Fairweather v. Kochis et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SEAN FAIRWEATHER, 	: 	CIVIL NO. 3:25-CV-1499
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
v. 	:
: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
JILLIAN KOCHIS, ESQ., et al., 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual Background
This case comes before us for a legally mandated screening review of the pro
se plaintiff’s pleadings. The plaintiff, Sean Fairweather, is a state inmate. In his
amended complaint, which is the operative pleading in this case, Fairweather names
three county assistant Public Defenders as defendants and brings federal civil rights
damages claims totaling $30,000,000 against these attorneys pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. According to Fairweather, these attorneys violated his rights under the Sixth
and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution by their ineffective
representation of him in criminal proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas of
Lackawanna County. Liberally construed, this Pennsylvania state prisoner also
appears to bring state law claims of professional negligence against his three
Pennsylvania-based court appointed counsel. (Doc. 9).
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Along with his complaint Fairweather sought, and obtained, leave to proceed
in forma pauperis. However, Fairweather was placed on notice that, prior to service
of his pleadings the court “will conduct a preliminary review of Fairweather’s
amended complaint.” (Doc. 12).
This case has now been referred to the undersigned for the purpose of
conducting this review. Upon review, for the reasons set forth below, we find that the
amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and that Fairweather’s state law claims also fail. Therefore, we
recommend that the amended complaint be dismissed.
II. 	Discussion
A. 	Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review
This Court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review
of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the
complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a
complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint,
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving
standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d
929 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)] and culminating recently
with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from
simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring
a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion
to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a
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plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions
will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id.
In 	keeping 	with 	the 	principles 	of 	Twombly, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which
relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of
the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. 	When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual
allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of
mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
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[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District
Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true but
may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,
a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-
step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. 	Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
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entitlement for relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what
a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which
may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and
conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that
are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, for the reasons set forth below it is
recommended that this complaint be dismissed.
B. 	This Amended Complaint Fails as a Matter of Law.
1. Fairweather’s Constitutional Claims Fail
In this case, the plaintiff is trying to pursue a federal civil rights claim against
his former court appointed counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent that
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Fairweather is attempting to convert his displeasure with counsel’s performance into
a $30,000,000 § 1983 federal civil rights claim against these assistant public
defenders the plaintiff fundamentally misconstrues the reach of the federal civil rights
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well established that § 1983 does not, by its own force, create new and
independent legal rights to damages in civil rights actions. Rather, § 1983 simply
serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil actions to vindicate violations of
separate and pre-existing legal rights otherwise guaranteed under the Constitution
and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). Therefore, any analysis of the legal
sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983 must begin with an assessment of the
validity of the underlying constitutional and statutory claims advanced by the
plaintiff.
In this regard, it is also well settled that:
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected
rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two
essential elements of a §1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally
protected right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ., 893 F.Supp. 409, 416 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 91 F.3d
122 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim
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brought under § 1983 that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defendants were
acting under color of law when that defendant allegedly violated the plaintiff’s rights.
To the extent that a complaint seeks to hold private parties liable for alleged civil
rights violations, it fails to state a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since
the statute typically requires a showing that the defendants are state actors. Am. Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
This principle applies with particular force to civil rights plaintiffs like
Fairweather, who invite the courts to consider lawsuits against their court appointed
criminal defense counsel. With respect to this state action requirement, it is well
settled that the conduct of an attorney representing a client in a state case does not,
by itself, rise to the level of state action entitling a plaintiff to bring a federal civil
rights action against counsel. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988); Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); Pete v. Metcalfe, 8 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1993).
As the Third Circuit has observed:
Attorneys performing their traditional functions will not be considered
state actors solely on the basis of their position as officers of the court.
See, e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318, 102 S.Ct. 445, 450,
70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981) (“[A] lawyer representing a client is not, by
virtue of being an officer of the court, a state actor ‘under color of state
law’ within the meaning of § 1983.”); Barnard v. Young, 720 F.2d 1188,
1189 (10th Cir.1983) (“[P]rivate attorneys, by virtue of being officers of
the court, do not act under color of state law within the meaning of
section 1983.”).
Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 1999).
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Indeed, cases are legion rejecting § 1983 claims brought by former criminal
defendants against their public defenders and other court appointed criminal defense
counsel.1 Accordingly, Fairweather’s § 1983 claims fail since the plaintiff simply has
not sufficiently alleged that his defense counsel were state actors within the meaning
of the statute.
2. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Fairweather’s State Law
Claims.
Liberally construed, Fairweather’s pro se complaint may also be asserting
various state law professional negligence claims against his court appointed counsel.
However, to the extent that the plaintiff invites a federal court to adjudicate these
state law claims, this complaint fails for a single, simple reason: we lack subject
matter jurisdiction over these state law allegations.
It is well-settled that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. As a
general rule, there are two primary grounds for federal district court jurisdiction over
a civil lawsuit. First, “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
1 See e.g., Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 318; Nelson v. Dauphin Cnty. Pub.
Def., 381 F. App'x 127, 128 (3d Cir. 2010); Calhoun v. Young, 288 F. App'x 47, 49
(3d Cir. 2008); Anderson v. Keim, 247 F. App'x 347, 348 (3d Cir. 2007).
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interest and costs, and is between–(1) citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1). This ground of federal jurisdiction is known as diversity jurisdiction. The
second principal ground for invoking the jurisdiction of a federal court is known as
federal question jurisdiction. Under this ground of jurisdiction, “district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §1331.
We have already determined that Fairweather’s federal legal claims are fatally
flawed and should be dismissed. Therefore, all that remains are Fairweather’s state
law claims. However, with respect to these state law claims, we can only exercise
federal jurisdiction over such claims in “civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between–
(1) citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (emphasis added).
In the instant case, this Court’s diversity jurisdiction simply does not provide
a basis for exercising jurisdiction over this particular controversy for at least two
reasons. First, the complaint indicates that the plaintiff and the defendant are all
citizens 	and 	residents 	of 	Pennsylvania. 	Therefore, 	the 	requisite 	diversity 	of
citizenship that is essential to federal court jurisdiction simply is not present. Given
that the amended complaint reveals on its face that this lawsuit is not between citizens
of different states the plaintiff may not invoke diversity jurisdiction in this matter. In
light of these basic jurisdictional flaws in this complaint, we conclude that state
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claims set forth in this pleading simply do not meet the requirements prescribed by
law for a federal lawsuit, since “the facts alleged in the complaint are [not] sufficient
to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief,’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-
11, in federal court under this court’s diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, at present, the
complaint does not even contain “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009), since the complaint actually seems to demonstrate on its face that federal
jurisdiction does not lie here.
In fact, this Court has previously held that Pennsylvania residents may not
maintain state law claims against Pennsylvania defendants in federal court. In
dismissing and refusing to reinstate a similar lawsuit, this court noted in terms that
are equally applicable here that:
Plaintiff's Complaint indicates that both he and Defendant . . . are located
and domiciled in Pennsylvania. Thus, there is not diversity jurisdiction
over this action because “complete diversity is lacking when the plaintiff
is a citizen of one state and a defendant is a citizen of that same state.”
Boldrini v. Bruno, No. CIV.A. 3:11-1401, 2013 WL 619610, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb.
19, 2013) (quoting Brett v. Brett, No. 12–3301, 2012 WL 5450879, at *1 (3d Cir.
Nov.8, 2012)).
Nor should we exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims,
having determined on a screening review that Fairweather’s federal constitutional
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claims fail as a matter of law. On this score, the law is well settled:
When a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over any remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Although
the district court's decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is
within its discretion, courts ordinarily decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction when all federal claims have been dismissed and only state
law claims remain. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009).
Chapman v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 3d 601, 613–14 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
Finally, we recognize that in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be
afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in
its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,
253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result
in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case,
however, Fairweather’s amended complaint is flawed in ways which cannot be
corrected through some more artful form of pleading. Therefore, it is recommended
that this case be dismissed without leave to further amend this complaint.
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the
Plaintiff’s amended complaint, (Doc. 9), be DISMISSED.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
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disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file
with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the
proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is
made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set
forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may
accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however,
need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where
required by law, and may consider the record developed before the
magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of
that 	record. 	The 	judge 	may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall
witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 14 th day of January 2026.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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