Cruz v. Klemm et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN ANTONIO CRUZ,
Plaintiff
V.
ULLI KLEMM, et al.,
Defendants
CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-665
(JUDGE MANNION)
MEMORANDUM
Presently 	before 	the 	court 	in 	this 	prisoner 	civil 	rights 	case 	is
defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. For the reasons set forth
below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, John Antonio Cruz, filed this case on April 8, 2025, and the
court received 	and 	docketed 	his complaint 	on 	April 	15, 	2025. 	(Doc. 1 ).
According to the complaint, Cruz is a member of the Jewish faith who follows
a 	Kosher 	diet. 	(Id. 	,ms-9). 	He 	was 	committed 	to 	the 	custody 	of 	the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") in 2016 and is currently
housed in SCI-Benner Township. (Id.)
Cruz was scheduled to observe Passover in April 2023 on the DOC's
roster of inmates observing the holiday. (Id. ,I11 ). On April 2, 2023, Cruz met
with SCI-Benner Township's chaplain, Chaplain Hansard, who purportedly
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instructed him that no food for the ceremonial meal would be made available
for purchase and that only food from the regular institutional menu would be
available. (Id. 1111 ). The complaint alleges that the food available on the
institutional menu is not Kosher and therefore would violate the tenets of
Cruz's faith. (Id. ) Cruz sent a request to Hansard requesting that Kosher food
be provided for the observance of Passover. (Id.)
On April 13, 2023, Cruz and other members of the Jewish faith met
with defendant Lilli Klemm , the DOC 's religious services administrator, to
discuss recent policy changes regarding meals for religious observances.
(Id. 	11114 , 12). Klemm stated that 	he was aware that the Jewish religion
required adherents to eat certain foods during certain holidays, but allegedly
stated that he would not arrange for these foods to be made available. (Id.
1113) . Klemm purportedly stated that denying Jewish inmates' request for
food 	on 	certain holidays was necessary because other religious groups
would 	likely request specific meals for specific religious holidays if their
request was granted . (Id.) Klemm also allegedly told Cruz that his lawyers
were "better" than Cruz's lawyers and that Cruz should sue him if he disliked
the policy. (Id.) The complaint alleges that the DOC's policies concerning
religious meals have been changed multiple times since this conversation ,
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but that none of the changes have provided the meals necessary for Jewish
inmates to practice their religious holidays. (Id. 1114 ).
The 	complaint 	alleges 	violations 	of the 	Rel igious 	Land 	Use 	and
Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") and the First Amendment. (/d.1116).
Cruz names as defendants Klemm and Laurel Harry, the DOC's secretary.
(Id. 	at 1-2). 	He sues both defendants in 	both their individual and 	official
capacities. 	(Id.) Cruz seeks 	an 	injunction 	requiring the DOC to 	provide
Jewish inmates religious meals on six specific holidays: Shabbath, Pesach,
Shabu'oth , Yorn Te'Urah, the evening after Yorn Kippur, and Sukkoth. (Id.
1117). He also seeks punitive damages and declaratory relief. (Id. 111118-19).
Defendants 	filed 	a motion 	to 	dismiss the 	complaint 	along 	with 	a
supporting brief on August 19, 2025. (Docs. 15-16). Defendants assert six
arguments for dismissal: 	(1) that all official capacity claims against them
should be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity; (2) that all official
capacity claims for money damages should be dismissed on the basis of
qualified immunity; (3) that all individual capacity claims should be dismissed
for failure to allege personal involvement; 	(4) that all 	individual capacity
claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; (5) that all claims for monetary damages should be dismissed
because Cruz has not alleged any physical injury; and (6) that all individual
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capacity claims for damages under RLUIPA should be dismissed because
RLUIPA does not permit such claims. (Doc. 16). Cruz filed an opposition brief
on November 30, 2025, which the court received and docketed on December
10 , 2025. (Doc. 19). Defendants have not filed a reply brief. The motion to
dismiss is accordingly ripe for judicial review.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. 	Motions to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes dismissal of a
complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted."
Under Rule 12(b )(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true,
construe the 	complaint 	in 	the 	light 	most favorable 	to 	the 	plaintiff, 	and
determine whether, 	under any reasonable reading 	of the complaint, the
plaintiff may be entitled to relief. " Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203,
210 (3d Cir. 2009 (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d 	Cir. 	2008)). While a complaint need only contain "a short and 	plain
statement 	of 	the 	claim, 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	8(a)(2), 	and 	detailed 	factual
allegations are not required, Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 555
(2007), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face ." Id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a
'probability requirement ,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
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defendant has acted 	unlawfully." Ashcroft v. 	Iqbal, 	556 U.S. 662 (2009)
(quoting 	Twombly, 	550 U.S. 	at 556). "[L]abels and conclusions" are not
enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and a court " is not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id.
In resolving a motion to dismiss, the court thus conducts "a two-part
analysis." Fowler, 	578 F.3d at 210. First, the court separates the factual
elements from the legal elements and disregards the legal conclusions. Id.
at 210-11 . Second, the court determines "whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for
relief." Id. at 211 (quotations omitted).
Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants.
Sause v. 	Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). 	Pro se complaints, "however
inartfully pleaded , must 	be 	held to 	less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 	U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 106 (1976)).
8. 	Constitutional Claims
Cruz's constitutional claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 	§1983.
Section 1983 authorizes redress for violations of constitutional rights and
provides in relevant part:
Every 	person 	who, 	under 	color 	of 	any 	statute, 	ordinance,
regulation , custom, 	or usage, 	of any State or Territory 	.. 	.
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subjects, or causes to be subjected , any citizen of the United
States 	or 	other 	person 	within 	the jurisdiction 	thereof to 	the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action 	at 	law, suit 	in 	equity, or other proper proceeding 	for
redress . ...
42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, to establish a successfu l claim under Section 1983,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by
a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). Section 1983 does
not create a substantive right, but merely provides a method for vindicating
federal rights conferred by the United States Constitution and the federal
statutes that it describes. Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
Ill. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Official Capacity Claims
Defendants first seek dismissal of all claims brought against them in
their official capacity on the basis of sovereign immunity. (Doc. 16 at 4-5).
Cruz argues that defendants are not entitled to sovereign immunity to the
extent 	he 	seeks 	injunctive 	relief ordering 	defendants to 	cease 	ongoing
violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 19 at 6-8). He additionally argues
that his 	su it 	is 	allowed 	because the government has waived 	sovereign
immunity under RLUIPA. (Id.)
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To the extent Cruz seeks damages for his constitutional claims from
defendants in their official capacities, these claims are barred by sovereign
immunity. 	DOC employees sued in their official capacities are entitled to
sovereign 	immunity 	under 	the 	Eleventh 	Amendment 	from 	claims 	for
damages brought pursuant to Section 1983. Downey v. Pa . Dep't of Corrs.,
968 F.3d 299, 310-11 (3d Cir. 2020).
Defendants are also entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent Cruz
seeks 	damages 	for 	violation 	of 	RLUIPA. States 	retain 	their 	sovereign
immunity from claims for damages under RLUIPA. Sossaman v. Texas , 563
U.S. 277, 293 (2011 ). The official capacity and RLUIPA damages claims will
accordingly be dismissed.
Cruz's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, however, are not
barred by sovereign immunity. "[T]he Ex Parle Young doctrine allows su its
... 	for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers in their official
capacities ." 	Reed v. Goertz , 598 	U.S. 230, 234 (2023) (citing 	Ex Parle
Young , 209 U.S. 123 159-61 (1908)).
B. 	Official Capacity Damages Claims
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from
Cruz's official capacity damages claims. This argument is meritless. "[T]he
doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials acting only in their individual
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capacities" and does not apply to official capacity claims. 1 WB . Matula , 67
F.3d 484, 499 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472-73
(1985)), abrogated in nonrelevant part by A. W v. Jersey City Public Schs. ,
486 F.3d 791 , 795-99 (3d Cir. 2007). 2
C. 	Individual Capacity Claims - Personal Involvement
Defendants next seek dismissal of Cruz's individual capacity claims for
failure to allege personal involvement. (Doc. 16 at 6-8). A defendant cannot
be liable for a violation of a plaintiff's civil rights unless the defendant was
personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v. Twp . of Riverdale, 904 F.3d
280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). The defendant's personal involvement cannot be
based solely on a theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Del/arciprete, 845
F .2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, for a supervisor to be liable for the
actions of a subordinate, there must be allegations of personal direction or
actual knowledge and acquiescence. Id.
1 As noted above, defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity from
the official capacity damages claims.
2 Although defendants' argument might be charitably read as asserting
qualified immunity with respect to Cruz's individual capacity claims if the
invocation of the official capacity claims is viewed as a typographical error,
the court will not grant defendants this liberal construction in light of Cruz's
status 	as 	a 	pro 	se 	litigant. 	An 	argument that defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity from official capacity claims simply does not give a pro se
litigant sufficient notice that qualified immunity with 	respect to individual
capacity claims may also be at issue.
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Personal involvement may also be pleaded through allegations that a
supervisory defendant "established 	and 	maintained 	a policy, practice or
custom 	which 	directly 	caused 	[the] 	constitutional 	harm." 	Santiago 	v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting A. M. ex rel.
J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.
2004)). To state such a claim , a plaintiff must allege the existence of a policy
or practice and allege that: "(1) the existing policy or practice created an
unreasonable risk of . . . injury; 	(2) the supervisor was aware that the
unreasonable risk was created; (3) the supervisor was indifferent to that risk;
and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or practice. " Beers-Capitol v.
Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 134 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d
1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)).
In 	this 	case, Cruz alleges that defendants 	have 	promulgated 	and
enforced various religious meals policies that have disallowed the religious
meals necessary for him to practice his Jewish faith. (Doc. 1). The court finds
this sufficient to allege personal involvement. See Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129
n.5; 	Beers-Capitol, 	256 	F.3d 	at 	134. Although 	the 	allegations 	against
defendant Harry in this respect are sparse, Cruz alleges that as the secretary
of the DOC, Harry " is 	charged with the final word 	in 	the policy making
process" and 	"approved 	the 	policy 	concerning 	the 	religious 	food 	items
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necessary for the ceremonial and ritual observance of the Plaintiff's Hebrew
religion ." (Doc. 1 at 2 ). Liberally construed , this is sufficient to allege Harry's
personal involvement in the alleged civil rights violations.
D. 	Individual Capacity Claims - Merits
Defendants also seek dismissal of Cruz's individual capacity claims for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . (Doc. 16 at 8-10).
Cruz's claims are grounded in the First Amendment and RLUIPA. The
First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting 	an
establishment of rel igion , or prohibiting 	the free 	exercise thereof. " U.S.
CONST. 	amend. 	I. 	It 	offers 	protection 	for 	a wide variety 	of expressive
activities, which are lessened, but not extinguished , in the prison context,
where legitimate penological interests must be considered in assessing the
constitutionality of official conduct. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
Although prisoners must be afforded "reasonable opportunities" to exercise
the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment, Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972) (per curiam), imprisonment necessarily results
in restrictions on some constitutional rights , including the First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion . O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348-
49 (1987). Only bel iefs which are both sincerely held and religious in nature
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are entitled to constitutional protection. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-19 (1972); Dehart v. Horn , 227 F.3d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2000).
Once it is established that the individual has a belief that is "both
sincerely held and religious in nature, " the Turner test must be applied to
determine 	whether 	the 	curtailment 	at 	issue 	is 	reasonably 	related 	to
penological interests. DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51. Specifical ly, Turner instructs
courts to weigh the following four factors in determining the reasonableness
of a challenged 	prison 	regulation : (1) whether there 	is 	"a valid, 	rational
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental
interest put forward to justify it "; (2) whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) the impact that
accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and (4)
whether there are "ready alternatives" available "that fully accommodate the
prisoner's right at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. " Turner, 482
U.S. at 89-91; O'Lone , 482 U.S. at 350-52 .
The most important prong of the Turner analysis requires a rational
connection between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest that
justifies it. Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F. 3d 366, 372 (3d Cir. 2003). "According to
Turner, a regulation will be sustained unless, 'the logical connection between
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the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy
arbitrary or irrational. "' Id. (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
RLUIPA 	provides 	additional 	protection 	for 	the 	religious 	rights 	of
incarcerated individuals beyond that provided by the First Amendment. Holt
v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). Under RLUIPA, "[n]o government shall
impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in
or confined to an 	institution, .. . even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of
the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2 ) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest. " 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1 (a). "A plaintiff bears the initial
burden of pr ov i ng that a prison policy 'impl icates his religious exercise."'
Ramirez v. Colli er, 595 U.S. 411 , 425 (2022) (quoting Holt, 574 U.S. at 360).
If the plaintiff makes such a showing , "the burden flips and the government
must 'demonstrate that imposition of the burden on that person' is the least
restrictive 	means 	of furthering 	a 	compelling 	governmental 	interest. " 	Id.
(quoting 42 U.S.C . §2000cc-1 (a)).
In this case, the court finds Cruz's allegations that defendants have
promulgated re ligious meals policies that directly bar him from obtaining the
meals necessary to practice his religion sufficient to allege violations of both
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the First Amendment and RLUIPA. Whether the policies ultimately comply
with the First Amendment and RLUIPA are fact questions that cannot be
resolved without a developed record. The court will accordingly deny the
motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims.
E. 	Damages
Finally, defendants argue that Cruz may not recover damages under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") because he has not alleged a
physical injury. (Doc. 16 at 10-11 ). Although defendants are correct that the
PLRA bars compensatory damages in a prisoner civil rights case unless the
plaintiff has suffered a physical injury, see 42 U.S.C. §1997e(e), Cruz seeks
only punitive damages in this case and 	does not request compensatory
damages. (Doc. 1 at 5). 	Punitive damages are not barred by the PLRA's
physical injury rule. Allah v. AI-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000). 3
F. 	Leave to Amend
Before dismissing a civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which 	rel ief may be granted, a district court must permit a curative
amendment unless the amendment would be inequitable or futile. Phillips,
3 Defendants also seek to bar Cruz from recovering damages for his
RLUIPA claims. (Doc. 16 at 11 ). The court need not address this argument
because, as noted above, defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity
from Cruz's RLUIPA damages claims.
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515 F.3d at 245. The court will deny leave to amend as futile because the
dismissed claims fail as a matter of law. The case will accordingly proceed
to discovery on plaintiff's original complaint.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons , the court will grant in part and deny in part
defendants' motion to dismiss, dismiss plaintiff's complaint to the extent it
seeks damages from defendants in their official capacities or for violation of
RLUIPA, require defendants to answer plaintiff's complaint with respect to all
other claims, and impose a case management schedule to govern this case.
An appropriate order shall issue.
. Mannion
es District Judge
Dated:
25-665-01
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