Saunders v. City of Scranton et al

3:25-cv-00265Pamd25 de nov. de 2025

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAJUAN SAUNDERS, 	: Civil No. 3:25-CV-265
:
Plaintiff, 	:
: (Judge Munley)
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
:
CITY OF SCRANTON, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the
	pro se
plaintiff’s amended complaint. The plaintiff, DaJuan Saunders, initially
filed this civil rights action against the City of Scranton, Mayor Paige
Cognetti, 	Lackawanna 	County, 	three 	Lackawanna 	County
commissioners, and three Scranton Police Department (“SPD”) officers. 1
The initial complaint asserted various claims against the defendants: a
First Amendment retaliation claim against the individual police officers
for directing the doctor not to treat Saunders’ wounds in retaliation for
1 Doc. 1.
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filing a lawsuit against SPD; 2 a
Monell 3 claim against the City and the
County 	for 	failure 	to 	train 	and 	supervise 	its 	officers; 4 	a 	failure 	to
intervene 	claim 	against 	Officer 	Merkel 	arising 	out 	of 	the 	hospital
incident; 5 a racial discrimination claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981
against the individual police officers;6 a Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection claim against all of the defendants; 7 	a defamation claim
against Sergeant Shields; 8 and an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and
unusual punishment arising out of the hospital incident.9
We recommend that the complaint be served on Defendants City of
Scranton, Lackawanna County, Officer Merkel, and Sergeants Shields
and Megivern as to the First Amendment, failure to intervene, and
2
Id. at 8.
3
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 695
(1978).
4 Doc. 1 at 10.
5
Id. at 12.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 13.
8
Id. at 14.
9
Id. at 15.
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Monell 	claims, 	but 	that 	the 	remainder 	of 	Saunders’ 	complaint 	be
dismissed. 10
Saunders submitted untimely objections to our recommendation. 11
The 	district 	court 	overruled 	the 	objections 	as 	they 	could 	“only 	be
construed 	as 	the 	facts 	that 	Saunders 	would 	plead 	in 	an 	amended
complaint.”12 	Accordingly, 	the 	district 	court 	adopted 	our
recommendation 	and 	dismissed 	defendants 	Cognetti, 	Chermak,
Gaughan, 	and 	McGloin, 	and 	dismissed 	Saunders’ 	Section 	1983
conspiracy and defamation claims along with his claims arising under
Section 1981, the Eighth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause
without prejudice to refiling an amended complaint. 13
Saunders thereafter filed an amended complaint pertaining to only
his claim under the Equal Protection Clause.14 	This claim arises out of
10 Doc. 7.
11 Doc. 8.
12 Doc. 10 at 3.
13
Id. at 4-6.
14 Doc. 17. 	Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a
court to dismiss claims for failure to prosecute or to comply with the
Federal Rules or court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Saunders’ amended
complaint does not reassert claims under Section 1981 or the Eighth
Amendment. 	He further fails to reassert claims against defendants
Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 3 of 12
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his arrest in November of 2023 for various charges, including,
inter alia,
burglary, aggravated assault, and witness intimidation.15 16 	Saunders
alleges that he was handcuffed to the bed at the hospital and interrogated
by Sergeant Shields of the SPD. 17 He claims that Shields referred to him
as a racial slur upon finding out that Saunders had filed a previous
lawsuit against SPD. 18 	He further asserts that officers directed the
doctor not to treat Saunders’ injuries in retaliation for Saunders filing a
lawsuit against SPD. 19 Saunders claims that he suffered from a shoulder
injury and an infection in his neck due the lack of medical treatment at
the hospital.20
In 	addition 	to 	the 	derogatory 	comments 	made 	to 	him 	at 	the
hospital, Saunders again claims that he has been the subject of such
Cognetti, Chermak, Gaughan, and McGloin. Accordingly, we recommend
these claims and defendants be dismissed with prejudice.
15
See Commonwealth v. Saunders, CP-35-CR-0000007-2024.
16 	We 	may 	take 	judicial 	notice 	of 	the 	public 	docket 	in 	Saunders’
underlying state criminal case.
Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1
(3d Cir. 2014) (“We may take judicial notice of the contents of another
Court’s docket.”).
17 Doc. 17 ¶ 2.
18
Id.
19
Id. ¶ 3
.
20
Id. ¶ 4.
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racial animus on two prior occasions—once when officers were searching
for him and remarked that the house they were at “was too nice to be
[Saunders’], and once when he was allegedly stopped for illegal tint on
his car windows. 21 Saunders asserts that “a pattern of racial bias within
the City of Scranton can be seen in the context of other legal matters
involving the City.”22 	Specifically, he claims that two female officers
brought a lawsuit against the City for alleged sexual abuse but they
“were not subject to derogatory treatment, racial slurs, or retaliation by
the City in connection with their legal claims.” 23
For the following reasons, we will recommend that the remaining
claim be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of
Pro Se Complaints – Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review
	pro se
complaints 	brought 	by 	plaintiffs 	given 	leave 	to 	proceed
	in 	forma
21
Id. ¶ 5.
22
Id. ¶ 12.
23
Id. ¶ 13.
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pauperis. 24 	We review such complaints to determine whether there are
frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. 25 This statutory preliminary screening
mirrors 	review 	under 	Rule 	12(b)(6) 	of 	the 	Federal 	Rules 	of 	Civil
Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 26
With 	respect 	to 	this 	legal 	benchmark, 	under 	federal 	pleading
standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement
of 	the 	claim 	showing 	that 	the 	pleader 	is 	entitled 	to 	relief.” 27 	In
determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this
pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the
complaint as true 28 and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the
non-movant.” 29 	However, 	a 	court 	is 	not 	required 	to 	accept 	legal
24
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
25
Id.
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
28
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
29
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d
Cir. 1994).
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conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” 30
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter
Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-
part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim
should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
. Second, a District
Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the
complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a
“plausible claim for relief.”
	Id. at 1950. In other words, a
complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement
to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with
its facts.
See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme
Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, 	the 	complaint 	has 	alleged—but 	it 	has 	not
‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ”
Iqbal, 129
S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense.”
Id. 31
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on
the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public
30
Id.;
see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice”).
31
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
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record. 32 	A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the
plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.”33 Additionally,
if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically
attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the
court may consider such document in its determination. 34 	However, the
court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion
to dismiss. 35
Finally, when reviewing a
pro se complaint, we are reminded that
such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial
justice.’” 36 	We must apply the relevant law even if the
pro se plaintiff
does not mention it by name. 37
32
Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
33
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
34
See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.
2002).
35
Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
36
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(f)).
37
Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Higgins v.
Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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B. Saunders’ Equal Protection Claim Fails as a Matter of Law.
After review of Saunders’ amended complaint, we conclude that he
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and his
remaining claim should be dismissed.
Saunders 	reasserts 	an 	Equal 	Protection 	claim 	against 	the
defendants, alleging that he was treated differently than others who also
filed lawsuits against the City. 38 	To state a claim for discrimination
under the Equal Protection clause, the plaintiff must show that he
endured 	“purposeful 	discrimination” 	because 	of 	a 	protected
characteristic. 39 Accordingly, he must establish that he was subjected to
“(1) 	disparate 	treatment 	in 	relation 	to 	other 	similarly 	situated
individuals, and (2) that the discriminatory treatment was based on
[race].” 40
Here, the plaintiff alleges that “the racial bias seen in other legal
matters involving the City of Scranton—such as the case of the two white
38 Doc. 17.
39
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).
40
Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F.
Supp. 3d 657, 667 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
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women 	who 	were 	sexually 	abused 	by 	[a 	Scranton 	police 	officer]—
illustrates a broader pattern of unequal treatment that favors white
Plaintiffs over Black Plaintiffs.”41
“Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection clause
when they are alike ‘in all relevant respects.’”42 	However, “an equal-
protection 	challenge 	must 	allege 	more 	than 	‘broad 	generalities’ 	in
identifying a comparator.” 43 Again, other than the general assertion that
these women filed a lawsuit against the city, there are no facts alleged in
the amended complaint from which we can even infer that these women
were similarly situated to Saunders. 	Indeed, Saunders states these
women were officers who alleged sexual abuse in the workplace.
Accordingly, Saunders’ Equal Protection claim fails. 	While we
recognize that
pro se plaintiffs should generally be permitted to amend
their complaints, 44 Saunders was already provided with an opportunity
41 Doc. 17 ¶ 16.
42
	Harvard 	v. 	Cesnalis, 	973 	F.3d 	190, 	205 	(3d 	Cir. 	2020) 	(quoting
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).
43
Stradford v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 53 F.4th 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted).
44
See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,
253 (3d Cir. 2007);
Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 10 of 12
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to correct the defects previously cited and this amended complaint merely
reiterates the prior allegations. 	Thus, we believe leave to amend would
be 	futile 	and 	now 	recommend 	that 	Saunders’ 	remaining 	claims 	be
dismissed with prejudice. To the extent that there is a motion to dismiss
the 	plaintiff’s 	amended 	complaint 	presently 	on 	the 	docket 	filed 	by
Defendants 	City 	of 	Scranton, 	Megivern, 	Merkel, 	and 	Shields,45 	we
recommend the court dismiss the motion as moot after dismissing the
claim.
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the remainder of the
claims 	and 	defendants 	be 	dismissed 	with 	prejudice, 	and 	that 	the
defendants’ motion to dismiss be denied as moot.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge's 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or
matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a
recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a
habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being
served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties,
written 	objections 	which 	shall 	specifically 	identify 	the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report
45 Doc. 18.
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to which objection is made and the basis for such objections.
The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall
apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those
portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her
discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or
her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge
may 	also 	receive 	further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses 	or
recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 25th day of November 2025.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
Case 3:25-cv-00265-JKM-DFB Document 20 Filed 11/25/25 Page 12 of 12

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