Koehler v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections d/b/a SCI-Benner et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CURTIS KOEHLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICER RIDDLE, et al.,
Defendant.
: 	NO. 3:23-CV-00939
:
:
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sexual abuse in prison is a serious matter. Naturally, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized that sexual abuse in prison
can 	violate 	the 	Eighth 	Amendment’s 	prohibition 	against 	cruel 	and
unusual punishments. Ricks v. Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 473 (3d Cir. 2018).
But not every sexual assault claim does. The sexual assault at issue must
be objectively harmful or sufficiently serious to violate the Constitution.
Id.
In 	this 	case, 	Plaintiff 	Curtis 	Koehler 	sued 	the 	Defendants,
correctional 	officers 	at 	SCI-Benner, 	Pennsylvania, 	under 	42 	U.S.C.
§ 1983 for allegedly sexually assaulting him in prison. The Defendants
moved for summary judgment. Doc. 27. Because, under Third Circuit
precedent, the sexual assault as alleged here is not objectively harmful
or sufficiently serious to violate Koehler’s right to be free from “cruel and
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unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment, the Court will
grant the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The material facts, as provided in the statement of facts, are
essentially undisputed. See Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts (SOF),
doc. 28; Pl.’s Amended Response SOF, doc. 40-1 (admitting all but one
statement from the Defs.’ SOF).
A. 	Factual Background
Koehler’s 	action 	arises 	from 	two 	alleged 	encounters 	with 	the
Defendants 	in 	February 	and 	March 	of 	2022, 	during 	Koehler’s
incarceration at SCI-Benner. Docs. 28 ¶¶ 1-2; 40-1 ¶¶ 1-2.
1. 	Sexual assault
On February 11, 2022, Defendant Colburn, a correctional officer,
entered Koehler’s cell to deliver commissary. See docs. 28 ¶¶ 2, 18, 29;
40-1 ¶¶ 2, 18, 29. During that delivery, Colburn stayed in Koehler’s cell
for about twenty-one seconds. Docs. 28 ¶ 36; 40-1 ¶ 36.
The next day, Koehler filed a prisoner grievance, asserting that
while delivering commissary Colburn entered his cell, pulled his penis
out, and asked “who can suck this?” See docs. 28 ¶ 2; 40-1 ¶ 2. Koehler
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further alleged that Colburn grabbed Koehler’s hand and rubbed it across
Colburn’s clothed penis. Doc. 28 ¶ 5; doc. 40-1 ¶ 5. Koehler’s cellmate
allegedly witnessed this incident. Doc. 28 ¶ 45; doc. 40-1 ¶ 45. The prison
promptly initiated an investigation under the Prison Rape Elimination
Act (PREA). Docs. 28 ¶¶ 8-9; 40-1 ¶¶ 8-9. It concluded that Koehler’s
allegations were unfounded. Doc. 28 ¶ 43; doc. 40-1 ¶ 43.
2. 	Food tampering
On March 1, 2022, Koehler filed a new grievance, asserting that
Defendant Riddle, also a correctional officer, gave him and his cellmate
“special” food trays and said, “I hope you both enjoy balls.” Docs. 28 ¶ 51;
40-1 ¶ 51. Koehler did not eat from this tray. Docs. 28 ¶ 65; 40-1 ¶ 65.
The 	prison 	investigated 	this 	grievance 	and 	concluded 	that 	it 	was
unfounded. Doc. 28 ¶¶ 58, 61; doc. 40-1 ¶¶ 58, 61.
B. 	Procedural History
Following the Defendants’ removal of Koehler’s complaint from
state court and the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Koehler filed the
operative Amended Complaint against Colburn and Riddle. 1 See docs. 1,
1 Koehler also sued, but later withdrew all claims against, Defendant J.
A. Burd. Doc. 34 at 10.
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2, 	8. 	The 	Amended 	Complaint 	contains 	two 	counts: 	(1) 	Eighth
Amendment Violation; and (2) Excessive Force/Assault and Battery. Doc.
8 ¶¶ 33-38. 2 In response, the Defendants filed an answer. Doc. 14.
Following discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment.
Doc. 27. The parties have fully briefed the Defendants’ motion (docs. 30,
34, 37, 40), and it is now ripe for resolution. The parties have consented
to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all
proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 73, including entry of final judgment. Doc. 12.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
2 	Koehler alleges four other incidents of sexual assault. 	See 	doc. 8
¶¶ 14-18. But as the Defendants highlight (doc. 27 ¶ 12), it is undisputed
that Koehler has not preserved any claims arising from these four
incidents. 	See 	doc. 	28 	¶ 69; 	doc. 	40-1 	¶ 69 	(admitting 	to 	Koehler’s
grievance history). For the instant case, Koehler has, by not reporting
these incidents to staff or otherwise pursuing administrative relief, failed
to exhaust. See doc. 28 ¶ 69 Pew v. Jones, No. 15-1611, 2023 WL 2692401,
at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2023); Jones v. Culinary Manager II, 30 F. Supp.
2d 491, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding that, where a prisoner-plaintiff
bringing an Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim admitted that
he did not file grievances for any of the other incidents alleged, the Court
can only 	consider a single incident for which the 	plaintiff 	actually
completed the prison grievance procedure).
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a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” when “a
reasonable 	jury 	could 	return 	a 	verdict 	for 	the 	nonmoving 	party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is
“material” only if it has the ability to “affect the outcome of the suit under
governing law.” Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir.
2006), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputes over irrelevant or
unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine
dispute exists such that summary judgment is warranted. See Celotex
Corp. 	v. 	Catrett, 	477 	U.S. 	317, 	322-23 	(1986). 	Once 	the 	movant
adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to 	“go 	beyond 	the 	pleadings 	and 	by 	her 	own 	affidavits, 	or 	by 	the
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324.
“In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court
may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of
the evidence.” Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.
2004), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, “[a]ll facts and inferences
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are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Boyle
v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998). Credibility
determinations are “the province of the factfinder.” Big Apple BMW, Inc.
v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The court's
role, at the summary judgment stage, is “to determine whether there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There can be “no
genuine issue as to any material fact,” however, if a party “fails to make
a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The 	parties’ 	sole 	factual 	dispute 	hinges 	on 	whether 	Colburn
sexually assaulted Koehler in his cell. Viewing the evidence in light most
favorable to Koehler, the Court finds that Koehler has created a genuine
dispute of a material fact.
The Court, however, will nonetheless grant the Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment because, as a matter of law, Koehler’s allegations
of sexual abuse, even if taken as true, do not rise to the level of a
Constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. Neither does
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Koehler’s Eighth Amendment food tampering claim. The Court addresses
the factual and legal disputes in turn.
A. 	Factual Dispute
The Defendants argue that Koehler’s allegations of sexual abuse
are 	contradicted 	by 	the 	video 	evidence. 	Defs.’ 	Br., 	doc. 	30 	at 	13.
Specifically, the Defendants contend that the video evidence shows that
“the sexual assault did not occur.” Id. at 14. The Court disagrees.
In cases where a reliable video depicts the events in question, the
court must not adopt a version of the facts that is “blatantly contradicted”
by the video footage. Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187, 192 (3d
Cir. 2021), citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). But, “[w]here
there are multiple interpretations of video footage, the Court is bound to
choose the interpretation most favorable to the non-movant.” Rivera v.
Redfern, 98 F.4th 419, 421 n.1 (3d Cir. 2024) (citation modified), citing
Rush v. City of Philadelphia, 78 F.4th 610, 618 (3d Cir. 2023).
Here, the video evidence is far from conclusive and does not show
that “the sexual assault did not occur.” Doc. 30 at 14. Critically, the video
fails to show any evidence as to what transpired in Koehler’s cell when
Colburn was inside to make his delivery. The interior of the cell is not
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visible. The video shows only that Colburn entered and exited Koehler’s
cell. The Court cannot conclude that the sexual assault did or did not
occur based on the video evidence alone. Koehler and his cellmate
testified that the assault did occur, which suffices to create a dispute of
material fact. Docs. 34-3, 34-4.
The Defendants, however, point to another correctional officer in
the video who was present on the cell block and was “standing near the
open cell door the entire time.” Doc. 30 at 14. The Defendants assert that
this contradicts Koehler’s version of events. Id. Indeed, a reasonable
factfinder could very well credit this evidence as disproving Koehler’s
allegations of sexual assault.
But at this stage, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in
Koehler’s favor. Boyle, 139 F.3d at 393. Under this standard, a reasonable
factfinder could just as well find that the other correctional officer’s
presence did not deter Colburn from sexually assaulting Koehler. After
all, the video shows the other correctional officer peeking into the cell for
a 	short 	time 	and 	then 	stepping 	away. 	Because 	the 	video 	does 	not
“blatantly contradict” what Koehler alleges to have occurred inside his
cell, the Court cannot adopt the Defendants’ version of the events for the
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purposes of deciding a motion for summary judgment. Jacobs, 8 F.4th at
192.3
The Court, therefore, finds that there remains a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Colburn sexually assaulted Koehler in his
cell.
B. 	Eighth Amendment Sexual Abuse
Sexual abuse is “simply not part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offense against society.” Ricks, 891 F.3d at 473
(citation omitted). Sexual assaults of inmates implicate the right of
prisoners to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 474.
3 	The 	Defendants 	also 	attempt 	to 	argue 	that 	the 	“sham-affidavit
doctrine,” 	supports 	summary 	judgment 	given 	the 	Plaintiff 	and 	his
cellmate’s 	conflicting 	deposition 	testimonies 	and 	their 	inconsistent
written grievances. See doc. 37 at 10. The Court finds that the doctrine is
inapplicable under the circumstances. The sham affidavit doctrine allows
the Court to conclude that summary judgment is appropriate “if it is clear
that an affidavit is offered solely for the purpose of defeating summary
judgment[.]” Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 253 (3d
Cir. 2007). The rationale behind the doctrine is that a deposition of a
witness 	will 	usually 	be 	more 	reliable 	than 	his 	affidavit, 	thus 	a
questionable affidavit submitted following a prior deposition is subject to
the 	doctrine. 	See 	id. 	Even 	so, 	“not 	all 	contradictory 	affidavits 	are
necessarily shams.” Id. at 254, citing Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 624
(3d Cir. 2004). Here, the doctrine clearly does not apply to inconsistencies
in the prisoner’s earlier written grievances and the later held deposition
testimonies.
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To 	determine 	whether 	a 	sexual 	assault 	violates 	the 	Eighth
Amendment, “the incident must be objectively, sufficiently intolerable
and cruel, capable of causing harm, and the official must have a culpable
state of mind.” Id. at 475. Regarding the subjective state of mind prong,
the Court considers whether the defendant official had a legitimate
penological purpose or if he or she acted “maliciously and sadistically for
the very purpose of causing harm.” Id., citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312, 319-20 (1986).
As to the objective prong, primarily at issue here, the Third Circuit
has declined to craft a mechanical test. Id. at 478. Instead, it provides
that the “scope, place, and timing of the offensive conduct will bear on its
severity, as will the details of the alleged contact.” Id. And “even if
sexualized touching lacks a penological purpose, it may still fall below
the threshold of constitutional cognizability based on a lack of objective
seriousness.” Id. at 476. A single incident, if sufficiently serious or severe,
can run afoul of the Eighth Amendment, and the “absence of force or
injury will not doom a sexual abuse claim outright.” Id. at 477. However,
not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause
of action. Id. at 476, citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
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And mere offensive sexual comments do not suffice. Williams v. Wetzel,
776 F. App’x 49, 50, 53 (3d Cir. 2019) (affirming district court’s grant of
summary judgment because the plaintiff failed to, at minimum, allege a
sexual contact between the plaintiff and the defendant correctional
officer).
For instance, the Third Circuit has found an Eighth Amendment
violation where a correctional officer grabbed a prisoner’s genitals and
caused the skin to rupture. See Drumgo v. Kuschel, 811 F. App’x 115, 118-
19 (3d Cir. 2020). Conversely, it found no Eighth Amendment violation
where 	a 	correctional 	officer 	“rubbed 	his 	erect 	penis 	against 	[the
prisoner’s] buttocks.” Ricks, 891 F.3d at 479.
Likewise, in Hughes v. Smith, the Third Circuit affirmed summary
judgment in favor of a correctional officer because it found that the
prisoner’s allegation that the correctional officer touched his testicles
through his clothing did not rise to the level of cruel and unusual. 237 F.
App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Jones v. Culinary Manager II, 30
F. Supp. 2d 491, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (finding insufficient a prisoner’s
sexual harassment claim even though a correctional officer pinned the
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prisoner against boxes and started grinding on the prisoner’s buttocks
with his penis and further threatened sexual assault).
Here, Koehler’s allegations of sexual assault against Colburn, even
if taken as true, fail to rise to the level of cruel and unusual. The most
severe allegation against Colburn is that he took Koehler’s hand and
rubbed it across Colburn’s clothed penis. See doc. 28 ¶¶ 2, 5; doc. 40-1
¶¶ 2, 5. While undoubtedly offensive, this allegation falls short of the
kind of sexual assault that the Third Circuit has found to be objectively
serious. See, e.g., Drumgo, 811 F. App’x at 118-19.
The assaultive conduct Koehler alleges is even less severe than
those that the Third Circuit found insufficient in Ricks and Hughes. In
Ricks, the prisoner alleged that a correctional officer rubbed his erect
penis against the prisoner’s buttocks, a far more overt and invasive act.
891 F.3d at 479. And in 	Hughes, a correctional officer touched the
plaintiff’s testicles, unlike here, where Colburn is not alleged to have
touched Koehler’s genitals. 237 F. App’x at 759.
The Court emphasizes that Koehler’s allegation of sexual assault
describes what would be serious and offensive conduct if proven. But it
does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
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violation, in light of Third Circuit precedents. The Court, therefore, will
grant summary judgment as to Koehler’s Eighth Amendment sexual
assault claim.
C. 	Eighth Amendment Food Tampering
Koehler’s Eighth Amendment food tampering claim also fails as a
matter of law. To state an Eighth Amendment food tampering claim, a
plaintiff must allege that he ate the tainted food and that doing so caused
injury. Rieco v. Moran, 633 F. App’x 76, 78 (3d Cir. 2015), citing Robles v.
Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (“prison officials may violate the
Eighth Amendment by serving unsanitary, spoiled or contaminated food
if the prisoner also alleges that he or she suffered a distinct and palpable
injury.”).
Here, even assuming that Riddle tampered with Koehler’s food,
Koehler admitted that he did not eat from the allegedly contaminated
tray. Doc. 28 ¶ 65; doc. 40-1 ¶ 65. And he alleges no injury caused by
tainted food. Because Koehler fails to meet an essential element of a food
tampering claim, Rieco 633 F. App’x at 78, the Court will grant summary
judgment. See Ali v. Suchocki, 254 F. App’x 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2007)
(affirming summary judgment of an Eighth Amendment food tampering
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claim 	because 	eating 	allegedly 	tainted 	pop 	tarts 	and 	developing 	a
headache and nausea do not rise to a sufficiently serious deprivation);
Burgos v. Camino, 358 F. App’x 302, 307 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no
genuine issue of material fact where the food tampering claim was based
on a prisoner’s claim that he saw one instance of defendant feeding an
inmate food with goose feces on it); Robinson v. Danberg, 673 F. App’x
205, 213 (3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (affirming grant of summary
judgment as to an Eighth Amendment food tampering claim because the
plaintiff provided “evidence in support of only one incident of foreign
objects in his food.”).
D. 	State Law Claims
Under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1367(c)(3), 	“district 	courts 	may 	decline 	to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . [if] the district court has dismissed
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See Byrd v. Shannon,
715 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 2013), citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (holding that when federal claims are dismissed
before trial, federal courts should not separately entertain pendent state
claims). Having granted summary judgment as to Koehler’s federal
claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
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Koehler’s state law assault and battery claims. See Byrd, 715 F.3d at 128
(“Because we will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment, . . . we will also affirm the District Court’s decision to decline
supplemental 	jurisdiction 	over 	[the 	plaintiff’s] 	state 	law 	negligence
claims.”); Bruton v. Paesani, 162 F. App’x 151, 154 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Once
the District Court granted summary judgment on [the plaintiff’s] two
federal claims, it was not required to adjudicate his claims under state
law.”); Patel v. Meridian Health Sys., Inc., 666 F. App’x 133, 136 (3d Cir.
2016) (finding that a district court may sua sponte decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
In granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the
Court “does not intend to trivialize [Koehler’s] allegations[.]” Ricks, 891
F.3d at 479. The Court’s conclusion provides only that the conduct as
alleged does not rise to the level that the Constitution recognizes as
providing a federal cause of action. An appropriate order follows.
Date: February 26, 2026 	s/ Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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