Washam v. Prince et al

1:25-cv-01365Pamd15 de dez. de 2025

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
THOMAS WASHAM,
Plaintiff
v.
DOCTOR PRINCE, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-01365
(MEHALCHICK, J.)
MEMORANDUM
Thomas Washam, a prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a fee-paid complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he has received inadequate medical care at SCI-Dallas. (Doc.
1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds that Washam’s complaint fails to state a
claim, but will grant him leave to amend the complaint before dismissing this case.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In his complaint and attached exhibits, Washam alleges as follows: On December 13,
2024, at SCI-Dallas, he attended a medical appointment for a urinary tract infection and
“penile inflammation problem,” which he had “complained of for a month.” In a grievance
dated December 23, 2024, Washam contended that he had a urethral stricture requiring
treatment by a urologist, but Defendant Dr. Prince1 “tried to convince me that there was no
1 In a proposed “addendum” to the complaint, Washam alleges that Dr. Prince “is not
a certified medical or professional licensed doctor,” and Washam “seeks an additional
$390,000.00 in damages.” See (Docs. 10, 11). These filings will be disregarded because “[t]he
court is not authorized to permit piecemeal amendment or gradual supplementation of the
operative pleading.” Nicholas v. Giola, No. 1:24-CV-01769, 2025 WL 2211470, at *2 (M.D.
Pa. Aug. 4, 2025), and Washam has not sought leave to file a supplemental complaint, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
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treatment for urethra stricture and a specialist wouldn’t be capable of aiding me.” (Doc. 1-2
at 4, 8). Between December 10 and January 31, Washam visited sick call “over 4 times seeking
treatment for the pain that was ongoing.” Despite these visits, he alleges that there was a “lack
of treatment” for his urinary problem. Washam suffered unspecified “serious complications”
from these injuries, causing “impairment of . . . movement[,] and excruciating pain” during
urination.
In January or February 2025, Washam “passed out and smacked his skull on the
concrete floor of the housing unit,” which he attributes to the lack of treatment for his urinary
issues. He was taken to the prison infirmary, but not to a hospital, despite unnamed officers
“insisting” that he be taken to an emergency room. He alleges that the fall left him in “a
constant concussed state of function,” with continual dizziness. On June 24, 2025, Washam
had an appointment with Dr. Prince to address his complaint of dizziness. Dr. Prince told
Washam that any ongoing dizziness was not related to the prior fall, but Washam asserts that
this assessment was “not logical.”
Washam asserts claims against eight defendants affiliated with SCI-Dallas, and
requests injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. He requests a preliminary injunction on
the basis that SCI-Dallas is a “dangerous environment where people are assaulted and stabbed
with knives,” that he is vulnerable to attack because of his “dazed state,” and that “cell space
is an issue” because multiple prisoners are being housed in cells designed for single
occupancy.
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A SCREENING
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated, prior to service of process, to screen
a civil complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or
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employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 230 Fed.
App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F. Supp. 2d
454, 471 (M.D. Pa. 2010). In performing this mandatory screening function, a district court
applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Banks v. Cty. of Allegheny, 568 F.
Supp. 2d 579, 588 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move
to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first
take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions
which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the
complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal
claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the amended
complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters
of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 322 (2007).
After recognizing the elements that make up the legal claim, a court should “begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff must provide
some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Thus, courts
“need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory
Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need the court assume that a
plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to
a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals
Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in
the amended complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those
allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.”
Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation
and citation omitted). The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose
a heightened pleading requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.
With these standards in mind, a document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded,”
must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” and can
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only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). Further, the Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is
vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative
amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
A. SECTION 1983
Washam does not assert a specific legal theory, but asserts that he brings this complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress
for violations of federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. City of Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a
right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141
(3d Cir. 1995). “A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). “Personal
involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and
acquiescence,’” and cannot be premised on the operation of respondeat superior. Dooley v.
Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).
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By this standard, five of Washam’s named defendants (Tammy Gola, S. Mackinowski,
Jasen Bohinski, Laurel Harry, and Mark Abel2) must be dismissed, because the complaint
does not allege their personal involvement beyond general descriptions of their supervisory or
administrative roles at the prison. See (Doc. 1 at 1-2); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. Defendant
Nancy Hogan is alleged to have “rejected” Washam’s grievance and thereby “sabotaged the
administrative process,” but a prisoner has no constitutional right to a grievance procedure
(see Burnside v. Moser, 138 F. App’x 414, 416 (3d Cir. 2005)), nor would mishandling of a
grievance demonstrate personal involvement in any underlying violation. See Brooks v. Beard,
167 Fed. Appx. 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006). Washam also names Wellpath, the prison medical
provider, but the complaint does not state any allegations against Wellpath or identify a
corporate policy, custom or practice that would facilitate liability against Wellpath. See
Montanez v. Price, No. 23-2669, 2025 WL 2846695 (3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Thus, the Court’s
analysis is limited to whether the complaint states a claim against Dr. Prince premised on
inadequate medical care for Washam’s urinary issues and subsequent injuries.
B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT
A plaintiff can state a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of medical care
by alleging (1) a serious medical need; (2) that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to
that need; and (3) that the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff. See Durham v.
2 Abel is not included in Washam’s list of parties, nor is his role described in the
complaint, although his name is included in Washam’s requests for relief. In an affidavit
accompanying the complaint, Washam asserts that Abel “informed [Washam] that Dallas
does not offer specialists for urinary tract infections or x-rays for concussions.” (Doc. 2). This
general statement does not plausibly suggest that Abel was responsible for decisions in
Washam’s medical care or that Abel was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.
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Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023). Courts have found deliberate indifference “in a variety
of circumstances, including where the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner’s need for
medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical
treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or
recommended medical treatment.” Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Washam has not stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Prince, because
his complaint indicates disagreement with Dr. Prince’s medical judgment, not deliberate
indifference. He objects to Dr. Prince’s conclusion that a urologist referral was not
appropriate, and with Dr. Prince’s assessment that his dizziness in June 2025 was not caused
by a fall in January or February 2025. Even if Dr. Prince’s assessments were wrong,
misdiagnosis “at worst, amounts to medical malpractice, which is not actionable under the
Eighth Amendment.” Stewart v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 677 F. App’x 816, 820 (3d Cir.
2017). Even accepting the inference that Dr. Prince agreed with Washam’s own diagnosis of
a urethral stricture, “disagreement between the prisoner and medical personnel over the
proper course of treatment” for the urethral stricture would not show deliberate indifference.
See Montanez, 2025 WL 2846695, at *4 (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir.
2004)).3 Although Washam claims he has been “denied . . . medical attention,” the complaint
indicates that he was repeatedly seen at sick calls and infirmary visits, and while he was not
receiving the particular treatment he wanted, he was not refused treatment outright. However,
Washam will be permitted to file an amended complaint to clarify these allegations.
3 Similarly, Washam’s assertion that his course of treatment is contrary to DOC
procedures does not state a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Washington v. Salamon, No. 4:21-
CV-01746, 2023 WL 8703392, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2023) (a violation of prison policy is
not itself a constitutional violation).
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Washam also lists other allegations about his conditions of confinement at SCI-Dallas,
but these are not pled in sufficient detail to state a claim. The Eighth Amendment “prohibits
any punishment which violates civilized standards and concepts of humanity and decency,”
including deprivations of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Thomas v. Tice,
948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991)).
Washam’s allegation that “cell space is an issue” does not itself suggest a constitutional
violation, even affording the liberal inference that he is being housed with another prisoner in
a cell designed for single occupancy. See Gardner v. Harry, No. 1:22-CV-1007, 2022 WL
3221225, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2022) (“Double celling of inmates is not per se
unconstitutional, and Gardner does not allege any facts as to how his rights were violated
beyond the fact that he was double celled.”) (citations omitted). He appears to contend that
he is vulnerable to attack because of ongoing symptoms from his fall and because SCI-Dallas
is a “dangerous environment,” but he does not allege that he has been attacked, describe why
he would be targeted by other prisoners, or explain how any defendant has been deliberately
indifferent to the alleged risk. A generalized statement that other inmates in a prison are
“dangerous” is not sufficient. See, e.g., Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 371 (3d Cir. 2012) (“the
risk that an inmate with a history of violence might attack another inmate for an unknown
reason” does not support an inference of deliberate indifference). Because the complaint does
not state a claim for relief, Washam’s related request for preliminary injunctive relief must
also be denied. See Moneyham v. Ebbert, 723 F. App’x 89, 92 (3d Cir. 2018).
C. ADDITIONAL MOTIONS
Washam has also filed three separate requests for relief. In the first, he alleges that a
mailing from the Clerk was rejected by the prison and that unspecified individuals at the
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prison are improperly interfering with his legal mail. (Doc. 14). It is unclear whether the
disputed mailing relates to this case, but the Clerk will be directed to provide Washam with a
copy of the docket. Any intended legal claims regarding interference with mail must be raised
in an amended complaint.
Washam has also filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (Doc. 15). Under the in
forma pauperis statute, a federal court may request that an attorney represent an indigent person
on a pro bono basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); see also Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492,
499 (3d Cir. 2002). However, Washam has been denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis, so
he would not be entitled to appointment of counsel. See Mitchell v. Henry, 255 Fed. App’x 684,
686 (3d Cir. 2007) (declining to appoint counsel in fee-paid appeal). Nor would appointment
of counsel be appropriate in a case where he has not stated a viable claim for relief. See
Montgomery, 294 F.3d at 499 (as a threshold matter, appointment of counsel is not considered
unless the case has arguable merit in fact and law).
Finally, Washam has filed a separate request for an “emergency injunction” (Doc. 16),
alleging that unspecified individuals at SCI-Dallas have placed him in the Restricted Housing
Unit and “undertaken a campaign of retaliation” against him in response to his lawsuits. As
noted above, Washam would not be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief without a viable
complaint that states a corresponding legal claim, so this motion will be denied. Washam is
further advised that any party seeking preliminary injunctive relief “must establish entitlement
to relief by clear evidence.” Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Because Washam’s complaint does not state a claim for relief, but amendment may
not be futile, he will be permitted to file an amended complaint. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108. An
appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 15, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
United States District Judge
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