Arrington v. Evans et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LATY J. ARRINGTON,
Petitioner
V.
CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-2241
(JUDGE MANNION)
SUPERINTENDENT EVANS,
Respondent
MEMORANDUM
This is a habeas corpus case filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 	§2254 in
which petitioner challenges the legality of a 2019 conviction and sentence in
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The petition will be dismissed
without prejudice as moot and untimely.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Laty Jerome Arrington , was convicted of manufacture or
delivery of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance in 2019. Commonwealth v. Arrington, 236 A.3d 1136
(table), No. 913 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 2070386, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 29,
2020). He was sentenced to 24-120 months of imprisonment on February
27 , 2019. 	Id. 	at *2. 	He appealed, 	and the Pennsylvania Superior Court
affirmed the judgment of sentence on April 29, 2020. Id. at *8. Arrington did
not seek further review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth
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v. Arrington, 292 A.3d 1122 (table), No. 456 MDA 2022, 2023 WL 395785,
at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2023).
Arrington filed a petition for collateral relief under Pennsylvania's Post-
Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") on February 8, 2021. (Doc. 1 at 4). The Court
of Common Pleas denied the PCRA petition on February 25, 2022. Arrington,
2023 WL 395785, at *1. Arrington appealed , and the Superior Court affirmed
the denial on January 25, 2023. Id. at * 6. He then filed a petition for allowance
of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on June
27, 2023. Commonwealth v. Arrington, 300 A.3d 1005 (Pa. 2023).
Arrington filed the instant case on November 17 , 2025, and the court
received and docketed it on November 24, 2025. (Doc. 1). On December 3,
2025, Arrington filed a letter informing the court that he has been released
from custody. (Doc. 4 ).
On December 8, 2025, the court issued an order requiring Arrington to
show cause why the case should not be dismissed as untimely pursuant to
United States v. Bendolph , 409 F.3d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2005). (Doc. 6). The
court add itionally directed Arrington to show cause why the case shou ld not
be dismissed as moot based 	on 	his release from prison. 	(/d.) The court
directed Arrington to respond to the order no later than January 7, 2026. (Id.)
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That deadline has since passed , and Arrington has neither responded to the
order nor requested an extension of time to do so .
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 4 of the rules governing habeas corpus petitions under 28
U.S.C. §2254, a district court must promptly review a petition and dismiss it
if it is plain from the face of the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief. 28 U.S.C. §2254 Rule 4. A district court may sua sponte dismiss a
habeas corpus petition as untimely pursuant to a Rule 4 review if the court
first gives the petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond . Bendolph , 409
F.3d at 158.
Ill. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Mootness
As a preliminary matter, Arrington's petition 	is subject to dismissal
because it is moot. Although a habeas corpus petition is not moot when a
petitioner can show that there are "collateral consequences" flowing from the
petitioner's 	conviction 	or 	sentence 	and 	collateral 	consequences 	are
ordinarily 	presumed 	when 	a petitioner 	is 	challenging 	the 	legality of his
underlying criminal conviction , see Burkey v. Mayberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148
(3d Cir. 2009), here the court ordered Arrington to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed as moot and he failed to respond. The court will
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accordingly dismiss the petition as moot based on Arrington's failure to show
the existence of collateral consequences.
B. 	Timeliness
The petition is also subject to dismissal because it is untimely. Section
2254 petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, which begins
to run from the latest of:
(A) 	the 	date 	on 	which 	the 	judgment 	became 	final 	by 	the
conclusion 	of direct 	review 	or the 	expiration 	of the time for
seeking such review;
(8) the date on which the impediment to filing 	an 	application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed , if the applicant was prevented from
fi ling by such State action ;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized 	by 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	and 	made 	retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.
28 	U.S.C. §2244(d)(1 ). The 	limitations 	period 	is 	tolled 	during 	the
pendency of a "properly filed " application for post-conviction rel ief in state
court. Id. §2244(d)(2). The limitations period may also be equitably tolled if
the petitioner shows "(1) that he has been pursu i ng his rights diligently, and
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(2) 	that 	some 	extraordinary 	circumstance 	stood 	In 	his 	way." 	Pace 	v.
Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
In addition to statutory and equitable tolling, the limitations period may
be 	excused 	under 	the 	actual 	innocence 	exception, 	which 	requires 	a
petitioner to present new evidence that shows "it is more likely than not that
no 	reasonable juror would 	have convicted the 	petitioner." 	McQuiggin 	v.
Perkins, 	569 	U.S. 	383, 	394-95 	(2013) 	(internal 	alterations 	omitted). 	A
petitioner invoking the actual innocence exception must "(1) present new,
reliable evidence of his innocence; and (2) show by a preponderance of the
evidence that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him (i.e., a reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt about
his guilt) in light of the new evidence." Wallace v. Mahanoy, 2 F.4th 133, 151
(3d Cir. 2021 ).
Under Section 2244(d)(1 )(A), Arrington had one year from the date his
conviction became final to seek federal habeas corpus relief via 28 U.S.C.
§2254. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1 )(A). His conviction became final on May 29,
2020, 	the 	last date 	he 	could 	have sought 	review 	by 	the 	Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Pa . R. App. P. 1113(a). The limitations period ran for 255
days until February 8, 	2021 , when the filing of Arrington's PCRA petition
statutorily tolled the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). The statutory
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tolling continued until June 27, 2023, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied his petition for allowance of appeal and therefore ended the appellate
process for his PCRA petition. Arrington, 300 A.3d at 1005. At that point,
based on the 255 days that had already elapsed towards the end of the
limitations period , Arrington had 110 days remaining to timely file his petition,
meaning that he was required to file it no later than October 16 , 2023. 1 He
did not file his petition until November 17 , 2025, 2 making it untimely by over
two years .
As noted above, Arrington has not responded to the court's order to
show cause and accordingly has not provided any arguments for equitable
or statutory tol l ing 	of the 	limitations period. 	In 	his petition , however, he
asserts that the petition should be treated as timely because it is based on
"[n]ewly discovered facts that could not be discovered through due diligence
as a resu lt of the COVID- 19 lock down. " (Doc. 1 at 13).
This argument is meritless. To show that the limitations period for a
Section 2254 habeas petition is triggered by new evidence requires a "highly
1 The 110-day period would have ordinarily expired on October 15,
2023, but because that date was a Sunday, the deadline is automatically
extended to October 16 , 2023. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1 )(C).
2 The petition is deemed filed on the date it was submitted to prison
officials for mailing rather than on the date the court received it pursuant to
the prisoner mailbox rule.
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fact- 	and 	context-specific analysis" of what facts 	petitioner knew at the
relevant time, when he learned of the factual basis for his claims, and what
steps he took to exercise reasonable diligence to find the facts before that
date. Bracey v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 986 F.3d 274, 285 (3d Cir.
2021 ). Arrington has not offered any of this factual information in his petition.
He 	simply states 	in 	conclusory fashion 	that his claims 	represent 	newly
discovered evidence and that he could not have discovered the evidence at
an earlier date and does not provide any factual support for his assertions.
Moreover, 	Arrington's 	assertion 	that 	he 	could 	not 	discover 	the
purportedly 	new 	evidence 	because 	of 	the 	COVID-19 	lockdown 	is
nonsensical 	on 	its face. Arrington appears to 	be arguing that COVID-19
lockdowns 	prevented 	him 	from 	learning 	the 	relevant 	facts 	prior to 	his
judgment of sentence 	in 	February 2019. 	But the first reported cases of
COVID-19 did not occur until late 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic did not
begin to meaningfully affect life in the United States until March 2020.
There is also no basis to deem the petition timely filed based on the
actual 	innocence 	exception. 	Arrington 	has 	not 	advanced 	any 	actual
innocence arguments, and it is his burden to do so. McQuiggin, 569 U.S. at
394-95. Hence, because Arrington's petition is untimely and there is no basis
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to 	toll 	the 	limitations 	period 	or 	excuse 	it 	under 	the 	actual 	innocence
exception , the petition will be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons , this case will be dismissed without prejudice
as moot and untimely. A certificate of appealability will not issue because
jurists of reason would not debate the correctness of this procedural ruling.
Slack v. McDaniel, 	529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). An appropriate order shall
issue.
Dated:
25-2241-01
Mannion
ni e 	s District Judge
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