Maack v. Warden

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD MAACK,
Petitioner
V.
WARDEN, FCI-LEWISBURG,
Respondent
Civil No. 3:25-cv-2474
(Judge Mariani)
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Richard Maack ("Maack") initiated the above-captioned action by filing a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. 1). 	Maack alleges
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") denied him review under the Second Chance
Act for prerelease placement and has not recommended him for placement in prerelease
custody. (Id . at 3-4). 	For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the habeas petition
without prejudice because Maack has not properly exhausted his claims .
I. 	Background
A. 	Maack's Criminal History
Maack is serving a 26-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for his conviction of failure to collect
and pay over taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202. 	(Doc. 6-2, Declaration of BOP Unit
Manager Chase Emerson ("Emerson Deel."), at 1 ~ 3; Doc. 6-3, Public Information Inmate
Data) . According to BOP documentation submitted by Respondent, Maack's projected
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release date, via Good Conduct Time and First Step Act release, is October 12, 2026 .
(Doc . 6-2, Emerson Deel., at 1 , 3; Doc. 6-3, Public Information Inmate Data) . However, a
review of the BOP's inmate locator indicates that Maack's projected release date is now
September 27, 2026. 1
B. 	Administrative Remedy History
The Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval reveals that, while in BOP
custody, Maack filed three administrative remedies during his previous incarceration that
were related to his entry into a substance abuse program. 	(Doc. 6-2, Emerson Deel. at 2 ,
5; Doc. 6-4, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval). Those administrative remedies
are as follows.
In December 2001, Maack filed administrative remedies 255644-F1 and 255644-F2
with the institution, concerning placement in a substance abuse program. 	(Doc. 6-4, at 3).
The institution denied the remedies. 	(Id.). 	In January 2002 , Maack appealed to the
Regional Office . (Doc. 6-4, at 4). The Regional Office denied the appeal, and Maack did
not appeal to the Central Office . (See Doc. 6-4) .
C. 	Facts Related to the Second Chance Act and First Step Act
Maack's Unit Team conducted an Individualized Needs Plan-Program Review. 	(Doc.
6-2 , Emerson Deel. at 2 ,, 6-7; Doc. 6-5, Institutional Referral for Community Corrections
1 	See FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS ' INMAT E LOCATOR , https ://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (search ing
Inmate Number 51728-066) (last visited Feb . 10 , 2026) .
2
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Center ("CCC 11
) Placement). The Unit Team reviewed Maack for prerelease placement
under the five factors of the Second Chance Act of 2007, codified at 18 U.S.C . §§ 3621 and
3624 .2 (Id .). The Unit Team considered and evaluated the five factors as follows: (1) there
are available residential reentry centers ("RRCs 11
) in Maack's release area ; (2) there are no
extenuating circumstances that would preclude placement; (3) Maack has an established
res idence and community ties; (4) the sentencing court's Judgment and Commitment Order
does not contain any statements rega rding RRC placement ; and (5) there are no pertinent
pol icies from the United States Sentencing Commission. 	(Doc. 6-5 , at 3; see also 18 U.S.C.
3621 (b)). As a result of the review , the Unit Team recommended a placement date of May
21 , 2026. (Id .).
The BOP conducted a First Step Act Time Credit Assessment on December 21 ,
2025. 	(Doc. 6-2 , Emerson Deel. at 2 ~ 9; Doc . 6-6 , FSA Time Credit Assessment) . Maack
has earned 105 days of FSA time credits that have been applied to his supervised release.
(Doc. 6-2, Emerson Deel. at 3 ~ 7; Doc. 6-6, FSA Time Credit Assessment).
2 	The Second Chance Act states in pertinent part as follows :
The [BOP] shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that a pr isoner serv ing a term of
impr isonment spends a portion of the final months of that term (not to exceed 12 months) ,
under cond itions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and
prepare fo r the reentry of that prisoner into the community . Such conditions may include a
community correctional facility .
See 18 U.S.C . § 3624(c) .
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D. 	Claims Raised in the Habeas Petition
In his Section 2241 petition, Maack alleges that the BOP denied him review under
the Second Chance Act and has not recommended him for placement in prerelease
custody. (Doc. 1). 	Respondent contends that the Section 2241 petition must be dismissed
because Maack failed to exhaust his administrative remedies . (Doc. 6). Alternatively ,
Respondent argues that the petition must be denied because the Court lacks jurisdiction to
hear Maack 's claims and the BOP properly reviewed Maack for prere lease placement under
the applicable five factor analysis. 	(Id .). Because the uncontroverted record confirms that
Maack has not exhausted his administrative remedies, the Court does not reach
Respondent's alternative arguments.
II. 	Discussion
While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petitions
brought pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that "[fjederal prisoners
are ordinarily requ ired to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241 ." Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons , 98
F.3d 757 , 760 (3d Cir . 1996) (citations omitted) ; Cal/wood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d
Cir. 2000). 	Exhaustion is required because: "(1) allowing the appropr iate agency to develop
a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial rev iew ; (2) permitting agencies to
grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources ; and (3) providing agencies the
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opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy." Moscato, 98 F.3d
at 761-62 (citations omitted); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050 , 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).
However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where these
underlying reasons for exhaustion would not be served. 	See Coleman v. U.S. Parole
Comm 'n, 644 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 	For example , exhaustion is
unnecessary if the issue presented is one that involves only statutory construction. 	See
Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at
1052) . Exhaustion is also excused when it would be futile. 	See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509,516 n.7 (1982); see also Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App'x 296, 297 (3d
Cir. 2019). "In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a party must 'provide a
clear and positive showing' of futility before the District Court ." Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475
F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir . 2007) (quoting D'Amico v. CBS Corp ., 297 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir.
2002)).
To exhaust administrative remedies, a federal inmate must comply with the
procedural requirements of the BOP's administrative remedy process, which are set forth in
the Code of Federal Regulations. 	See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19. 	Under these
regulations, an inmate shall first attempt informal resolution of his complaint with staff and, if
the inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he shall submit a formal, written
request on the proper form to the designated staff member. 	See id. §§ 542 .13-542.14 . If
the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden's response , the inmate shall then submit an
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appeal to the Regional Director, using the appropriate form. 	See id . § 542 .15(a). And,
finally, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional Director's response , then the inmate
shall submit an appeal to the Office of the General Counsel , located in the BOP Central
Office , using the appropriate form. 	See id . An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his
administrative remedies until his complaint has been pursued at all levels . See id .
(explaining that an "[a]ppeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal ").
Here , the undisputed record reflects that Maack has not filed any administrative
remedies concerning his prerelease placement. 	(Doc. 6-4). The only administrative
remedies Maack filed while in BOP custody were during his previous incarceration in 2001
and 2002 and were related to his placement in a substance abuse program . (See id .).
Maack has not presented any evidence to dispute these facts . Rather than comply with the
Administrative Remedy process, Maack bypassed the statutorily mandated procedures and,
instead, filed the instant habeas petition in federal court .
Maack concedes his failure to exhaust and argues that exhaustion should be
excused as futile because "[t]he administrative remedy process routinely takes several
months to complete ." (Doc. 1, at 5; see a/so Doc. 7) . Maack thus argues that he should not
have to exhaust his administrative remedies because the administrative remedy process
could take time to complete, and he should be released before the process is completed.
(Id .). The Court , however , is unpersuaded by Maack's argument, as it does not provide a
bas is to excuse exhaustion. 	See , e.g. , Greene v. Spaulding , No. 22-cv-1726, 2023 WL
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3372375, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2023) (concluding that the Section 2241 petitioner had
failed to show irreparable harm as a basis for excusing administrative exhaustion, where he
argued that the denial of his claim at the administrative level would result in him being
released later than the date he would be entitled to release if he were granted habeas
relief-i.e., granted credits under the First Step Act); Rodriguez v. Sage, No. 22-cv-2053,
2023 WL 2309781 , at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2023) (explaining that "district courts within the
Third Circuit have repeatedly rejected the argument that an inmate can be excused from the
exhaustion requirement simply because his projected release date is approaching, and he
may not complete his administrative appeal before the release date" (collecting cases));
Ramirez v. Sage, No. 22-cv-638, 2022 WL 2318693, at *2 (M.D . Pa. June 28, 2022)
(rejecting the Section 2241 petitioner's argument that requiring him to exhaust his
administrative remedies "would subject him to irreparable harm because the delay would
result in him being incarcerated beyond the date he should be released" (citation omitted)) .
Additionally, the Court is unaware of any decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
holding that a federal prisoner may be excused from the exhaustion requirement on that
ground. The fact that Maack's sentence currently falls within the 12-month period that the
BOP could place him in pretrial release is not a basis to excuse exhaustion.3
3 	The Court notes that the Second Chance Act does not entitle a federal inmate to any
guaranteed placement in prerelease custody. See Woodall v. Fed . Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235 , 244-
51 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding , in exercising its discretion to make halfway house placement decisions, the BOP
must consider the factors set forth in § 3621 (b) ; "[h]owever , that the BOP may assign a prisoner to a CCC
does not mean that it must ").
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Maack has not identified any BOP actions that would clearly and unambiguously
violate statutory or constitutional rights , and he has not set forth any facts or advanced any
argument that wou ld permit this Court to find that exhaustion of administrative remed ies
would subject him to irreparable injury . His unsupported and conclusory claim that
exhaustion wou ld be futile is insufficient to circumvent the prudential exhaustion
requirement for Section 2241 petitions and falls short of making a "clear and positive
show ing,, of futil ity to excuse exhaustion. 	Wilson, 475 F.3d at 175 .
The Court finds that Maack 's claim must first be presented to BOP officials and fully
exhausted. 	Because Maack did not even attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies
concerning prerelease placement before petitioning this Court, and because no exception to
the exhaust ion requirement applies here , his Section 2241 petit ion must be dismissed .
Ill. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss without prejudice the petit ion for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S .C. § 2241 . (Doc. 1).
A separate Order shall issue.
Dated : February i.JL, 2026
United States District Judge
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