Redevelopment Authority of the City of Pottsville v. 23 North Centre Street, Pottsville, Pennsylvania, Tax Parcel ID No. 68-27-0362.000 et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
OF THE CITY OF POTTSVILLE,
Petitioner,
v.
23 NORTH CENTRE STREET,
POTTSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA,
TAX PARCEL ID NO. 68-27-
0362.000, et al.,
Respondents.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00902
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
This matter comes before the court on a motion to remand this
diversity case to the state court from which it was removed. In addition,
the movant has requested that it be awarded costs and attorney fees
incurred as a result of the removal of this case to federal court. For the
reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On September 16, 2024, the petitioner, Redevelopment Authority of
the City of Pottsville (the “Redevelopment Authority”), commenced this
conservatorship action by filing a petition in the Court of Common Pleas
for Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, styled as
Redevelopment Authority
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of the City of Pottsville v. 23 North Centre Street Pottsville, No. S-1767-
2024 (Schuylkill Cnty. (Pa.) Ct. Com. Pl. filed Sept. 16 2024), seeking a
court-appointed conservator pursuant to the Abandoned and Blighted
Property Conservatorship Act, 68 P.S. § 1101
et seq.1
The petition included two named respondents. The first was the
allegedly blighted property itself, a building and parcel of land located at
23 North Centre Street, Pottsville, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania,
commonly known as the “Thompson Building,” which has been assigned
tax parcel number 68-27-362 by the county. The other named respondent
was the record owner of the property, Advanced Consulting, Inc., a
Minnesota corporation with its principal place of business in New York,
which had apparently acquired the property via a tax sale on April 28,
2021.2
1 A copy of the original state-court petition has been filed as an
exhibit to the removing defendant’s notice of removal.
See Doc. 1-2, at
28–58. Regardless, a district court may properly take judicial notice of
state 	and 	federal 	court 	records.
	See 	Fed. 	R. 	Evid. 	201;
	Sands 	v.
McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007);
Ernst v. Child & Youth
Servs. 	of 	Chester 	Cnty., 	108 	F.3d 	486, 	498–99 	(3d 	Cir. 	1997);
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 373 F.2d 771, 778 (3d Cir. 1967).
2
	See 	Schuylkill 	Cnty. 	(Pa.) 	Recorder 	of 	Deeds, 	https://
pa.uslandrecords.com (select “Schuylkill” from counties menu, select
“Volume Search” from search type menu, and search for “Volume 2729,
(continued on next page)
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Appearing initially through counsel, Advanced Consulting filed an
answer and appeared for a hearing on the petition on October 30, 2024.
Finding that additional time was needed for the hearing, the state court
continued it until December 9, 2024.
On December 5, 2024, the chief executive officer of Advanced
Consulting, an individual named Gemini Lake, filed a pro se civil rights
action 	in 	this court, 	seeking 	to 	enjoin 	the 	state 	court 	proceedings,
claiming that the state-court conservatorship proceedings violated his
federal 	constitutional 	rights. 	On 	December 	6, 	2024, 	we 	entered 	an
opinion and order dismissing Lake’s civil rights action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
See Lake v. Brennan, No. 3:24-cv-02104, 2024 WL
5008863 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2024).
On December 8, 2024, Advanced Consulting filed a pro se Chapter
Page 2103”) (deed recorded Apr. 30, 2021) (last visited Jan. 29, 2026);
Schuylkill 	Cnty. 	(Pa.) 	Assessment 	Information 	Website, 	https://
gis.vgsi.com/SchuylkillCountyPA/Search.aspx (search for address “23 N
Centre Street” for property ownership history) (last visited Jan. 29,
2026). A district court may take judicial notice of publicly recorded
property records such as this.
See generally Fed. R. Evid. 201;
Gagliardi
v. Kratzenberg, 188 Fed. App’x 86, 88 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)
(taking judicial notice of publicly recorded deeds reflecting property
ownership);
	Hynoski v. Columbia Cnty. Redevelopment Auth., 941 F.
Supp. 2d 547, 556 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (taking judicial notice of publicly
recorded real estate transfer records).
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11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York.
See In re Adv. Consulting Inc., No. 24-
12456-pb (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. dismissed Feb. 19, 2025).3
On December 9, 2024, the date of the scheduled hearing in this
matter, the state court entered an order staying the conservatorship
proceedings after being advised of Advanced Consulting’s eleventh-hour
bankruptcy petition.
On February 19, 2025, Advanced Consulting’s bankruptcy petition
was dismissed with prejudice on the motion of the United States Trustee.
In dismissing the case, the bankruptcy court expressly found, in its
written order and in its bench ruling, that the debtor had filed the
bankruptcy case in bad faith and for tactical or dilatory reasons.
See In
re Adv. Consulting Inc., No. 24-12456-pb (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. dismissed Feb.
19, 2025). That same day, presumably upon receiving notice that the
bankruptcy case had been dismissed, the state court scheduled a two-day
trial on the petition, to take place on March 5 and 10, 2025.
On March 3, 2025, the state court entered an order formally lifting
3 Advanced Consulting’s pro se Chapter 11 petition was signed by
Lake as its CEO and authorized representative. The debtor was never
represented by counsel in the bankruptcy proceedings.
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its stay of the conservatorship action, and it rescheduled the two-day trial
for April 9 and 11, 2025.
On March 21, 2025, Advanced Consulting’s attorney, Anthony M.
Crane, Esq., moved for leave to withdraw as counsel of record for the
corporation due to personal health reasons.
On March 26, 2025, Lake filed a
second pro se federal civil rights
action related to the Thompson Building conservatorship proceedings,
seeking 	monetary 	damages 	and 	declaratory 	and 	injunctive 	relief,
including 	an 	order 	enjoining 	the 	state 	conservatorship 	action 	from
proceeding. That action has been referred to a United States magistrate
judge for all pretrial proceedings, and it remains pending.
See Lake v.
Brennan, No. 3:25-cv-00548 (M.D. Pa. filed Mar. 26, 2025).
Following a phone conference on April 3, 2025, the state court
granted Attorney Crane’s motion to withdraw as counsel of record for
Advanced Consulting.
On April 7, 2025, Lake filed a
third pro se federal civil rights action
related to the Thompson Building conservatorship proceedings, again
seeking 	monetary 	damages 	and 	declaratory 	and 	injunctive 	relief,
including 	an 	order 	enjoining 	the 	state 	conservatorship 	action 	from
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proceeding. That action has been referred to a United States magistrate
judge for all pretrial proceedings, and it remains pending.
See Lake v.
Redevelopment Auth. of the City of Pottsville, No. 3:25-cv-00668 (M.D.
Pa. filed Apr. 7, 2025).
On the April 9, 2025, trial date, Lake appeared and informed the
state court that he had been unable to obtain substitute counsel to
represent Advanced Consulting in the conservatorship action. But he
further 	informed 	the 	state 	court 	that, 	on 	April 	1, 	2025, 	Advanced
Consulting had conveyed a 50-percent ownership stake in the Thompson
Building to him personally, and that the deed conveying that interest to
Lake had been recorded on April 7, 2025.4 That same day, the state court
entered an order rescheduling the two-day trial for May 22 and 23, 2025,
and adding Lake to the action as a party-respondent in recognition of his
newly acquired status as a record owner of the property.
4
	See 	Schuylkill 	Cnty. 	(Pa.) 	Recorder 	of 	Deeds, 	https://
pa.uslandrecords.com (select “Schuylkill” from counties menu, select
“Volume Search” from search type menu, and search for “Volume 2899,
Page 2479”) (deed recorded Apr. 7, 2025) (last visited Jan. 29, 2026);
Schuylkill 	Cnty. 	(Pa.) 	Assessment 	Information 	Website, 	https://
gis.vgsi.com/SchuylkillCountyPA/Search.aspx (search for address “23 N
Centre Street” for property ownership history) (last visited Jan. 29,
2026).
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On the eve of trial in the state court, May 21, 2025, Lake filed a
notice of removal in this federal court, which was received over the
counter by the clerk. Service copies of the notice, however, were not
delivered to the state court or to the Redevelopment Authority until May
22, 2025.
Not yet having received service of the notice of removal, the state
court commenced trial on the morning of May 22, 2025. Although Lake
informed the court of his filing of the notice of removal, in light of his
history of dilatory conduct in connection with this litigation, petitioner’s
counsel and the state court were apparently skeptical of his claims. After
informing the state court of the filing of his notice of removal and arguing
that the proceeding should not go forward, Lake left the courtroom
against the court’s advice. The trial then proceeded without Lake present,
with the court receiving testimony from several witnesses and admitting
several documentary exhibits. At the conclusion of the trial, the state
court took the matter under advisement and informed the petitioner that
it would issue an order in the near future.5 No ruling was ever entered,
5 Lake has submitted a copy of the trial transcript as an exhibit to
his brief in opposition to remand.
See Doc. 11-1.
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however, apparently because the court and the petitioner subsequently
learned that they had received service copies of the notice of removal that
same day.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1441 governs the removal of a case to federal court.
Generally, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant . . . to the district court of the United States for the district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a).
“Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts to be
resolved in favor of remand.”
Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir.
2009). Thus, “[t]he defendants bear the burden of establishing removal
jurisdiction and demonstrating compliance with all pertinent procedural
requirements.”
Shadie v. Aventis Pasteur, 254 F. Supp. 2d 509, 514 (M.D.
Pa. 2003);
see also Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 359 (3d
Cir. 1995) (“[T]he burden of establishing removal jurisdiction rests with
the defendant.”);
Baldy v. First Niagara Pavilion, C.C.R.L., LLC, 149 F.
Supp. 3d 551, 555 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (“Defendants must also establish that
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all pertinent procedural requirements for removal have been met.”).
A defendant seeking to remove an action must file a notice of
removal with the district court within thirty days after the receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the complaint or
initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1);
see also Shadie, 254 F. Supp. 2d
at 514. When a case involves multiple defendants, “each defendant
individually has thirty days to file a notice of removal beginning when
that particular defendant is served.”
Delalla v. Hanover Ins., 660 F.3d
180, 185 (3d Cir. 2011). “[A]ll defendants must unanimously join or
consent to the removal through a timely-filed, express written indication
of consent.”
Dietz v. Avco Corp., 168 F. Supp. 3d 747, 756 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
“This action can take the form of: (1) clearly and unambiguously joining
in the removing defendant’s notice of removal; or (2) filing a separate
written consent to removal with the court.”
Rand v. Everson, ___ F. Supp.
3d ____, 2025 WL 3172848, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2025) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“Once an action is removed, a plaintiff may challenge removal by
moving to remand the case back to state court.”
Id. at *2;
see also Brown
v. Rite Aid Corp., 415 F. Supp. 3d 588, 591 (E.D. Pa. 2019);
Baldy, 149 F.
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Supp. 3d at 555. “Cases may be remanded under § 1447(c) for (1) lack of
district court subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal
procedure.”
PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993).
However, “[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other
than lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days
after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a).” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c). “A motion to remand based on an objection to a procedural
defect in the removal process is clearly waived if it is not raised within
thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal.”
Ramos v. Quien, 631
F. Supp. 22d 601, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing
In re FMC Corp. Packaging
Sys. Div., 208 F.3d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 2000), and
Ariel Land Owners, Inc.
v. Dring, 351 F. 3d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 2003));
see also Rand, ___ F. Supp. 3d
at ____, 2025 WL 3172848, at *2;
St. Joe Co. v. Transocean Offshore
Deepwater Drilling Inc., 774 F. Supp. 2d 596, 613 (D. Del. 2011). Courts
are without authority to expand this period.
	See Air-Shields, Inc. v.
Fullam, 891 F.2d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1989) (“By remanding the case for
procedural defects after the thirty day limit imposed by . . . Section
1447(c) had expired, the district court exceeded its statutorily defined
power.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted);
see also Rand,
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___ F. Supp. 3d at ____, 2025 WL 3172848, at *2.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Here, the petitioner has raised two non-jurisdictional objections to
removal, which require this case to be remanded to state court. First,
Lake’s eleventh-hour filing of the notice of removal was untimely, coming
well more than thirty days after the state court ordered him added as a
respondent to the petition, which it did in conjunction with a hearing at
which Lake was present and in which he participated. Second, the
corporate respondent, Advanced Consulting, similarly failed to timely
join or consent in removal of the case.
As CEO of Advanced Consulting, Lake was aware of and had
participated in the conservatorship action since it had commenced in
September 2024. He personally participated in multiple hearings in this
matter 	before 	the 	state 	court, 	including—at 	a 	minimum—hearings
conducted on December 4, 2024, April 9, 2025, and May 22, 2025.
At the April 9, 2025, state court hearing, Lake appeared pro se and
informed the state court that he had personally acquired a 50-percent
ownership interest in the property at issue by a deed recorded on April 7,
2025. That same day, the state court entered an order joining Lake as a
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party-respondent, based on his newly acquired ownership interest in the
property. 	At 	the 	time, 	Lake 	had 	already 	received 	a 	copy 	of 	the
conservatorship petition, and thus the action became newly removable
upon his joinder as a party-respondent.
	See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2);
Delalla, 660 F.3d at 185.
On 	May 	21, 	2025—one 	day 	before 	the 	state 	court 	trial 	was
scheduled to commence, and
forty-two days after he was joined as a
party-respondent in this conservatorship action—Lake filed his notice of
removal in this action. Doc. 1.
On May 30, 2025—
fifty-one days after Lake was joined as a party-
respondent in this action—Advanced Consulting filed its initial, defective
written consent to removal of this action. Doc. 6. Advanced Consulting’s
initial written notice of consent was not signed by counsel of record for
the 	corporation; 	rather, 	it 	was signed by non-attorney Lake 	in 	his
capacity as CEO of Advanced Consulting.
	Id. On July 10, 2025, we
entered an order advising Advanced Consulting that its written consent
to removal was defective and subject to being stricken under Rule 11(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the defect was not timely cured.
Doc. 16. On August 25, 2025—
138 days after Lake was joined as a party-
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respondent in this action—counsel of record entered her appearance on
behalf of Advanced Consulting and filed a written consent to removal on
behalf of the corporation. Doc. 22.
On June 5, 2025—less than thirty days after Lake’s notice of
removal was filed—the petitioner timely filed a motion to remand this
conservatorship action to state court. Doc. 8;
see also Doc. 9. Among other
reasons given, the petitioner argued that Lake had failed to timely file
his notice of removal in this action, and that Advanced Consulting had
failed to timely join or consent in writing to Lake’s removal of the action.
The petitioner’s objections to removal are well taken. Under the
circumstances set forth above, Lake’s notice of removal and Advanced
Consulting’s written consent to removal were both untimely filed, well
more than thirty days after Lake was properly joined and had received a
copy of the initial pleading in this action, and thus we are compelled to
remand the matter to state court for any further proceedings.
	See
Weinstein v. Paul Revere Ins. Co., 15 F. Supp. 2d 552, 560 (D.N.J. 1998)
(“While the time limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) are not jurisdictional,
they are mandatory and are to be strictly construed when asserted by a
party.”);
Capone v. Harris Corp., 694 F. Supp. 111, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
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(“Failure to file a petition for removal within the thirty days provided by
§ 1446(b) is sufficient ground on which to remand.”);
Balestrieri v. Bell
Asbestos Mines, Ltd., 544 F. Supp. 528, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (“This 30-day
limitation [for removal] is mandatory and cannot be extended by the
court.”);
see also, e.g.,
Maglio v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 542 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.
Pa. 1982) (remanding case in which notice of removal was filed
thirty-one
days after complaint was received by the defendant in the mail).
We must then turn to the petitioner’s request for an award of costs
and reasonable attorney fees. Section 1447(c) expressly provides that
“[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and
any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the
removal.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1447(c). 	“An 	award 	under 	Section 	1447(c) 	is
appropriate whether remand is based upon a jurisdictional defect or a
defect in the removal procedure.”
Lior v. Sit, 913 F. Supp. 868, 878 (D.N.J.
1996). “Although the Court has ‘broad discretion’ in determining whether
to award fees, such an award is only proper if ‘the removing party lacked
an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.’”
Cacoilo v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 902 F. Supp. 2d 511, 524 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting
Mints v.
Educ. Testing Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1260 (3d Cir. 1996), and
Martin v.
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Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)) (citations omitted). “A
finding of bad faith by the removing party is not required for an award
under Section 1447(c).”
Lior, 913 F. Supp. at 878;
see also Mints, 99 F.3d
at 1260 (“[T]he district court may require the payment of fees and costs
by a party which removed a case which the court then remanded, even
though the party removing the case did not act in bad faith.”);
Little
League Baseball, Inc. v. Welsh Pub. Grp., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 648, 656
(M.D. Pa. 1995) (“An award of costs does not require a finding of bad faith
on the part of the removing party.”).
“A defendant’s 	untimeliness 	in 	filing 	his 	notice 	of 	removal 	is
‘precisely the type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c).’”
Garrett
v. 	Cook, 	652 	F.3d 	1249, 	1254 	(10th 	Cir. 	2011) 	(quoting
	Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995)). Thus, “[i]f
objectively unreasonable, an untimely removal may give rise to an award
of fees and costs under § 1447(c).”
Id. (citing
Durham v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 2006));
see also Net 2 Press, Inc. v.
Nat’l Graphic Supply Corp., 324 F. Supp. 2d 15, 19 (D. Me. 2004)
(awarding costs and fees where removal was “obviously” untimely and
thus improper);
Lior, 913 F. Supp. at 878 (awarding costs and reasonable
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attorney fees where, among other defects, the amended notice of removal
was filed thirty-four days after the removing defendants received a draft
stipulation 	from 	the 	plaintiffs 	dismissing 	an 	allegedly 	nondiverse
corporate defendant);
cf. Little League Baseball, 874 F. Supp. at 656
(awarding 	costs 	under 	§ 1447(c) 	where 	“‘minimal 	research’ 	into 	a
fundamental question would have revealed to the removing party that
removal was improper”). Here, because minimal research would have
revealed to Lake that the time period for removal had
already expired,
his filing of a notice of removal forty-two days after the state court had
ordered his joinder as a party-respondent, and his company’s filing of
written consent to removal weeks or even months later, were obviously
untimely and thus objectively unreasonable.
Moreover, 	although 	the 	court 	need 	not 	find 	that 	Lake 	acted
dilatorily or in bad faith to award costs and attorney fees incurred due to
removal, we cannot overlook the removing defendant’s clear pattern of
delay and abuse of legal process. In particular, we have considered Lake’s
multiple eleventh-hour filings in federal district and bankruptcy court,
undertaken by him in a conspicuous bad-faith effort to delay state court
proceedings scheduled to occur in this conservatorship action within days
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after 	those 	filings, 	and 	in 	an 	attempt 	to 	force 	the 	Redevelopment
Authority to incur additional, unnecessary expenses.
	Cf. Fosnocht v.
Demko, 438 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner’s motion (Doc. 8) will be
granted in its entirety. This action will be remanded to the Court of
Common 	Pleas 	for 	Schuylkill 	County, 	Pennsylvania, 	for 	all 	further
proceedings 	on 	the 	conservatorship 	petition, 	and 	the 	removing
respondent, Gemini Lake, will be ordered to reimburse the petitioner for
the costs and reasonable attorney fees it has incurred as a result of the
improper removal of this action to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c).
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 4, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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