Branch v. Dauphin County Recorder of Deeds Office et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JORDAN A. BRANCH,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAUPHIN COUNTY RECORDER
OF DEEDS OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
: 	NO. 1:25-CV-00812
:
: 	(WILSON, D.J.)
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are four motions to dismiss, filed by: (1)
Defendant Dream Home Realty (DHR); (2) Defendants Dauphin County
and Dauphin County Recorder of Deeds Office (County Defendants); (3)
Defendants 	Lower 	Paxton 	Township 	and 	Officer 	Morris 	(Township
Defendants); and (4) Defendants One Abstract LLC and Realty ONE
Group Unlimited (ONE Defendants), docs. 28, 52, 61, 63; and one motion
for default judgment by Plaintiff Jordan Branch against all Defendants.
Doc. 79.
The undersigned respectfully recommends the Court grant the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 28, 52, 61, 63) because the Plaintiff
fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Because the
Plaintiff has failed to properly serve DHR and default judgments are
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unwarranted 	against 	the 	remaining 	Defendants, 	the 	undersigned
respectfully recommends the Court deny the Plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff states no facts in the operative complaint (see Doc.
16),1 so the undersigned begins with the procedural history.
A. 	Complaints, Proofs of Service, and Waivers
On May 8, 2025, Plaintiff Jordan Branch, proceeding pro se, first
lodged a complaint against the Defendants.2 Doc. 1. On May 27, 2025, the
Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint. Doc. 16. On the same
day, shortly after filing the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff filed proofs
of service for each of the seven Defendants. Doc. 18.3 Each proof of service
1 The three page Amended Complaint has no fact section and includes at
most the titles of causes of action and prayers for relief. See Doc. 16 at
1-3.
2 Although the Plaintiff initially moved for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis (Doc. 2), the Court denied the motion and the Plaintiff paid the
filing fees. May 9, 2025, Order, Doc. 7. After the Plaintiff’s payment, the
Court issued summons to the Plaintiff to be served on the Defendants.
See Docket Entry of May 21, 2025; Docs. 15, 19.
3 In his proofs of service, the Plaintiff does not indicate whether he served
the original complaint or the Amended Complaint. See Doc. 18. Upon
review of the docket sheet, it appears that the Plaintiff could not have
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claims that service was made via certified mail sent on May 27, 2025. Id.
at 1-7. The Plaintiff, however, failed to attach any certified mail receipts.
Id.
All Defendants entered timely notices of appearance. Docs. 22-23,
24, 32-33, 38. All Defendants except DHR filed waivers of service. Docs.
25, 35, 41.
B. 	The Motions
On June 20, 2025, DHR filed its first responsive pleading, moving
to 	dismiss 	the 	Amended 	Complaint. 	Doc. 	28 	at 	1. 	The 	remaining
Defendants also moved to dismiss. Docs. 52, 61, 63. In response, the
Plaintiff filed two opposition briefs. Docs. 50, 66. DHR, Township, and
ONE Defendants filed replies. Docs. 56, 69, 74.
The Plaintiff also moved for default judgment. Doc. 42. Despite the
Plaintiff’s request (Doc. 27), the clerk of court has not entered default.
And 	the 	Court 	ordered 	the 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment 	deemed
served the Amended Complaint because the clerk of court did not issue
summons for the Amended Complaint until after the Plaintiff filed his
proof of service of the original summons and complaint. See Docs. 16, 18,
19. The Plaintiff has not filed further proofs of service for the Amended
Complaint.
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withdrawn pursuant to Local Rule 7.5 for failure to file a brief in support.
Doc. 68. On September 11, 2025, the Plaintiff renewed his motion for
default judgment, this time supported by a brief. Docs. 79, 82. The
Defendants opposed. Docs. 84-87. All parties have had the opportunity to
brief the issues, and the time for filing briefs has passed, so all motions
are ripe for resolution.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified).
A 	district 	court 	must 	conduct 	a 	three-step 	analysis 	when
considering the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v.
George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must identify
“the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Second, the court must identify all of the
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plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, accept them as true, and
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The court
can discard bare legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations
that merely state the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Third, the court must
determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d
at 211, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A facially plausible claim “allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750
(3d Cir. 2005).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 	94 	(2007), 	quoting 	Estelle 	v. 	Gamble, 	429 	U.S. 	97, 	106 	(1976).
Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
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complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
III. 	ANALYSIS
This case presents two main issues: (1) whether the Amended
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because
it contains no factual allegations; and (2) whether the Defendants are in
default. The undersigned addresses each in turn.
A. 	The 	Amended 	Complaint 	contains 	no 	factual
allegations.
The Plaintiff amended the original complaint, removing and adding
claims. Compare Doc. 1 at 8-18, with Doc. 16 at 2 (adding, for example,
fraud and misrepresentation, and removing several claims under § 1983).
Thus, the Amended Complaint superseded the original complaint.4
4 The Court must refrain from discussing allegations from an original
complaint where a plaintiff—including a pro se plaintiff—amended the
original complaint. See Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173, 175 n.3
(3d Cir. 2019), citing W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington
Nat’l 	Bank, 	712 	F.3d 	165, 	173 	(3d 	Cir. 	2013) 	(noting 	that 	liberal
construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean accumulating
allegations from superseded pleadings and that district courts typically
may not look outside the four corners of the amended complaint).
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that a civil
rights complaint is adequate where it states the “conduct, time, place,
and persons responsible.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.
2005), citing Boykins v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 80 (3d Cir.
1980). 	Here, 	the 	Amended 	Complaint 	fails 	to 	include 	any 	of 	these
elements. Although the Plaintiff sued seven different individuals and
entities, he fails to state any factual allegations against any of them. In
fact, the names of the Defendants appear in the Amended Complaint only
in the caption and the list of parties. Id. at 1-2.
At most, the Amended Complaint contains prayers for relief. See
Doc. 16 at 1-3 (requesting among other things, clearing his name from
false liens, quieting title, receiving compensatory and punitive damages,
and 	reviving 	other 	declaratory 	and 	injunctive 	reliefs). 	Because 	the
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts as to which Defendants, for what
reason and how, committed what acts to cause harm to the Plaintiff, the
Amended Complaint must be dismissed. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353; see
Hudson v. McKeesport Police Chief, 244 F. App’x 519, 522 (3d Cir. 2007)
(affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint against a defendant judge
because the plaintiff failed to provide “any basis for a claim against him,”
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and “merely includes [the defendant] in the caption of his complaint”);
Walsh v. Fuentes, No. 16-1498, 2016 WL 4070167, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July
29, 2016) (finding appropriate to dismiss an action for failure to state a
claim where the complaint fails to allege any personal involvement by
any of the captioned defendants).
B. 	The Defendants are not in default.
The Plaintiff asks the Court to grant default judgment, arguing
that the Defendants failed to timely respond to his pleading and that his
service of process on the Defendants were valid. Default J. Mot., Doc. 79
at 1-3. Both arguments fail.
1. 	There are no entries of default against the Defendants.
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a clerk of court must
enter a party’s default when the party has failed to plead or otherwise
defend an action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). The Third Circuit has held
that “entry of default by the Clerk under [Rule] 55(a) constitutes a
general prerequisite for a subsequent default judgment under Rule
55(b).” Husain v. Casino Control Comm’n, 265 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir.
2008), 	citing 	10A 	Wright 	& 	Miller’s 	Federal 	Practice 	& 	Procedure
§ 2682 (4th ed. 2007). Here, the clerk of court has not entered default
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against any of the parties and thus the Plaintiff has failed to meet the
prerequisite.
2. 	The Plaintiff never properly served DHR.
Additionally, DHR, as the only defendant to not waive service of
process, argues that it never received proper service of process. DHR’s
Br., 	Doc. 	49 	at 	6-9. 	Specifically, 	DHR 	contends 	that 	the 	Plaintiff
improperly attempted to “effectuate service on his own behalf,” and “to
serve the parties through an improper method,” by mailing a copy of the
summons and complaint. See id. at 9. The Plaintiff responds, asserting
that he “effected service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(e)(1), which incorporates Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 403.”
Pl.’s Br., Doc. 50 at 2.
The Plaintiff’s attempt at service by certified mail was improper.
See Collins v. Lincoln Caverns, Inc., No. 11-355, 2011 WL 1930659, at *1
(M.D. Pa. May 19, 2011) (finding as improper a pro se plaintiff’s attempt
at service by certified mail); but see Rehman v. Etihad Airways, No.
19-653, 2019 WL 12095413, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2019) (denying a
motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process because service on a
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corporation by certified mail was proper upon an out-of-state corporation
under Rule 403 and 404 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure).
First, under the federal rules, the Plaintiff’s service by certified
mail was improper. Carruth v. Pennsylvania, 779 F. App’x 993, 995 (3d
Cir. 2019), citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (h) (“Serving an individual or a
corporation or other association by mail is not permitted under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
Second, under state rules, contrary to the Plaintiff’s argument,
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 403 does not apply to this case. See
Doc. 50 at 2 . Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 404 provides that
“[o]riginal 	process 	shall 	be 	served 	outside 	the 	Commonwealth,” 	by,
among other methods, “mail in the manner provided by Rule 403.” Pa. R.
Civ. P. 404(2). And Rule 403 does allow process to be served by mail. See
Pa. R. Civ. P. 403(1) (“[T]he plaintiff shall have the right of service by
mailing a copy to the defendant.”). But Rules 404 and 403 only apply for
service of process on a party located 	outside 	the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Sawyers v. Davis, 222 A.3d 1, 5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019)
(“Service of original process upon an out-of-state defendant is governed
by [Rules] 403-405”); Jordan v. Pa. State Univ., 276 A.3d 751, 768 (Pa.
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Super. Ct. 2022) (finding service of process proper under Rule 403 and
404 for a plaintiff that resides outside of the Commonwealth); see also
Carruth, 779 F. App’x at 995, citing Pa. R. Civ. P. 402, 404 (“Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow service by mail unless service is
outside Pennsylvania.”). Here, the Plaintiff did not mail service outside
the Commonwealth. Doc. 27-2 at 3 (showing Lemoyne, Pennsylvania as
the address on the certified mail receipts for DHR).
The 	Plaintiff 	should 	have 	instead 	served 	process 	under
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 424. See Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s
Cleaning Servs., Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. 1997) (“Rule 424 sets forth
the 	methods 	of 	effectuating 	service 	on 	corporations 	and 	similar
entities.”). Rule 424 requires service of original process by “handing a
copy to” any of the following persons:
(1) an executive officer, partner or trustee of the corporation or
similar entity, or
(2) the manager, clerk or other person for the time being in charge
of any regular place of business or activity of the corporation or
similar entity, or
(3) an agent authorized by the corporation or similar entity in
writing to receive service of process for it.
Id., citing Pa. R. Civ. P. 424. Because the Plaintiff served DHR by
certified mail only, and service was not made to an out-of-state party, the
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Plaintiff’s service of process was improper as to DHR. See Collins, 2011
WL 1930659, at *1 (finding that neither the federal rules nor the state
rules permit service on a Pennsylvania corporation through the mail).
When service of process is improper, default judgment cannot be granted.
Petrucelli v. Bohringer, 46 F.3d 1298, 1304 (3d Cir. 1995). Because the
Plaintiff failed to properly serve DHR, the Plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment must be denied as to DHR for this reason as well.
3. 	Default 	Judgment 	is 	not 	warranted 	against 	the
remaining Defendants
The Plaintiff’s main argument in moving for a default judgment is
that several “defendants never filed an answer or responsive pleading by
their deadlines.” Doc. 79 at 2. As noted above, DHR was never properly
served and thus was not required to respond.
The 	remaining 	Defendants, 	however, 	timely 	waived 	service 	of
process (Docs. 25, 35, 41), which extended their time to respond from
twenty-one days to sixty days “after the request [for waiver] was sent.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3) (“A defendant who, before being served with
process, 	timely 	returns 	a 	waiver 	need 	not 	serve 	an 	answer 	to 	the
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complaint until 60 days after the request was sent.”).5 Therefore, the
County, Township, and ONE Defendants had until July 26, 2025, sixty
days from May 27, 2025, when the Plaintiff sent his summons and
complaint, 	to 	file 	their 	responsive 	pleadings. 	Doc. 	27-2 	(showing
postmarked certified mail receipts).
County Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on July 11, 2025,
well within the sixty-day deadline and thus timely responded. See Doc.
52. The Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment, therefore, must be denied
as to the County Defendants.
Township and ONE Defendants, however, served their motions to
dismiss on July 28, 2025—two days after the sixty-day deadline. See
Docs. 61, 63. The issue for the Township and ONE Defendants, then, is
whether their late filings warrant default judgments. The Court must
consider three factors in deciding whether to grant default judgment: (1)
5 Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if a defendant “has timely
waived service under Rule 4(d),” it must serve an answer “within 60 days
after the request for a waiver was sent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (a)(1)(A)(ii).
Under Rule 4(d), a plaintiff requesting waiver must “give the defendant
a reasonable time of at least 30 days after the request was sent . . . to
return the waiver.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)(F). Here, the Plaintiff mailed
the summons and complaint on May 27, 2025, and the Defendants
returned the waivers of service on June 17, 23, and 25 (Docs. 25, 35, 41),
all within thirty days after the waivers were sent.
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prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied; (2) whether the defendant
appears to have a litigable defense; and (3) whether defendant’s delay is
due to culpable conduct. Fridline v. Millennia Tax Relief, LLC, 727 F.
Supp. 	3d 	517, 	521 	n.9 	(M.D. 	Pa. 	2024) 	(citation 	modified), 	citing
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).
First, the Plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the Court allowing the
Township and ONE Defendants to proceed in this action with their
two-days late motions to dismiss. Plaintiff has had a full and fair
opportunity to respond to their motions, and those motions do not raise
any arguments not raised by the other defendants. And as has been
previously noted by this Court, even if the Court were to enter a default
judgment against these Defendants, under Third Circuit precedent, the
Court would likely be required to set aside the default judgment upon
request by the Defendants. See Kleckner v. Glover Trucking Corp., 103
F.R.D. 553, 556 (M.D. Pa. 1984), citing Gross v. Stereo Component Sys.,
700 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (“The case law with respect to default
judgments, 	however, 	dictates 	that 	a 	request 	for 	relief 	from 	default
judgment be granted except in the most extraordinary cases.”).
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Second, Township and ONE Defendants have litigable defenses.
Like the other defendants, Township and ONE Defendants raised the
issue of the Plaintiff’s complete lack of factual allegations in the Amended
Complaint. See Township Defendants’ Br., Doc. 62 at 7; ONE Defendants’
Br., 	Doc. 	64 	at 	7. 	Third, 	there 	is 	no 	evidence 	to suggest 	that 	the
Defendants’ two-day delay in filing their motions to dismiss was due to
culpable conduct, “which in the Third Circuit is conduct that is ‘taken
willfully or in bad faith.’” Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 164, quoting Gross,
700 F.2d at 124. If anything, the delay likely resulted from excusable
neglect, such as mistakenly counting the sixty-day deadline from when
they received the waiver of service forms.
And, again, Plaintiff has not obtained the Clerk’s entry of default,
a necessary prerequisite without which the Court cannot grant default
judgment.
Thus, the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment should be denied.
IV. 	LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit instructs this Court to grant leave to amend when
a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to plead with particularity,
In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1435 (3d
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Cir.1997), unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Mullin v.
Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017); Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Because the Plaintiff included no
factual allegations in the Amended Complaint, the undersigned cannot
determine whether amendment in this case would be futile. As the
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and has amended his original complaint
only once, as a matter of course, the Amended Complaint should be
dismissed without prejudice.
V. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that:
(1) 	The Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 28, 52, 61, 63) be
GRANTED;
(2) 	The Amended Complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice;
(3) 	The Plaintiff be instructed, if he chooses to file a second
amended 	complaint, 	to 	properly 	serve 	pleadings 	on 	the
Defendants; and
(4) 	The 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	default 	judgment 	(Doc. 	79) 	be
DENIED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	proposed 	findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition
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of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days
after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk
of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written
objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed
findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the
basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local
Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of
those 	portions 	of 	the 	report 	or 	specified 	proposed 	findings 	or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only
in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the
record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own
determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive
further 	evidence, 	recall 	witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Date: December 5, 2025 	s/ Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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