Scanlon et al v. MSM Transport, LLC et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TINA SCANLON and PATRICK 	:
SCANLON, wife and husband,
and 	: 	CIVIL ACTION NO: 3:24-758
BRIAN GARDZALLA and
BRANDY GARDZALLA, husband 	:
and wife,
Plaintiffs 	: 	(JUDGE MANNION)
v. 	:
MSM TRANSPORT, LLC and 	:
SULEYMAN MOHAMED,
Defendants 	:
MEMORANDUM
Pending before the court in this motor vehicle collision case is the
joint motion for leave to file an amended complaint, (Doc. 27), by Plaintiffs
Tina 	and 	Patrick 	Scanlon 	and 	Brian 	and 	Brandy 	Gardzalla 	(herein
collectively 	referred 	to 	as 	“Plaintiffs”). 	Plaintiffs’ 	motion 	sets 	forth
arguments in support of their request to amend in order to include
allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, which are detailed in
the proposed amended complaint (Doc. 27-1). For the reasons outlined
herein, Plaintiffs’ motion will be GRANTED.
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 1 of 16

2
I. 	Factual Background
This matter arises out of a tractor trailer and motor vehicle collision
that occurred on February 23, 2024. (Doc. 1). As described in the original
complaint, Plaintiff Tina Scanlon was operating her pick-up truck in the left
southbound lane of Interstate 81 in Moosic Borough, Lackawanna County,
Pennsylvania. Id., ¶ 6. She encountered traffic conditions that caused her
to bring her vehicle to a stop. Id. In the same lane directly behind her,
Plaintiff Brian Gardzalla began decelerating his car in response to the
traffic conditions in front of him. Id., ¶ 7. Meanwhile, in the same lane
behind Gardzalla, Defendant Suleyman Mohamed was operating a tractor
trailer owned by Defendant MSM Transport, LLC. Id., ¶¶ 8,9.
According 	to 	Plaintiffs’ 	version 	of 	events, 	Suleyman 	Mohamed
caused the tractor trailer to “violently crash” into the back of Gardzalla’s
car, “catapulting” Gardzalla’s car into the back of Scanlon’s stopped pick-
up truck. Id., ¶ 13. Mr. Mohamed was operating this tractor trailer on behalf
of his own company, MSM Transport, LLC, an interstate freight carrier and
Michigan Corporation. Id., ¶¶ 9-12.
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 2 of 16

3
II. 	Procedural History 1
On May 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint alleging that
the collision occurred as a result of Defendants’ negligence. Id., ¶¶ 15-16.
Relevantly, the complaint did not include allegations of recklessness or
request punitive damages. Defendants filed their joint answer to Plaintiffs’
complaint on September 10, 2024. (Doc. 7).
According 	to 	Plaintiffs, 	Defendants’ 	discovery 	production 	was
“shockingly sparce.” (Doc. 28 at 3). In their initial Rule 26 disclosures,
Defendants merely produced the police report from the collision. Id. at 3.
Plaintiffs 	jointly 	served 	initial 	discovery 	requests 	on 	Defendants 	on
January 	15, 	2025. 	(Doc. 	16-1). 	Plaintiffs 	maintain 	that 	Defendants
responded with “baseless objections, followed by the vague observation
that investigation was ongoing.” (Doc. 28 at 3).
Dissatisfied 	with 	Defendants’ 	discovery 	responses, 	Plaintiffs’
counsel requested a discovery conference, which occurred on March 25,
2025. (Docs. 16 & 17). They noted, in particular, that Defendants had not
produced documentation from the “Motive” platform, an electronic logging
1 The procedural history in this case is pertinent to the present motion
and, therefore, a detailed summary is necessary.
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 3 of 16

4
device (“EDL”) which Mr. Mohamed stated in his discovery responses he
had 	used to 	track 	his 	driving. 	(Doc. 	28 	at 	4). 	The court 	instructed
Defendants that supplemental/amended responses were to be provided
within 	30 	days, 	making the 	deadline 	April 	25, 	2025, 	and 	instructed
Defendants’ counsel to contact Motive by the end of the week. (Doc. 17).
Plaintiffs note that Defendants’ supplemental/amended responses
omitted relevant information, including driver logs and electronic data
relating to Defendants’ operation of the tractor trailer, and other documents
concerning Mr. Mohamed’s travel at the time of the collision. (Doc. 28 at
4). Thus, Plaintiffs’ counsel requested another discovery conference,
which was held on June 10, 2025. (Docs. 20-22). The court again directed
counsel to collect and produce the Motive data. (Doc. 22).
In Mr. Mohamed’s deposition on June 24, 2025, he testified that he
had contacted Motive “yesterday” and was informed that he would receive
his driver logs “within 24 hours.” (Doc. 27-1 at 33). Since the instant
motion, Plaintiffs’ counsel had inquired as to the status of the Motive
records and were informed that Defendant had not received any response
from Motive. (Doc. 28 at 4). According to Plaintiffs, “an overwhelming
amount of self-explanatorily relevant, federally required documentation
has still not been produced.” Id. at 5.
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 4 of 16

5
On July 29, 2025, after the amendment deadline, Plaintiffs jointly
filed the present motion and supporting brief for leave to amend their
complaint to add allegations of recklessness and requests for punitive
damages. (Doc. 27-28). On August 12, 2025, Defendants filed a brief in
opposition, attaching the Motive driver logs as an exhibit. (Doc. 30-6).
Plaintiffs timely filed a reply brief on August 21, 2025, alleging that the
driver logs produced with Defendants’ opposition brief contained “false
entries.” (Doc. 33 at 2).2 The court then ordered Defendants to file a
response to this new allegation. (Doc. 34). Upon receiving Defendants’
sur-reply (Doc. 35), the court scheduled an oral argument, which was held
on January 20, 2025.
The court has considered the aforementioned factual background
and 	procedural 	history 	and 	has 	thoroughly 	reviewed 	the 	pleadings
submitted by the parties. Plaintiffs’ motion is now ripe for disposition.
2 	Plaintiffs’ arguments presented in their reply brief relating to Mr.
Mohamed’s driver logs will be credited given that the driver logs were not
made available prior to Defendants’ brief in opposition, and given that
Defendant was afforded the opportunity to respond via their sur-reply.
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 5 of 16

6
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
When a party moves for leave to file an amended complaint after the
pretrial scheduling order's deadline, the court must analyze the moving
party’s request under both Rule 15(a) and Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Eastern Minerals & Chems. Co. v. Mahan, 225 F.3d
330, 340 (3d Cir. 2000). Under Rule 16(b), a court's schedule “may be
modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16(b)(4). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the “good
cause” inquiry derived from Rule 16(b) “focuses on the moving party's
burden to show due diligence.” Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire
Corp., 614 F.3d 57, 84 (3d Cir. 2010). Under this standard, “a party is
presumptively not diligent if, at the commencement of the lawsuit, the party
knows or is in possession of the information that is the basis for that party's
later motion to amend.” Chancellor v. Pottsgrove Sch. Dist., 501 F. Supp.
2d 695, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
Where the moving party demonstrates good cause under Rule 16(b),
the court must next analyze the request under Rule 15(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, “Amended and Supplemental Pleadings,” which
states that “a party may amend its pleadings only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave,” and that “the court should freely give
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 6 of 16

7
leave when 	justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 	While Rule 15
liberally allows leave to amend to be “freely given,” it is within the sound
discretion of the trial court to deny leave to amend a complaint “where it is
apparent from the record that: (1) there is undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive; (2) the amendment would be futile; or (3) the amendment would
prejudice the other party.” Black v. Metso Paper USA, Inc., 240 F.R.D.
155, 160 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (citing Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir.
2000)).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs’ motion relies on new information uncovered during the
later stages of discovery, which they argue was not knowable at the time
they filed their original complaint. (Doc. 28 at 12). It was only after
Defendant Mohamed’s deposition on June 24, 2025, and the subsequent
report from Plaintiffs’ industry expert, that they believed Defendants had
“egregiously 	violated” 	Federal 	Motor 	Carrier 	Safety 	Administration
(“FMSCA”) regulations. Id. This included violations of hours-of-service
rules and the failure to maintain logs of driving and working hours. Id.
Based on this evidence and the reasonable inferences from Plaintiffs’
expert, they argue that Defendants’ conduct leading up to and during the
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 7 of 16

8
collision 	was 	reckless, 	justifying 	their 	request 	to 	add 	allegations 	of
recklessness and punitive damages via amended complaint.
Defendants 	argue that the court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion
because it did not meet the court’s deadline for amending pleadings and
because Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Further, Defendants argue that, even if they
demonstrated good cause under Rule 16(b)(4), Plaintiffs’ amendment
would be both prejudicial and futile under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
A. Rule 16(b)(4)
Here, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint on July 29, 2025,
more than fourteen months after initiating this action, and more than two
months after the amendment deadline. See (Docs. 14, 24). 	Despite this
delay, Plaintiffs argue that new information has come to light through
“factual evidence and expert opinions” that were not previously available
to them. (Doc. 28 at 12). It was only after Mr. Mohamed’s deposition on
June 24, 2025, that Plaintiffs’ experts, upon reviewing the deposition
testimony, were fully equipped with this new information, which they
incorporated into their findings and shared with Plaintiffs. Id.
However, this purported “new information”—i.e., statements from
Mr. Mohamed’s deposition—does not align with what Plaintiffs claim it to
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 8 of 16

9
be. For instance, contrary to Plaintiffs’ claim that the deposition revealed
Defendants’ “wholesale failure to maintain logs of driving and working
hours,” 	Mr. 	Mohamed’s 	testimony 	did 	not 	confirm 	this. 	Instead, 	Mr.
Mohamed testified that he could not remember whether he logged his
hours, stating, “I don’t remember that day,” and adding, “[i]t’s been a long
time ago, but I was in compliance with the DOT that day.” (Doc. 30-5 at
23). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ second major claim regarding the deposition—
that it suggests Mr. Mohamed “operated his tractor-trailer in a manner
consistent with a fatigued, distracted and inattentive driver in violation of
the 	FMCSA’s 	hours 	of 	service 	limitations”—is 	unsupported 	by 	the
deposition transcripts provided by either party, let alone the pages that
Plaintiff cites to. See (Doc. 28 at 12). To the contrary, Mr. Mohamed stated
that he “still had more hours to drive” on the day of the collision, (Doc. 30-
5 at 23), and responded “no” when asked whether he was tired or had
exceeded the hours-of-service limit prior to the accident. Id. at 34.
On the other hand, the court is reluctant to fault Plaintiffs for the
timeliness of their motion in light of Defendants’ consistent failure to
comply with their discovery obligations. In particular, Defendants were
instructed by the court on March 25, 2025 to contact Motive by the end of
the 	week 	to 	obtain 	Mr. 	Mohamed’s 	driver 	logs. 	Months 	later, 	in 	a
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 9 of 16

10
subsequent 	June 	10, 	2025, 	discovery 	conference, 	the 	court 	again
instructed Defendant to collect his driver logs from Motive. On June 24,
2025, Mr. Mohamed testified that he contacted Motive “yesterday” and that
Motive replied that they would email him the driver logs within 24 hours.
However, 	it 	was 	not 	until 	August 	12, 	2025, 	in 	Defendants’ 	brief 	in
opposition to Plaintiffs’ present motion, that Defendants conveniently
produced these driver logs from Motive. Even more concerning, the driver
logs indicate that they were printed out on June 23, 2025, suggesting that
Defendants may have had them in their possession much earlier, but
waited until they were forced to defend against Plaintiffs’ present motion
to finally produce them.
Given that these driver logs are pertinent to Plaintiffs’ allegations
supporting recklessness and punitive damages, and that Defendants were
months late in producing them, Defendants cannot in good faith argue that
Plaintiffs should have moved to amend sooner. To the contrary, Plaintiffs
could not have known whether Defendants complied with the FMCSA’s
hours-of-service limitations or adequately maintained driving logs without
first 	receiving 	them. 	Instead, 	they 	were 	compelled 	to 	draw 	logical
conclusions that Defendants’ failure to fulfill these discovery obligations
was an effort to hide information that might demonstrate wrongdoing.
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 10 of 16

11
Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiffs’ have demonstrated good cause
for not moving to amend before the court’s deadline.
B. Rule 15(a)(2)
i. 	Whether the Amendment would be Futile
In the context of Rule 15(a)(2), “‘[f]utility’ means that the complaint,
as amended, would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
In assessing ‘futility,’ the District Court applies the same standard of legal
sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Holst v. Oxman, 290 F. App'x
508, 510 (3d Cir. 2008). “While Defendants may ultimately present facts
to dispute the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint, the Court is
constrained to consider the factual underpinnings of the motion for leave
to amend based upon the allegations set forth in the pleading itself.” M.G.
v. Crisfield, 2009 WL 2920268, at *7 (D.N.J. 2009).
Here, Defendants argue that, even taking the allegations in Plaintiffs’
motion as true, such allegations are nevertheless futile because they fail
to satisfy the standard of outrageous or reckless conduct required in a
claim for punitive damages. (Doc. 30 at 13). Given that Plaintiffs’ diversity
action involve claims based on Pennsylvania law, the court must apply
Pennsylvania’s 	standard 	when 	analyzing 	the 	allegations 	for 	punitive
damages. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 11 of 16

12
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
The standard for governing the award of punitive damages
in 	Pennsylvania 	is 	settled. 	Punitive 	damages 	may 	be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
rights of others. As the name suggests, punitive damages
are penal in nature and are proper only in cases where the
defendant's actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate
willful, wanton or reckless conduct.
Hutchinson v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005) (internal quotations
and citations omitted). Punitive damages are used as a tool to punish and
deter certain conduct, and therefore “[t]he state of mind of the actor is vital.
The act, or the failure to act, must be intentional, reckless, or malicious.”
Id. at 770–71 (citing Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (1984)). Stated
differently, “a punitive damages claim must be supported by evidence
sufficient to establish that (1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of
the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted,
or failed to act, as the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.”
Hutchinson, 870 A.2d at 772.
Here, the allegations set forth in Plaintiffs’ brief and subsequent reply
brief are that Mr. Mohamed was “operating his truck in excess of the hours-
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 12 of 16

13
of-service limitations and that he intentionally tried to conceal that fact by
falsifying log entries.” (Doc. 33 at 12). Specifically, Plaintiffs cite a detailed
analysis 	of 	Mr. 	Mohamed’s 	driver 	logs 	from 	their 	industry 	expert
suggesting that he could have been driving upwards of 29 hours prior to
the collision, far in excess of the hours-of-service limitations. Id. at 4.
Further, Plaintiffs allege that despite knowing the safety risks associated
with driving tired, Mr. Mohamed willfully exceeded the driving limitations
causing him to drive his tractor-trailer “in a clearly fatigued and inattentive
state” with a “diminished attention level” before “slam[ing] into the back of
readily observable vehicles stopped at the end of a long line of traffic.” Id.
at 12-13. Thus, unlike many of the cases cited by Defendants, Plaintiffs’
allegations not only specify the federal regulations that were violated but
also indicate that the violations were intentional, despite being aware of
the safety risks, and that the collision resulted from Defendants’ disregard
of those risks.
Given the liberal standard for the amendment of pleadings, and
taking the allegations of the proposed amended complaint as true, the
court finds that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient facts to support the
imposition of punitive damages. If Mr. Mohamed was indeed in knowing
violation of the hours-of-service limitations on the day of the accident,
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 13 of 16

14
causing him to operate his tractor-trailer in a “fatigued” or “inattentive”
manner, was aware of the risks associated with this violation, and that
conscious disregard of the risk led to the collision, Plaintiffs could plausibly
establish that Defendants acted with reckless indifference. Although the
parties put forth competing evidence regarding whether Mr. Mohamed was
operating his vehicle in a fatigued or inattentive state, or whether he did
exceed the hours-of-service limitations, consideration of this evidence is
improper on a motion for leave to amend. The court finds that Plaintiffs’
factual allegations in the proposed amended complaint, if proven at trial,
could support the imposition of punitive damages.
ii. 	Whether the Amendment would be Prejudicial
Finally, Defendants argue that allowing Plaintiffs to amend the
complaint to include these new allegations would cause them substantial
prejudice, as it would require them to conduct additional discovery and
retain new experts. (Doc. 30 at 10).
“It is well-settled that prejudice to the non-moving party is the
touchstone for the denial of an amendment.” Cornell & Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978).
However, merely claiming prejudice is insufficient; the opposing party
“must 	show 	that 	it 	was 	unfairly 	disadvantaged 	or 	deprived 	of 	the
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 14 of 16

15
opportunity to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had
the . . . amendments been timely.” Heyl & Patterson Int'l, Inc. v. F.D. Rich
Housing, 663 	F.2d 	419, 	425 	(3d 	Cir. 	1981) 	(citing 	Deakyne 	v.
Commissioners of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 n. 19 (3d Cir. 1969)).
Here, Defendants’ argument that an amendment would necessitate
further discovery or the retention of experts, thereby incurring additional
costs, 	does 	not 	sufficiently 	establish 	prejudice. 	See 	Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. Orrstown Financial Services,
Inc., 335 F.R.D. 54, 77 (M.D. Pa. 2020); see also Dole v. Arco Chem. Co.,
921 F.2d 484, 488 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, Plaintiffs’ new allegations
directly relate to the cause of the collision alleged in the original complaint,
and “any claim of prejudice . . . regarding additional discovery is undercut
by the fact that the new allegations of the proposed [amended complaint]
share a close factual nexus with the claims currently pending against
them.” Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation, 335 F.R.D. at 77.
To the extent that Defendants may be at a disadvantage with
punitive damages added to the complaint at this stage of the litigation, it
was 	not 	the 	result 	of 	an 	unfair 	process. 	As 	the 	court 	mentioned,
Defendants cannot benefit from their failure to comply with discovery
obligations by producing pertinent discoverable material several months
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 15 of 16

16
late—only when it was convenient for their defense—and then claiming
prejudice on the grounds that Plaintiffs’ motion was untimely. Further, the
fact that the new allegations in the proposed amended complaint are
based largely on documents withheld or produced by Defendants weighs
against the finding of prejudice. See Grill v. Aversa, 2014 WL 198805, at
*4 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (finding no prejudice to opposing party where proposed
amended pleading was based on facts provided late by opposing party
during discovery period).
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint
to include allegations of recklessness and to seek punitive damages, (Doc.
27), will be GRANTED. An appropriate order follows.
s/ Malachy E. Mannion
MALACHY E. MANNION
United States District Judge
Dated: February 9, 2026
24-0758-01
Case 3:24-cv-00758-MEM Document 38 Filed 02/09/26 Page 16 of 16