K.D. v. McCurdy et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
K.D., an adult individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
AARON McCURDY, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00573
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
This action commenced when the plaintiff, K.D., appearing through
counsel, filed her complaint on March 31, 2025. Doc. 1.
The plaintiff is the aunt of M.R., who falsely accused K.D. of rape.
In September 2022, defendant Aaron McCurdy, a caseworker employed
with defendant Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”),
transmitted to the state department of human services a Form CY-48
naming K.D. as an “indicated” perpetrator of child abuse, and as a result,
K.D. was placed on the Statewide Child Abuse Register, commonly
known 	as 	“ChildLine.” 	As 	a 	consequence 	of 	her 	placement 	on 	the
ChildLine register, K.D. was terminated from her employment as a
teacher, and she was unable to obtain other employment in her field as a
school 	teacher. 	K.D. 	pursued 	an 	administrative 	appeal 	from 	her
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designation 	as 	an 	“indicated” 	child 	abuser. 	In 	August 	2024, 	an
administrative law judge entered an order fully vindicating K.D., and in
September 2024, K.D. was notified that the ChildLine record had been
amended so that she was no longer identified as a perpetrator of child
abuse.
In 	her 	complaint, 	K.D. 	alleges 	that 	the 	defendants1 	failed 	to
adequately 	investigate 	M.R.’s 	allegations 	of 	abuse 	and 	filed 	the
“indicated” report of abuse against K.D. without substantial evidence to
support the agency findings and without a pre-deprivation hearing, in
violation 	of 	her 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	rights.2 	In
particular, 	K.D. 	alleges 	that 	the 	defendants 	were 	aware 	that 	the
complainant, M.R., had a history of significant mental health issues and
of previously making false reports of abuse. Moreover, K.D. alleges that
the defendants failed to interview M.R.’s grandparents, at whose home
the rape was alleged to have occurred in December 2017, and that the
1 In addition to CYS and McCurdy, the complaint names Heather
Batchler, McCurdy’s supervisor at CYS, and the municipality of Luzerne
County as defendants.
2 In addition to her § 1983 federal civil rights claims, K.D. also
asserts a state-law tort claim for malicious prosecution against McCurdy
and Batchler.
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grandparents would have informed investigators that neither K.D. nor
M.R. were present at the home at that time. Rather, K.D. alleges that the
defendants’ findings were based solely on a 20-minute phone interview
with the complainant, M.R., with no effort to actually investigate M.R.’s
allegations. 	K.D. further alleges that 	defendants CYS 	and Luzerne
County had failed to adequately train defendants McCurdy and Batchler.
In addition to the termination of her employment as a teacher and related
loss of past and future earnings, K.D. alleges that she was forced to
expend substantial monies seeking and obtaining expungement of her
name from the child abuse registry and clearing her name, and she
suffered significant mental and emotional harms as well.
This matter is currently before the court, however, on a motion by
the defendants to compel the disclosure of the plaintiff ’s identity. Doc. 13.
Rather than disclosing her true name, the plaintiff has appeared in this
action pseudonymously, using her initials “K.D.” only. The motion is fully
briefed and ripe for decision.
See Doc. 14; Doc. 16; Doc. 17.
The 	plaintiff 	has 	not 	moved 	for 	leave 	to 	proceed 	under 	a
pseudonym. More importantly, even if she were to be granted leave to
proceed pseudonymously, the federal rules require that, at a minimum,
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her complaint must provide and be signed under her
true name.
See Fed.
R. 	Civ. 	P. 	10(a) 	(requiring names of 	parties to 	be 	disclosed in 	the
complaint); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring all papers filed in federal
litigation to be signed by a
pro se party personally and forbidding lying
in all papers filed with the court);
Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 484
(11th Cir. 2006) (“A trial is not a masquerade party nor is it a game of
judicial hide-n-seek where the plaintiff may offer the defendant the
added challenge of uncovering his real name.”). To the extent there is a
factual and legal basis to withhold her identity or other facts from
disclosure to the public, that interest may be preserved by moving the
court for leave to file the complaint and other papers
under seal.
See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 5(d). But the plaintiff here has not pursued that avenue,
choosing instead to file her complaint under a pseudonym without leave
of court.
“[P]roceeding 	under 	a 	fictitious 	name 	is 	an 	unusual 	measure
reserved for exceptional cases.”
Doe v. Ind. Black Expo, Inc., 923 F. Supp.
137, 139 (S.D. Ind. 1996). As the Third Circuit has observed:
One of the essential qualities of a Court of Justice is
that 	its 	proceedings 	should 	be 	public. 	Rule 	10(a)
requires parties to a lawsuit to identify themselves in
their respective pleadings. Courts have explained that
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) illustrates the
principle that judicial proceedings, civil as well as
criminal, are to be conducted in public. Identifying the
parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of
publicness. . . . A plaintiff ’s use of a pseudonym runs
afoul of the public’s common law right of access to
judicial proceedings.
While not expressly permitted under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 10(a), in exceptional cases courts have
allowed 	a 	party 	to 	proceed 	anonymously. 	That 	a
plaintiff may suffer embarrassment or economic harm
is not enough. Instead, a plaintiff must show both (1) a
fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of severe harm
is reasonable. . . . When a litigant sufficiently alleges
that he or she has a reasonable fear of severe harm
from litigating without a pseudonym, courts of appeals
are in agreement that district courts should balance a
plaintiff ’s interests and fear against the public’s strong
interest in an open litigation process.
Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations, internal
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
In
Megless, the Third Circuit set forth “a non-exhaustive list of
factors to be weighed both in favor of anonymity and also factors that
favor the traditional rule of openness.”
Id. at 409. The factors in favor of
anonymity include:
(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has
been 	kept 	confidential; 	(2) 	the 	bases 	upon 	which
disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the
substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of the
public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the
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litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because of the purely
legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there
is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the
litigant’s 	identities; 	(5) 	the 	undesirability 	of 	an
outcome 	adverse 	to 	the 	pseudonymous 	party 	and
attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the
price of being publicly identified; and (6) whether the
party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate
ulterior motives.
Id. (quoting another source). The factors militating against anonymity
include:
(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the
identities 	of 	litigants; 	(2) 	whether, 	because 	of 	the
subject 	matter 	of 	this 	litigation, 	the 	status 	of 	the
litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a
particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant’s
identities, 	beyond 	the 	public’s 	interest 	which 	is
normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to
pseudonym 	by 	counsel, 	the 	public, 	or 	the 	press 	is
illegitimately motivated.
Id. (quoting another source). “The
Megless factors require a fact-specific,
case-by-case analysis.”
Doe v. Coll. of N.J., 997 F.3d 489, 495 (3d Cir.
2021).
Applying these factors to the instant case, we conclude that the
motion should be denied, as the balance of factors favors permitting the
plaintiff to proceed anonymously.
First, the plaintiff has kept the facts and nature of this case and
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her claims largely to herself. Although K.D.’s identity was necessarily
disclosed to
some extent for the 24-month period when she was listed on
the ChildLine registry as the perpetrator of an indicated report of child
abuse, the ChildLine registry itself is not accessible to the general public
like the SORNA (Megan’s Law) registry.
Compare J.F. v. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 325 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024) (“[F]or the most part,
access to Childline Registry information is limited to discrete situations
involving adoptive or foster parents, where an individual’s employment
brings them in contact with children, or with persons licensed to provide
child daycare in their residence, and the unauthorized release of such
information carries possible criminal penalties.”),
with Commonwealth v.
Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 613 (Pa. 2020) (“Not only does SORNA establish
a registry of sexual offenders, but it also directs the state police to make
information available to the public through the internet. The resulting
website contains a feature to permit a member of the public to obtain
relevant information for an offender by a query of the internet website
based on search criteria including searches for any given zip code or
geographic radius set by the user.”) (citation, internal quotation marks,
and brackets omitted). Moreover, her identity and the allegations of child
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abuse 	lodged 	against 	her 	are 	no 	longer 	accessible 	to 	even 	those
authorized to access the ChildLine registry, as those charges have been
fully expunged and she is no longer listed on that registry. This limited
disclosure of K.D.’s identity as a result of the now-expunged indicated
report of child abuse is not inconsistent with maintaining confidentiality.
This factor weighs in favor of anonymity.
Second, the plaintiff points to the recognized stigma that may be
caused to an individual labeled or accused as a child abuser, which has
been recognized by Pennsylvania federal and state courts as sufficient to
merit providing anonymity to accused individuals during investigation,
administrative appeals, and litigation concerning child abuse reporting
and the ChildLine registry.
See, e.g.,
Z.N. v. Cumberland Cnty. Children
& Youth Servs., No. 1:18-1286, 2018 WL 3585085 (M.D. Pa. July 26,
2018);
A.W. v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 338 A.3d 1047 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2025)
(unpublished en banc table decision);
S.F. v. Pa. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 298
A.3d 495 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2023) (en banc). The potential impact of this
stigma in this case is enhanced by the plaintiff ’s professional occupation
as a teacher, and underscored by her termination from a teaching
position and her inability to obtain other employment in education or
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childcare during the two-year period while her administrative appeal was
pending. Although the indicated report of child abuse against K.D. has
been expunged, the stigma or reputational harm of such charges are
likely to continue to affect her particular employment prospects if made
fully public. This factor weighs in favor of anonymity.
Third, 	there 	is 	minimal 	public 	interest 	in 	maintaining 	the
confidentiality of the names of perpetrators of indicated reports of child
abuse. Unlike confidentiality for victims and reporters of child abuse,
confidentiality for perpetrators of child abuse does not serve the public
interest of preventing future child abuse.
Cf. G.V. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare,
91 A.3d 667, 670–71 (Pa. 2014). This factor weighs against anonymity.
Fourth, the claims here are not purely legal claims, and thus the
public’s interest cannot be said to be “atypically weak.” The plaintiff ’s
claims 	are 	generally 	fact-intensive. 	This 	factor 	weighs 	against
anonymity.
Fifth, the plaintiff does not suggest that granting this motion might
cause her to abandon this lawsuit, but she does argue that it was filed by
the defendants for malicious and retaliatory reasons. To the extent public
disclosure 	of 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	identity 	deters 	this 	plaintiff 	or 	future
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plaintiffs from pursuing valid claims to preserve anonymity, such an
outcome would be undesirable to the public interest. This factor weighs
in favor of anonymity, but not strongly.
Sixth, there is no evidence or allegation that the plaintiff has an
illegal or ulterior motive for pursuing her claims against the defendants
anonymously. This factor weighs in favor of anonymity.
Turning then to the factors militating against anonymity, first “we
must acknowledge the thumb on the scale that is the universal interest
in favor of open judicial proceedings.”
Megless, 654 F.3d at 411. None of
the parties to this case is a public figure, and the subject matter of this
case does not implicate any stronger public interest beyond that which
normally obtains in a civil rights action. Finally, there is no evidence or
allegation to suggest that the defendants oppose anonymity for illegal or
ulterior reasons.
Therefore, finding the balance of
Megless factors weighs in favor of
anonymity, the motion to compel disclosure of the plaintiff ’s identity will
be denied. The court will, however, direct the plaintiff to file
under seal a
notice formally disclosing the plaintiff ’s true name.
See generally Fed. R.
Civ. P. 5.2(d); M.D. Pa. LR 5.8; M.D. Pa. LCrR 49(c)(3).
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An appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 11, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
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