Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
FRANCIS F. JOSEPH,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, PIKE COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
Respondent.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-02428
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Francis F. Joseph, who is detained in the custody of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Pike County
Correctional Facility, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). He contends that his ongoing detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) is unconstitutional, and requests immediate release or a
bond hearing. For the following reasons, the Court will order that Joseph
be provided an individualized bond hearing within 21 days of this
memorandum and order.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Joseph is a native and citizen of India. He was admitted to the
United States in 2000 on an H1B visa, and in 2004, he was granted lawful
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permanent resident status.
See (Doc. 10-2 at 4). In 2023, Joseph was
convicted and sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado on charges related to
health care fraud.
See U.S. v. Joseph, No. 1:21-CR-00083-RM (Doc. 149)
(D. Colo. Jun. 5, 2023). He remained in Bureau of Prisons custody from
June 1, 2023, through December 4, 2024. During that time, ICE issued
Joseph with a Notice to Appear, charging him as removable pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony,
i.e., 	a 	crime 	of 	fraud 	or 	tax 	evasion 	resulting 	in 	a 	loss 	exceeding
$10,000.00.
See (Doc. 10-3). Joseph moved to terminate his immigration
proceedings, but his motion was denied by an immigration judge, and his
request for interlocutory appeal was denied by the Board of Immigration
Appeals. (Docs. 10-6, 10-7).
Upon his December 4 release from the BOP, Joseph was detained
by ICE and held at the Clinton County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”).
On 	April 	29, 	2025, 	with 	his 	removal 	proceedings 	ongoing, 	he 	was
transferred to the Pike County Correctional Facility (“PCCF”), where he
remains 	today.
	See 	(Docs. 	10-4, 	10-5). 	On 	November 	10, 	2025, 	an
immigration judge ordered Joseph removed to India and denied his
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applications for withholding of removal and for relief under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture. (Doc. 10-9). Joseph appealed that
decision on December 6, 2025 (Doc. 10-10), and that appeal remains
pending.
At this time, Joseph has been held in ICE pre-removal custody,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), for more than 14 months.
II. 	DISCUSSION
A district court may issue a writ of
habeas corpus when a petitioner
“is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Thus, courts may consider
habeas
corpus petitions filed by immigration detainees who challenge their
continued detention as unconstitutionally excessive.
	See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018).
Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides for
mandatory pre-removal detention of individuals previously convicted of
certain criminal offenses.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B) (“The Attorney
General shall take into custody any alien who . . . is deportable by reason
of having committed any offense covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),
A(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title.”). Under this statute, an individual
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detained under section 1226(c) may be released only if the Attorney
General decides that the release is necessary to protect a witness and the
individual is not a flight risk and does not pose a danger to society.
See
id., 	§ 1226(c)(2). 	Thus, 	“section 	1226(c) 	does 	not 	give 	the 	Attorney
General 	any 	authority 	to 	release 	these 	[individuals] 	on 	bond.”
	See
Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir.
2015) (citing
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)).
In
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303-06 (2018), the Supreme
Court held that the language of § 1226(c) authorized unlimited detention
pending removal proceedings of an alien who is deportable based on their
criminal activity, and that no implicit restraint on the duration of that
detention can be read into the statute.
Jennings, however, left open the
possibility “that detention under § 1226(c) may violate due process if
unreasonably long.”1
Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906
F.3d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 2018);
see also Ojo v. Warden Elizabeth Det. Ctr.,
1 	On 	January 	23, 	2026, 	the 	parties 	were 	directed 	to 	file
supplemental briefs addressing the application of
Khalil v. President, 169
F.4th 259 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2026), to this petition. Neither party disputes
that the Court retains subject matter jurisdiction, given that the petition
is a challenge to the petitioner’s “prolonged detention,”
see Khalil, 164
F.4th at 277, rather than the removal proceedings themselves.
See (Docs.
15, 16).
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808 Fed. App’x 61, 65 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
To prevail on such a claim, “an alien must show that as applied in
his or her case, application of the statute is so arbitrary and unreasonable
that it constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of liberty.”
Ojo, 808 Fed. App’x
at 65. The Third Circuit has adopted “a nonexhaustive list of four factors
to 	consider 	in 	assessing 	whether 	an 	alien’s 	detention 	has 	grown
unreasonable”: (1) the duration of detention; (2) the likelihood that
detention will continue; (3) the reasons for the delay; and (4) whether the
alien’s 	conditions 	of 	confinement 	are 	“meaningfully 	different” 	from
criminal 	punishment.
	German 	Santos 	v. 	Warden 	Pike 	Cnty. 	Corr.
Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2020).
As the Third Circuit has recognized, “[t]he most important factor is
the duration of detention.”
German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. Joseph has
now been in ICE pre-removal custody for 14½ months. Although perhaps
a close call, we find that this duration of detention weighs in favor of
granting the requested habeas relief.
See Nunez v. Oddo, No. 25-CV-143,
2025 WL 2443437, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2025) (finding that detention
of “just over [] 14 months” without a bond hearing “weigh[ed] strongly”
in favor of granting habeas relief);
Davydov v. Doll, No. 1:19-cv-2110,
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2020 WL 969618, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2020) (over 14 months);
Malcolm A.H. v. Green, 403 F. Supp. 3d 398, 402 (D.N.J. 2019) (“14-plus
months”);
Bah v. Doll, No. 3:18-CV-1409, 2018 WL 6733959, at *7 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 16, 2018) (exceeding 14 months),
R. & R. adopted, 2018 WL
5829668 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2018);
cf. Saint Jacques v. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., No. 1:21-cv-1144, 2021 WL 4494623, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021)
(finding detention period of less than 14 months did not weigh in favor of
habeas relief);
Dryden v. Green, 321 F. Supp. 3d 496, 502–03 (D.N.J.
2018) (“just over a year”).
The second factor, the likelihood that detention will continue, favors
granting habeas relief. Joseph is appealing his removal order to the BIA,
and expresses his intent to appeal to the Third Circuit if necessary.2 The
respondent argues that Joseph’s removal order is “likely to become final
within the calendar year,” (Doc. 10 at 17), but the status of Joseph’s
appeal process supports habeas relief, even if the appeal may be resolved
in less than a year.3
See German Santos, 965 F.3d at 212 (“[Appeal to the
2 	Joseph also claims to be “pursuing multiple other collateral
remedies” (Doc. 1 at 14), but he does not specify what those are or how
they would entitle him to relief or lengthen his detention.
3 For this reason, the respondent’s argument that this factor “relies
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BIA] could take months. And if the Board dismisses his appeal, he may
petition this Court for review. That too would add months more in
prison.”) (citations omitted);
Ologbenla v. Lowe, No. 3:25-CV-1351, 2025
WL 2375272, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 2025);
Shonhai v. Lowe, No. 3:24-
229, 2025 WL 510975, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2025);
see also Suite v.
Larose, No. 25-CV-2613, 2026 WL 116424, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2026)
(noting that the Third Circuit “averages approximately 8.5 months to
dispose of an appeal”) (citation omitted).
The third factor requires the court to consider the reason for the
delay. The respondent states that Joseph’s immigration proceedings have
“moved 	forward 	at 	the 	normal 	rate 	for 	noncitizens 	who 	contest
removability and apply for relief.” There is no allegation of any delay
caused by bad faith or improper conduct by any party.
See (Doc. 1 at 14-
15, Doc. 10 at 17-18). Therefore, this factor is neutral in the analysis.
See
German Santos, 956 F.3d at 212;
Ologbenla, 2025 WL 2375272, at *3.
The fourth factor is whether Joseph’s conditions of confinement
on unhelpful hypothesizing . . . and improperly requires litigants to argue
to this Court the merits of their position at the administrative level,”
(Doc. 10 at 17), does not foreclose consideration in Joseph’s favor.
See
Shonhai v. Lowe, No. 3:24-229, 2025 WL 510975, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
14, 2025) (addressing the same argument).
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differ meaningfully from criminal punishment. In
German Santos, the
Third Circuit held that an immigration habeas petitioner’s detention
alongside convicted criminals at the PCCF was “indistinguishable” from
criminal punishment.
See 965 F.3d at 212-13. Joseph contends, and the
government does not dispute, that he has been similarly detained among
convicted criminals at the CCCF and PCCF.
In addition, Joseph, formerly a practicing physician4, alleges that
he suffers ongoing medical harm from his conditions of confinement. He
describes himself as immunocompromised due to ulcerative colitis and
diabetes, and alleges that he has 10-15 bowel movements per day and
must wear adult diapers. At the CCCF, where he was held until April 29,
2025, he alleges that the conditions were unsanitary, and he developed
toenail fungus, staph infections, and eczema “because of substandard
care.” At the PCCF, the prison allegedly provides “chucks” instead of
diapers and will not provide a particular kind of insulin that Joseph
believes he requires. He generally alleges that his various illnesses, in
combination, represent a “ticking time bomb” based on the inadequate
4
See United States v. Joseph, 108 F.4th 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2024);
(Doc. 13-1 at 8-23).
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treatment offered at the PCCF.
See (Doc. 1 at 15-19).
The respondent did not specifically address Joseph’s allegations
about prison conditions, but accepts
German Santos’s holding that the
conditions 	at 	the 	PCCF 	were 	found 	“punitive 	as 	to 	immigration
detainees,” and thus weigh in favor of Joseph’s entitlement to a bond
hearing.
See (Doc. 10 at 18). Despite the limited evidentiary record, this
factor weighs strongly in favor of a bond hearing, particularly given
Joseph’s 	documented5 	medical 	issues.
	See,
	e.g.,
	Ibrahim, 	2026 	WL
116489, at *5;
Maksaddzhon A. v. Pittman, No. 25-CV-13734 (MCA), 2025
WL 3648710, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2025) (a detainee’s medical needs are
relevant to whether his conditions of confinement are “meaningfully
different” from criminal punishment);
	Malede v. Lowe, No. 1:22-CV-
01031, 2022 WL 3084304, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2022) (“Malede’s
5 The Court does not, as Joseph requests, take “judicial notice” of
facts about his medical care based purely on his own allegations.
See
(Doc. 1 at 15); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). However, Joseph offers supporting
evidence for some of his claims, such as a request to staff dated May 28,
2025: (“I need my diapers. [B]een asking for 3 days in a row every shift.
I have been wearing the same diaper for 3 days this is inhumane!”). The
staff responded: “[R]eviewed, diapers delivered tonight, apologies and we
will prevent this from happening again.”).
See (Doc. 1-1). He also attaches
evidence indicating that he was prescribed Jardiance, and unspecified
“fungal treatment” for toenail fungus, which were delayed indefinitely.
See (Doc. 1-3 at 1-3). The respondent has not disputed these facts.
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conditions 	of 	confinement 	also 	strongly 	favor 	a 	finding 	of
unreasonableness, particularly in light of his medical concerns.”).
However, 	the 	foregoing 	analysis 	does 	not 	entitle 	Joseph 	to
immediate release.
See,
e.g.,
Van v. Oddo, No. 3:25-CV-00322, 2025 WL
3492736 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2025);
Appiah v. Lowe, No. 3:24-CV-2222, 2025
WL 510974, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2025) (finding that the court “cannot
grant [immediate] release from custody,” and is “limited to resolving
whether [the petitioner] is entitled to an individualized bond hearing”);
cf. Tropskii v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3226, 2025 WL 3016518 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
28, 2025) (granting immediate release in a “novel” case where there was
“no evidence that [the § 1226(c) detainee] was convicted of a crime,” and
therefore a bond hearing was by definition “not sufficient to accord [him]
his due process rights”).
Joseph has also filed motions requesting a “constitutional due
process in-person hearing with an Article III judge” and a temporary
restraining order enjoining the respondent from “detaining [Joseph] in
violation of his due process rights.” (Docs. 12, 13). Because Joseph will be
afforded a constitutionally adequate bond hearing, the requested relief is
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moot.6
See Quinteros v. Sabol, No. 4:15-CV-02098, 2016 WL 6525295, at
*1-2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2016).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Considering the applicable factors, Joseph has sufficiently shown
that 	his 	ongoing 	detention 	has 	become 	unreasonable. 	Joseph 	must
receive an individualized bond determination within 21 days, for which
the 	government 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	demonstrating 	by 	clear 	and
convincing evidence that his continued detention is needed to prevent
him from fleeing or harming the community.
See German Santos, 965
F.3d at 213-14. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 23, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
6 Joseph argues at length that he is not a flight risk or a danger to
the community, and he may have intended to request that the Court,
rather than an immigration judge, conduct a bond hearing. A district
court may, in certain circumstances, make a bond determination based
on its inherent power to enforce a writ of
	habeas corpus.
	See,
	e.g.,
Chiguano v. Lowe, No. 1:24-CV-02210, 2025 WL 3187161, at *4 (M.D. Pa.
Nov. 14, 2025). Regardless, Joseph has not presented evidence that a
bond determination by an immigration judge would be inadequate.
See,
e.g.,
Cahuec v. Soto, No. 25-CV-17389 (GC), 2025 WL 3524463, at *1-2
(D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2025) (denying preliminary injunctive relief premised on
petitioner’s “speculation” that a bond hearing by an immigration judge
would not protect0 his due process rights).
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