Randolph v. The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania et al

3:26-cv-00215Pamd12 de mar. de 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SHAWN LUKE RANDOLPH, 	: Civil No. 3:26-CV-215
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: (Judge Saporito)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
THE DISCIPLINARY BOARD 	:
OF THE SUPREME COURT 	:
OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the plaintiff’s
pro se civil complaint. 1 	The plaintiff, Shawn Randolph, filed this action
against the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
(“Disciplinary Board”), the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners, and
Attorney General David Winslow Sunday, Jr. 	Randolph challenges
Pennsylvania’s 	mandatory 	attorney 	licensing 	requirement 	set 	forth
under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2524. Randolph claims this provision violates
1 Doc. 1.
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his 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	right 	to 	work 	and 	pursue 	a 	chosen
profession. 2 	Randolph seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
costs. 3
Along with this complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to
proceed
in forma pauperis. 4 	We will conditionally grant the plaintiff’s
motion to proceed
in forma pauperis for screening purposes only, but
after 	a 	screening 	review, 	we 	recommend 	that 	this 	complaint 	be
dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of
Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
	pro se
complaints 	brought 	by 	plaintiffs 	given 	leave 	to 	proceed
	in 	forma
pauperis. 5 	We review such complaints to determine whether there are
frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 6 This statutory preliminary screening
2
Id. at 2.
3
Id. at 4.
4 Doc. 6.
5
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
6
Id.
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mirrors 	review 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 7
With 	respect 	to 	this 	legal 	benchmark, 	under 	federal 	pleading
standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 8 	In
determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this
pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true9 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the
non-movant.” 10 	However, 	a 	court 	is 	not 	required 	to 	accept 	legal
conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” 11
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
9
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
10
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d
Cir. 1994).
11
Id.;
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
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[A]fter
Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
. Second, a District
Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
“plausible claim for relief.”
	Id. at 1950. In other words, a
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with
its facts.
See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme
Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, 	the 	complaint 	has 	alleged—but 	it 	has 	not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ”
Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. 12
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
record. 13 	A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”14 Additionally,
if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
12
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
13
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
14
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
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attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
court may consider such document in its determination. 15 	However, the
court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion
to dismiss. 16
Finally, when reviewing a
pro se complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’” 17 	We must apply the relevant law even if the
pro se plaintiff
does not mention it by name. 18
B. This Complaint Should be Dismissed
After review, we conclude that this complaint should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The plaintiff asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violation 	of 	his 	constitutional 	right 	to 	work 	and 	pursue 	a 	chosen
15
See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002).
16
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
17
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(f)).
18
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 5 of 10
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profession under the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen 	of 	the 	United 	States 	or 	other 	person 	within 	the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress. 19
“Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under
the 	color 	of 	state 	law, 	deprives 	another 	individual 	of 	any 	rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.”20 	Section 1983 “does not create any new substantive
rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal
constitutional or statutory right.” 21
Accordingly, to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
plead two elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a
“person” acting under color of law; and (2) that conduct deprived the
19
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
20
See Shuman v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted).
21
See id. (citation omitted).
Case 3:26-cv-00215-JFS Document 8 Filed 03/12/26 Page 6 of 10
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plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States.22
Here, Randolph attempts to sue the Disciplinary Board and the
Board of Law Examiners for his violating Fourteenth Amendment right
to work and pursue a chosen profession. 	However, it is well established
that a state and its entities are not “persons” for purposes of Section
1983.23 	As arms of the state, this prohibition applies to the Disciplinary
Board and the Board of Law Examiners. 24 	Accordingly, the claims
against these defendants should be dismissed.
Moreover, 	and 	more 	fundamentally, 	a 	plaintiff 	asserting 	a
procedural due process claim under Section 1983 must allege that “(1)
she was deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed within
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of life, liberty, or property, and
22
	See Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 268 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted);
Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1141–
42 (3d Cir. 1990).
23
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
24
L. Offs. of Christopher S. Lucas & Assocs., 320 F. Supp. 2d at 296 (“the
Disciplinary Board is not a “person” who can be sued within the meaning
of § 1983.”);
Murphy v. State Bd. of L. Examiners for Com. of Pa., 429 F.
Supp. 16, 17 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (“the State Board is not a ‘person’ within the
meaning of [Section 1983]”)
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(2) the procedures available to her did not provide due process of law.” 25
Similarly, a substantive due process claim requires the plaintiff to
establish 	“a 	protected 	property 	interest 	to 	which 	the 	Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection applies.” 26 	Randolph claims Pennsylvania’s
mandatory attorney licensing regime impedes his right to follow lawful
employment in a chosen profession. 	This right falls within the purview
of “both the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” 27 	However, “[i]t is the liberty to
	pursue a calling or
occupation, and not the right to a specific job, that is secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 28 	Thus, due process is not violated when a
state has “made procedural protection available and the plaintiff has
simply refused to avail himself of them.” 29
25
Sawicki v. Kipphan, No. 1:21-CV-02031, 2023 WL 3061850, at *8 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 24, 2023) (citing
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.
2000));
see also Arneault v. O’Toole, 864 F. Supp. 2d 361, 395 (W.D. Pa.
2012).
26
Sawicki, 2023 WL 3061850, at *8–9;
see also Arneault, 864 F. Supp. 2d
at 401–02.
27
Piecknick v. Com. of Pa., 36 F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994);
see also
Sawicki, 2023 WL 3061850, at *11.
28
Piecknick, 36 F.3d at 1259 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
29
Alvin, 227 F.3d at 116.
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Here, Randolph simply refuses to avail himself of the processes
available to pursue employment as a licensed attorney. 	While the
plaintiff must overcome certain financial and educational hurdles to
practice law, such requirements are not unconstitutional. 	Accordingly,
the complaint is devoid of any allegations that Randolph is deprived of
his right to pursue a chosen profession and should be dismissed.
While we have concluded that Randolph’s complaint does not state
a claim at this time, recognizing that Randolph is a
pro se litigant, we
recommend that the court allow him an opportunity to amend his
complaint 	to 	endeavor 	to 	state 	a 	claim 	upon 	which 	relief 	may 	be
granted. 30
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED
that the plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to
the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
30
See Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,
253 (3d Cir. 2007);
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
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Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge's 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination because of that record. The judge may
also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 12th day of March 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
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