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3:26-cv-00518Pamd23 de mar. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MAISAM ALI,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, PIKE COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-CV-00518
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner, Maisam Ali (“Ali”), a citizen of Pakistan and asylum seeker, brings this
petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1). On March 2, 2026, Ali filed the instant petition,
requesting that Respondents David O’Neill, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, and Warden of the
Pike County Correctional Facility1 release him from custody or provide him with a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Doc. 1, at 1-2). Lowe filed a response to Ali’s petition
1 The government avers that pursuant to the “immediate custodian rule,” the only proper
respondent in this case is Craig A. Lowe (“Lowe”), Warden of the Pike County Correctional
Facility. (Doc. 7, at 1 n.1). “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that the
proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].’”
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(“[t]he writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the
person detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444 (3d Cir. 2021)
(“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate custodian rule, then the district court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition”). As Ali is detained at the Pike County
Correctional Facility, Lowe is the proper respondent. (Doc. 1, at 3); see Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at
434. As such, Respondents David O’Neill, Kristi Noem, and Pamela Bondi are DISMISSED.
However, the government will be bound by the Court’s judgment because Lowe is acting as
an agent of the federal government by detaining Lario on behalf of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”). See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018 WL 10602037, at *9-*10
(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (finding the warden acts as an agent of the ICE regional director
when ICE makes initial custody determinations including setting of a bond and review of
conditions of release); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr. Facility, 3:25-cv-01896,
2025 WL 3522932, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025), adopted in part, rejected in part, 2025 WL
3513152 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (finding same).
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on March 10, 2026 (Doc. 7), and Ali filed a traverse on March 11, 2026. (Doc. 10). For the
following reasons, Ali’s petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED, and Lowe is ORDERED to release
Ali from custody.
I. 	FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following background is derived from Ali’s petition, Lowe’s response, and the
exhibits thereto. (Doc. 1; Doc. 7). Ali is a citizen of Pakistan, who has lived and worked in
the United States since May 2023. (Doc. 1, at 3-4). Ali entered the United States on or about
May 13, 2023, at or near Lukeville, Arizona without admission or parole. (Doc. 1, at 3). Ali
subsequently encountered United States Border Patrol, who served Ali with a Notice to
Appear, before releasing Ali on his own recognizance due to lack of space.2 (Doc. 1, at 4;
Doc. 1-4, at 4).
Since entering the United States, Ali has complied with immigration reporting
requirements while residing in Florida and then Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 4). On March 23,
2024, Ali applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture. (Doc. 1, at 4). Ali avers that if the government removes him to Pakistan, he
will be killed by the Tehreek Taliban because of his women’s rights advocacy in Parachinar,
Pakistan. (Doc. 1-5, at 6).
On December 29, 2025, ICE took Ali into custody during a routine check-in
appointment at the ICE Philadelphia Field Office. (Doc. 1, at 4-5). Ali is currently detained
at the Pike County Correctional Facility, in Lords Valley, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, at 3). The
2 In the argument section of his response, Lowe indicates that Ali was released into the
United States on humanitarian parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Doc. 7, at 16).
However, the Department of Homeland Security records explicitly state that “Ali [was]
released on his own recognizance due to being a non priority alien and lack of space.” (Doc.
1-4, at 4).
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Executive Office for Immigration Review’s case information indicates that Ali has an
individual hearing on March 26, 2026, in the Elizabeth Immigration Court. EOIR Automated
Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last visited March 17,
2026).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 2241 governs district courts’ power to grant the writ of habeas corpus.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b), the writ of habeas corpus extends to petitioners “in custody for
an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or
decree of a court or judge of the United States.” Claims where non-citizens challenge
immigration enforcement-related detention “fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of habeas corpus
and thus must be brought in habeas.” Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025) (quoting
Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 167 (2022)). “For ‘core habeas petitions,’ ‘jurisdiction lies in
only one district: the district of confinement.’” J. G. G., 604 U.S. at 672. While reviewing a
noncitizen’s 	habeas 	petition, 	courts 	evaluate 	whether 	the 	government 	complied 	with
regulatory, statutory, and constitutional protections for noncitizens. See Martinez v. McAleenan,
385 F. Supp. 3d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding ICE failed to comply with regulatory and
constitutional notice requirements prior to detaining a non-citizen petitioner and granting the
petitioner’s habeas petition). A court may order a bond hearing or release if the Court
determines that a noncitizen habeas petitioner is entitled to such relief under relevant
constitutional or statutory protections. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 827 (W.D. Pa.
2025) (finding that a noncitizen habeas petitioner was entitled to a bond hearing under the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment); see Cantu-Cortes v. O’Neill, No. 25-cv-6338, 2025
WL 3171639, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (finding a habeas petitioner was entitled to a
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bond hearing under relevant statutory protections); see also Alexey Kashranov v. J.L. Jamison, et
al., No. 2:25-CV-05555, 2025 WL 3188399 at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025) (finding that the
appropriate remedy when the government detains a petitioner under an inapplicable statute,
violating due process, is release from custody).
III. 	JURISDICTION
“[F]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.’” Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v.
Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.
500, 514 (2006)). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 empowers federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus
where a petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States . . . in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1),
(3). Recently, in Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259, 273 (3d Cir. 2026), the Third
Circuit determined that the INA strips district courts of subject matter jurisdiction to hear
claims arising from removal actions or proceedings, when the claims could be addressed on a
petition for review of a final order of removal (“PFR”). However, the Third Circuit clarified
that district courts retain jurisdiction over habeas petitions presenting “now or never”
questions of law, that cannot be meaningfully reviewed later on a PFR. Kahlil, 164 F.4th at
273-74.
Habeas actions based on whether a petitioner is detained pursuant to the appropriate
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and is entitled to a bond hearing are “now
or never” legal questions that remain in the jurisdiction of district courts. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th
at 274-77; see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)
does not present a jurisdictional bar to challenges unrelated to review of an order of removal,
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the government’s decision to detain in the first place, and the process by which removability
will be determined). A determination of whether § 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies to a petitioner
also determines whether that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. See Matter of Yajure Ali,
29 I. & N. Dec. 126 (BIA 2025) (holding immigration judges lack authority to hear bond
requests for noncitizens detained under § 1225(b)); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399 at *5
(citing § 1226(a)) (finding § 1226(a) allows for detainees to be released on conditional parole
or bond). Such claims do not arise from removal proceedings, they arise “now.” If left to be
raised on a PFR, the petitioner will never get the opportunity for an immigration judge to
determine their eligibility for bond during removal proceedings. See Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-
77 (“when [noncitizens] raise claims that courts cannot ‘meaningfully’ review through the
PFR process, those claims do not ‘aris[e] from’ the ‘action[s] taken’ or ‘proceeding[s] brought’
to remove them”). Thus, the Court retains jurisdiction because the legal questions of whether
§ 1225(b) or § 1226(a) applies to Ali and whether Ali is entitled to a bond hearing are wholly
collateral to his removal proceedings and cannot be meaningfully reviewed on a PFR.
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294; Kahlil, 164 F.4th at 274-79.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Ali contends that his mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is both a violation of
the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Doc. 1, at 6-7). Lowe counters
that Ali is subject to mandatory detention because he falls squarely under § 1225(b)(2)(A),
which provides noncitizens only with the rights and protections set forth by Congress. (Doc.
7, at 16). The Court will first address whether Ali was properly detained under §
1225(b)(2)(A). The Court will then address whether Ali’s detention violates due process.
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A. LOWE IMPROPERLY DETAINED ALI UNDER 8 U.S.C. 1225(B).
Lowe improperly detained Ali under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), when Lowe should have
detained Ali under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Ali avers that noncitizens who resided in the United
States before ICE apprehend and detained them are not arriving applicants for admission and
are not subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. 1, at 6). Lowe counters that Ali is
properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) because the statute mandates the detention of
noncitizens, like Ali, who are present in the United States without lawful admission. (Doc. 7,
at 17).
The INA is a comprehensive statute regulating immigration, which Congress has
repeatedly reworked since its enactment in 1952. Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. Before
1996, the INA provided that noncitizens who presented themselves at ports of entry were
subject to mandatory detention during exclusion proceedings, while noncitizens who evaded
inspection by entering elsewhere were afforded the opportunity to obtain release during
deportation proceedings. Matter of Yajure Ali, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 222-223 (BIA 2025) (citing
8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a); 1251 (1994)). In 1996, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) amended the INA to include § 1225 and § 1226, in part, to
end the preferential treatment of noncitizens who evaded inspection when entering the United
States. OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1997, PL 104–208,
September 30, 1996, 110 Stat 3009; H.R. Rep. No. 104-469, at 225 (1996); see Ali, 29 I. & N.
Dec. at 223. With the IIRIRA, Congress eliminated separate exclusion and deportation
hearings and combined them into a single removal proceeding, regardless of where the
noncitizen entered the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Since 1996, only noncitizens who are
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admitted are subject to deportation, while noncitizens who have never been formally admitted
are deemed inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA provides that “in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained
[pending removal hearings].” Pursuant to this provision, noncitizens are subject to mandatory
detention while their removal proceedings are pending, but they may be released “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (citing §
1182(d)(5)(A)); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1. To trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), an examining
immigration officer must determine that an individual is (1) an applicant for admission, (2)
seeking admission, and (3) not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Martinez v.
Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d, 211, 214 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025), Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at
*6. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to a noncitizen who is both an “applicant for
admission” and “seeking admission.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Soto, 2025 WL
2976572, at *5 (collecting cases). The parties dispute whether Ali is still “seeking admission”
to the United States. (Doc. 1, at 6-7; Doc. 7, at 18).
The INA defines an applicant for admission as a noncitizen who is “present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” § 1225(a)(1);
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 286. The phrase “alien seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, so
the Court must construe the phrase based upon its ordinary meaning and statutory context.
See Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also J.A.M. v. Streeval, No. 4:25-cv-34 2 (DCL),
2025 WL 3050094, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2025). District courts in the Third Circuit and
across the country have found that “seeking admission” describes active and ongoing
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conduct, such as physically attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of
entry. Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; Del Cid, 2025 WL 2985150, at *16 n. 7; J.A.M.,
2025 WL 3050094, at *3; Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25 CV 10865, 2025 WL 2938779, at *6
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025); see Cantu-Cortes, 2025 WL 3171639, at *2 (quoting Vazquez v. Feeley,
No. 25-cv-01542, 2025 WL2676082, at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025)) (finding a noncitizen
who has already been residing in the United States cannot be characterized as “seeking entry”
consistent with the ordinary meaning of that phrase). This reading comports with the Supreme
Court’s finding in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583, U.S. 281, 285 (2018), that § 1225(b) “applies
primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States,” those who are “seeking admission
into the country.” See Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *6. This reading also preserves a distinction
between “seeking admission” and the separate term “applicant for admission,” ensuring that
each phrase carries independent meaning.3 Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6.
Section 1226 of the INA applies to noncitizens who are not seeking admission but are
already present in the United States. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89. Section 1226(a) provides
that “[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” The
Attorney General may release a noncitizen on bond or conditional parole. 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2). Pursuant to § 1226(a), “[i]mmigration authorities make an initial custody
determination, after which the noncitizen may request a bond hearing before an immigration
judge.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)). At their
3 The Court acknowledges that the Fifth Circuit recently issued a decision in Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 503 (5th Cir. 2026), holding that under the INA an “applicant
for admission” is necessarily someone who is “seeking admission.” However, Buenrostro-
Mendez is not binding on the Court, and the Court declines to follow it here.
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bond hearing, a noncitizen “may secure his release if he can convince the officer or
immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.” Nielsen v.
Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397-98 (2019); see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1.
On July 8, 2025, ICE and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced a new
practice, in which that all applicants for admission, regardless of when the noncitizen was
apprehended, are now subject to the mandatory detention provision of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Interim 	Guidance 	Regarding 	Detention 	Authority 	for 	Applicants 	for 	Admission,
https://www.aila.org/library/ice-memo-interim-guidance-regarding-detention-authority-
for-applications-for-admission (last visited March 17, 2026). On September 5, 2025, the BIA
adopted the DOJs new position, holding that immigration judges have no authority to
consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States without admission,
finding all applicants for admission are subject to detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are
ineligible for release on bond. Matter of Yajure Ali, 29 I. &N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). Several
district courts across the country, including courts in the Third Circuit, reject this new policy
and the application of § 1225(b)(2)(A) to noncitizens who have been residing in the United
States for a period of time before they are detained by ICE pending removal proceedings.
Cantu-Cortes, 2025 WL 3171639, at *2 (finding § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applicable for
petitioner who resided in the United States for approximately 25 years before ICE detained
him); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only applies for
aliens who are “seeking admission,” and petition who lived in the United States for almost
two years was not seeking admission but “already here”); Del Cid v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2985150
at *14-17 (finding noncitizens who had been in the United States for over two years when
arrested are subject to § 1226(a) not § 1225); Soto, 2025 WL 2976572 at *7 (collecting cases).
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Section 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to Ali’s detention. Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies to noncitizens who are applicants for admission and are seeking admission to the
United States. See Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 214, see Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6;
see also Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *5 (collecting cases). Ali is not actively attempting to enter
the United States. Ali has lived in the United States for over two years. (Doc. 1, at 3-4). Based
on the plain meaning of the phrase “seeking admission,” Ali sought admission when he
entered the United States on or about May 13, 2023. (Doc. 1, at 3); see Kashranov, 2025 WL
3188399, at *6 (“seeking admission describes active and ongoing conduct—physically
attempting to come into the United States, typically at a border or port of entry and presenting
oneself for inspection and authorization”). A noncitizen, like Ali, who has established himself
in the United States, making connections since his entry, is no longer at the “threshold of
initial entry.” See Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 107 (2020); see also Y-
Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1146 (D. Or. 2025). Section 1226(a) applies to
applicants for admission, like Ali, who are not actively seeking admission but who have been
residing in the United States for an extended period. Cantu-Cortes, 2025 WL 3171639, at *2
(finding § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applicable for petitioner who resided in the United
States for approximately 25 years before ICE detained him); Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399,
at *1 (finding “mandatory detention only applies for aliens who are “seeking admission,” and
petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two years was not seeking admission but
“already here”). Accordingly, Lowe improperly detained Lario under § 1225(b), when he
should have detained Lowe under § 1226(a).
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B. ALI’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN LOWE IMPROPERLY
SUBJECTED HIM TO MANDATORY DETENTION.
Lowe’s mandatory detention of Ali under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Ali’s procedural due
process rights. Ali avers that Lowe’s mandatory detention of Ali constitutes due process
violations. (Doc. 1, at 7). Lowe contends that Ali’s detention is a constitutionally permissible
part of the removal process. (Doc. 7, at 42).
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including [noncitizens],
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). To determine whether a government action violates due process,
courts apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The
Mathews balancing test weighs: (1) the private interest implicated by the government action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards; and
(3) the government’s interest, including administrative burdens of additional procedures.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.
The first factor, private interest implicated by the government action, weighs heavily
in Ali’s favor because Lowe has deprived Ali of his physical liberty through improper
detention without the possibility of bond under § 1225(b). Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507,
529 (2004) (“[T]he most elemental of liberty interests [is] the interest in being free from
physical detention by [the] government.”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (“Freedom from
imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or forms, of physical restraint-lies at the
heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects; Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8. The
second factor, risk of erroneous deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards, also
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weighs heavily in Ali’s favor because Ali remains erroneously detained without the possibility
of release on bond pursuant to § 1225(b). See Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8 (citing Barrios v.
Shepley, No. 1:25-cv-00406-JAW, 2025 WL 2772579, at *11 (D. Me. Sept. 29, 2025); Zumba
v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-14626, 2025 WL 2753496, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2025)) (finding the
second Mathews factor weighs in petitioner’s favor when subject to erroneous detention
without a showing from the government that petitioner presented a public safety or flight risk);
see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *5 (finding the lack of any individualized assessment
creates a high risk of error). The third Mathews factor, the government’s interest, also weighs
in Ali’s favor. Generally, the government’s interest in detaining noncitizens is to ensure the
appearance of noncitizens at future immigration proceedings and to prevent danger to the
community. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8. Here, Ali poses no
such risk to the government’s interest in detaining him. Lowe does not allege that Ali poses a
flight risk or danger to the community. (See Doc. 7). Further, Ali has no criminal history and
has complied will all immigration reporting requirements. (Doc. 1, at 4; Doc. 10, at 2). As
each Mathews factor weighs in Ali’s favor, his mandatory detention under § 1225(b) violates
his procedural due process rights. Accordingly, Ali’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is
GRANTED, and Lowe is ORDERED to release Ali from custody.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ali’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.
(Doc. 1). Lowe is ORDERED to release Ali from custody. Lowe is also permanently enjoined
from re-detaining Ali under § 1225(b). Ali may move to reopen this matter if Lowe seeks to
detain him under § 1226(a) and fails to schedule a timely bond hearing. The Clerk of Court is
directed to close this matter.
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An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
Dated: March 23, 2026 	/s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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