Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
VALARIE JO MARZOLF,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
: 	NO. 1:25-CV-00047
:
: 	(MARIANI, D.J.)
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff Valarie Marzolf’s claim for disability and disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court
has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference). For the reasons stated
herein, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court affirm
the decision of the Commissioner.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
On August 8, 2022, Marzolf applied for disability benefits, alleging
disability beginning March 18, 2021. Transcript, Doc. 11-3 at 2. Following
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an initial denial, Marzolf submitted an appeal, requesting a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Doc. 11-4 at 17. The ALJ
conducted the hearing and determined that Marzolf was not disabled.
Doc. 11-2 at 25, 30.
Marzolf filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the
Appeals Council denied. Id. at 2. The ALJ’s decision, therefore, became
the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Pending before
this 	Court 	is 	Marzolf’s 	action 	seeking 	judicial 	review 	of 	the
Commissioner’s decision. Complaint, Doc. 1. This case is fully briefed
(docs. 14, 16, 17) and ripe for resolution.
B. 	The Disability Determination Process
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”),
a claimant must be unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable . . . impairment which can . . .
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Under the Act, a claimant is disabled “only if his . . . impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
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any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 	§ 423(d)(2)(A). 	An 	impairment 	is 	one 	that 	“results 	from
anatomical, 	physiological, 	or 	psychological 	abnormalities 	which 	are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” § 423(d)(3).
Social 	Security 	regulations 	provide 	a 	“five-step 	sequential
evaluation process” to determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through
step four, while at step five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show
that the claimant can perform substantial gainful employment other
than the claimant’s past relevant work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(1987)).
At the first step, the claimant must establish that he has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged
disability. See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At the second step, claimant must
establish that he suffers from a “severe medically determinable . . .
impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . (“impairment . . .
must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at
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least 12 months”).” § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the claimant
must provide evidence that his impairment “meets or equals one of our
listings in appendix 1.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates
his impairments meet those listings, he is considered to be disabled. See
id.; § 404.1520(d). If he cannot establish severity of impairment at the
third step, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four in which the ALJ
determines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
allows 	the 	claimant 	to 	continue 	his 	previous 	employment.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most [a claimant] can still do despite”
impairments. 	§ 404.1545(a)(1). 	To 	prevail 	on 	step 	four, 	claimant’s
“impairment(s) must prevent [him] from doing . . . past relevant work.”
§ 404.1520(f). At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the burden to
demonstrate that the claimant’s RFC and his “age, education, and work
experience . . . [allows] adjustment to other work.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If
the Commissioner cannot satisfy this burden, the claimant’s claim is
granted. See § 404.1520(g).
C. 	The ALJ’s Decision
Here, the ALJ determined that Marzolf “has not been under a
disability, . . . from March 18, 2021, through the date of this decision.”
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Doc. 11-2 at 25. 	The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding
through the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security
Act. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); see Doc. 11-2 at 17-25.
At step one, the ALJ determined that Marzolf “has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since March 18, 2021, the alleged onset date”
of disability. Doc. 11-2 at 17. At step two, the ALJ found that Marzolf has
the 	following 	severe 	impairments: 	asthma; 	chronic 	obstructive
pulmonary disease (COPD); plantar fasciitis; and obesity. Id. At step
three, the ALJ determined that Marzolf “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity
of one of the listed impairments in” 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P,
appendix 1. Id. at 18.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Marzolf has the
following RFC: “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)
except frequent balancing; occasional use of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds;
avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dust, gases, and poor
ventilation.” Id. at 19. At step four, the ALJ determined that Marzolf “is
capable of performing past relevant work as a bakery salesclerk and a
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sterilizer. This work does not require the performance of work-related
activities precluded by the claimant’s [RFC].” Id. at 23.
Despite finding that the claimant can perform past relevant work,
the ALJ analyzed step five, as an alternative, finding that, considering
Marzolf’s “age, education, work experience, and [RFC], the claimant is
capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in
significant numbers in the national economy.” Id. at 24-25.
D. 	Issues on Appeal
The sole issue on appeal is whether the ALJ violated the social
security regulations by failing to properly consider and explain his
analysis of Dr. Kneifati’s opinion. Doc. 14 at 9.
Because 	the 	ALJ 	“did 	weave 	supportability 	and 	consistency
throughout her analysis of which doctors were persuasive,” Zaborowski
v. Commissioner of Social Security, 115 F.4th 637, 639 (3d Cir. 2024), and
in 	this 	case 	explained 	why 	Dr. 	Kneifati’s 	opinion 	specifically 	was
unpersuasive, the undersigned recommends that the Court, adhering to
the deferential standard of review outlined below, affirm the decision of
the Commissioner.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the
findings 	of 	the 	final 	decision-maker 	are 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence 	in 	the 	record. See 42 	U.S.C. 	§ 1383(c)(3) 	(incorporating 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.
Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an
existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient
evidence 	to 	support 	the 	agency’s 	factual 	determinations. 	Biestek 	v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a
large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence
but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by
the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an
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adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may
be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the 	ALJ’s 	decision] 	from 	being 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In
determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.
Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the
record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third
Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions
for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the
ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not
only 	supports 	[a 	contrary] 	conclusion 	but 	compels 	it.” 	Immigr. 	&
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Marzolf is
disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Marzolf is not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based
upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.
12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been
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held 	that 	an 	ALJ’s 	errors 	of 	law 	denote 	a 	lack 	of 	substantial
evidence.”); Burton 	v. 	Schweiker, 	512 	F. 	Supp. 	913, 	914 	(W.D. 	Pa.
1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim
requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright
v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of
review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he
court 	has 	plenary 	review 	of 	all 	legal 	issues 	decided 	by 	the
Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate
whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to
enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for
his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Marzolf argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider and explain
Dr. Kneifati’s opinion. Doc. 14 at 9. Marzolf contends that the ALJ’s
analysis falls short in explaining: (1) supportability; and (2) consistency.
Id. 	at 11, 13. The undersigned finds that the ALJ has sufficiently
explained both factors and thus recommends that the Court affirm the
decision of the Commissioner.
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A. 	The ALJ’s supportability analysis
Marzolf contends that the ALJ’s supportability analysis “picks and
chooses through Dr. Kneifati’s examination and fails to consider Dr.
Kneifati’s supporting explanations directly within the opinion itself.” Id.
at 11. The ALJ’s analysis tells a different story. See Doc. 11-2 at 20-22.
Supportability means “[t]he more relevant the objective medical
evidence and supporting explanations . . . are to support his or her
medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the medical opinions . . . will
be.” Minarsky v. Kijakazi, 747 F. Supp. 3d 801, 813-14 (M.D. Pa. 2024),
citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). ALJs err when they fail to consider
supporting explanations and fail to evaluate whether an opinion contains
relevant objective medical evidence. Minarsky, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 815.
Here, 	the 	ALJ 	sufficiently 	considered 	Dr. 	Kneifati’s 	supporting
explanations and evaluated the relevant objective medical evidence.
Before discussing Dr. Kneifati’s medical opinion, the ALJ devoted
an entire section to reviewing Dr. Kneifati’s own treatment notes and
examination records. See Doc. 11-2 at 20. That review contains citations
to Dr. Kneifati’s medical records, which provide sufficient evidence to
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support the ALJ’s factual determinations. Id.; see also Biestek, 587 U.S.
at 102.
In fact, the ALJ examined Dr. Kneifati’s consultation examination
notes in their entirety, providing citations to nearly all of the sections
that Marzolf contends the ALJ ignored. Compare Doc. 11-2 at 20, 22, with
Doc. 14 at 5-6.1 After reviewing the entire record, the ALJ determined
that Dr. Kneifati’s opinion was unpersuasive because “it is unsupported
by his own examination of the claimant as Dr. Kneifati found the
claimant had a normal gait; normal strength; ability to walk on heels and
toes without difficulty; had a normal stance and was able to get on and
off the exam table without assistance.” Doc. 11-2 at 22. Thus, the ALJ
found that Dr. Kneifati’s own objective medical findings contradicted Dr.
Kneifati’s RFC analysis. Cf. Minarsky, 747 F. Supp. 3d at 815 (finding
that an ALJ failed to address supportability because the ALJ did not
consider the medical provider’s supporting explanations and did not
1 In her moving and reply briefs, for example, Marzolf insists that the
ALJ ignored Dr. Kneifati’s finding that Marzolf’s squatting was limited
to sixty percent. Doc. 14 at 12; Pl.’s Reply Br., Doc. 17 at 2. Marzolf
ignores the plain text of the ALJ’s analysis. Doc. 11-2 at 20 (“Dr.
Kneifati’s examination of the claimant found her to have a 60% limitation
in her squatting ability; however, she had normal gait . . . and was able
to rise from a chair without difficulty.”).
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evaluate 	whether 	the 	opinion 	contained 	relevant 	objective 	medical
evidence).
Marzolf further argues that the ALJ erred because the ALJ “makes
not a single mention of any . . . positive findings that would tend to
support Dr. Kneifati’s opinion.” Doc. 17 at 2. The ALJ reviewed, cited,
and discussed nearly all of Dr. Kneifati’s reports to support the ALJ’s
RFC analysis. That was more than enough. Minarsky, 747 F. Supp. 3d at
814 	(emphasis 	added) 	(finding 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	analysis 	was
supported by substantial evidence because “the ALJ included citations to
the record, which provided more than a scintilla of evidence for his
reasoning.”). And the ALJ has discretion to discredit the counter evidence
Marzolf suggests. See Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2014)
(noting that an ALJ may choose to discredit alleged limitation that is
“supported by medical evidence, but is opposed by other evidence in the
record”). Even if the Court were to find that the evidence the ALJ failed
to cite, such as Dr. Kneifati’s range of motion findings, deserve greater
weight, 	the 	Court 	must 	not 	“weigh 	the 	evidence 	or 	substitute 	its
conclusions for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182.
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Accordingly, 	the 	ALJ’s 	supportability 	analysis 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence.
B. 	The ALJ’s consistency analysis
Marzolf also argues that the ALJ’s consistency analysis was flawed
because the ALJ downplayed “the significant nature of Plaintiff’s plantar
fasciitis.” Doc. 14 at 13. Specifically, Marzolf contends that the ALJ
ignored “Dr. Juliano’s examination of the right foot,” and that the noted
improvement to the claimant’s asthma from Singulair, a medication,
came 	after 	Dr. 	Kneifati’s 	examination. 	Id. 	at 	13-14. 	As 	with 	the
supportability analysis, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s consistency
analysis is supported by substantial evidence.
The consistency factor requires an ALJ to explain whether medical
opinions are “consistent with other medical opinions in the record.”
Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639; see also Minarsky, 747 F. Supp.3d at 814,
citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2). Like the supportability factor, there is
a “low threshold” for an ALJ to articulate how consistent a medical
opinion is. Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 640; see Minarsky, 747 F. Supp. 3d
at 	814 	(emphasis 	added) 	(finding 	that 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	analysis 	is
supported by substantial evidence because “the ALJ included citations to
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the record, which provided more than a scintilla of evidence for his
reasoning.”).
Here, 	contrary 	to 	Marzolf’s 	contention, 	the 	ALJ 	sufficiently
reviewed and analyzed the consistency factor by evaluating Dr. Kneifati’s
opinion with Dr. Juliano’s report, citing the very record Marzolf argues
the ALJ ignored. See Doc. 11-2 at 22; Doc. 17 at 3. The ALJ found that
Dr. Kneifati’s opinion was inconsistent with medical evidence such as
x-rays of her foot which showed no acute bony abnormality, preserved
joint space, no erosive changes, no unexpected bone formation, and
normal soft tissues. Doc. 11-2 at 22 (citing Dr. Juliano’s report at Ex.
5F/33). As the ALJ found that Dr. Kneifati’s opinion was inconsistent
with other medical opinions, and supported that finding with record
evidence, “[t]here was no need to say more than that.” Zaborowski, 115
F.4th at 640. Accordingly, the ALJ sufficiently analyzed the consistency
factor.
On the whole, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantive
evidence, and should be affirmed.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that:
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1. 	The 	decision 	of 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security 	denying
Marzolf’s benefits under the Social Security Act be AFFIRMED;
and
2. 	The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case.
An appropriate order follows.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule
72.3:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	proposed
findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter
described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation
for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof.
Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the
magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall
specifically 	identify 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	proposed 	findings,
recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis
for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local
Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept,
reject, 	or 	modify, 	in 	whole 	or 	in 	part, 	the 	findings 	or
recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion
or where required by law, and may consider the record developed
before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination
on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further
evidence, 	recall 	witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Date: January 2, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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