Davis v. Warden

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DEVANTE DAVIS,
Petitioner
v.
WARDEN,
Respondent.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-02471
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
DeVante Davis, incarcerated at FCI-Schuylkill, filed the instant petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). “If it plainly appears from the petition
and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the
judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” Rules Governing
§ 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 4 (also
applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule 1(b)); see McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994)
(“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears legally
insufficient on its face.”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the petition.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 18, 2019, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, Davis was sentenced to 65 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to being a
felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8)) and possession
of fentanyl with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)). See
United States v. Davis, No. 4:23-CR-00067, Doc. 48 (E.D. Mo.).
The Court received Davis’s habeas corpus petition on December 19, 2025. (Doc. 1).
In the petition, Davis contends that he is entitled to a 1-year reduction in his sentence because
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he has completed the Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”), but the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) has wrongly deemed him ineligible for the reduction because his conviction is being
wrongly classified as a “crime of violence.” Following two administrative orders granting
Davis extensions of time to pay the filing fee or seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the
Court received his filing fee on February 2, 2026. See (Doc. 6).
II. DISCUSSION
The BOP’s management of the RDAP is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3621. When an
inmate successfully completes “a program of residential substance abuse treatment,”
including the RDAP, his sentence “may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons” for up to one
year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2) (emphasis added). Pursuant to its authority under the statute,
the BOP has passed a regulation categorically excluding certain classes of inmates from
receiving sentence reductions when they complete the RDAP. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55. These
disqualifying offenses include any felony conviction that “involved the carrying, possession,
or use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon or explosives.” See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii).
Because RDAP placement is discretionary, “many courts have held that they lack
jurisdiction to consider challenges to RDAP early release decisions.” See VanOchten v. United
States, No. 1:25-CV-00133, 2025 WL 1644370, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2025); Harvey v.
Warden/Superintendent of USP Canaan, No. 21-CV-02150, 2022 WL 2292006, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
June 24, 2022) (listing cases). Regardless, it is clear from the petition that Davis would not be
entitled to habeas relief. Davis was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, which
disqualifies him from the RDAP reduction under the relevant regulation. Although he
contends that the BOP’s denial amounts to “considering [his] non-violent offense to be a
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crime of violence,”1 this assumption is contradicted by the BOP’s “Prior Offense Review”
attached to his petition. Specifically, the exhibit shows that he was deemed ineligible for the
RDAP reduction (18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B)) because of his “current commitment under the
current version of 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b),” which does not require any determination of a
“crime of violence.” See (Doc. 1-2); see, e.g., Jenkins v. Greene, No. 1:25-CV-730, 2025 WL
2796766, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2025) (the regulation “denies RDAP credit to inmates
convicted of crimes involving firearms not because they are ‘crimes of violence,’ but rather
simply as an exercise of the discretion granted to the BOP by Section 3621”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed. An
appropriate order follows.
Dated: March 12, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
1 Although Davis does not contend that the applicable regulations exceed the BOP’s
authority, he includes references to case law that has been cited for that purpose in other
petitions. Regardless, any such claim would lack merit, because the Supreme Court has
endorsed the language now used in 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b) (disqualifying inmates with felony
convictions involving “the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous
weapon” from the RDAP reduction) as a valid exercise of the BOP’s discretion. See Lopez v.
Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241-45 (2001); see, e.g., Taylor v. Warden, No. 3:26-CV-408, 2026 WL
579472, at *3-6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2026).
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