if needed, should have ability to enlarge or magnify print, and
when needed be permitted to wear blue light glasses. The
claimant can work with large items but no tiny objects such
as small nuts, bolts, coins or paper clip size items. The
claimant can have no commercial driving or operating moving
equipment. The claimant can do simple routine tasks but no
complex tasks.
Id. at 57-58.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Hollobaugh “is unable to
perform any past relevant work.” 	Id. 	at 69. At step five, the ALJ
determined 	that 	considering 	Hollobaugh’s 	“age, 	education, 	work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.” Id. at 70.
D. 	Issues on Appeal
Hollobaugh challenges the ALJ’s medical opinion analysis, step
three analysis, and RFC assessment. Pl.’s Br., Doc. 10 at 1. The Court,
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adhering to the deferential standard of review outlined below, will affirm
the decision of the Commissioner.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the
findings 	of 	the 	final 	decision-maker 	are 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence 	in 	the 	record. See 42 	U.S.C. 	§ 1383(c)(3) 	(incorporating 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.
Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an
existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient
evidence 	to 	support 	the 	agency’s 	factual 	determinations. 	Biestek 	v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a
large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence
but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
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ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by
the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an
adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may
be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the 	ALJ’s 	decision] 	from 	being 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In
determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.
Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the
record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third
Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions
for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the
ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not
only 	supports 	[a 	contrary] 	conclusion 	but 	compels 	it.” 	Immigr. 	&
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Hollobaugh
is disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Hollobaugh is
not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based
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upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.
12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been
held 	that 	an 	ALJ’s 	errors 	of 	law 	denote 	a 	lack 	of 	substantial
evidence.”); Burton 	v. 	Schweiker, 	512 	F. 	Supp. 	913, 	914 	(W.D. 	Pa.
1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim
requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright
v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of
review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he
court 	has 	plenary 	review 	of 	all 	legal 	issues 	decided 	by 	the
Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate
whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to
enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for
his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Hollobaugh argues that the ALJ failed to properly conduct the: (1)
medical 	opinion 	analysis; 	(2) 	RFC 	assessment; 	and 	(3) 	step 	three
analysis. Doc. 10 at 1. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
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A. 	The ALJ’s medical opinion analysis is supported by
substantial evidence.
Hollobaugh 	contends 	that 	the 	ALJ 	improperly 	rejected 	Dr.
Lindsay’s opinion as to her reaching, handling, and fingering limitations.
See id. at 16. She argues that because “the only relevant medical opinion
of record,” as to the limitations is that of Dr. Lindsay, and the ALJ failed
to provide a basis for rejecting these limitations, the ALJ’s decision is
unreviewable. Id. Hollobaugh is incorrect.
“Limitations that are medically supported but are also contradicted
by other evidence in the record may or may not be found credible—the
ALJ can choose to credit portions of the existing evidence but ‘cannot
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.’” Rutherford v.
Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005), citing Mason, 994 F.2d at
1066.
To begin with, the ALJ provided several pertinent grounds for
rejecting Dr. Lindsay’s opinion. See Doc. 9-11 at 60-61. In finding Dr.
Lindsay’s opinion unpersuasive, the ALJ clearly noted Dr. Lindsay’s
finding that the claimant exhibited “considerable amount of findings in
the normal range, including . . . full motor strength in the upper and
lower extremities, including grip strength.” Doc. 9-11 at 61. Further, the
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ALJ noted that “Dr. Lindsay observed a tremor in [Hollobaugh’s] hands
during this examination, but it is unclear if this is from anxiety, as he
notes the claimant was upset, and no other examination in the record
noted tremors.” Id. The ALJ emphasized that examinations, “including
Dr. Lindsay’s, showed full strength in all extremities and full grip
strength.” Id. Contrary to Hollobaugh’s contention, the ALJ, thus, has
clearly met its burden to articulate reasons to support the decision to
decline to adopt Dr. Lindsay’s functional limitations. See Burnett, 220
F.3d at 119.
Hollobaugh, however, argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting “the
only relevant medical opinion in the record.” Doc. 10 at 16. But it is the
“ALJ—not 	treating 	or 	examining 	physicians 	or 	State 	agency
consultants—[that] 	must 	make 	the 	ultimate 	disability 	and 	RFC
determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d
Cir. 2011). Because the ALJ provided sufficient basis to reject Dr.
Lindsay’s RFC findings, the ALJ did not err by rejecting “the only
relevant medical opinion.” Doc. 10 at 16; Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F.
App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2006) (“There is no legal requirement that a physician
have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts in the course of
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determining an RFC. Surveying the medical evidence to craft an RFC is
part of the ALJ’s duties.”); see also Winters v. Saul, No. 19-1017, 2020 WL
5246710, at *15 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2020) (citation omitted) (noting that
an ALJ can make “an RFC assessment even if no doctor has specifically
made the same findings and even if the only medical opinion in the record
is to the contrary”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-1017,
2020 WL 5232406 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2020).
B. 	The ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial
evidence.
Hollobaugh argues that the ALJ erred in assessing the RFC by: (1)
failing to include Dr. Lindsay’s limitations, and (2) rejecting portions of
Dr. Kibler’s opinion. Doc. 10 at 10-11, 22-23.
1. 	Dr. Lindsay’s limitations
Similar to Hollobaugh’s medical opinion argument, she contends
that the ALJ erred in assessing her RFC because Dr. Lindsay’s opinion
is “the only relevant medical opinion of record,” and it “supports greater
functional limitations than found by the ALJ.” Id. at 9. Hollobaugh
asserts that “no medical opinion of record supports the ALJ’s RFC
assessment.” Id. at 11. The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC determination
is supported by substantial evidence.
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First, as previously noted, the ALJ would not be required to adopt
Dr. Lindsay’s functional limitations even if Dr. Lindsay’s was the only
medical opinion of record. See Titterington, 174 F. App’x at 11; Winters,
2020 WL 5246710, at *15. But Dr. Lindsay’s is not the only relevant
medical 	opinion. 	See 	doc. 	9-11 	at 	69 	(discussing 	Drs. 	Whang 	and
Butcofski’s medical opinions). The ALJ discussed the medical opinions of
Drs. Whang and Butcofski, which found that Hollobaugh “had no severe
medically determinable physical impairment,” and, deciding in favor of
Hollobaugh, 	found 	them 	unpersuasive 	and 	inconsistent 	with 	the
longitudinal evidence of record. Id. Because Dr. Lindsay found significant
limitations and Drs. Whang and Butcofski found none, the ALJ had to
contend with these conflicting medical opinions.
An ALJ has an obligation to weigh the medical evidence and “make
choices between conflicting medical evidence.” Williams v. Sullivan, 870
F.2d 1178, 1187 (3d Cir. 1992). When medical opinions conflict, “the ALJ
is not only entitled but required to choose between them.” Cotter v.
Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). Moreover, the
ALJ may “assess[] the RFC that falls between competing opinions.”
Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
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Here, the ALJ weighed the conflicting medical opinions of Drs.
Lindsay (finding far greater limitations) and Drs. Whang and Butcofski
(finding no limitations) and assessed an RFC that fell between these
opinions. See id. at 57-58. The Court, therefore, finds that the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is supported by substantial evidence. Durden, 191 F. Supp.
3d at 455.
2. 	Dr. Kibler’s limitations
Hollobaugh also argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting parts of Dr.
Kibler’s opinion which posited that Hollobaugh’s visual limitations would
hinder her ability to “avoid ordinary hazards in the workplace.” Doc. 10
at 	22. 	Specifically, 	Hollobaugh 	asserts 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	reasons 	for
rejecting the limitation are insufficient as they consider Hollobaugh’s
ability to function in a home setting and not in a “competitive work
environment” as required under the regulations. See id.
Hollobaugh’s argument is flawed as it omits the rest of the ALJ’s
analysis. The ALJ first noted that Dr. Kibler’s opinion that Hollobaugh
could not avoid ordinary hazards “is inconsistent with the record.” Doc.
9-11 at 61. The ALJ then noted that the treatment records do not show
evidence 	of 	any 	“injuries 	from 	falling 	or 	reports 	of 	falling 	or 	the
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prescription of a cane to be aware of objects in her path.” Id. That was
the primary basis for finding that part of Dr. Kibler’s limitations opinion
unpersuasive and “inconsistent with the record.” Hollobaugh instead
attacks the additional reasons, including Hollobaugh’s reported level of
activity, that the ALJ provides as additional support for the assessment.
Id. (“In addition, . . . .”). The Court, therefore, finds that the ALJ’s RFC
assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
C. 	The 	ALJ’s 	step 	three 	analysis 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence.
Finally, Hollobaugh argues that the ALJ erroneously concluded
that she did not meet or equal listings 2.03B or 2.04B at step three of the
analysis. Doc. 10 at 18. Specifically, she asserts that the ALJ failed to
develop the record as to her optic neuropathy because Dr. Schaffzin
“ultimately conceded that ‘there’s really no way to determine if those
listings were met or equaled.’” Id. at 19, citing doc. 9-10 at 26. Hollobaugh
maintains that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record which required
the ALJ to order an additional consultative examination. Id. at 21.
“The decision to order a consultative examination is within the
sound discretion of the ALJ.” Thompson v. Halter, 45 F. App’x 146, 149
(3d Cir. 2002). That duty “does not require a consultative examination
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unless the claimant establishes that such an examination is necessary to
enable the ALJ to make the disability decision.” Id. This Court in Dietrich
v. Saul further explained:
The regulations authorize the ALJ to obtain a consultative
examination if there remains information needed to make a
disability determination, “such as clinical findings, laboratory
tests, a diagnosis or a prognosis” which cannot be obtained
from the medical record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519a, 416.919a.
Such 	an 	examination 	may 	be 	requested 	when 	the
Commissioner is not presented with the information that is
necessary to make a decision or is presented with inconsistent
information. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519a(a)-(b), 416.919a(a)-(b).
501 F. Supp. 3d 283, 293 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (emphasis in original). Here,
the Court finds that the ALJ exercised proper discretion not to order a
further consultative examination. Thompson, 45 	F. App’x at 149. On a
previous 	remand, 	the 	Appeals 	Council 	instructed 	that 	further
consideration at step three was required because “no physician of record
indicated the cause of the claimant’s vision loss, . . . and if the claimant’s
visual disorder does not satisfy the criteria in 2.03, the Agency will
request a description of how the visual disorder affects her ability to
function.” Doc. 9-11 at 42. The ALJ sufficiently complied with this order.
The ALJ secured a medical expert, Dr. Schaffzin, to testify at the
hearing. Docs. 9-10 at 20; 9-11 at 55. And Dr. Schaffzin testified as to the
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cause of Hollobaugh’s optic neuropathy and described how it “affects her
ability to function.” Doc. 9-11 at 42, 55. Dr. Schaffzin testified that the
medical records “did not show a clear etiology for the claimant’s optic
neuropathy and it could be caused by many types of conditions,” and
provided function limitations as to Hollobaugh’s visual disorder. Doc. 9-
11 at 55, 64. By taking Dr. Schaffzin’s testimony and incorporating his
limitation assessment, the ALJ complied with the Appeals Council’s
order. See doc. 9-11 at 64. At bottom, the ALJ adopted Dr. Schaffzin’s
testimony and conclusion that the “longitudinal evidence and diagnostic
testing of record [are] not sufficient to support listing level severity[.]” Id.
at 55. Thus, the ALJ “was presented with sufficient information to make
a decision and acted properly within the scope of his discretion by not
ordering consultative examinations . . . that Plaintiff could also have
obtained.” Dietrich, 501 F. Supp. 3d at 293.
Although Hollobaugh repeatedly argues that the ALJ had a duty to
order further testing and develop the record, ultimately, “[t]he burden
lies with the claimant to develop the record regarding his or her disability
because the claimant is in a better position to provide information about
his or her own medical condition.” Money v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 210,
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215 (3d Cir. 2004), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
Hollobaugh’s counsel cross-examined Dr. Schaffzin, who testified as to
the unreliability of some of the visual tests for Hollobaugh. See doc. 9-10
at 26 (“the Claimant has had problems with this type of testing[.]”); doc.
10 at 18. But during the hearing, counsel did not ask the ALJ to order a
different, more reliable testing or to keep the record open to secure such
a test. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot conclude that the
ALJ erred in failing to order further examinations or visual testing. See
Colombin v. Colvin, No. 16-311, 2017 WL 272029, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Jan.
19, 2017) (affirming ALJ’s discretion to not order additional testing
where a claimant was represented by counsel at the hearing and his
counsel did not ask the ALJ to order further testing on claimant’s behalf
or to keep the record open to secure such a test); Smith v. Colvin, No. 15-
1426, 2016 WL 6729120, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2016) (holding same).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.
An appropriate order follows.
Date: March 19, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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