Meta Platforms, Inc. f/k/a Facebook, Inc. et al v. New Ventures Services, Corp. et al

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Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page1of10

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

META PLATFORMS, INC.; ‘ No. 3:21cv697
INSTAGRAM, LLC; and :
WHATSAPP LLC, : (Judge Munley)
Plaintiffs, :
Vv.

NEW VENTURES SERVICES, CORP.
et al.,
Defendants

MEMORANDUM ORDER

In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs Meta Platforms, Inc. (f/k/a
Facebook, Inc.) (“Meta”), Instagram, LLC (“Instagram”), and WhatsApp LLC
(“WhatsApp”) assert that defendants violated the AntiCybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (“ACPA’).' (Doc. 201, J 147-175).

Defendants opposed plaintiffs’ claims and filed an answer asserting several

affirmative defenses. (See Doc. 209). Subsequently, plaintiffs moved to strike

1 Defendants New Ventures Services, Corp. (“NVSC”), Web.com Group, Inc. (“Web.com”),
Register.com, Inc. (“Register.com”), Network Solutions, LLC (“Network Solutions’),
SnapNames Web.com LLC, SnapNames 1, LLC, SnapNames 6, LLC, SnapNames 7, LLC,
SnapNames 9, LLC, SnapNames 11, LLC, SnapNames 14, LLC, SnapNames 21, LLC,
SnapNames 30, LLC, SnapNames 33, LLC, SnapNames 34, LLC, SnapNames 47, LLC,
SnapNames 49, LLC, SnapNames 50, LLC, SnapNames 51, LLC, SnapNames 55, LLC,
SnapNames 56, LLC, SnapNames 57, LLC, SnapNames 58, LLC, SnapNames 59, LLC,
SnapNames 60, LLC, SnapNames 65, LLC, SnapNames 69, LLC, SnapNames 70, LLC,
SnapNames 85, LLC, SnapNames 88, LLC, SnapNames 95, LLC, SnapNames 98, LLC,
Perfect Privacy LLC (“Perfect Privacy”), and Does 1-10.

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 2 of 10

one of those defenses. (See Doc. 210). For the reasons that follow, plaintiffs’
motion to strike will be denied.
Background

At issue are plaintiffs’ claims that defendants, acting individually and
through related entities, registered and used hundreds of domain names identical
or confusingly similar to plaintiffs’ trademarks in violation of the ACPA.?
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants individually and collectively as alter
egos, registered, trafficked in, and used at least 773 domain names identical or
confusingly similar to plaintiffs’ trademarks. (Doc. 201, J 2). According to
plaintiffs, the infringing domain names—such as webapp-facebook.com,
httpinstagram.com, Instagram-login.com, and hackearwhatsapp.com—are
dilutive of the Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp trademarks. (Id. JJ 3, 150).

Plaintiffs assert that several defendants who serve as accredited registrars
abused their positions by working with affiliated entities in a coordinated effort to
cybersquat on plaintiffs’ trademarks. (Id. {| 4). Plaintiffs further allege that they
provided defendants with takedown notices and abuse reports identifying the

allegedly infringing domain names. (Id. J] 13). Despite receiving those notices,

2 These brief background facts are derived from plaintiffs' second amended complaint. (Doc.
201).

2

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 3 of 10

defendants allegedly failed to disable many of the infringing domain names and
continued to traffic in and use them. 3 (Id.)

In response, defendants asserted, among other defenses, that the doctrine
of unclean hands precludes plaintiffs’ claims in whole or in part (“Seventh
Affirmative Defense”). (Doc. 209 at 34-35). Plaintiffs now move to strike that
Seventh Affirmative Defense. (Doc. 210). The parties have filed briefs in support
of their positions, bringing the case to its present posture.

Jurisdiction

Because plaintiffs assert claims under federal statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
and 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a), the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

Legal Standard

Rule 12(f) provides that the court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED.
R. Civ. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) motions are designed to clean up the pleadings,
streamline litigation, and avoid unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.

Goode v. LexisNexis Risk & Info. Analytics Grp., Inc., 284 F.R.D. 238, 243 (E.D.

3 Among other allegations, plaintiffs assert that each defendant is the alter ego of the others
and that each directly participates in the other's acts of cybersquatting. (Doc. 201, Jf] 112-13).

a

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 4of10

Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); see also McInerney v. Moyer Lumber & Hardware,

Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 393, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Providing relief under Rule 12(f)
is largely disfavored and such motions are typically denied “unless the material
bears no possible relation to the matter at issue and may result in prejudice to

the moving party.” Miller v. Grp. Voyagers, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 164, 168 (E.D. Pa.

1996).
Analysis

Before addressing the grounds for plaintiffs’ motion to strike, a review of
defendants’ Seventh Affirmative Defense is warranted. Defendants’ Seventh
Affirmative Defense asserts that:

Plaintiffs’ claims, in whole or part, are barred by the
doctrine of unclean hands, including because Plaintiffs
engage in much of the same behavior that Plaintiffs allege
supports the basis of their theories of liability under the
doctrines of alter ego/direct participant—including without
limitation, common ownership and officers, joint marketing,
and shared management, legal and administrative
services—and as a result of such behavior Plaintiffs have
been able to obtain, maintain, use, promote, market,
advertise and/or enforce their trademarks asserted against
Defendants in this action.

(Doc. 209 at 34-35).

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 5 of 10

Plaintiffs move to strike the Seventh Affirmative Defense on three grounds.
First, they contend that the defense is factually insufficient. Second, plaintiffs
argue that it relies on a purported “inverse defense” theory unsupported by law.
Third, they assert that allowing the defense to proceed would result in prejudice.
The court finds each argument unpersuasive.

Factual Sufficiency — Plaintiffs argue that defendants’ Seventh Affirmative

Defense is insufficient as a matter of law and should be stricken. (Doc. 210-1, Br.
in Supp. at 10-11). Per plaintiffs, defendants have not and cannot prove the
elements of the unclean hands doctrine. (Id. at 6-7). Defendants disagree.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has “explained that the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands applies when a party seeking relief has committed an
unconscionable act immediately related to the equity the party seeks in respect

to the litigation.’* Newborn Bros. Co. v. Albion Eng'g Co., No. 24-1548, 2025 WL

3560164, at *4 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (quoting Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health

Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 174 (3d Cir. 2001)). “[O]ne's misconduct need not
necessarily have been of such a nature as to be punishable as a crime or as to

justify legal proceedings of any character.” Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.,

4 In the Third Circuit, a defendant asserting an unclean hands defense must present “clear,
convincing evidence of egregious misconduct” by the plaintiff. Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc. v.
Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 129 (3d Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). This
standard generally requires proof of “fraud, unconscionability, or bad faith on the part of the
plaintiff.” S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 377 n.7 (3d Cir. 1992)).

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456 F.2d 592, 598 (3d Cir. 1972). “Any willful act concerning the cause of action
which rightfully can be said to transgress equitable standards of conduct is
sufficient cause for the invocation of [the unclean-hands doctrine.]” Id. “[W]hether

[a plaintiff] was acting with unclean hands is a question of fact.” Project Dev.

Grp., Inc. v. O.H. Materials Corp., 766 F. Supp. 1348, 1355-56 (W.D. Pa. 1991),

aff'd, 993 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1993).
Here, the parties agree that the plausibility pleading standard articulated in

Twombly and Iqbal does not apply to affirmative defenses. (Doc. 210-1, Br. in

Supp. at 14) (citing Dann v. Lincoln Nat. Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 145 (E.D. Pa.

2011)); (Doc. 213, Br. in Opp. at 2-3) (citing F.T.C. v. Hope Now Modifications,

LLC, No. CIV. 09-1204 JBS/JS, 2011 WL 883202, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2011)).
That is because, “by stating an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c), a defendant
is not making a ‘claim for relief’ to which Rule 8(a) would apply.” F.T.C., 2011 WL
883202, at *3. Even so, a defendant must plead in its affirmative defense more
than “bare bones’ allegations that fail to provide the other party with fair notice of
the nature of the defense. Dann, 274 F.R.D. at 146. Accordingly, the “pleading
standard for an affirmative defense is less demanding than that of a claim or

counterclaim.” Allergan USA, Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd., 636 F. Supp. 3d

483, 489-90 (D. Del. 2022): see also Internet Media Corp. v. Hearst Newspapers,

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 7 of 10

LLC, No. 10-690-SLR, 2012 WL 3867165, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 6, 2012) (noting
that affirmative defenses “need not be plausible to survive” under Rule 8(c)).

In their Seventh Affirmative Defense, defendants contend that plaintiffs
themselves engaged in many of the same acts they attribute to defendants,
including common ownership and officers, joint marketing, and shared
management, legal and administrative services. (Doc. 213. Br. in Opp. at 5-6).
Defendants argue that, under plaintiffs’ own theory, these overlapping
relationships would likewise support a finding that plaintiffs operate as alter egos
of one another. (Id.)

After review of the allegations, the court concludes that defendants have
articulated their unclean hands affirmative defense with sufficient specificity to

satisfy Rule 8(c) and to survive a motion to strike. See Dann v. Lincoln Nat.

Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139, 146 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (“[A]ffirmative defenses are
pleadings, subject to the general pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, including the ‘short and plain statement’ rule.”) (citation omitted).
The Seventh Affirmative Defense provides plaintiffs with fair notice of the nature

of the defense. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2002)

(“The purpose of requiring the defendant to plead available affirmative defenses
in his answer is to avoid surprise and undue prejudice by providing the plaintiff

with notice and the opportunity to demonstrate why the affirmative defense

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 8 of 10

should not succeed.”). Furthermore, the Seventh Affirmative Defense adequately
asserts a close connection between the misconduct defendants allegedly

committed and plaintiffs’ claims. In re New Valley Corp., 181 F.3d 517, 525 (3d

Cir. 1999) (“When applying the doctrine, the courts in this Circuit have generally
been clear that the connection between the misconduct and the claim must be
close.”).

Inverse Defense — Plaintiffs also argue that the Seventh Affirmative

Defense rests on a novel “inverse defense” theory. (Doc. 215, Reply. Br. at 9).
According to plaintiffs, defendants improperly assert that because plaintiffs allege
that defendants engaged in certain conduct, defendants may respond by alleging
that plaintiffs engaged in similar conduct. (Id.) Plaintiffs contend that this theory
lacks legal support. (Id.)

The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized that “courts of
equity ... are not bound by formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to
trammel the[ir] free and just exercise of discretion” in applying the unclean hands

doctrine. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46

(1933). In any event, a motion to strike is not the proper vehicle for resolving the
viability of an unclean hands defense at this stage. “Unclean hands is a fact-

specific doctrine that is seldom vulnerable to a motion to strike prior to the

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 9 of 10

completion of discovery.” Reuters Transaction Servs. v. Bloomberg L.P., 2004

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27336, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2004).

Prejudice — Lastly, plaintiffs contend that permitting defendants’ unclean
hands defense to proceed would prejudice them by forcing litigation of irrelevant
issues and by subjecting plaintiffs to unnecessary and burdensome discovery.
(Doc. 210-1, Br. in Supp. at 18-19). Plaintiffs assert that litigating this affirmative
defense would require them to respond to discovery requests that defendants
purportedly pursue for no legitimate purpose. (Id.) In support, plaintiffs point to
defendants’ first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents,
both dated September 1, 2023. (See Doc. 210-3, 210-4). However, the
discovery requests on which plaintiffs rely predate defendants’ assertion of the
unclean hands defense by over two years. That chronology undercuts plaintiffs’
claim of prejudice. Hence, plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Seventh Affirmative

Defense will be denied. See Perma-Liner Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Sewer & Drain, Inc.,

630 F. Supp. 2d 516, 526 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that Rule 12(f) motions “are
not favored and usually will be denied unless the allegations have no possible
relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties, or if the

allegations confuse the issue.” (cleaned up).

Case 3:21-cv-00697-JKM Document 218 Filed 02/23/26 Page 10 of 10

rch

/\
AND NOW, to wit, this pin February 2026, it is hereby ORDERED

that plaintiffs’ motion to strike defendants’ Seventh Affirmative Defense, (Doc.

210), is DENIED.

nited States District Cou

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