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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JESSICA NOLL, 	: Civil No. 1:25-CV-2227
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	:
Commissioner of Social Security, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
Jessica Noll filed an application under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income on August 15, 2022. 	Following a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), during which the plaintiff withdrew
her Title II claim, the ALJ found that Noll was not disabled from her
application date through December 13, 2024, the date of the ALJ’s
decision. 1
Noll now appeals this decision, arguing that the ALJ’s decision is
not supported by substantial evidence. After a review of the record, and
1 Tr. 40-66.
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mindful of the fact that substantial evidence “means only—‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion,’” 2 we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
findings in this case. 	Therefore, we will affirm the decision of the
Commissioner denying this claim.
II. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
Noll filed for supplemental security income, alleging disability due
to diabetes, a right foot amputation, a left toe amputation, anxiety, and
depression. 3 	Noll was 37 years old at the time of her application, had at
least a high school education, and had no past relevant work.4
An ALJ held a hearing on Noll’s disability application on September
24, 2024. 5 	Noll and a Vocational Expert (“VE”) both appeared and
testified at this hearing. 6 Following this hearing, on December 13, 2024,
the ALJ issued a decision denying the plaintiff’s application for disability
2
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
3 Tr. 104.
4 Tr. 59.
5 Tr. 67-95.
6
Id.
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benefits.7 	The 	ALJ 	first 	concluded 	that 	Noll 	had 	not 	engaged 	in
substantial gainful activity since her application date. 8 	At Step 2 of the
sequential analysis that governs disability claims, the ALJ found that the
plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: right below-the-
knee 	amputation; 	left 	third 	toe 	amputation; 	diabetes 	mellitus;
neuropathy; depression; and anxiety.9 At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that
none of these impairments met or equaled the severity of a listed
impairment under the Commissioner’s regulations. 10
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ then concluded that the plaintiff
has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a range of
sedentary work with additional limitations, including the use of a cane
and 	certain 	postural 	and 	environmental 	limitations.11 	The 	ALJ
considered the medical records, opinion evidence, and the plaintiff’s
subjective symptoms. 12 	Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff
7 Tr. 40-66.
8 Tr. 46.
9
Id.
10 Tr. 46-49.
11 Tr. 49.
12 Tr. 49-59.
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was not as limited as she alleged. Having made these findings, the ALJ
found at Step 4 that Noll had no relevant past work but found at Step 5
that she could perform the occupations of a polisher, table worker, and
documents preparer. 13 Accordingly, the ALJ found that Noll had not met
the stringent standard prescribed for disability benefits and denied her
claim. 14
This appeal followed. 15 	On appeal, Noll argues that the ALJ erred
in her consideration of the medical opinion evidence, in finding that Noll
did not meet a listing, and in failing to acquire additional evidence
regarding the documents preparer job identified at Step 5.16 	This case is
fully briefed and is therefore ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth
below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
13 Tr. 59-60.
14 Tr. 60-61.
15 Doc. 1.
16 Doc. 13.
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III. 	Discussion
A. Substantial Evidence Review and the Disability Determination
Process
This Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits
is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-
maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record.17 	Substantial
evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” 18 	Substantial evidence means less
than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. 19
The court must “scrutinize the record as a whole” to determine if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence.20
When conducting this review, we must remain mindful that “we
must not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder.”21
17
See 42 U.S.C. §405(g);
Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198,
200 (3d Cir. 2008);
Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa.
2012).
18
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988).
19
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
20
Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
21
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Rutherford
v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005)).
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Instead, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s findings. In doing so, we must also determine whether
the ALJ adequately articulated the reasons for his decision. 22 	The ALJ
is not required to use “magic” words, but rather must discuss the evidence
and explain the reasoning behind his or her decision with more than just
conclusory 	statements. 23 	Ultimately, 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	must 	be
accompanied by “a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on which
it rests.” 24
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must demonstrate that he or
she has a severe physical or mental impairment that precludes him or
her from engaging in previous work or “any other substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy.” 25 	To receive benefits under
Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must show that he or she is
under retirement age, contributed to the insurance program, and became
22
Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
23
See Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
24
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981).
25 	42 	U.S.C. 	§423(d)(2)(A); 	42 	U.S.C. 	§1382c(a)(3)(B); 	20 	C.F.R.
§§404.1505(a), 416.905(a).
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disabled prior to the date on which he or she was last insured.26 	In
making 	a 	disability 	determination, 	the 	ALJ 	follows 	a 	five-step
evaluation. 27 	The 	ALJ 	must 	sequentially 	determine 	whether 	the
claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals a listed
impairment; (4) is able to do his or her past relevant work; and (5) is able
to do any other work, considering 	his or her age, education, work
experience and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).28
Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ must also determine the claimant’s
residual functional capacity (“RFC”)—that is, “that which an individual
is 	still 	able 	to 	do 	despite 	the 	limitations 	caused 	by 	his 	or 	her
impairment(s).”29 	The ALJ must consider all the claimant’s medically
determinable 	impairments, 	including 	any 	non-severe 	impairments
identified by the ALJ at step two of his or her analysis. 30 	Our review of
26 42 U.S.C. §423(a); 20 C.F.R. §404.131(a).
27 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
2820 C.F.R. §§404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
29
	Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (citations omitted);
	see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1).
30 20 C.F.R. §§404.1545(a)(2), 416.945(a)(2).
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the ALJ’s determination of the plaintiff’s RFC is deferential, and that
determination will not be set aside if it is supported by substantial
evidence. 31
The claimant bears the burden at Steps 1 through 4 to show a
medically 	determinable 	impairment 	that 	prevents 	him 	or 	her 	from
engaging in any past relevant work. 32 	If met, the burden then shifts to
the Commissioner to show at Step 5 that there are jobs in significant
numbers 	in 	the 	national 	economy 	that 	the 	claimant 	can 	perform
consistent 	with 	the 	claimant’s 	RFC, 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience. 33
B. Legal 	Benchmarks 	for 	the 	ALJ’s 	Assessment 	of 	Medical
Opinions
For applications filed after March of 2017, the regulations require
ALJs to consider several factors to determine the persuasiveness of a
medical 	opinion: 	supportability, 	consistency, 	relationship 	with 	the
claimant, 	specialization, 	and 	other 	factors 	tending 	to 	support 	or
31
Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002).
32
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993).
33 20 C.F.R. §§404.1512(f), 416.912(f);
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1064.
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contradict a medical opinion. 34 	Supportability and consistency are the
two most important factors, and an ALJ must explain how these factors
were considered in his or her written decision.35 	Supportability means
“[t]he 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical 	evidence 	and 	supporting
explanations . . . are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . . the
more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will be.” 36 	The consistency
factor focuses on how consistent the opinion is “with the evidence from
other medical sources and nonmedical sources.”37
It is well settled that “[t]he ALJ – not treating or examining
physicians 	or 	State 	agency 	consultants 	– 	must 	make 	the 	ultimate
disability and RFC determinations.” 38 	When confronted with several
medical opinions, the ALJ can choose to credit certain opinions over
others 	but 	“cannot 	reject 	evidence 	for 	no 	reason 	or 	for 	the 	wrong
reason.” 39 Further, the ALJ can credit parts of an opinion without giving
34 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).
35 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2);
Blackman v. Kijakazi, 615
F. Supp. 3d 308, 316 (E.D. Pa. 2022).
36 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1).
37 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
38
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).
39
Mason, 994 F.2d at 1066.
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credit to the whole opinion and may formulate a claimant’s RFC based
on different parts of different medical opinions, so long as the rationale
behind the decision is adequately articulated.40 	On the other hand, in
cases 	where 	no 	medical 	opinion 	credibly 	supports 	the 	claimant’s
allegations, “the proposition that an ALJ must always base his RFC on a
medical opinion from a physician is misguided.” 41
C. Step 3 Analysis
At Step 3 of this sequential analysis, the ALJ is required to
determine 	whether 	a 	claimant’s 	impairments 	or 	combination 	of
impairments are so severe that they are
per se disabling, entitling the
claimant to benefits. As part of this analysis, the ALJ must determine
whether a claimant’s alleged impairment is equivalent to one or more
listed 	impairments, 	commonly 	referred 	to 	as 	listings, 	that 	are
acknowledged to be so severe as to preclude the claimant from working. 42
40
See Durden v. Colvin, 191 F. Supp. 3d 429, 455 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
41
Cummings, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 214–15.
42 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1;
Burnett, 220 F.3d 112, 119.
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Thus, if a claimant’s impairment meets or equals one of the listed
impairments, the claimant is considered
per se disabled and is awarded
benefits.43 	The 	claimant 	bears 	the 	burden 	of 	presenting 	“medical
findings equivalent in severity to
all the criteria for the one most similar
impairment.” 44 	An impairment that meets or equals only some of the
criteria for a listed impairment will not be sufficient.45
While a claimant must present medical evidence or a medical
opinion showing that his or her impairment meets or equals a listing, the
ALJ is not required to accept a physician’s opinion if the opinion is not
supported by objective medical evidence.46 	The ALJ is responsible for
identifying the relevant listed impairments, given that it is “the ALJ’s
duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and
against granting benefits.”47
43 20 C.F.R. §416.920(d);
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 119.
44
	Sullivan 	v. 	Zebley, 	493 	U.S. 	521, 	531 	(1990) 	(citing 	20 	C.F.R.
§416.920(d); SSR 83-19 at 91).
45
Id.
46
See Schwartz v. Halter, 134 F. Supp. 2d 640, 659 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
47
Burnett, 220 F.3d at 120 n.2.
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D. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Our review of the ALJ’s decision denying an application for benefits
is deferential; we must simply determine whether the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 48 	Judged against this
deferential standard, we conclude that substantial evidence supported
the ALJ’s decision in this case.
Noll first argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinion
evidence. 	Specifically, with respect to her physical impairments, Noll
contends 	that 	the 	ALJ 	improperly 	rejected 	the 	opinions 	of 	the
consultative examining providers, Dr. Monfared and Certified Registered
Nurse Practitioner (“CRNP”) Cywinski, who opined that Noll required a
wheelchair, walker, two canes, or two crutches to ambulate.49 	She also
argues that the ALJ improperly considered the consultative opinion of
Dr. Havel, who found moderate limitations in Noll’s mental functioning
relating to simple work. 50 	We find these arguments unavailing.
48
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
49 Doc. 14 at 8-11.
50
Id. at 11-12.
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First, with respect to the physical consultative examining opinions,
the 	ALJ 	considered 	Dr. 	Monfared’s 	opinion 	and 	found 	it 	partially
persuasive. 51 	The ALJ specifically addressed Dr. Monfared’s limitation
that Noll required the use of a wheelchair, walker, two canes, or two
crutches 	and 	found 	this 	limitation 	unpersuasive 	based 	on 	medical
records indicating that Noll used a prosthesis and a cane. 52 The ALJ also
cited 	medical 	records 	during 	the 	relevant 	period 	that 	contained
examination findings that were inconsistent with such a limitation. 53
Additionally, and significantly, the ALJ also noted Noll’s testimony from
the September 2024 hearing that she typically used a cane and her
prosthesis. 54
In 	a 	similar 	vein, 	the 	ALJ 	also 	considered 	CRNP 	Cywinski’s
opinion, 	which 	contained 	the 	same 	limitation 	regarding 	the 	use 	of
assistive devices, and found it unpersuasive.55 	The ALJ reasoned that
CRNP 	Cywinski’s 	limitations 	were 	not 	supported 	by 	her 	own
51 Tr. 56.
52
Id. (citing Tr. 1242-59).
53
Id. (citing Tr. 455-58, 490, 574, 1261-62).
54 Tr. 50-51, 78-79.
55 Tr. 56-57.
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examination of the plaintiff, nor were they consistent with the other
medical evidence of record. 56 Significantly, while CRNP Cywinski opined
that Noll required the use of a wheelchair, walker, two canes, or two
crutches for ambulation, Noll presented to the consultative examination
using her prosthesis and a cane. 57 	And as we have explained, the ALJ
also cited Noll’s testimony that she used a cane and prosthesis for
ambulation. 58 	Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ did not “cherry
pick” evidence and rely on his own lay opinion to discount this limitation
by these providers. 	Rather, the medical record contained contrary
examination findings, as well as the plaintiff’s own testimony, and the
ALJ relied on this evidence to conclude that this limitation was not
credibly established. 	Accordingly, we find no error with the ALJ’s
consideration of these medical opinions.
We 	reach 	a 	similar 	conclusion 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	ALJ’s
consideration of Dr. Havel’s opinion. The ALJ found Dr. Havel’s opinion
unpersuasive, 	reasoning 	that 	his 	finding 	of 	a 	moderate 	limitation
56
Id.
57 Tr. 56, 1242-44.
58 Tr. 56-57, 78-79.
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regarding Noll’s ability to perform simple work was not consistent with
the longitudinal record showing that Noll was able to perform self-care
tasks and household chores, shop in stores, and manage her money. 59
Instead, the ALJ relied on the state agency consulting physicians who
found only a mild limitation in this area, reasoning that these opinions
were supported by the physicians’ review of Noll’s records and her
reported activities of daily living. 60 	Thus, the ALJ’s decision adequately
explained why he found the state agency consulting opinions more
persuasive than Dr. Havel’s opinion, citing to evidence in the medical
record to support his conclusions. We find no error with the treatment of
this opinion evidence.
Noll also argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that she did not
meet Listings 1.20D or 9.00.61 	We first note that Noll’s argument
regarding Listing 1.20D, concerning amputations, is entirely based on
her assertion that the ALJ failed to credit the medical opinion evidence
59 Tr. 58.
60 Tr. 57-58.
61 Doc. 13 at 13-15.
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regarding her need for a wheelchair, walker, two canes, or two crutches.62
But we have already explained that the ALJ adequately explained why
he failed to include this limitation, finding that it was not supported by
the medical evidence and Noll’s own testimony. 	The ALJ similarly
discussed 	his 	reasoning 	in 	his 	consideration 	of 	Listing 	1.20D. 63
Accordingly, this argument is entirely unpersuasive.
Regarding Listing 9.00, concerning diabetes, Noll argues that the
ALJ 	failed 	to 	adequately 	consider 	this 	listing 	when 	he 	cited 	her
noncompliance with diabetes treatment.64 	But this argument is entirely
undeveloped. A plaintiff asserting she meets Listing 9.00 must show that
her endocrine disorder, such as diabetes, meets or medically equals the
criteria of a listing for another body system. 65 	Here, Noll merely asserts
that, 	had 	the 	record 	been 	more 	developed 	with 	respect 	to 	Noll’s
noncompliance with treatment, Noll “likely meet[s] Listing 9.00[.]” 66 The
burden lies with the plaintiff to prove disability at Step 3, and Noll has
62
Id. at 14.
63 Tr. 46.
64 Doc. 13 at 14-15.
65
See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, § 9.00(B)(5).
66 Doc. 13 at 15.
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not provided any evidence that she meets a Listing. 67 	Accordingly, this
argument is unavailing and does not require a remand.
Noll’s final argument asserts that the ALJ erred at Step 5 by relying
on the occupation of documents preparer, which she contends is obsolete,
relying on Social Security Emergency Message (“EM”) 24027 REV. 68 But
we conclude that the ALJ’s decision complied with the guidance set forth
in EM-24027 REV. 	This emergency message instructs that ALJs may
not rely on certain jobs at Step 5 for a finding of “not disabled” without
additional VE evidence describing the occupation as it is currently
performed. 69 	If the ALJ intends to rely on jobs identified in the EM, the
ALJ must solicit additional testimony from the VE to establish that, “as
the occupation is currently performed: [i]ts requirements are consistent
with the individual’s RFC, and [i]t exists in the national economy in
67
Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 531 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d); SSR 83-19 at
91).
68Emergency 	Message 	24027 	REV 	(“EM-24027 	REV”)
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/reference.nsf/links/01062025092030AM
(last accessed October 14, 2026).
69 EM-24027 REV.
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numbers 	that 	alone, 	or 	in 	combination 	with 	work 	in 	other 	cited
occupations, are significant.”70
Here, the ALJ did, in fact, solicit additional testimony from
the VE regarding how the occupation of documents preparer is performed
currently. 71 The ALJ then explicitly referenced this additional testimony
at Step 5 when concluding there were sufficient jobs in the national
economy that the plaintiff could perform. 72 	Contrary to the plaintiff’s
assertion that the ALJ was required to obtain additional testimony,
courts have found in similar circumstances that a VE’s experience is a
sufficient basis on which an ALJ may rely in determining whether these
jobs, as currently performed, permit a finding of “not disabled” at Step
5. 73 	Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ in this case complied with
EM-24027 REV, and a remand is not warranted
In sum, we find that the ALJ considered all the evidence and
adequately 	explained 	the 	decision 	to 	include 	or 	discount 	certain
70
Id.
71 Tr. 94.
72 Tr. 60.
73
See e.g.,
Rose v. Bisignano, 2026 WL 540781, at *2-3 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 26,
2026) (finding reliance on VE testimony, including the VE’s experience,
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limitations as established by the evidence. Accordingly, we find no error
with the decision and conclude that substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s evaluation of this case. As such, this decision will be affirmed.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner in this
case will be affirmed, and the plaintiff’s appeal denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Submitted this 16th day of October 2026.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
sufficient to comply with EM-24027 Rev);
Tester-Kopec v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2025 WL 3628110, at *9-10 (N.D. Oh. Dec. 15, 2025) (same).
	But
see Julia K. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 3760344, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 9, 2024) (finding the VE testimony insufficient to show that the
number of document preparer positions, as currently performed, equates
to those under the DOT).
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