Riley v. United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
GEORGE RILEY,
Plaintiff
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-02250
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff George Riley, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a complaint alleging that he
was assaulted by officers at USP Canaan and asserting a claim under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. (Doc. 1). Defendant United States of America has filed a “Motion to Dismiss and/or for
Summary Judgment.” (Doc. 12). Because the complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief,
and because summary judgment prior to discovery would be premature, the motion will be
denied.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Riley’s complaint alleges as follows: On March 29, 2023, in the Special Housing Unit
at USP Canaan, Riley was pulled from his cell by correctional officers R. Swift and Voda,
who escorted him to the shower in restraints. These officers allegedly “repeatedly punch[ed
Riley] in the upper torso/head and face.” Riley alleges that because of this assault, he
sustained fractures to his nose and skull and lost vision in his left eye. Although the complaint
referred to alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment, Riley checked a box on the complaint
form to indicate that the case was a “Negligence Action under the Federal Tort Claims Act . . .
against the United States.” See (Doc. 1 at 1).
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The Court directed service of the complaint on defendant United States (Doc. 5),
which filed the instant motion. The motion confirms that Riley filed an administrative tort
claim pertaining to this incident. The defendant has also submitted evidence extrinsic to the
complaint, including Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) records pertaining to the incident. Through
this evidence, the defendant contends that on the day in question, an officer found Riley
banging his head against a shower wall, after which Riley assaulted another inmate while the
officer was trying to restrain Riley. As a result, another officer deployed “two[] 5-8 round
volleys from a .68 caliber pepper ball launcher.” The BOP initially recorded Riley as
sustaining a “minor left eye injury,” but he was later taken to a hospital and diagnosed with
fracture of his nose and left orbital wall. See generally (Doc. 13).
The defendant seeks summary judgment, arguing that the evidence establishes the
force used against Riley was reasonable and that he cannot sustain any tort claim. In the
alternative, the defendant requests dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6),
arguing that Riley’s complaint is too “vague and conclusory” to sustain a claim. In response
to the motion, Riley filed a letter arguing, among other points, that “any expert could
confirm” that he did not sustain his injuries in the manner the defendant describes, and that
evidence would show that the officers “are know[n] for assaulting inmates.” See (Doc. 19).
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
“If discovery is incomplete in any way material to a pending summary judgment
motion, a district court is justified in not granting the motion.” Doe v. Abington Friends Sch.,
480 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2007). While the “proper course” for a non-movant to request
additional discovery is a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), see
Abington Friends, 480 F.3d at 257, the relief is properly granted if the parties’ arguments
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demonstrate the need for discovery. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 79 F.4th 312, 315-16, 320
(3d Cir. 2023) (“Wilson . . . continued to assert in his opposition to summary judgment that
he could later present expert testimony and that he should be permitted to seek discovery . . .
The District Court therefore erred in granting pre-discovery summary judgment.”).
Here, Riley’s argument that expert testimony and other evidence can support his claim
suggests that the case should proceed to discovery. Although the defendant argues that the
BOP’s own records “demonstrate[] that [Riley’s] allegations . . . are without merit and false,”1
that conclusion relies on the assumption that the BOP’s records must be accepted as credible
and Riley’s contrary allegations are not credible. On a request for summary judgment, the
Court cannot “weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations,” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750
F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), nor can it assume that Riley will be unable to
present contrary evidence. Accordingly, summary judgment prior to discovery is not
appropriate in this case.
III. DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO RULE 12(B)(6)
Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a
complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first take note of the elements a plaintiff
must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions which are not entitled to the
assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint’s factual allegations, taken
1 The defendant also argues that Riley’s failure to complain of staff assault to outside
medical providers shows that his allegations are fabricated. But these providers acknowledged
that Riley’s injuries were caused by “traumatic” impact to his face, so it is unclear why
identifying the perpetrator would have been relevant to his treatment. See, e.g., (Doc. 13-5 at
51 (diagnosing “traumatic optic neuropathy”); Doc. 13-5 at 109 (“Patient was hit in face 1
week ago”)).
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as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc.,
662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider
the facts alleged on the face of the amended complaint, as well as “documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.”
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
The plaintiff must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal
conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting
In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor
need the court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526
(1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to
a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in
the amended complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &
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Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those
allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.”
Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
and citation omitted).
Here, the defendant argues that Riley “does not provide any information regarding the
assault other than his statements to an emergency room doctor,” and his allegations are “so
speculative and vague” that they cannot support a negligence claim. However, Riley’s
complaint plainly alleges the date and location of the incident, the officers involved, the
actions they allegedly took (“repeatedly punching me in the upper torso/head and face”), and
the injuries these actions allegedly caused, with reference to several pages of attached medical
records. See (Doc. 1, Doc. 1-1). The defendant cannot compel dismissal by pointing to
additional facts that Riley could have pleaded, or by asserting that “[t]here is no evidence” to
support Riley’s allegations (Doc. 14 at 15-17). See Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347-48 (“Courts
cannot inject evidentiary issues into the plausibility determination . . . This includes the
weighing of facts or the requirement that a plaintiff plead ‘specific facts’ beyond those
necessary to state a valid claim.”) (citation omitted).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the defendant’s motion will be denied, and the case will proceed to
discovery. An appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 25, 2026 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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