Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

Page 1 of 35
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAMILABEN D. PATEL,
Petitioner,
v.
ANGELA HOOVER,
Respondent.
: 	NO. 3:25-CV-02181
:
: 	(SAPORITO, D.J.)
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Indefinite, 	unreviewable 	executive 	detention 	is 	anathema 	to 	a
functional democracy. Respondent argues that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention, of no specified duration, and that no district court
can review that detention for any reason. But where “a person is detained
by executive order, rather than, say, after being tried and convicted in a
court, the need for collateral review is most pressing.” Boumediene v.
Bush, 	553 	U.S. 	723, 	783 	(2008). 	Because 	habeas 	corpus 	is 	a 	core
constitutional guarantee, placing a check on what would otherwise be
unfettered executive authority to restrain an individual’s liberty, “the
writ must be effective.” Id. And, because Petitioner has satisfied her
burden to show that the government is detaining her unlawfully, the
undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court grant the writ of
habeas corpus and order her released immediately.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 1 of 35

Page 2 of 35
I. 	BACKGROUND
The facts underlying this petition are not in dispute. Petitioner,
Ramilaben D. Patel, is an immigration detainee currently held at the
Clinton County Correctional Facility in McElhattan, Pennsylvania, and
she has filed a counseled Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241. Habeas Petition, Doc. 1. Petitioner is a native and
citizen 	of 	India. 	Id. 	¶ 17. 	She 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	without
inspection near San Ysidro, California, on June 25, 2022. Id. ¶ 2. Shortly
thereafter, she was apprehended by Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”)
and detained for approximately 24 hours. Id. The day after Patel was
detained, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released her on
her 	own 	recognizance 	and 	issued 	a 	Notice 	to 	Appear 	(NTA) 	in
Immigration Court, charging her as being an alien present in the United
States without admission or parole. Id. In February 2023, Petitioner’s
husband 	timely 	filed 	an 	I-589 	Application 	for 	Asylum 	with 	U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), listing Petitioner and
their children as derivatives, that is currently pending. Id. ¶ 3. As asylum
applicants, Petitioner and her family have work authorization and social
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 2 of 35

Page 3 of 35
security numbers. Id. There are no allegations of any criminal conduct or
convictions. 1
In November 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
officers arrested Petitioner at her place of employment in Bloomsburg,
Pennsylvania, and charged her with entering the United States without
admission or inspection. Id. ¶ 4. DHS refused to release Petitioner from
immigration custody in accordance with a new DHS policy issued on July
8, 2025, that instructed all ICE employees to regard all non-citizens who
unlawfully 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	to 	be 	subject 	to 	mandatory
detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A), 	and 	thus 	ineligible 	to 	be
released on bond. Id. ¶ 5.
Petitioner is detained at Clinton County Correctional Facility in
McElhattan, 	Pennsylvania, 	and 	is 	in 	the 	physical 	custody 	of
Respondent. 2 Id. ¶ 10. After arresting Petitioner, ICE did not set bond
1 Respondent claims that Patel is detained while appealing a “removal
order,” but provides no evidence that she has ever been ordered removed.
Doc. 7 at 1. Respondent also later responds to arguments about an
“automatic stay” provision that Petitioner has not made and that have no
bearing here. Id. at 2, 45-47.
2 Petitioner lists multiple officials as Respondents, while the government,
without 	explanation 	or 	argument, 	lists 	only 	CCCF 	Warden 	Angela
Hoover. In previous similar cases, the government has asserted that,
pursuant to the “immediate custodian rule,” the only proper respondent
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 3 of 35

Page 4 of 35
and Petitioner did not attempt to seek review by an immigration judge of
her custody, due to the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA” or “Board”) in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA
2025), which held that an immigration judge has no authority to consider
bond requests for any person who entered the United States without
admission. Id. ¶¶ 6, 17.
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring that she be
immediately released, or, in the alternative, ordering Respondent to
in a case such as this is the warden of the facility where the Petitioner is
detained. “The federal habeas statute straightforwardly provides that
the proper respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody
over [the petitioner].’” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434 (2004)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242); 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“[t]he writ, or order to show
cause shall be directed to the person having custody of the person
detained”); see Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 444
(3d Cir. 2021) (“if a § 2241 petitioner does not adhere to the immediate
custodian rule, then the district court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the
petition”). 	As 	Patel 	is 	detained 	at 	the 	Clinton 	County 	Correctional
Facility, 	Hoover 	is 	the 	proper 	respondent. 	(Doc. 	1, 	¶ 1). 	All 	other
respondents should be dismissed. However, as Hoover is acting as an
agent 	of 	the 	federal 	government 	by 	detaining 	Patel 	on 	behalf 	of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the government will be
bound by the Court’s judgment. See Madera v. Decker, 18 Civ. 7314, 2018
WL 10602037, at *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2018) (finding the warden acts
as an agent of the ICE regional director when ICE makes initial custody
determinations including setting of a bond and review of conditions of
release). It amounts to a distinction without a practical difference.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 4 of 35

Page 5 of 35
provide a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days. Id. ¶ 9. The
parties have fully briefed the issues, and the petition is ripe. Docs. 1, 7,
8.
II. 	JURISDICTION
As explained further below, this Court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a person in custody
in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003). “[A]bsent suspension, the writ
of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within
the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004), citing
U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Petitioner was detained within this Court’s
jurisdiction and by a custodian within this Court’s jurisdiction when she
filed the Petition, and she asserts that her continued detention violates
due process. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction over her claims.
Trump 	v. 	J. 	G. 	G., 	604 	U.S. 	670, 	672 	(2025) 	(per 	curiam) 	(noting
jurisdiction for “core habeas petitions” lies in the district of confinement).
District Courts also have jurisdiction in “all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the ability to grant equitable relief in the absence
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 5 of 35

Page 6 of 35
of an exclusive statutory review scheme. Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229,
242 (3d Cir. 2014). The district court has referred this case to the
undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, which authorizes, among other
things, 	the 	undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	to 	prepare 	reports 	and
recommendations on potentially dispositive matters.
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner 	argues 	that 	DHS’s 	newly 	instituted 	application 	of
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), as set forth in Hurtado, violates
the plain language of the INA. Doc. 1 ¶ 7. Respondent counters first that,
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9), and because Petitioner failed
to exhaust her administrative remedies, this Court lacks jurisdiction over
Petitioner’s claims. Response to Petition, Doc. 7 at 1-2. Next, Respondent
maintains that Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) is proper here.
Id. 	Petitioner 	has 	“the 	burden 	of 	sustaining 	[her] 	allegations 	by 	a
preponderance of evidence.” 	Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286
(1941).
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
recommends that the Court reject Respondent’s arguments as to both
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 6 of 35

Page 7 of 35
jurisdiction 	and 	the 	lawfulness 	of 	detention, 	and 	order 	Petitioner
released.
A. 	This 	Court 	has 	jurisdiction 	to 	review 	Petitioner’s
detention
1. 	Section 1252(g) Does Not Strip This Court of
Jurisdiction.
Respondent contends that the INA strips jurisdiction from district
courts over challenges to administrative detention, and therefore this
Court cannot entertain this petition. A plain reading of the statutes does
not support Respondent’s argument, as the Supreme Court has agreed.
Even if the statutes could be read to purport to preclude review of this
petition, Respondent fails to address how such an outcome would not run
afoul of the Suspension Clause.
Respondent first argues that:
Section 1252(g) specifically deprives courts of jurisdiction,
including habeas corpus jurisdiction, to review “any cause or
claim by or on behalf of an alien arising from the decision or
action by the Attorney General to [1] commence proceedings,
[2] adjudicate cases, or [3] execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Section 1252(g)
eliminates jurisdiction “[e]xcept as provided in this section
and notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), 	including 	section 	2241 	of 	title 	28, 	United
States 	Code, 	or 	any 	other 	habeas 	corpus 	provision, 	and
sections 1361 and 1651 of such title.”
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 7 of 35

Page 8 of 35
Doc. 7 at 15.
Nothing 	in 	§ 1252(g) 	precludes 	district 	courts 	from 	exercising
habeas jurisdiction over the detention of individuals in administrative
immigration proceedings. “The provision applies only to three discrete
actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’”
Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)
(emphasis in original).3 Petitioner does not ask this Court to review the
decision or action to commence immigration proceedings against her, nor
to adjudicate her case, nor to impose or eventually execute a removal
order. Petitioner only seeks review of her ongoing detention, a heartland
habeas corpus claim. Section 1252(g) does not prevent the Court from
exercising jurisdiction under § 2241 over such a claim.
Respondent next argues that jurisdiction is also barred by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9):
Second, under § 1252(b)(9), “judicial review of all questions of
law . . . including interpretation and application of statutory
provisions . . . arising from any action taken . . . to remove an
3 Respondent cites to Reno (Doc. 7 at 17), but ignore the Court’s limited
reading of § 1252(g), and do not attempt to square the case with their
contention that the provision strips jurisdiction over far more than the
“three discrete actions” specified by the Court.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 8 of 35

Page 9 of 35
alien 	from 	the 	United 	States” 	is 	only 	proper 	before 	the
appropriate federal court of appeals in the form of a petition
for review of a final removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9);
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S.
471, 	483 	(1999). 	Section 	1252(b)(9) 	is 	an 	“unmistakable
‘zipper’ clause” that “channels judicial review of all [claims
arising from deportation proceedings]” to a court of appeals in
the first instance.
Doc. 7 at 17.
Again, on its face, Section 1252(b)(9) does not purport to deprive the
courts of jurisdiction over petitions like the one before the Court that seek
a writ of habeas corpus and challenge the legality of detention. Petitioner
does not ask this Court to interfere with any “action taken to remove” her
from the United States. See Traverse, Doc. 8 at 6. She challenges only the
statute under which she is being detained and to the denial of a bond
hearing. Id.; see Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294-95 (2018) (“For
present purposes, it is enough to note that Respondents are not asking
for review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to
detain them in the first place or to seek removal; and they are not even
challenging any part of the process by which their removability will be
determined. Under these circumstances, § 1252(b)(9) does not present a
jurisdictional bar.”).
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 9 of 35

Page 10 of 35
Respondent points to the Supreme Court’s “guidance” in Jennings
to support their position:
The Court found that Ҥ 1252(b)(9) [did] not present a
jurisdictional bar” in situations where “respondents . . .
[were] not challenging the decision to detain them in the
first place.” [Jennings, 583 U.S.] at 294–95. In this case,
Petitioner does challenge the government’s decision to
detain her in the first place. Though Petitioner may
attempt 	to 	frame 	this 	challenge 	as 	one 	relating 	to
detention authority, rather than a challenge to DHS’s
decision to detain her pending her removal proceedings
in the first instance, such creative framing does not
evade the preclusive effect of § 1252(b)(9).
Doc. 7 at 20. But Petitioner does not, in fact, challenge “the government’s
decision to detain her in the first place.” She challenges the government’s
continuing detention of her. Nowhere does she contend that her arrest by
DHS 	was 	unlawful, 	nor 	that 	her 	initial 	detention 	was 	illegal.
Respondent’s own “creative framing” misses the mark and misconstrues
both Petitioner’s arguments and Jennings. 4
4 Respondent also highlights portions of Khalil v. President, U.S., Nos.
25-2162 & 25-2357, 2026 WL 111933 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2026), in their
Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 10) to support their argument
that, 	like 	the 	Petitioner 	in 	Khalil, 	Petitioner 	in 	the 	instant 	case
challenges her removal and not simply her detention. However, unlike
Petitioner in Khalil, Petitioner here is not challenging the legality of her
arrest or detention, but rather the statute under which she is being
detained and her entitlement to a bond hearing. In fact, Khalil reaffirms
that, when challenges are limited to the legality of detention, such habeas
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 10 of 35

Page 11 of 35
As 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	explained, 	“It 	may 	be 	argued 	that”
Petitioner’s 	claims 	regarding 	detention 	arise 	from 	deportation
proceedings “in the sense that if those actions had never been taken, [she]
would not be in custody at all. But this expansive interpretation of
§ 1252(b)(9) would lead to staggering results.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 293.
The Court reviewed certain claims that might be said to “arise from”
removal proceedings under the construction the Respondent offers here,
including conditions of confinement, and found that “cramming judicial
review of those questions into the review of final removal orders would
be absurd.” Id.
Interpreting ‘arising from’ in this extreme way would also
make claims of prolonged detention effectively unreviewable.
By the time a final order of removal was eventually entered,
the allegedly excessive detention would have already taken
place. And of course, it is possible that no such order would
ever be entered in a particular case, depriving that detainee
of any meaningful chance for judicial review.
Id.
Indeed, 	the 	“staggering 	results” 	of 	such 	an 	interpretation 	of
§ 1252(b)(9) are easy to imagine. Under such a regime of unreviewable,
petitions are still properly brought “in federal district court despite
§ 1252(b)(9).” Khalil at 29.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 11 of 35

Page 12 of 35
indefinite executive detention, any person could be taken into custody
and held for any amount of time, without recourse. If, as the Respondent
contends, the government need only recite that it detains a person subject
to deportation proceedings to preclude the courts from reviewing that
detention, then the executive has unlimited authority to detain anyone,
for any amount of time, without review. And if the only review becomes
available when a final order is entered, the government could simply
refrain from issuing a final order, and detention could last indefinitely.
In response to this precise hypothetical, the Court of Appeals for the
Third 	Circuit 	recently 	reaffirmed 	in 	Mahmoud 	Khalil 	v. 	President,
United States of America, that “if the government did detain an alien and
then tried to evade judicial review by refusing to enter a final order of
removal for a long time. . . the alien could bring a prolonged detention
challenge in federal district court despite § 1252(b)(9).” Nos. 25-2162 &
25-2357, 2026 WL 111933, at 29 (3d Cir. Jan. 15, 2026).
This is precisely why the writ of habeas corpus exists, and why the
Founders guaranteed the availability of the writ, which can only be
suspended as specified in the Suspension Clause. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9,
cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 12 of 35

Page 13 of 35
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (“[T]he constitutional
privilege of habeas corpus [is] not to be withdrawn except in conformance
with the Suspension Clause[.]”).
Confronted 	with 	a 	similar 	argument 	by 	the 	government 	that
indefinite executive detention was unreviewable by the courts because of
a jurisdiction-stripping statute, the Supreme Court recalled the words of
Alexander Hamilton, who summed up the importance of the writ of
habeas corpus to the preservation of a limited government:
[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all
ages, 	the 	favorite 	and 	most 	formidable 	instruments 	of
tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone . . . are
well worthy of recital: 	“To bereave a man of life . . . or by
violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial,
would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must
at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole
nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying
him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is
a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous
engine of arbitrary government.” 	And as a remedy for this
fatal 	evil 	he 	is 	everywhere 	peculiarly 	emphatical 	in 	his
encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which in one place he
calls “the bulwark of the British Constitution.”
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 744, quoting The Federalist No. 84.
As the Court then explained, “In our own system the Suspension
Clause is designed to protect against these cyclical abuses.”
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 13 of 35

Page 14 of 35
The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a means
consistent with the essential design of the Constitution. It
ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the
Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain
the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest
safeguard of liberty. The Clause protects the rights of the
detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary
to call the jailer to account.
Id. at 745, quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
Thus, even if Respondent’s reading of the statutes was correct,
habeas jurisdiction would still lie because the elimination of jurisdiction
under the circumstances presented here would violate the Suspension
Clause.
To determine whether a jurisdiction-stripping statute violates the
Clause, the Court applies a two-step analysis. Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y
Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 2018), citing Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 723. The Court first determines “whether a given habeas petitioner is
prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause due to some attribute of
the 	petitioner 	or 	to 	the 	circumstances 	surrounding 	his 	arrest 	or
detention.” Id., citing Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d
422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016). Then, if the petitioner is not prohibited from
invoking the Suspension Clause, we “turn to the question whether the
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 14 of 35

Page 15 of 35
substitute for habeas is adequate and effective to test the legality of the
petitioner’s detention.” Id., quoting Castro, 835 F.3d at 445.
In assessing the first factor, the Boumediene Court considered three
sets of factors to determine whether detainees at Guantanamo Bay may
seek the writ: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the
adequacy of the process through which that status determination was
made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention
took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the
prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.” 553 U.S. at 766. Like the “status of
the detainees” at Guantanamo Bay, Petitioner’s “status” as a detainee in
DHS custody “militates against denial of the writ.” Osorio-Martinez, 893
F.3d 	at 	166 	n.10. 	Similarly, 	“Petitioner 	[was] 	not 	apprehended 	or
detained outside United States territory, nor are there serious practical
obstacles to permitting habeas corpus proceedings besides the kind of
‘incremental expenditure of resources’ that the Supreme Court deemed
not 	dispositive 	to 	the 	question 	of 	granting 	the 	writ.” 	Id., 	citing
Boumediene and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950). Thus,
the first step in the Boumediene test weighs in favor of Petitioner, and
the Court moves to step two.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 15 of 35

Page 16 of 35
With respect to the second step in the analysis, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit has recognized:
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court took care to explain that
habeas review is “most pressing” in the case of executive
detention, 	as 	opposed 	to 	where 	“relief 	is 	sought 	from 	a
sentence that resulted from the judgment of a court of record.”
For the writ to be effective in such a case, “[t]he habeas court
must have sufficient authority to conduct a meaningful review
of both the cause for detention and the Executive’s power to
detain.” 	More 	specifically, 	the 	Court 	declared 	it
“uncontroversial . . . that 	the 	privilege 	of 	habeas 	corpus
entitles 	the 	prisoner 	to 	a 	meaningful 	opportunity 	to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous
application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”
Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 177; see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
301 (2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served
as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
that context that its protections have been strongest.”). These are the
exact 	circumstances 	now 	before 	the 	Court: 	Petitioner 	is 	subject 	to
executive detention, not to detention resulting from a judgment of a court
of record. Thus, any proposed substitute for habeas review must be robust
enough to satisfy the “historical core” purposes of the writ.
Here, even under Respondent’s reading of the statutes, “the INA’s
jurisdiction-stripping 	provisions 	do 	not 	provide 	even 	this
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 16 of 35

Page 17 of 35
‘uncontroversial’ baseline of review.” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 177.
Section 1252(b)(9) provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including
interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory
provisions, 	arising 	from 	any 	action 	taken 	or 	proceeding
brought to remove an alien from the United States under this
title shall be available only in judicial review of a final order
under 	this 	section. 	Except 	as 	otherwise 	provided 	in 	this
section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus
under section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any
other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such
title, 	or 	by 	any 	other 	provision 	of 	law 	(statutory 	or
nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of
law or fact.
And Section 1252(g) provides for no substitute review but only precludes
any court from reviewing the Attorney General’s decisions or actions to
“commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.”
The statutes Respondent relies on to argue that the Court lacks
jurisdiction offer no adequate or effective substitute for habeas “to test
the legality of the petitioner’s detention,” (Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at
166), and Respondent offers no other alternative substitutes. Thus, what
Respondent proposes would be an unconstitutional suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. To be clear, a plain reading of the statutes does not
support Respondent’s reading of them; nothing in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) or
(b)(9) purports to eliminate jurisdiction of this Court over a petition for
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 17 of 35

Page 18 of 35
writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	challenging 	only 	the 	legality, 	duration, 	or
conditions of detention, as explained by the Supreme Court in Jennings
and Reno. But even if the Court agreed with Respondent as to the
interpretation of those two provisions, they would be unconstitutional as
applied to the Petitioner. See Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 178 (holding
that a different provision under § 1252 violated the Suspension Clause
as applied to petitioners and that the District Court therefore retained
jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ claims).
Other judges in this district to have considered the question have
also 	found 	that 	this 	Court 	has 	habeas 	jurisdiction 	under 	identical
circumstances. See, e.g., Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cty. Corr.
Facility, No. 3:25-CV-01896, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252409, at *4 (M.D.
Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (adopting report and recommendations, finding district
court jurisdiction); Quispe v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02276, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 255209, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2025) (same); Centeno v. Lowe,
No. 3:25cv2518, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6654, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13,
2026) (same, and collecting cases); Samassa v. Lowe, No. 1:25-CV-02197,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 260251, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2025) (same);
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 18 of 35

Page 19 of 35
Patel v. O’Neil, No. 3:25-cv-2185, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252347, at *6
(M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (same).
2. 	Exhaustion here would be futile.
Additionally, 	Respondent 	argues 	that 	this 	matter 	should 	be
dismissed 	or 	stayed 	because 	Petitioner 	failed 	to 	exhaust 	her
administrative remedies. Doc. 7 at 21-23. She asserts that the BIA’s
decision 	to 	not 	hold 	bond 	hearings 	“should 	not 	nullify 	the 	entire
administrative 	process, 	nor 	should 	it 	allow 	an 	alien 	in 	Petitioner’s
position the ability to skip the process entirely and proceed directly to the
district court for immediate review.” Id. at 21. Instead of first challenging
her lack of bond determination at the district court, Respondent suggests
that Petitioner should have sought review from an immigration judge.
Id. at 22-23. Doing so, however, would have been futile.
A petitioner challenging agency action must generally first exhaust
administrative remedies; however, in habeas proceedings, “exhaustion
exists as a judicially created doctrine applied at the Court’s discretion.”
Kashranov v. Jamison, No. 2:25-cv-05555, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224644,
2025 WL 3188399, at *3 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)); see also Vadel v. Lowe, No. 3:25-CV-02452, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 19 of 35

Page 20 of 35
268386, 	at 	*6-7 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	Dec. 	31, 	2025). 	No 	statute 	requires
administrative exhaustion in habeas proceedings under § 2241. See id.
In instances where a court requires petitioners to exhaust their
administrative remedies, the court may excuse such a requirement when
either “waiver, estoppel, tolling or futility” applies. 	United States v.
Dohou, 948 F.3d 621, 628 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation modified). Here, further
administrative review would serve no purpose. According to Respondent,
Patel is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2), under which immigration
judges lack authority to hear bond requests. Doc. 7 at 23; 	see also
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec., at 225. There is no question that Patel would be
precluded 	from 	obtaining 	a 	bond 	hearing 	if 	she 	did 	seek 	further
administrative review, and these circumstances constitute good cause to
excuse exhaustion. See Vadel v. Lowe, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 268386, at
*7.
Accordingly, this Court should exercise its jurisdiction and consider
the petition.
B. 	The 	Court 	should 	grant 	the 	Petition 	and 	order
Petitioner released immediately.
Petitioner contends that DHS’s newly instituted application of
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) violates the INA. Doc. 1 ¶ 49.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 20 of 35

Page 21 of 35
Respondent disagrees. See Doc. 7 at 45. As hundreds of other courts have
found, 	including 	multiple 	judges 	in 	this 	district, 	the 	undersigned
concludes that Respondent’s detention of Petitioner under § 1225 is
unlawful.
1. 	Section 1225 has no application to Petitioner.
Petitioner argues that Respondent incorrectly applied § 1225 to
hold her in mandatory detention without bond, and that she should
instead be detained pursuant to § 1226, with the possibility of release on
bond. Doc. 8 at 1, 6.
Section 1225 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code is entitled “Inspection by
immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens;
referral 	for 	hearing.” 5 	Section 	1225(a)(1) 	defines 	“applicant 	for
5 The title and preamble of an act can provide insight into its meaning.
See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts § 34, at 218 (2012) (Preambles “set forth the assumed facts and the
purposes that the majority of the enacting legislature . . . had in mind,
and these can shed light on the meaning of the operative provisions that
follow”); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234, 118 S.
Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998), quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947) (“We also note that ‘the title of a
statute and the heading of a section’ are ‘tools available for the resolution
of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.”); I.N.S. v. Nat’l Ctr. for
Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991) (“[T]he title of a
statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s
text.”).
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 21 of 35

Page 22 of 35
admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the
United States after having been interdicted in international or United
States waters).” The remaining provisions under subsection (a) deal with
“stowaways,” inspection of aliens, including alien crewmen, seeking
admission to the United States, withdrawal of applications for admission
with immediate departure, and the compulsion of statements during
admission interviews. See § 1225(a)(2)–(5). Section 1225(b)(2) states that
if an examining immigration officer determines that an alien “seeking
admission” is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien shall be detained for removal proceedings under § 1229a. Thus, on
its face, § 1225 applies only at the borders or at other ports of entry,
where individuals are “seeking admission” to the country. See Del Cid v.
Bondi, No. 25-304, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209136, at *39-40 (W.D. Pa.
Oct. 23, 2025), quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287-88 (“[T]he Supreme
Court has tethered § 1225 to ‘the Nation’s borders and ports of entry,’
noting that aliens detained pursuant to those provisions are typically
detained during removal proceedings.”)
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 22 of 35

Page 23 of 35
Respondent contends that Section 1225(b)(2) requires the detention
of Petitioner until the conclusion of removal proceedings because, as set
forth in internal DHS guidance and Hurtado, the government now views
all aliens present without parole in the United States as “applicants for
admission,” who are actively “seeking admission.” Doc. 7 at 26. Nearly
every court to have considered this reading of the statute—and there are
many—has 	rejected 	it 	outright. 	See, 	e.g., Belsai 	D.S. 	v. 	Bondi, 	No.
25-3682, 	2025 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	194262, 	at 	*13 	(D. 	Minn. 	Oct. 	1,
2025); Quispe v. Crawford, No. 25-1471, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194070,
at *9-15 (E.D. Va. Sept. 29, 2025); Savane v. Francis, No. 25-6666, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194889, at *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2025); Zumba v.
Bondi, No. 25-14626, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190052, at *27-30 (D.N.J.
Sept. 26, 2025); Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-835, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
183335, *12-13 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-1163,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187233, at *9-10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025); Roman
v. Noem, No. 25-1684, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186389, *12-13 (D. Nev.
Sept. 23, 2025); Reyes v. Lyons, No. 25-4048, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
188085, at *3-6 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 23, 2025); Singh v. Lewis, No. 25-96,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185696, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025); Barrera
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 23 of 35

Page 24 of 35
v. Tindall, No. 25-541, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184356, at *14 (W.D. Ky.
Sept. 19, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 25-1408, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
184734, 	at 	*17-18 	(E.D. 	Va. 	Sept. 	19, 	2025); Vazquez 	v. 	Feeley,
No.25-1542 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182412, at *37-38 (D. Nev. Sept. 17,
2025); Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-2677, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181582, at *6
(D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Santos v. Noem, No. 25-1193, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 183412, at *9-13 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2025); Perez v. Kramer, No.
25-3179, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177428, at *7 (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2025);
Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-12546, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175767, at *15-20
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2025); Hinestroza v. Kaiser, No. 25-7559, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 176133, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); Jimenez v. FCI
Berlin, Warden, No. 25-326, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176165, at *12
(D.N.H. Sept. 8, 2025); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-3051, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 166326, at *21 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025); Leal-Hernandez v. Noem,
No. 25-2428, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165015, at *20-27 (D. Md. Aug. 24,
2025); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 25-12486, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169423, at *24-26 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Benitez v. Francis, No.
25-5937, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, at *22-23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,
2025).
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 24 of 35

Page 25 of 35
Every court within the Third Circuit that has considered this issue
has 	likewise 	rejected 	Respondent’s 	application 	of 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	to
individuals in circumstances like Petitioner’s. See, e.g., A.D. v. Oddo, No.
25-460J, 2026 WL 101476 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2026); Centeno v. Lowe, No.
25-2518, 2026 WL 94642, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 2026); Vadel v. Lowe,
No. 25-02452, 2025 WL 3772059, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 31, 2025); Samassa
v. Lowe, No. 25-02197, 2025 WL 3653751, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2025);
Quispe v. Rose, No. 25-02276, 2025 WL 3537279, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 10,
2025); Patel v. O'Neil, No. 25-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4, n.7 (M.D.
Pa. Dec. 8, 2025); Juarez v. O’Neill, No. 25-6191, 2025 WL 3473363, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2025); Santana-Rivas v. Warden of Clinton Cnty. Corr.
Facility, No. 25-1896, 2025 WL 3522932, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted in relevant part; Soto v. Soto, et al.,
No. 25-16200, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207818, at *15 (D.N.J. Oct. 22,
2025); Lomeu v. Soto, No. 25-16589, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209240, at
*20-23 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025); Zumba, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190052, at
*2; 	Smit Patel v. Almodovar, No. 25-15345, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
212112, at *9 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2025); Lopez v. Sec’y Kristi Noem, No. 25-
16890, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218088, at *7-8 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2025);
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 25 of 35

Page 26 of 35
Mboup v. Field Office Dir. of N.J. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 25-16882,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 216326, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025); Del Cid, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209136, at *34-36; Castillo v. Lyons, No. 25-16219, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205664, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2025); Buestan v. Chu,
No. 25-16034, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211879, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2025);
Del Cid v. Bondi, No. 25-304, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209136, at *39-40
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025); see also C.B. v. Oddo, No. 25-00263, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 208250, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2025) (alien originally
detained “upon arrival” properly held under § 1225(b)(2)(A), but unduly
prolonged detention without bond hearing violated due process).
The 	reasoning 	employed 	in 	these 	cases 	is 	comprehensive 	and
persuasive. 	Particularly 	compelling 	here, 	courts 	have 	noted 	that
Respondent’s interpretation of the phrase “seeking admission” “violates
the rule against surplusage and negates the plain meaning of the text.”
See, e.g., Soto, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207818, at *9; Martinez v. Hyde,
No. 25-11613, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724, at *6 (D. Mass. July 24,
2025); Zumba, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190052, at *8; Benitez, 2025 U.S.
Dist. 	LEXIS 	157214, 	at 	*16. 	The 	phrase 	“seeking 	admission” 	in
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) 	necessarily 	connotes 	some 	affirmative, 	present-tense
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 26 of 35

Page 27 of 35
action. The verb “seeking” is a present participle, and the “present
participle is used to signal present and continuing action.” Westchester
Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 48 F.4th 1298, 1307 (11th Cir.
2022); see also, e.g., D.L. Markham DDS, MSD, Inc. 401(K) Plan v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 88 F.4th 602, 610 (5th Cir. 2023) (“The
word ‘providing,’ used here as a present participle, most commonly
describes a person who is currently providing services.”) (emphasis in
original); 	United 	States 	v. 	Hull, 	456 	F.3d 	133, 	145 	(3d 	Cir. 	2006)
(Ackerman, Sr. Dist. J., sitting by designation, concurring) (“Congress’s
use of the present participle ‘committing’ connotes present, continuing
action.”).
The INA defines the term “admission” as, “with respect to an alien,
the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Thus,
the INA’s own definition of the term “admission” supports the limited
application of § 1225 to encounters with aliens along the borders and at
ports of entry. Respondent contends that, because Petitioner has not been
lawfully admitted to the country, she must be “seeking admission.” Doc.
7 at 25. But there is no indication that Petitioner is presently “seeking
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 27 of 35

Page 28 of 35
admission” as defined in § 1101(a)(13)(A), that is, “lawful entry . . . into
the United States[.]” Petitioner “‘has already “entered” the country’—
[she] 	is 	no 	longer 	seeking 	to 	enter 	the 	United 	States 	(lawfully 	or
otherwise).” 	Jimenez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176165, at *22, citing
Benitez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, at *19. And while Petitioner “has
applied for asylum, that application does not seek ‘“lawful entry” to the
United States, but [rather] a lawful means to remain here.’” Id.
As 	such, 	Respondent’s 	argument 	that 	Petitioner 	is 	“seeking
admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A), despite taking no affirmative action,
and despite already having entered the country years ago, is contrary to
the plain, ordinary meaning of the words “seeking admission.” “Seeking
admission” clearly requires an act, currently underway, to enter a space
from without, and not a static condition of one currently present within
that space. See, e.g., Zumba, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190052, at *23;
Benitez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, at *14.
For example,
one could deem every person in the country a “potential
homebuyer,” 	but 	they 	are 	not 	“seeking 	to 	buy 	a 	home,”
without taking some affirmative action towards that goal. Nor
is every “employable adult” in the country “applying for a job,”
simply because jobs exist. Or, as Judge Ho explained in
Benitez, 	“someone 	who 	enters 	a 	movie 	theater 	without
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 28 of 35

Page 29 of 35
purchasing a ticket and then proceeds to sit through the first
few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be described
as ‘seeking admission’ to the theater. Rather, that person
would be described as already present there.” Further, “[e]ven
if that person, after being detected, offered to pay for a ticket,
one 	would 	not 	ordinarily 	describe 	them 	as 	‘seeking
admission’ . . . at that point—one would say that they had
entered unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining
there.”
Soto, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207818, at *16-17, quoting Benitez, 2025
U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	157214, 	at 	*21. 	Petitioner 	entered 	Judge 	Ho’s
proverbial 	theater 	more 	than 	three 	years 	ago. 	She 	is 	not 	seeking
admission (“lawful entry”) because she is already inside; she seeks only
to be allowed to stay.
Respondent’s 	reading 	of 	§ 1225 	also 	violates 	the 	rule 	against
surplusage. 	Removing 	the 	words 	“seeking 	admission” 	from
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) would not alter its meaning under Respondent’s theory:
“[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the
examining 	immigration 	officer 	determines 	that 	an 	alien 	seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien shall be detained[.]” That result is inconsistent with the principle
that courts must interpret a statute to give meaning to “every clause and
word of a statute” that Congress chose to include. United States ex rel.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 29 of 35

Page 30 of 35
Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023), quoting
Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883).
Here, as in other cases, “Petitioner was not detained until more
than a year after her initial encounter. At that point, it cannot be denied
that she was ‘already in the country,’ after having ‘effected an entry[.]’”
Martinez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724, at *21, first quoting Jennings,
583 	U.S. 	at 	289; 	and 	then 	quoting 	Dep’t 	of 	Homeland 	Sec. 	v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020). Because Petitioner had already
been residing in the country for more than two years when she was
detained, she was not “seeking admission” at that time, and therefore,
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) simply has no application to her case. See, e.g., id.;
Benitez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157214, at *16; Jimenez, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 176165, at *22 (“Because § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to applicants for
admission who are seeking to enter the United States, it cannot apply to
[Petitioner], who has already entered the country and has been residing
here for over two years.”).
“[T]he plain text of Sections 1225 and 1226, together with the
structure 	of 	the 	larger 	statutory 	scheme, 	indicates 	that 	Section
1225(b)(2) does not apply to noncitizens who are arrested on a warrant
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 30 of 35

Page 31 of 35
issued by the Attorney General while residing in the United States.”
Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-11571, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128085, at *19-20
(D. Mass. July 7, 2025); see Martinez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141724, at
*8. “In reaching this conclusion, it is unnecessary to define the precise
outer boundaries of when mandatory detention under § 1225 applies
because it clearly does not apply to someone who has resided in the
country for two years like [Petitioner].” Benitez, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157214, at *15.
Respondent’s 	reading 	of 	§ 1225 	would 	also 	render 	redundant
§ 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision applicable to persons who have
committed certain crimes. As Petitioner points out, that would also mean
Congress’s enactment of the Laken Riley Act last year to amend § 1226(c)
would be entirely meaningless because § 1225 mandatory detention
would apply to all aliens, regardless of whether they have committed an
enumerated crime or not. Doc. 8 at 17; Laken Riley Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). Given
all of this analysis, it becomes evident that the reasoning of Hurtado is
mistaken.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 31 of 35

Page 32 of 35
Thus, the Court should hold that Petitioner cannot be held under
the authority of § 1225. Instead, her current detention fits squarely
under § 1226(a). She entered the United States without inspection on
June 25, 2022, and has lived in the United States for more than three
years. Doc. 1 ¶ 2. DHS issued her a Notice to Appear in Immigration
Court and released her on her own recognizance pursuant to § 1226(a).
See id.; Doc. 1-3 at 1; Doc. 8 at 25. Petitioner is an “alien . . . arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether [she] is to be removed from the
United States,” (§ 1226(a)), therefore, the Court should hold that she is
being held subject to the provisions of § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A).
2. 	The Court should grant relief.
Most 	of 	the 	cases 	reviewing 	the 	application 	of 	Hurtado 	have
involved detainees who were never afforded a bond hearing, and thus
some courts, in fashioning relief, ordered a bond hearing. Many others,
after finding that detention of a petitioner under § 1225(b)(2)(A) was
unlawful, 	ordered 	immediate 	release 	and 	permanently 	enjoined 	the
government from re-detaining them under § 1225. See, e.g., Soto, 2025
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207818, at *22. In that case, the District of New Jersey
court 	reasoned 	that 	because 	“Respondents 	have 	not 	argued 	in 	the
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 32 of 35

Page 33 of 35
alternative that Petitioner should be detained under § 1226(a), the Court
cannot construe the record to authorize his continued detention on that
basis.” Id. The court further ordered that, “Should Respondents elect to
later detain him under § 1226(a) and fail to provide him with a timely
bond hearing, at which an immigration judge assesses whether he is a
danger or a flight risk, Petitioner may move to reopen” his habeas case.
Id.
Here, as in Soto, Respondent has not argued in the alternative that,
should the Court find Patel’s detention under § 1225 unlawful, she
should be held under § 1226, so the reasoning of Soto is persuasive.
Indeed, Respondent remains adamant that all non-citizens in Petitioner’s
circumstances are to be held without bond or review. Additionally, other
judges 	in 	this 	district 	have 	ordered 	immediate 	release 	under 	the
circumstances presented here. See, e.g., Vadel, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
268386, 	*16-17 	(granting 	petition, 	ordering 	release 	of 	Petitioner,
permanently enjoining Respondent from re-detaining Petitioner under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)); Patel v. O’Neil, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 252347, *18
(same, 	and 	ordering 	Respondent 	to 	“file 	a 	declaration 	or 	affidavit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming that [Petitioner] has been
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 33 of 35

Page 34 of 35
released from custody.”); 	Centeno, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6654, *11
(same, and temporarily barring re-arrest for 14 days and requiring bond
hearing within 10 days if Petitioner detained under § 1226 in the future).
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Court:
(1) 	GRANT Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1), and enter judgment for
the Petitioner and against the Respondent;
(2) 	ORDER Respondent to immediately release Petitioner;
(3) 	ORDER 	that, 	within 	48 	hours, 	Respondent 	shall 	file 	a
declaration or affidavit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 confirming
that Patel has been released from custody;
(4) 	ORDER Respondent not to re-arrest Petitioner for fourteen days
to ensure that this habeas remedy is effective;
(5) 	ENJOIN Respondent from re-arresting or re-detaining Patel
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, permanently;
(6) 	ORDER 	that, 	if, 	in 	the 	future, 	Respondent 	does 	detain
Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Respondent shall,
within ten days, afford her notice and an opportunity to be heard
at a bond hearing before an immigration judge, who shall
provide an individualized assessment as to whether Patel poses
a flight risk or a danger to the community;
(7) 	DIRECT Petitioner that, if Respondent seeks to detain her
under § 1226(a) and fails to schedule a timely bond hearing, or
seeks to detain her under § 1225 in violation of this Court’s
order, she may move to reopen this matter to seek expeditious
relief; and
(8) 	DIRECT the Clerk of Court to close this case.
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 34 of 35

Page 35 of 35
NOTICE
Further, given the unique circumstances of this case and the liberty
interests at issue, the undersigned ORDERS that, notwithstanding Local
Rule 72.3, any objections must be filed no later than January 28, 2026.
The parties are further placed on notice that, pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations 	or 	report 	addressing 	a 	motion 	or 	matter
described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation
for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the
magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall
specifically 	identify 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	proposed 	findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis
for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local
Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion
or where required by law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination
on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further
evidence, 	recall 	witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Date: January 21, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:25-cv-02181-JFS Document 11 Filed 01/21/26 Page 35 of 35