Friend Jones v. Regional Acceptance Corporation et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RUTH LOUISE FRIEND JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
REGIONAL ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-02226
(SAPORITO, J.)
MEMORANDUM
On January 12, 2026, the
pro se plaintiff filed an emergency
ex
parte motion for temporary restraining order pursuant to Rule 65(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to enjoin the defendants
from: 	(1) 	repossessing 	her 	2016 	Toyota 	Carolla 	(VIN:
2T1BURHE1GC722126); 	(2) 	initiating 	or 	continuing 	the 	collection,
enforcement, or credit reporting related to the underlying dispute; and
(3) taking any further action to accelerate, collect on, or otherwise enforce
the sales contract involving her 2016 Toyota Carolla. (Doc. 22). That same
day, 	we 	ordered 	that 	the 	defendants 	be 	temporarily 	enjoined 	from
repossessing the plaintiff ’s 2016 Toyota Carolla pending the resolution of
the plaintiff ’s motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 23) On January
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 1 of 11

- 2 -
20, 2026, the defendants filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiff ’s
motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 25). On January 27, 2026, the
plaintiff filed her response. (Doc. 29). The matter is now ripe for review.
I. 	Background1
Because we write solely for the parties, we need only include a brief
outline of the relevant facts pertaining to this case.
On August 4, 2016, the plaintiff obtained a loan in the amount of
$20,079.26 to finance the purchase of a new Toyota Carolla. The loan was
assigned 	to 	Regional 	Acceptance 	Corporation 	(“RAC”). 	The 	plaintiff
agreed to make seventy-two payments of $430.05 to pay off the loan,
beginning 	in 	September 	of 	2016 	and 	ending 	in 	August 	of 	2022.
Throughout the payment period, however, the terms of the contract were
modified by several payment extensions, as late as December 29, 2023.
The 	plaintiff 	continued 	to 	pay 	her 	monthly 	installments 	per 	those
extensions.
On November 21, 2025, the plaintiff initiated this action against
the defendants asserting the following claims: (1) a violation of the Fair
1 This section is taken from allegations in the plaintiff ’s complaint.
(Doc. 1).
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 2 of 11

- 3 -
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681,
et seq.,; (2) a violation of the
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1638,
	et seq., (3) a violation of
Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Law; (4)
a 	breach 	of 	contract; 	(5) 	negligence; 	(6) 	negligent 	supervision; 	(7)
conversion; 	and 	(8) 	invasion 	of 	privacy. 	The 	plaintiff 	asserts 	that
although her seventy-two month contract with RAC matured in August
of 2022, the defendants continue to bill, collect, and withhold her title in
violation of that contract. She contends that the defendants’ continued
loan 	servicing, 	collection, 	and 	lien 	retention 	are 	unlawful 	and
unsupported by any borrower-authorized modification. Moreover, the
plaintiff believes that she has been harmed by inaccurate, incomplete,
and unverifiable information furnished about the plaintiff ’s account. The
defendants argue that the plaintiff willingly agreed to modify her original
maturity date of August 2022 on at least eight occasions, and that her
continued 	monthly 	payments 	past 	August 	2022 	conveyed 	her
understanding that the contract was modified. Moreover, the defendants
articulate that their attempts to bill, collect, and withhold the plaintiff ’s
title are based on the plaintiff ’s failure to pay the total outstanding
amount of her loan. Therefore, any information published about the
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 3 of 11

- 4 -
plaintiff ’s account is truthful, complete, and verifiable. Moreover, that
information is not harmful.
II. 	Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Preliminary injunctive 	relief is an 	“extraordinary remedy,” 	for
which 	the 	movant 	“must 	establish 	entitlement 	to 	relief 	by 	clear
evidence.”
Doe by & through Doe. v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d
518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018). On a request for preliminary injunctive relief,
courts 	consider 	four 	factors: 	(1) 	whether 	there 	is 	a 	“reasonable
probability” of success on the merits, (2) whether denial would cause
irreparable harm to the plaintiff, (3) whether the relief would cause
greater harm to the non-moving party, and (4) whether the relief would
be in the public interest.
See Amalgamated Transit Union Loc. 85 v. Port
Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 39 F.4th 95, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2022). The first two
factors are “prerequisites that the moving party must establish.”
Id.
(citing
Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Com. v. City of Philadelphia, 949
F.3d 116, 133 (3d Cir. 2020)). These two factors “are correlative: that is,
the weaker the merits showing, the more will be required on the showing
of irreparable harm, and vice versa.”
Camacho Lopez v. Lowe, 452 F.
Supp. 3d 150, 163 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (citations omitted). “[A] showing of
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 4 of 11

- 5 -
irreparable harm is insufficient if the harm will occur only in the
indefinite future. Rather, the moving party must make a clear showing
of
immediate irreparable harm.”
Wesley v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of
Corr., 569 F. App’x 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)).
III. 	Discussion
The plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from repossessing her
car. 	The 	plaintiff 	seeks 	injunctive 	relief 	on 	her 	conversion 	claim,
asserting 	that 	RAC 	no 	longer 	holds 	any 	rights 	under 	the 	retail
installment sales contract securing an interest in her vehicle, because the
contract required the loan to be paid in full by August of 2022.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The 	plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	the 	defendants 	have 	“identified 	no
borrower-executed 	modification, 	refinancing, 	or 	statutory 	basis
authorizing enforcement beyond the contract’s August 2022 maturity.”
(Doc. 22, at 4). But the plaintiff has attached documents to her complaint
indicating otherwise. The plaintiff ’s retail installment contract with RAC
states that “any change to [the original] contract must be in writing and
the assignee must sign it.” (Doc. 1-3, at 2). The contract also states that
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 5 of 11

- 6 -
RAC 	“may 	extend 	the 	time 	for 	making 	some 	payments….” 	(
Id.).
Accordingly, 	the 	plaintiff ’s 	exhibits 	attached 	to 	the 	complaint
demonstrate that RAC followed the terms of the contract, as she was
given at least eight written extension forms and notices of extension that
were signed by RAC, the last of which was granted on December 29, 2023.
See (Doc. 1-5, at 9–22). Moreover, additional documents show that she
continued to make monthly payments pursuant to those extensions. (Doc.
1-6, at 13–18). Therefore, the plaintiff ’s own allegations cast doubt on the
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim, as she not only identifies
the agreed upon authority to modify her contract, but she alleges facts
which acknowledge her agreement to the modifications.2
The 	plaintiff, 	however, 	contends 	that 	contradictions 	in 	the
defendants’ assertions throughout the payment process demonstrate
“unresolved 	factual 	and 	legal 	disputes 	concerning 	post-maturity
authority―disputes that cannot be resolved against Plaintiff at this
stage.” (Doc. 29, at 16);
See, e.g., (
Id. at 13) (“Defendants asserted that
2 The plaintiff does not appear to dispute that she continued making
monthly payments past August 2022.
See (Doc. 29, at 3) (“Defendants’
own 	transaction 	history 	reflects 	that 	Plaintiff 	continued 	making
payments well beyond the 72-payment term.”).
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 6 of 11

- 7 -
Plaintiff 	owed 	$3,721.75 	as 	of 	October 	16, 	2025, 	while 	their 	own
transaction history reflects a balance of $3,766.00 on that same date.”).
We 	note 	two 	points in 	response. First, 	we 	find that 	the 	plaintiff ’s
argument 	is 	immaterial 	concerning 	her 	request 	for 	a 	preliminary
injunction. The plaintiff ’s request for injunctive relief centers on the
disputed ownership of her vehicle, and although her assertions may be
true, they do not establish that she is entitled to the vehicle’s title or that
the defendants lack authority to repossess it. Second, we reiterate that
preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy,” for which the
movant 	“must 	establish 	entitlement 	to 	relief 	by 	clear 	evidence.”
Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d at 526. It is not enough that the
record may show “unresolved factual and legal disputes,” but rather the
plaintiff bears the burden to show that she “is likely to succeed on the
merits.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Here,
the plaintiff has failed to meet that standard.
B. Irreparable Harm
Moreover, the plaintiff has not shown that the repossession of her
vehicle would cause immediate and irreparable harm warranting the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 22, at 4). For an injury to be
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 7 of 11

- 8 -
irreparable, 	it 	“must 	constitute 	‘potential 	harm 	which 	cannot 	be
redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.’”
Ecosave
Automation, Inc. v. Del. Valley Automation, LLC, 540 F. Supp. 3d 491,
500 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting
Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645,
653 (3d Cir. 1994)). But the plaintiff has failed to identify “why monetary
damages would not remedy [her] prospective injury.”
Sprinturf, Inc. v. Sw.
Recreational Indus., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 508, 517 (E.D. Pa. 2003). The
simple loss of use of a car does not meet the burden of establishing
irreparable harm.
See Kowalko v. Philadelphia Fed. Credit Union, No.
24-4918-KSM, 2024 WL 5656314, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2024) (“And
while the possible loss of his car could cost him time, money, and energy,
such 	injuries 	are 	not 	enough 	to 	call 	for 	the 	drastic 	remedy 	of 	a
preliminary injunction.);
Sampson v. Murray, 415 61, 90 (1974) (“Mere
injuries, 	however 	substantial, 	in 	terms 	of 	money, 	time 	and 	energy
necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough [for a
preliminary injunction.”) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, we
note that the plaintiff ’s alleged injury is arguably self-inflicted, as she
could satisfy the remaining balance to retain possession of her vehicle.
Accordingly, 	the 	injury 	does 	not 	constitute 	irreparable 	harm.
	See
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 8 of 11

- 9 -
Simpson 	v. 	New 	Concept, 	Inc., 	No. 	2:25-CV-02552-JDW, 	2025 	WL
2934910, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2025) (“By withholding the monthly car
payments, [the plaintiff] has created the unfortunate situation in which
he finds himself, and he cannot seek injunctive relief to remedy this type
of self-inflicted injury… an injunction is not necessary to prevent the
alleged irreparable harm; he can avoid the impending repossession of his
car by making the necessary payments to bring his account current.”).
Finally, although the plaintiff contends that repossession of her vehicle
would render her conversion claim moot (Doc. 22, at 4), she offers no
further explanation for that contention and, as the party bearing the
burden, she has failed to show irreparable harm for this contention.
See
Delaware State Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Delaware Dep’t of Safety &
Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 201 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Courts may withhold
this extraordinary remedy if a plaintiff ’s alleged injury does not threaten
to moot the case. That approach is often, perhaps usually, the wiser
course”).
To the extent that the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the defendants from furnishing any adverse information about her
loan to credit reporting agencies, we find that the plaintiff is not entitled
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 9 of 11

- 10 -
to such relief. As the defendants have noted, numerous courts in this
Circuit 	have 	held 	that 	injunctive 	relief 	is 	not 	available 	to 	private
plaintiffs under the FCRA.
See Alexander v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, No.
25-CV-2833, 2025 WL 2535610, at *6 (E.D. PA. Sept. 3, 2025) (“Injunctive
relief is not available to private litigants under the FCRA.”) (citing
Washington v. CSC Credit Servs., 199 F.3d 263, 268 (5th Cir. 2000));
Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 06-5118, 2007 WL
2306578, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2007),
aff ’d 583 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2009)
(“[B]ecause a claim for declaratory relief would frustrate the FCRA’s
limitation 	of 	injunctive 	relief, 	such 	claim 	cannot 	be 	maintained.”)
(citations omitted).
IV. 	Conclusion
The plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits of her claims or irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary
injunction. Therefore, the plaintiff has failed to establish the necessary
prerequisites for her preliminary injunction request.
See Amalgamated
Transit Union Loc. 85, 39 F.4th at 102–03 (noting the first two factors are
“prerequisites that the moving party must establish.”)
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff ’s motion for a preliminary
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 10 of 11

- 11 -
injunction will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: February 2, 2026
	s/Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge
Case 1:25-cv-02226-JFS Document 30 Filed 02/02/26 Page 11 of 11