USA v. Dimitris Smith, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
DIMITRIS SMITH, JR.,
Defendant.
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-00106
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
In a superseding indictment, the Government charged Dimitris Smith, Jr. (“Smith”)
with five counts – one count of distribution of fentanyl resulting in serious bodily injury and
death in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and four counts of distribution of fentanyl and/or
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). (Doc. 23). The delivery of a controlled substance
resulting in death allegedly occurred on December 11, 2023. (Doc. 67, at 1; Doc. 23, at 1-2).
Counts II through V allege drug deliveries Smith made to an undercover officer on four
occasions in March and April 2024. (Doc. 67, at 2). Smith is the sole defendant in this case,
which is set for trial on January 5, 2026. (Doc. 83). Before the court is Smith’s motion to
compel discovery, motion for early disclosure of Jencks material, and motion to suppress
evidence. (Doc. 60; Doc. 62; Doc. 64). For the following reasons, Smith’s motions are
DENIED.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) governs the disclosure of evidence in
criminal cases, “with some additional material being discoverable in accordance with
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statutory pronouncements and the due process clause of the Constitution.” United States v.
Ramos, 27 F.3d, 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1994). Rule 16(a) provides that upon the defendant’s request,
the government must disclose the defendant’s relevant oral statements, written or recorded
statements, prior record, statements of organizational defendants, certain documents and
objects, certain reports of examinations and tests, and expert witness disclosures. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16(a). Rule 16(a) does not “authorize the discovery or inspection of reports,
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by an attorney for the
government. . . in connection with investigating or prosecuting the case.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
16(a)(2). Rule 16(a) also does not “authorize the discovery or inspection of statements made
by prospective government witnesses except as provided in [the Jencks Act].” Fed. R. Crim.
P. 16(a)(2), (3). Pursuant to Rule 16(d), the Court may, for good cause, “deny restrict, or defer
discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1). If a party
fails to comply with Rule 16, the Court may, “(A) order that party to permit the discovery or
inspection. . . (B) grant a continuance; (C) prohibit that party from introducing the
undisclosed evidence; or (D) enter any other order that is just under the circumstances.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2).
Rule 16 is intended to prescribe the minimum amount of discovery to which the parties
are entitled. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment. Additional
material is discoverable pursuant to relevant statutes and the due process clause of the
Constitution. Ramos, 27 F.3d at 68. This additional material is general limited to Jencks Act
materials available pursuant to the Brady doctrine. Ramos, 27 F.3d at 68. The Jencks Act
requires that after a government witness has testified on direct examination, the government
must produce to the defense any statement made by the witness which relates to his or her
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testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 3500. Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), the
government is to produce “evidence favorable to an accused on request. . . where the evidence
is material either to guilt or to punishment.” 373 U.S. at 87. The Government must produce
materials that “go to the heart of the defendant’s guilt or innocence,” and “materials that
might affect the jury’s judgment of the credibility of a crucial prosecution witness.” United
States v. Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1992); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154
(1972) (holding that Brady encompasses impeachment evidence). In other words, under Brady,
the government has an continuing obligation to disclose all evidence favorable to defendants,
including exculpatory and impeachment evidence. United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 262
(3d. Cir. 2013); United States v. Nickas, No. 3:21-CR_143, 2022 WL 2657114, at *5 (M.D. Pa.
July 8, 2022). Exculpatory material must be disclosed on a rolling basis “without undue
delay.” United States v. Johnson, 218 F. Supp. 3d 454, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2016); United States v.
Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d 566, 577 (M.D. Pa. 2021). While Brady impeachment material generally
should be disclosed only in time for its effective use at trial, the Third Circuit encourages
adherence to the promotion of early production of all types of Brady material. United States v.
Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 n.6 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Yawson, No. 13-271, 2014 WL
3401663, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2014).
Smith requests that the Court compel the Government to provide notice of the
Government’s intent to introduce hearsay statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
807; disclosure of expert information in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a)(1)(G) and Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705; notice of the Government’s
intent to introduce evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609; disclosure
of the Government’s witnesses, including any statements made by such witnesses, the identity
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of any confidential informants, and all inducements or consideration offered to secure their
testimony; disclosure of any and all evidence the Government seeks to admit under the co-
conspirator exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a)(2)(E), the hearsay rule; and all
remaining requested discovery materials that have not yet been produced by the Government.
(Doc. 60, at 4-5). Smith avers that the United States Constitution, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and Federal rules of Evidence require the Government to disclose these materials
to ensure the fairness of proceedings and to safeguard Smith’s rights. (Doc. 60, at 3). The
Government counters that there are no outstanding discovery issues. (Doc. 69, at 1). The
Government asserts that it has complied with and will continue to comply with its discovery
obligations under the United States Constitution, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
Federal Rules of Evidence. (Doc. 69, at 1-2). The Government also notes that, as of October
6, 2025, it already provided Smith with over 1,500 pages of discovery, which contain state
and federal police reports; lab, toxicology, and pathology reports; curriculum vitae of experts;
photos; videos; and prison calls. (Doc. 69, at 1). The Court will address each of Smith’s
discovery requests in turn.
1. Notice of the Government’s Intention to Use Hearsay Statements Pursuant to
Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Smith contends that the Government must disclose notice of its intention to use
hearsay statements pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 807. (Doc. 61, at 4). The
Government asserts that it intends to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and provide notice
to Smith regarding its intent to introduce hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 807. (Doc. 69,
at 2). Federal Rule of Evidence 807 provides that “a hearsay statement is not excluded by the
rule against hearsay” if,
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(1) the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness—after
considering the totality of the circumstances under which it was made and
evidence, if any, corroborating the statement; and
(2) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.
Fed. R. Evid. 807.
Pursuant to Rule 807, a hearsay statement is admissible under the residual exception “only if
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement—
including its substance and the declarant’s name—so that the party has a fair opportunity to
meet it.” Fed. R. Evid. 807. Such notice “must be provided in writing before the trial or
hearing—or in any form during the trial or hearing if the court, for good cause, excuses a lack
of earlier notice.” Fed. R. Evid. 807. District courts have denied motions to compel pretrial
notice of hearsay statements intended to be introduced under Rule 807 when the Government
asserts that it is unaware of responsive information or indicates that it will provide the
requisite pretrial notice if it seeks to introduce evidence pursuant to Rule 807. See e.g., United
States v. DeLaCruz, No. 3:17-CR-00201, 2019 WL 1757528, at *3-*4 (M.D. Pa. April 19, 2019);
United States v. Li, No. 3:16-CR-194, 2017 WL 590275, at *4-*5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2017);
United States v. Manfredi, No. 07-352, 2008 WL 2622901, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June 27, 2008).
The Government has indicated that it will follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and
provide Smith with notice of its intent to introduce hearsay statements pursuant to Rule 807.
(Doc. 69, at 2). Smith does not contest the Government’s representation that it will provide
Smith with the requested material before trial. Accordingly, Smith’s motion to compel the
Government to provide notice of their intention to use hearsay statements pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 807 is DENIED without prejudice. (Doc. 60). The Court instructs Smith
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to reassert his motion if the Government fails to file its notice pursuant to Rule 807 at least
five days before trial.
2. Expert Information Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G)
and Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705
Smith next contends that the Government must disclose expert information pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) and Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703,
and 705. (Doc. 61, at 4). The Government provides that they are waiting to receive a final
report from its expert toxicologist, Dr. Michael Coyer (“Dr. Coyer”), and it has already
provided Smith’s counsel with Dr. Coyer’s curriculum vitae and a list of cases in which he
has testified over the past four years. (Doc. 69, at 2). The Government also asserts that it
intends to file its formal expert disclosure pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) as soon as
practicable, at least two weeks before trial. (Doc. 69, at 2).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) provides in relevant part:
(i) Duty to Disclose. At the defendant's request, the government must disclose
to the defendant, in writing, the information required by (iii) for any testimony
that the government intends to use at trial under Federal Rule of Evidence
702, 703, or 705 during its case-in-chief, or during its rebuttal to counter
testimony that the defendant has timely disclosed under (b)(1)(C). If the
government requests discovery under the second bullet point in (b)(1)(C)(i) and
the defendant complies, the government must, at the defendant's request,
disclose to the defendant, in writing, the information required by (iii) for
testimony that the government intends to use at trial under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, 703, or 705 on the issue of the defendant's mental condition.
(ii) Time to Disclose. The court, by order or local rule, must set a time for the
government to make its disclosures. The time must be sufficiently before trial
to provide a fair opportunity for the defendant to meet the government's
evidence.
(iii) Contents of the Disclosure. The disclosure for each expert witness must
contain:
• a complete statement of all opinions that the government will elicit from the
witness in its case-in-chief, or during its rebuttal to counter testimony that the
defendant has timely disclosed under (b)(1)(C);
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• the bases and reasons for them;
• the witness's qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the
previous 10 years; and
• a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness has
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(i), (ii), (iii).
Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705 provide for what witnesses constitute experts
and what expert witnesses are permitted to testify to and in what form. See Fed. R. Evid. 702,
703, 705.
To this date, the Government has not filed its formal expert disclosures pursuant to
Rule 16(a)(1)(G), and, to the Court’s knowledge, the Government has not provided Smith
with a complete statement of all opinions the Government will elicit from Dr. Coyer, the basis
and reasons for them, or a list of all publications authored by Dr. Coyer in the previous 10
years. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G)(iii). Smith does not contest the Government’s
representation that it will provide Smith with the requested material before trial. Accordingly,
Smith’s motion to compel the Government to disclose expert information pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(G) and Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705 is
DENIED without prejudice. (Doc. 60).
3. Disclosure of the Government’s Intention to Use Evidence Pursuant to Federal
Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609
Smith contends the government must disclose its intention to use evidence pursuant
to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609. (Doc. 61, at 4). The Government provides that,
if applicable in this case, it intends to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and provide Smith
with its intent to introduce prior acts pursuant to Rule 404(b). (Doc. 69, at 1). The
Government also provides that if Smith or any defense witness testifies at trial, the
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Government will request that any applicable evidence of a criminal conviction be admitted
for purposes of impeachment. (Doc. 69, at 2).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “evidence of any other crime, wrong,
or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character,” but such evidence “may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), (2).
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) also provides that, in a criminal case, a prosecutor must,
(A) provide reasonable notice of any such evidence that the prosecutor intends
to offer at trial, so that the defendant has a fair opportunity to meet it;
(B) articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which the prosecutor
intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning that supports the purpose; and
(C) do so in writing before trial--or in any form during trial if the court, for good
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(3)
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 provides for when a witness can be impeached by evidence of
a criminal conviction. Fed. R. Evid. 609.
Neither Rule 404(b) nor Rule 609 set forth a time frame within which the Government
must produce the applicable evidence to a defendant. “What constitutes reasonable notice in
advance of trial [pursuant to Rule 404(b)] is determined by the circumstances and complexity
or the prosecution.” United States v. Johnson, 218 F. Supp. 3d 454, 462 (W.D. Pa. 2016); United
States v. DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *5 (M.D. Pa. April 19, 2019). Courts frequently
order disclosure of Rule 404(b) evidence no less than one to two weeks prior to
trial. DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *5 (collecting cases). Additionally, district courts “can
only order the [G]overnment to provide advanced written notice of its intent to proffer any
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Rule 609(b) evidence but not Rule 609(a) evidence. See United States v. Beech, 307 F.R.D. 437,
443 (W.D. Pa. 2015); DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *5.
The Government filed its notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) on
December 12, 2025. (Doc. 94). The Government also notes that it will request that applicable
evidence of a criminal conviction will be admitted for impeachment purposes, pursuant to
Rule 609, if Smith or any defense witness testifies at trial. (Doc. 69, at 2). Additionally, the
Government provides that it must present evidence of the conviction listed in the superseding
indictment (Doc. 23) at trial. (Doc. 69, at 2). Smith does not contest the Government’s
representation that it will provide Smith with the requested notices before trial. Accordingly,
Smith’s motion to compel the Government to provide notice of its intent to introduce
evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 609 is DENIED without
prejudice. (Doc. 60).
4. Disclosure of the Government’s Witnesses and Any Statements Made by
Witnesses Including the Identity of Confidential Informants and Any
Inducements Offered to Those Individuals in an Effort to Produce Their
Testimony
Smith requests that the Court compel the Government to disclose the witnesses it
intends to call at trial, including any statements made by such witnesses, the identity of any
confidential informants, and all inducements or consideration offered to secure their
testimony. (Doc. 61, at 4). The Government does not address this specific request, but it
asserts that it has complied with and will continue to comply with its discovery obligations
pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),
and the Jencks Act. (Doc. 69, at 1-2).
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) does not “authorize the discovery or
inspection of statements made by prospective government witnesses except as provided in
[the Jencks Act].”1 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(2), (3). Brady and Giglio provide that the government
has a continuing obligation to disclose all evidence favorable to defendants, including
exculpatory and impeachment evidence. 373 U.S. at 87; 405 U.S. at 154; United States v.
Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 262 (3d. Cir. 2013); United States v. Nickas, No. 3:21-CR_143, 2022 WL
2657114, at *5 (M.D. Pa. July 8, 2022). Exculpatory evidence “go[es] to the heart of the
defendant’s guilt or innocence,” and impeachment evidence consists of “materials that might
affect the jury’s judgment of the credibility of a crucial prosecution witness.” United States v.
Hill, 976 F.2d 132, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1992); Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (holding that Brady
encompasses impeachment evidence). Third Circuit has found that due process requires only
that Brady impeachment material be disclosed “in time for its effective use at trial.” United
States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 n.6 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Yawson, No. 13-271, 2014
WL 3401663, at *2 (W.D. Pa. July 10, 2014); DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *9.
Outside of disclosure under the Jencks Act, Brady, and Giglio, the Government is not
required to disclose the identity of its witnesses in a noncapital case. Government of V.I. v.
Martinez, 847 F.2d 125, 128 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We begin our analysis by noting the well
established principle that the government is not automatically required to disclose the name
of a witness in a non-capital criminal case.”); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 62 (3d
Cir. 1971) (“in no event is the Government required to divulge the identity of its witnesses in
1 The Court addresses Smith’s motion for early release of Jencks material in Section I.B.,
infra.
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a noncapital case.”); DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *6 (finding defendant’s request that the
Government disclose to names of its witnesses to be unsupported by law). Nevertheless,
district courts have discretion to order the Government to disclose the identity of its witnesses
“to ensure the effective administration of the criminal justice system.” Higgs, 713 F.2d at 44
n. 6; Martinez, 847 F.2d at 128.
Additionally, “[t]he government has a qualified privilege to protect the identity of its
confidential informants.” Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 580-81 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53, 59 (1957)). However, this privilege “must give way” when “disclosure of an
informer’s identity. . . is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause.” Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 581 (citing United States v. Jiles, 658
F.2d 194, 196 (3d Cir. 1981)). When a defendant “sets forth a specific need for disclosure,”
the court must balance “the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the
individual’s right to prepare his defense.” Jiles, 658 F.2d at 196; Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62; Coles,
511 F. Supp. 3d at 581.
Here, Smith provides no specific need for the identity of the Government’s witnesses
and confidential informants. Smith only provides general, unsupported requests for the
identities of the Government’s witnesses and confidential informants. (Doc. 61, at 4-5).
Additionally, the Government has indicated that it has complied with and will continue to
comply with its discovery obligations under the Jencks Act, Brady, and Giglio, which Smith
does not contest. (Doc. 69, at 1-2; see Doc. 61). Given the Government’s lack of an obligation
to provide a witness list in a non-capital case, and Smith’s failure to establish a specific need
for disclosure of the identity of confidential informants, Smith’s request is DENIED. (Doc.
60); see Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 581 (denying defendant’s request for government witness list
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and identities of confidential informants where the defendant failed to specify need for the
disclosures); DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *6 (finding same).
5. Disclosure of All Evidence Sought to be Admitted at Trial by the Government
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(e)
Smith requests that the Court compel the Government to disclose all evidence it seeks
to admit at trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(e). (Doc. 61, at 5). The
Government does not address this specific request, but the Government provides that it does
not believe that there are currently any specific outstanding discovery issues in this case. (Doc.
69, at 2). Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(e) provides that a statement is not hearsay when
offered against an opposing party and was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(e). Rule 801(d)(2)(e) provides for the
admissibility of co-conspirator statements at trial, not for the disclosure of co-conspirator
statements before trial. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(e); DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *6.
Additionally, “[d]istrict courts of the Third Circuit have consistently held that Rule 16 does
not provide for the discovery of a co-conspirator’s statement.” United States v. Cheatham, 500
F. Supp. 2d 528, 538 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (collecting cases); DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *6.
Here, Smith has not provided any legal analysis or caselaw to support his request for
disclosure of evidence the Government seeks to admit at trial pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(e).
(Doc. 61, at 5). Therefore, Smith’s request that the Court compel evidence the Government
seeks to admit at trial pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(e) is DENIED. See Cheatham, 500 F. Supp.
2d at 538 (collecting cases) (finding Rule 16 does not provide for the discovery of a co-
conspirator’s statement); DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *6 (denying motion to compel
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evidence pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(e), where defendant fails to support his request with
caselaw or legal analysis).
6. Remaining Requested Evidence Not Provided by Government
Finally, Smith requests that the Court compel all remaining discovery materials
requested by Smith that have not yet been furnished by the Government. (Doc. 61, at 5).
Smith does not specify which, if any, requested materials are outstanding. (Doc. 61, at 5). The
Government contends that there are not currently any specific outstanding discovery issues.
(Doc. 69, at 2). Based Smith’s motion and brief in support, the Court is unable to determine
whether there is any remaining evidence that has not been provided to Smith by the
Government. (Doc. 60; Doc. 61). Therefore, to the extent that the Court has not already
addressed Smith’s requests in other portions of this memorandum opinion, Smith’s request
that the Government produce all remaining requested evidence that has not been provided is
DENIED. (Doc. 60); see DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *8 (denying defendants requests for
remaining outstanding discovery where defendant failed to specify what discovery was
outstanding).
B. MOTION FOR EARLY RELEASE OF JENCKS MATERIAL
In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667, 672 (1957), the Supreme Court held that
a defendant on trial in a federal criminal prosecution is entitled, for impeachment purposes,
to relevant statements or reports of a government witness in possession of the government,
touching on the subject matter of the government witness’s testimony at trial. In 1957,
Congress codified the Jencks decision in the Jencks Act, which provides in relevant part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be
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the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified
on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the
possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which
the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to
the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be
delivered directly to the defendant for his examination and use
18 U.S.C. § 3500(a), (b)
The Jencks Act protects statements or reports made by prospective government
witnesses from disclosure until after they testify in direct examination at trial. 18 U.S.C. §
3500(a). “After the witness testifies, the [Jencks] Act entitles the defendant to a copy of ‘any
statement. . . of the witness in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject
matter as to which the witness has testified.’” United States v. Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d 566, 575
(M.D. Pa. 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (b)); United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 247 (3d
Cir. 2012)). The Jencks Act provides a defendant with “an opportunity to review the witness’s
statements for any possible inconsistencies that he might use to impeach the witness.” Maury,
695 F.3d at 248; Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 575. While the Third Circuit encourages the
government to disclose Jencks material prior to trial, “the government has no obligation to
produce Jencks material until the witness has testified [at trial]” Maury, 695 F.3d at 248; Coles,
511 F. Supp. 3d at 575. As such, “there is no authority by which [a district court] can compel
the government to provide Jencks Act statements prior to the time any government witness
has testified on direct examination at trial. Maury, 695 F.3d at 248; Hill, 976 F.2d at140.
Smith requests that the Court direct the government to disclose Jencks materials to
Smith at least thirty days before trial. (Doc. 62, at 1). Smith contends that early disclosure of
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Jencks materials is necessary to avoid unnecessary delays and ensure the full and fair cross
examination of witnesses brought against Smith. (Doc. 62, at 2-3). The Government counters
that the based on Third Circuit precedent, the Court cannot require early disclosure of Jencks
material. (Doc. 70, at 2). The Government also notes that they have voluntarily agreed to
produce all Jencks materials to Smith three days prior to trial. (Doc. 63, at 4; Doc. 70, at 2).
In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667, 672 (1957), the Supreme Court held that
a defendant on trial in a federal criminal prosecution is entitled, for impeachment purposes,
to relevant statements or reports of a government witness in possession of the government,
touching on the subject matter of the government witness’s testimony at trial. In 1957,
Congress codified the Jencks decision by passing the Jencks Act, which protects statements or
reports made by prospective government witnesses from disclosure until after they testify in
direct examination at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). “After the witness testifies, the [Jencks] Act
entitles the defendant to a copy of ‘any statement. . . of the witness in the possession of the
United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.’” United
States v. Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d 566, 575 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (citing § 3500 (b)); United States v.
Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 247 (3d Cir. 2012)). The Jencks Act provides a defendant with “an
opportunity to review the witness’s statements for any possible inconsistencies that he might
use to impeach the witness.” Maury, 695 F.3d at 248; Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 575. While the
Third Circuit encourages the government to disclose Jencks material prior to trial, “the
government has no obligation to produce Jencks material until the witness has testified [at
trial]” Maury, 695 F.3d at 248; Coles, 511 F. Supp. 3d at 575. “[T]here is no authority by which
[a district court] can compel the government to provide Jencks Act statements prior to the time
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any government witness has testified on direct examination at trial. Maury, 695 F.3d at 248;
Hill, 976 F.2d at 140.
The Government has, consistent with the practice of the United States Attorney’s
Office for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, agreed to produce all Jencks materials to Smith
three days prior to trial. (Doc. 70, at 2). The Court encourages the Government to produce
Jencks material to Smith as soon as practicable; however, the Court has no authority to compel
Jencks material before a government witness has testified on direct examination at trial. Maury,
695 F.3d at 248; Hill, 976 F.2d at 140; DeLaCruz, 2019 WL 1757528, at *12. Accordingly,
Smith’s motion for the early release of Jencks material is DENIED. (Doc. 60).
C. MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. This right “shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment may not be introduced at trial. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229,
232 (2011); United States v. Lewis, 711 F. Supp. 3d 444, at 456 (E.D. Pa. 2024). The use of
wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by police without the consent of the communicator
or without prior legal authorization is generally considered an unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
For motions to suppress, “the burden of proof is on the defendant who seeks to suppress
evidence.” United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995); Lewis, 711 F. Supp. 3d at
456. Once the defendant has established a basis for his motion, the burden shifts to the
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government to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the search or seizure was
reasonable and that the challenged evidence is admissible. Johnson, 63 F.3d at 245 (citing
United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1453 (10th Cir. 1993)); United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974); United States v. Cook, 106 F. Supp. 3d 573, 577 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
Smith requests that the Court issue an order suppressing all recordings and derivative
evidence obtained in violation of the Pennsylvania Wiretap and Electronic Surveillance
Control Act (“the Wiretap Act”). (Doc. 64, at 5). Smith contends that an undercover officer
recorded telephone and in-person conversations with an individual, that the Government
alleges to be Smith, in violation of the Wiretap Act. (Doc. 64, at 2). Smith avers that the officer
did not have the required prior authorization to make such recordings, making them illegal
interceptions under the Wiretap Act. (Doc. 64, at 3). The Government counters that the
recordings were obtained in accordance with both federal and state law. (Doc. 71, at 1).
The Wiretap Act criminalizes the intentional interception of wire, electronic, and oral
communications. 18 P.a.C.S. § 5703. The Wiretap Act applies to all persons, even those
acting in a governmental capacity. United Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania Public
Utility Com’n, 676 A.2d 1244 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). Under the Wiretap Act, intentional
interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications requires prior judicial approval,
unless otherwise exempted. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 5703, 5712.
However, federal law, not state law, applies in determining the admissibility of
evidence in federal court. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964); United States v. Bennett, 170 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Third Circuit has likewise held that “evidence obtained in accordance with federal law is
admissible in federal court even though it was obtained by state officers in violation of state
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law.” United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Williams, 124
F.3d 411, 428 (3d Cir. 1997) (collecting cases); see United States v. Montgomery, 290 F. Supp.
3d 396, 412 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (denying motion to suppress evidence where evidence was
obtained in compliance with federal law but allegedly obtained in violation of state law).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects the “right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment may not be introduced at trial. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 232 (2011);
United States v. Lewis, 711 F. Supp. 3d 444, at 456 (E.D. Pa. 2024). The use of wiretapping and
electronic eavesdropping by police without the consent of the communicator or without prior
legal authorization is generally considered an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Smith does not assert that the wiretap evidence was obtained in violation of federal
law, instead averring that the wiretap evidence was obtained in violation of “state
constitutional principles.” (Doc. 65, at 4). The Court may deny Smith’s motion to suppress
on this basis alone. See United States v. Montgomery, 290 F. Supp. 3d 396, 412 (W.D. Pa. 2018)
(denying motion to suppress evidence where evidence was obtained in compliance with
federal law but allegedly obtained in violation of state law). Additionally, the Government
indicates that on September 26, 2025, it produced to Smith the prior written authorizations
to obtain the telephone and in-person recordings at issue. (Doc. 71, at 2). The Government
asserts that this wiretap evidence was obtained in compliance with both federal and state law.
(Doc. 71, at 1-2). Smith does not dispute receiving the written authorizations on September
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26, 2025, nor does he aver that those authorizations violate the applicable federal law.
Accordingly, Smith’s motion to suppress is DENIED. (Doc. 64).
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Smith’s motion to compel is DENIED (Doc. 60); Smith’s
motion for early disclosure of Jencks material is DENIED (Doc. 62); and Smith’s motion to
suppress evidence is DENIED. (Doc. 64).
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 15, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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