Scocozzo v. Henry et al

3:24-cv-01748Pamd12 de jan. de 2026

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY SCOCOZZO, 	: 	Civ. No. 3:24-CV-1748
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	(Judge Munley)
:
v. 	:
: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
MICHELLE HENRY, et al, 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, commenced this in forma pauperis
lawsuit by filing a complaint, (Doc. 1), which he has amended on several occasions.
(Docs. 95, 98). In this a pro se lawsuit Scocozzo names multiple local, state and
federal defendants and brings a host of legal challenges relating to the ability of the
plaintiff to possess firearms following what is alleged to have been his involuntary
mental health commitment in 2009. Scocozzo’s amended complaint, the operative
pleading in this case, stitches together disparate events involving distinct actors and
distinct episodes spanning some fourteen years between 2009 and 2023 into a single
seamless gestalt. (Doc. 98 passim). In essence, Scocozzo alleges that in 2009 he was
twice improperly involuntarily committed following episodes in which he threatened
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to kill himself. As a result of these involuntary mental health commitments Scocozzo
was placed on a computerized database of persons who were legally prohibited from
possessing firearms. According to the plaintiff, he learned that these involuntary
commitments barred him from possessing firearms in March of 2020 when he
attempted to acquire a gun. Scocozzo unsuccessfully attempted to challenge this
prohibition on firearms possession and alleges that, as a result of this petitioning
activity, he was charged by local authorities with making false statements in
connection with the attempted acquisition of firearms, charges that remain pending.
Based upon this sweeping array of averments, Scocozzo has lodged a host of
legal claims against some thirteen defendants ranging from the Attorney General of
the United States to a local police officer who initiated involuntary commitment
proceedings against Scocozzo in March of 2009 based upon Scocozzo’s voiced
threats of suicide; namely, his statement that: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic]
and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself. I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill
myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31).
Included among the defendants named in Scocozzo’s amended complaint are
three 	mental 	health 	professionals 	who 	participated 	in 	his 	2009 	involuntary
commitments: Dr. Muhammed Rahman, Dr. Boriosi, and Stephen Arnone, a local
mental health administrator. (Id.) Scocozzo never provided valid addresses for these
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defendants and has never properly served these defendants. Consequently, in April
of 2025 Scocozzo was placed on notice that the failure to provide valid addresses
for these defendants by June 2025 could result in the dismissal of the defendants
pursuant to Rule 4. (Doc. 53). Despite this admonition, Scocozzo has failed to
perfect service of his complaint, and the time for service has now long passed.
Furthermore, a screening review of the plaintiff’s amended complaint reveals that
his claims against these three defendants, which relate to events which took place
some fifteen years ago, are now time-barred.
Accordingly, upon a screening review oof this complaint, it is recommended
that Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi now be dismissed from this lawsuit.
II. 	Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review
This court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review
of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review the
complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the language
of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a
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complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for the legal sufficiency of a
complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted
the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have 	seemingly 	shifted 	from 	simple 	notice 	pleading 	to 	a 	more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
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alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In 	keeping 	with 	the 	principles 	of 	Twombly, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon
which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to
dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,
in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has
advised trial courts that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
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allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id., at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as
true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement
with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
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“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1950).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and
matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant
attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the
[attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998
F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are alleged
in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not
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physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd.
v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a district court
may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document integral to or
explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the
motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment”). However, the court may not
rely on other parts of the record in determining whether to dismiss a complaint or
when determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,
O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what
a complaint should say and provides that:
(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and
conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that
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are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
Judged against these legal guideposts, Scocozzo’s amended complaint fails as
a matter of law on several scores with respect to Defendants Arnone, Boriosi, and
Rahman, as discussed below.
B. Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi Should Be Dismissed from
this Case.
With 	respect 	to 	Defendants 	Arnone, 	Rahman 	and 	Boriosi, 	Scocozzo’s
amended complaint brings claims which are both untimely and lacking in merit.
At the outset, Scocozzo’s claims against these defendants are profoundly
flawed in at least two respects. First, these allegations—which relate to civil
commitments in March and November of 2009 but were first presented in October
of 2024, some fifteen years later—are clearly time barred. It is well-settled that civil
rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to the state statute of
limitations for personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67
(1985). In Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations for a personal injury action is two
years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524. A cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes
when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis
of the cause of action. Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142
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F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998); see also, Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010
(3d Cir. 1995).
While this two-year limitations period may be extended based upon a
continuing wrong theory, a plaintiff must make an exacting showing to avail himself
of this grounds for tolling the statute of limitations. For example, it is well settled
that the “continuing conduct of [a] defendant will not stop the ticking of the
limitations clock [once] plaintiff obtained requisite information [to state a cause of
action]. On discovering an injury and its cause, a claimant must choose to sue or
forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 800 F. 2d 356, 360 (3d Cir.
1986)). See also Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 266-68 (3d Cir. 2000). Instead:
The continuing violations doctrine is an “equitable exception to the
timely filing requirement.” West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,
754 (3d Cir.1995). Thus, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a
continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing
the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such an
instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier related acts that would
otherwise be time barred.” Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1295 (3d Cir.1991).In
order to benefit from the doctrine, a plaintiff must establish that the
defendant's conduct is “more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic
acts.” West, 45 F.3d at 755 (quotation omitted). Regarding this inquiry,
we have recognized that courts should consider at least three factors:
(1) subject matter-whether the violations constitute the same type of
discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2)
frequency-whether the acts are recurring or more in the nature of
isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence-whether the act had a
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degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiff's awareness of
and duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the
act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to
discriminate. See id. at 755 n. 9 (citing Berry v. Board of Supervisors
of Louisiana State Univ., 715 F.2d 971, 981 (5th Cir.1983)). The
consideration of “degree of permanence” is the most important of the
factors. See Berry, 715 F.2d at 981.
Cowell v. Palmer Township. 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001).
In this case, Scocozzo attempts to evade the bar of the statute of limitations
by asserting that he was not specifically aware of the fact that he was briefly
involuntarily committed at the time of these events in March of 2009. The problem
with this assertion, however, is that it is evident from Scocozzo’s own complaint that
he knew of this involuntary commitment no later than March of 2020, when the
commitment served as the grounds for denying his application to purchase a firearm.
(Doc. 98 at 15). Thus, Scocozzo concedes that he was fully aware of the fact of this
involuntary commitment no later than March 2020. Yet, he did not file this lawsuit
until October 2024, more than four years after the fact of this involuntary
commitment was known by the plaintiff.
On these facts, by March 2020 Scocozzo plainly had sufficient knowledge of
his injury and its cause, that he was legally required to timely “choose to sue or
forego that remedy.” Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 154 (3d Cir.
1998). Scocozzo failed to do so, waiting more than four years before bringing this
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claim. Therefore, his claims against Defendants Rahman, Boriosi and Arnone are
time-barred and should be dismissed.
Further, given the factual recitals set forth in Scocozzo’s amended complaint,
his false arrest claims against these defendants fail on their merits. On this score, the
gist 	of 	Scocozzo’s 	amended 	complaint 	is 	his 	insistence 	that 	the 	defendants
improperly lacked probable cause to believe that he was a threat to himself at the
time of these involuntary commitments in 2009. Yet, the actual commitment papers
which Scocozzo attached to his amended complaint make it abundantly clear that
there was ample reason to believe that Scocozzo presented a threat to himself in
2009. Indeed, these commitments rested on the immutable fact that Scocozzo
reportedly stated that he planned to kill himself. For example, Scocozzo’s March
2009 commitment followed a March 9, 2009, traffic stop when Scocozzo told the
police officer: “I am going to take 50 ambient [sic] and 90 zanax [sic] and kill myself.
I can’t take this anymore. I am going to kill myself.” (Doc. 98-1 at 31). Likewise,
according to the commitment papers attached to Scocozzo’s amended complaint in
November of 2009, the plaintiff stated five times that he intended to kill himself and
that he wished to jump off a bridge into a gorge. (Id. at 38).
Probable cause exists “whenever reasonably trustworthy information or
circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person
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of reasonable caution to conclude that” the subject’s detention is warranted. U.S. v.
Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91
(1964)). In conducting an inquiry into whether probable cause existed, a court should
consider the totality of the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge
and information which the officer[] possessed at the time of [the detention], coupled
with the factual occurrences immediately precipitating the [detention].” United
States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, it is entirely undisputed
that in 2009 Scocozzo repeatedly stated that he planned to kill himself. Given
Scocozzo’s own statements, these defendants had an obligation to take appropriate
steps to protect the plaintiff from himself. Their actions, therefore, were supported
by ample probable cause, were fully justified and simply do not give rise to federal
civil rights liability some seventeen years later.
Finally, dismissal of this pleading as to Defendants Arnone, Boriosi and
Rahman James is now warranted since the failure to properly serve this filing
compels dismissal under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In particular, this
result is mandated by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
prescribes the method by which service can be made and describes how a party must
demonstrate proof of service on the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)-(l). Rule 4 also
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sets time limits for service and prescribes the sanction of dismissal for the failure to
make proper and timely service, stating as follows:
(m) Time Limit for Service. If a defendant is not served within 90
days after the complaint is filed, the court--on motion or on its own
after notice to the plaintiff--must dismiss the action without prejudice
against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified
time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court
must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The language of Rule 4(m) is both clear and mandatory. Where
there is an unjustified and unexcused failure to timely serve a complaint, the court
“must dismiss the action.” Id. As a general rule, “the party asserting the validity of
service bears the burden of proof on that issue.” Grand Entertainment Group, Ltd. v.
Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 4A Charles A.
Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1083 (1987)). When
the plaintiff fails to carry this burden of proof on the issue of proper and timely
service, consistent with Rule 4(m)’s mandate that the “court—on motion or on its
own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action,” dismissal of the case is
entirely appropriate. Indeed, when a plaintiff does not show good cause for a failure
to serve, Beckerman v. Susquehanna Township Police, 254 F. App’x 149, 154 (3d
Cir. 2007), or fails to make service, despite warnings and requests by the court to
address service issues, Foster v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm’n, 157 F.
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App’x 488, 490 (3d Cir. 2005), courts have frequently dismissed actions for failure
to make service.
These principles control here and call for dismissal of this action with respect
to Defendants Arnone, Rahman and Boriosi for failure to make timely and proper
service. In this case, the plaintiff has provided no proof of proper service on these
defendants more than nine months after being instructed to make service upon pain
of dismissal of these defendants. Given this cascading array of failures, dismissal is
appropriate here. Beckerman, 254 F. App’x at 154 (affirming dismissal for failure
to serve two days after service deadline elapsed where no good cause shown)
C. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants Rahman,
Boriosi, and Arnone be DISMISSED from this case.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
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made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
Submitted this 12 th day of January 2026.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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