3:24-cv-01748•Scocozzo v. Henry et al
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1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ANTHONY SCOCOZZO, : Civ. No. 3:24-CV-1748 : Plaintiff, : (Judge Munley) : v. : : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) : MICHELLE HENRY, et al, : : Defendants. : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. Factual and Procedural Background The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this in forma pauperis lawsuit by filing a complaint, (Doc. 1), which he has amended on several occasions. (Docs. 95, 98). In this a pro se lawsuit Scocozzo names multiple local, state and federal defendants and brings a host of legal challenges relating to the ability of the plaintiff to possess firearms following what is alleged to have been his involuntary mental health commitment in 2009. Scocozzo’s amended complaint, the operative pleading in this case, stitches together disparate events involving distinct actors and distinct episodes spanning some fourteen years between 2009 and 2023 into a single seamless gestalt. (Doc. 98 passim). In essence, Scocozzo alleges that in 2009 he was twice improperly involuntarily committed following episodes in which he threatened Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 1 of 16
2 to kill himself. As a result of these involuntary mental health commitments Scocozzo was placed on a computerized database of persons who were legally prohibited from possessing firearms. According to the plaintiff, he learned that these involuntary commitments barred him from possessing firearms in March of 2020 when he attempted to acquire a gun. Scocozzo unsuccessfully attempted to challenge this prohibition on firearms possession and alleges that, as a result of this petitioning activity, he was charged by local authorities with making false statements in connection with the attempted acquisition of firearms, charges that remain pending. Based upon this sweeping array of averments, Scocozzo has lodged a host of legal claims against some thirteen defendants ranging from the Attorney General of the United States to a local police officer who initiated involuntary commitment proceedings against Scocozzo in March of 2009 based upon Scocozzo’s voiced threats of suicide; namely, his statement that: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic] and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself. I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31). Included among the defendants named in Scocozzo’s amended complaint are three mental health professionals who participated in his 2009 involuntary commitments: Dr. Muhammed Rahman, Dr. Boriosi, and Stephen Arnone, a local mental health administrator. (Id.) Scocozzo never provided valid addresses for these Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 2 of 16
3 defendants and has never properly served these defendants. Consequently, in April of 2025 Scocozzo was placed on notice that the failure to provide valid addresses for these defendants by June 2025 could result in the dismissal of the defendants pursuant to Rule 4. (Doc. 53). Despite this admonition, Scocozzo has failed to perfect service of his complaint, and the time for service has now long passed. Furthermore, a screening review of the plaintiff’s amended complaint reveals that his claims against these three defendants, which relate to events which took place some fifteen years ago, are now time-barred. Accordingly, upon a screening review oof this complaint, it is recommended that Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi now be dismissed from this lawsuit. II. Discussion A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review This court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 3 of 16
4 complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that: Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 4 of 16
5 alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must: [B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 5 of 16
6 allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id., at 679. Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: [A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. As the Court of Appeals has observed: The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955). This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 6 of 16
7 “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012). In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 7 of 16
8 physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what a complaint should say and provides that: (a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 8 of 16
9 are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action. Judged against these legal guideposts, Scocozzo’s amended complaint fails as a matter of law on several scores with respect to Defendants Arnone, Boriosi, and Rahman, as discussed below. B. Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi Should Be Dismissed from this Case. With respect to Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi, Scocozzo’s amended complaint brings claims which are both untimely and lacking in merit. At the outset, Scocozzo’s claims against these defendants are profoundly flawed in at least two respects. First, these allegations—which relate to civil commitments in March and November of 2009 but were first presented in October of 2024, some fifteen years later—are clearly time barred. It is well-settled that civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 9 of 16
10 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010 (3d Cir. 1995). While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself of this grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir. 1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead: The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991).In order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry, we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors: (1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 10 of 16
11 degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001). In this case, Scocozzo attempts to evade the bar of the statute of limitations by asserting that he was not specifically aware of the fact that he was briefly involuntarily committed at the time of these events in March of 2009. The problem with this assertion, however, is that it is evident from Scocozzo’s own complaint that he knew of this involuntary commitment no later than March of 2020, when the commitment served as the grounds for denying his application to purchase a firearm. (Doc. 98 at 15). Thus, Scocozzo concedes that he was fully aware of the fact of this involuntary commitment no later than March 2020. Yet, he did not file this lawsuit until October 2024, more than four years after the fact of this involuntary commitment was known by the plaintiff. On these facts, by March 2020 Scocozzo plainly had sufficient knowledge of his injury and its cause, that he was legally required to timely “choose to sue or forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir. 1998). Scocozzo failed to do so, waiting more than four years before bringing this Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 11 of 16
12 claim. Therefore, his claims against Defendants Rahman, Boriosi and Arnone are time-barred and should be dismissed. Further, given the factual recitals set forth in Scocozzo’s amended complaint, his false arrest claims against these defendants fail on their merits. On this score, the gist of Scocozzo’s amended complaint is his insistence that the defendants improperly lacked probable cause to believe that he was a threat to himself at the time of these involuntary commitments in 2009. Yet, the actual commitment papers which Scocozzo attached to his amended complaint make it abundantly clear that there was ample reason to believe that Scocozzo presented a threat to himself in 2009. Indeed, these commitments rested on the immutable fact that Scocozzo reportedly stated that he planned to kill himself. For example, Scocozzo’s March 2009 commitment followed a March 9, 2009, traffic stop when Scocozzo told the police officer: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic] and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself. I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31). Likewise, according to the commitment papers attached to Scocozzo’s amended complaint in November of 2009, the plaintiff stated five times that he intended to kill himself and that he wished to jump off a bridge into a gorge. (Id. at 38). Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 12 of 16
13 of reasonable caution to conclude that” the subject’s detention is warranted. U.S. v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause existed, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which the officer[] possessed at the time of [the detention], coupled with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the [detention].” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, it is entirely undisputed that in 2009 Scocozzo repeatedly stated that he planned to kill himself. Given Scocozzo’s own statements, these defendants had an obligation to take appropriate steps to protect the plaintiff from himself. Their actions, therefore, were supported by ample probable cause, were fully justified and simply do not give rise to federal civil rights liability some seventeen years later. Finally, dismissal of this pleading as to Defendants Arnone, Boriosi and Rahman James is now warranted since the failure to properly serve this filing compels dismissal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, this result is mandated by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes the method by which service can be made and describes how a party must demonstrate proof of service on the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)-(l). Rule 4 also Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 13 of 16
14 sets time limits for service and prescribes the sanction of dismissal for the failure to make proper and timely service, stating as follows: (m) Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The language of Rule 4(m) is both clear and mandatory. Where there is an unjustified and unexcused failure to timely serve a complaint, the court “must dismiss the action.” Id. As a general rule, “the party asserting the validity of service bears the burden of proof on that issue.” Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 4A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1083 (1987)). When the plaintiff fails to carry this burden of proof on the issue of proper and timely service, consistent with Rule 4(m)’s mandate that the “court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action,” dismissal of the case is entirely appropriate. Indeed, when a plaintiff does not show good cause for a failure to serve, Beckerman v. Susquehanna Township Police, 254 F. App’x 149, 154 (3d Cir. 2007), or fails to make service, despite warnings and requests by the court to address service issues, Foster v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 157 F. Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 14 of 16
15 App’x 488, 490 (3d Cir. 2005), courts have frequently dismissed actions for failure to make service. These principles control here and call for dismissal of this action with respect to Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi for failure to make timely and proper service. In this case, the plaintiff has provided no proof of proper service on these defendants more than nine months after being instructed to make service upon pain of dismissal of these defendants. Given this cascading array of failures, dismissal is appropriate here. Beckerman, 254 F. App’x at 154 (affirming dismissal for failure to serve two days after service deadline elapsed where no good cause shown) C. Recommendation For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants Rahman, Boriosi, and Arnone be DISMISSED from this case. The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3: Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 15 of 16
16 made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Submitted this 12 th day of January 2026. S/ Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge Case 3:24-cv-01748-JKM-MCC Document 159 Filed 01/12/26 Page 16 of 16
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