Sgagias v. Newberry Township Police Department

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KONSTANTINOS SGAGIAS, 	: 	CIV NO. 1:24-CV-1632
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
NEWBERRY TOWNSHIP POLICE 	:
DEPARTMENT, et al. 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Statement of Facts and of the Case
The pro se plaintiff in this case, Konstantinos Sgagias, is a prodigious litigant
who has filed at least four versions of his complaint since initiating this case in
September of 2024. (Docs. 1, 7, 8, 22). Despite his repeated attempts to revise and
refine his complaint, often without leave of court, we previously found that he has
failed to state a claim against most of the defendants upon which relief may be
granted. Nonetheless, in his latest filings, Sgagias now moves for leave to file fourth
and fifth amended complaints and asks the Court to lift the stay on his proceedings
since the state case against him, which forms part of the basis of his claims, has
terminated in his favor. (Docs. 49, 59).
By way of background, Sgagias’ claims originate from his 2018 purchase of
a York County property at a tax sale which had previously operated as an automotive
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salvage yard. (Doc. 22, ⁋⁋ 9-10). Prior to the plaintiff taking possession of the
property in 2022, Sgagias alleges that the former proprietor of the salvage company,
Emeka Kinglsey Oguejiofor, abandoned a 2015 Chevrolet Camaro on the property.
(Id. ⁋⁋ 10-13). Though not entirely clear from the face of the complaint, it appears a
legal battle ensued over whether Oguejiofor had abandoned the Camaro and who
was its rightful owner. (Id., ⁋⁋ 13-15). According to the plaintiff, he legally
possessed the Camaro pursuant to several Pennsylvania court orders. 1 (Id.)
On 	September 	28, 	2022, 	officers 	of 	the 	Newberry 	Township 	Police
Department, under the direction of Defendant Lieutenant Braxton Ditty, entered
Sgagias’ property to conduct a VIN check on the Camaro at which time Sgagias
alleges he presented the officers with the court orders proving the vehicle was
forfeited and lawfully in his possession. (Id., ⁋⁋ 16-17). Despite this documentation,
the officers removed the vehicle from the plaintiff’s property and returned it to
Oguejiofor. (Id., ⁋ 18). A few months later, on December 27, 2022, Lieutenant Ditty
charged the plaintiff with misdemeanor unauthorized use of a vehicle. (Id., ⁋ 19).
1 We did not previously reach the issue of whether Sgagias had legal claim to the
Camaro due to the ongoing state court litigation. The exhibits attached to his
previous complaint were enigmatic in nature and, at best, showed only that
Oguejiofor and Sgagias were in a legal battle over its ownership. His latest motion
attaches the title to the Camaro which, despite Sgagias’ claim to the contrary, names
Oguejiofor as title owner.
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In September 2024, Sgagias filed his complaint in federal court, alleging the
defendants violated his constitutional rights and committed state law torts when they
removed the vehicle from his property and initiated criminal charges against him.
Against Defendants Ditty and Newberry Township Police Department he alleged
constitutional violations of due process, false arrest, unlawful seizure, and a state
law conversion claim. (Doc. 22, ⁋⁋ 34-54). He also lodged an abuse of process claim
against Defendant Ditty. (Id.) As to the York County defendants, he alleged
violations of due process and attempted to impute liability upon York County for his
claims against the police department and district attorney’s officer under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). At the time Sgagias filed his
complaint, his case remained unresolved in state court.
In January 2025, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s third
amended complaint, arguing both that his claims failed as a matter of law and that
this Court should abstain from ruling on the issues under the Younger 2 abstention
doctrine, since the state criminal case against Sgagias was ongoing. (Docs. 25, 28,
35). On September 12, 2025, this Court dismissed the constitutional claims against
the York County defendants and the Newberry Township Police Department and
stayed the claims against Defendant Lieutenant Braxton Ditty and the pendant state
2 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
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law claims against the police department pending the outcome of the plaintiff’s state
criminal case.
One week later, on September 19, 2025, Sgagias filed the instant motion for
leave to file a fourth amended complaint which adds three new defendants – Chief
Deputy District Attorney John Hamme, Assistant District Attorney Virginia Hobbs,
and the current acting York County District Attorney Tim Barker – and reasserts
claims against the previously dismissed defendants Newberry Township, York
County, and District Attorney David Sunday, Jr., as well as Lt. Braxton Ditty. (Doc.
49-1). The proposed amended complaint also adds a cause of action under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). (Id.) The plaintiff argues the
Court should grant him leave to file a fourth amended complaint because of newly
available evidence, including the title to the Camaro which names Oguejiofor as the
owner, bodycam footage of his arrest, 3 a criminal docket revealing “a fabricated
‘military leave’ continuance,” prosecutorial turnover, commercial insurance losses,
and new environmental claims. (Doc. 49).
Since Sgagias submitted his proposed fourth amended complaint to the Court,
he has informed us that he was acquitted on all charges on November 5, 2025. (Doc.
59; 	Commonwealth 	v. 	Konstantinos 	G. 	Sgagias, 	Docket 	No. 	CP-67-CR-
3 The plaintiff purports that the bodycam footage captures Lt. Ditty instructing
subordinates to attempt to interview Sgagias and secure a confession to the crime
with which he was charged.
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0000001978-2023 (Pa. Com. Pl. – York Cnty.). Thus, the state proceedings, the
ongoing nature of which led the Court to abstain from ruling on some of Sgagias’
claims, have terminated in his favor. Sgagias now moves the Court to lift the stay on
some of his claims but also requests leave to submit a fifth amended complaint,
despite this Court not yet approved his fourth amended complaint. (Id.) However,
the plaintiff has not attached a proposed fifth amended complaint to his motion.
In consideration of the foregoing, and in the interest of providing a resolution
to this strange and protracted litigation, for the reasons set forth below we will deny
the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, (Doc. 49), and
deny his newest motion to file a fifth amended complaint but grant this motion to
the extent it asks the court to lift the stay on his surviving claims against Lt. Ditty
and the Newberry Township Police Department. (Doc. 59).
II. 	Discussion
A. Motion to Amend Standard of Review
Motions to amend are governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
procedure, which provides as follows:
(a) Amendments Before Trial.
(1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course within:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
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(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required,
21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after
service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
(2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's
leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
As the text of this rule implies, decisions regarding motions to amend or
supplement pleadings rest in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. See e.g., Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort,
LP, 550 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2008); Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 252
F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001). That discretion, however, is governed by certain basic
principles, principles that are embodied in Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thus, “[l]eave to amend must generally be granted unless equitable
considerations render it otherwise unjust.” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204
(3d Cir. 2006). Further:
The liberality of Rule 15(a) counsels in favor of amendment even when
a party has been less than perfect in the preparation and presentation of
a case. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227; Boileau v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 730 F.2d 929, 938–39 (3d Cir. 1984). It allows for
misunderstandings and good-faith lapses in judgment, so long as the
party thereafter acts reasonably and diligently.
Id. at 206.
Yet, while Rule 15 provides that leave to amend should be freely given when
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justice so requires, the district court still retains broad discretion when ruling upon a
motion to amend, Bjorgung, 550 F.3d 263; Cureton, 252 F.3d 267. “Among the
grounds that could justify a denial of leave to amend are . . ., bad faith, dilatory
motive, prejudice, and futility. ‘Futility’ means that the complaint, as amended,
would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Shane v. Fauver, 213
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997); Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413-14 (3d
Cir. 1993)) (some quotations omitted). Moreover, a party seeking to supplement
pleadings must act in a diligent fashion. Thus, for example, “[a] District Court has
discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend where the plaintiff was put on notice as
to the deficiencies in his complaint but chose not to resolve them.” Krantz v.
Prudential Investments Fund Management LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citing Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir.
1998)).
By defining futility for purposes of a motion to amend as failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, Rule 15 mirrors the language of Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint
should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the
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complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild,
O'Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need
not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion
to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
Additionally, a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the . . .
plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). As
the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct.
1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff
must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not
do.” Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id.
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis: “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must
plead to state a claim.’ Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify
allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
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plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ Id.” Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629
F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
Moreover, in undertaking this analysis of a motion for leave to amend a
complaint “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an
amendment.” Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting
Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823
(3d Cir. 1978)). However, “[i]n the absence of substantial or undue prejudice, denial
instead must be based on bad faith or dilatory motives, truly undue or unexplained
delay, repeated failures to cure the deficiency by amendments previously allowed,
or futility of amendment.” Id. Further, while the burdens of additional discovery are
relevant to consideration of whether a proposed amendment results in substantial or
undue prejudice, oftentimes, “[g]iven the liberal view towards amendment pleadings
embodied in Rule 15, re-opening discovery, rather than forecasting claims, . . . would
seem to be the preferable course for addressing these claims of potential prejudice.”
New Prime, Inc., 2016 WL 3742872, at *4.
B. The Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend His Complaint Are Denied.
Judged against these standards, we will deny the plaintiff’s motions to file a
fourth and fifth amended complaint in this case. Upon review of the plaintiff’s
proposed fourth amended complaint we conclude that amendment would be futile
both because he has failed to meaningfully resolve deficiencies which caused his
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most recent operative complaint to fail as to many of the defendants and because his
claims against the new defendants fail as a matter of law.
1. The Monell Claims in the Proposed Amended Complaint Fail.
As to the defendants the Court previously dismissed from this action,
amendment of his complaint would be futile because “the plaintiff was put on notice
as to the deficiencies in his complaint but chose not to resolve them.” Krantz v.
Prudential Investments Fund Management LLC, 305 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citing Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 654 (3d Cir.
1998)). Indeed, as to the institutional defendants York County and Newberry
Township, against whom the plaintiff’s proposed fourth amended complaint renews
constitutional claims, it appears the plaintiff simply cannot cure the defects which
caused his original claims to fail since these are simply not appropriate defendants
in this case.
On this score, the plaintiff has again named York County and Newberry
Township as defendants in this case but has alleged no wrongdoing on the part of
these defendants. Instead, in stating his claim under Monell,4 the plaintiff’s proposed
complaint simply states in a conclusory manner that, “Newberry Township is liable
4 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018,
56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)
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under Monell because Lt. Ditty, acting as a final policymaker of police operations,
directed the unlawful seizures and prosecution of Plaintiff.” (Doc. 49-1, at).
Similarly, as to York County, he states, “York County is liable through Sunday and
Hamme as final policymakers, maintained a custom of misusing prosecutorial
authority in civil disputes making his actions attributable to the County under
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati.” (Id.) These conclusory statements lay bare Sgagias’
attempt to impute liability upon these institutional defendants simply by virtue of the
actions of their subordinates. This he may not do. In fact, it is well settled that local
governmental entities may not be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of others under
a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; see
also Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1027 (3d Cir. 1991). Instead,
such 	an 	agency 	may 	only 	be 	held 	liable 	“when 	execution 	of 	a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that
the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Thus, to sustain a claim against this institutional defendant, a plaintiff must
“identify a . . . policy or custom that caused the plaintiff's injury.” Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (quotations omitted).
A plaintiff can adequately allege a policy or custom establishing institutional
liability for the acts committed by its employees by showing a formal policy, a
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specific 	injury-causing 	action 	taken 	by 	a 	government 	official, 	a 	practice 	so
widespread it had become a custom, or a widespread failure to train or supervise
subordinates. See Ashley v. Kosehba, No. 1:22-CV-00982, 2023 WL 6200805, at
*4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2023). Once this policy or custom has been established, the
plaintiff must also allege “that it was the proximate cause of his injuries by
demonstrating a plausible nexus or affirmative link between the municipality's
policy or custom and the specific harm sustained.” Hargrove v. City of Philadelphia,
No. CV 21-4082, 2023 WL 3229927, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2023) (citing Bielevicz
v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990); Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914
F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)) (quotations omitted).
Judged against these standards, the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint
still fails to state a claim against York County and Newberry Township. In
attempting to cure the deficiencies previously identified by the Court, the plaintiff
proposes to impute liability upon York County not through the actions of the
Newberry Township Police Department, who we have already explained operates
independently of York County, see 16 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 14302, 14340, but instead
through the actions of York County District Attorney David Sunday and former
Chief Deputy DA John Hamme, who the plaintiff identifies as “final policymakers.”
(Doc. 49-1, at). Thus, it appears the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint would
impute 	liability 	upon 	York 	County 	for 	“a 	single 	decision 	by 	municipal
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policymakers,” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S. Ct. 1292,
1298, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1986), namely the District Attorney’s involvement in the
decision to prosecute him.
It is true that the Supreme Court in Pembaur established that, “municipal
liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under
appropriate circumstances.” 475 U.S. at 480. But, “[t]o utilize this approach there
must be a basis in the record to establish that the official whose decision is in
question had final policy-making authority for the governmental entity with regard
to the specific matter at hand.” Fogle v. Sokol, No. 2:17CV194, 2018 WL 6831137,
at *14 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2018), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 957 F.3d 148
(3d Cir. 2020) (citing Pembaur at 480).
As to York County, we acknowledge that the Third Circuit has recognized
that district attorneys are “chief law enforcement officer[s] for the county in which
[they were] elected,” Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 349 (3d Cir. 1999), and
a narrow set of cases has concluded that a “county may be understood to be bound
by the conduct of the district attorney for the purposes of a motion to dismiss,” where
the DA engages in investigative activities which “garner[] constitutional concern.”
Fogle, 2018 WL 6831137 at *15. Nonetheless, even acknowledging this narrow
theory upon which the plaintiff rests his claim against York County, the factual
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allegations in his proposed amended complaint are simply too vague and conclusory
to justify the reinitiation of claims against this institutional defendant.
At the outset, the plaintiff’s proposed claims against Defendants Sunday are
conclusory and do not allege the requisite personal involvement of this defendants
in his claim. The plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint recites no specific factual
allegations which tie Defendant Sunday to the decision to prosecute him beyond his
position at District Attorney at the time of his prosecution. Moreover, while we are
instructed to accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, “[t]he Supreme
Court has held that the determination as to whether a decision maker has authority
to make final decisions is a question of state law, not a question of fact for the jury.”
Washington-Pope v. City of Philadelphia, No. CV 12-4300, 2015 WL 7450522, at
*13 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2015) (citing Pembauer at 483). Here, the plaintiff has not
alleged, nor do we conclude, that the Chief Deputy District Attorney, John Hamme,
had the authority to make final policy decisions for the York County District
Attorney’s office.
Similarly, as to the plaintiff’s claims against Newberry township, by virtue of
the actions of Lt. Ditty, the plaintiff’s conclusory statement that Lt. Ditty was “acting
as finally policymaker of police operations,” simply does not make it so. Here,
absent any facts which would support this legal conclusion, we do not accept
Sgagias’ claim that Lt. Ditty’s actions as a police officer constituted an official
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policy on behalf of the Township which would subject them to legal liability. Absent
any other specific allegations showing a policy or practice on behalf of the township,
the Monell claims against this institutional defendant are futile.
In sum, none of the new evidence cited by the plaintiff in his motion or
proposed amended complaint identifies a specific policy or practice that caused his
injury. As we have noted, to survive a motion to dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Since the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint
still does not identify any policy or practice which would impute liability upon York
County or Newberry Township for these alleged violations, any amendment of this
complaint would be futile as to these defendants.
2. The District Attorney Defendants Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity.
We also conclude amendment of his complaint would be futile as to his
renewed claims against the York County District Attorney, David Sunday, current
acting York County DA Tim Barker, and former Chief Deputy DA John Hamme,
and ADA Virgina Hobbs.
At the outset, as previously explained to the plaintiff, the United States
Supreme Court has long recognized that those officials performing judicial, quasi-
judicial, and prosecutorial functions in our adversarial system must be entitled to
some measure of protection from personal liability for acts taken in their official
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capacities. In order to provide this degree of protection from liability for judicial
officials, the courts have held that judges, Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991);
prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and those who perform
adjudicative functions, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n. 20 (grand jurors); Harper v.
Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d. Cir. 1986) (parole board adjudicators); are entitled
to immunity from personal liability for actions they take in our adversarial system
of justice.
Indeed, it is well-settled that a criminal defendant may not sue prosecutors for
the act of filing charges against him since such conduct is cloaked in immunity from
civil liability. The immunity conferred upon prosecutors for the quasi-judicial act of
filing and bringing criminal charges is also broad and sweeping:
[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that state prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability under § 1983 for actions performed in a quasi-
judicial role. This immunity extends to acts that are “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” such as
“initiating a prosecution and ... presenting the State's case.” [The] Court
has 	noted 	numerous 	public 	policy 	considerations 	underlying 	its
extension 	of 	absolute 	immunity 	to 	prosecutors: 	[S]uits 	against
prosecutors 	for 	initiating 	and 	conducting 	prosecutions 	“could 	be
expected with some frequency, for a defendant often will transform his
resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and
malicious actions to the State's advocate”; lawsuits would divert
prosecutors’ attention and energy away from their important duty of
enforcing the criminal law; prosecutors would have more difficulty
than other officials in meeting the standards for qualified immunity; and
potential 	liability 	“would 	prevent 	the 	vigorous 	and 	fearless
performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper
functioning of the criminal justice system.” ... [T]here are other checks
on 	prosecutorial 	misconduct, 	including 	the 	criminal 	law 	and
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professional discipline.
Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
Thus, to the extent that Sgagias’ proposed amended complaint again seeks to
hold the York County District Attorney personally liable for supervising and
ratifying the actions of the police officer defendant, he is immune from personal,
individual liability for his actions in bringing this criminal case. This is equally true
for the plaintiff’s claims against the current acting York County District Attorney,
Tim 	Barker, 	whose 	appearance 	as 	a 	defendant 	is 	only 	predicated 	upon 	his
assumption to the office of acting district attorney during the pendency of the case
against Sgagias. 5
Further, even if Sgagias now alleges these DA defendants, and the new
prosecutors he proposes to add to the amended complaint, acted outside of their
prosecutorial duties during the investigation of this case and thus are not subject to
5 Moreover, as previously noted, the plaintiff simply has not alleged the type of
personal involvement on the part of Sunday or Barker which would give rise to
supervisory liability for his constitutional claims since to state a constitutional tort
claim the plaintiff must show that the supervisory defendants actively deprived him
of a right secured by the Constitution. Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132
F.3d 902 (3d Cir.1997); see also Maine v.Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65
L.Ed.2d 555 (1980). Constitutional tort liability is personal in nature and can only
follow personal involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct shown through specific
allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence in the
challenged practice. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir.1997).
Fallin v. Mueller, No. 1:15-CV-00248, 2015 WL 4951280, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
19, 2015)n
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absolute 	immunity, 	his 	claims 	against 	these 	defendants 	falter 	on 	another
insurmountable legal obstacle: the new evidence which accompanies the plaintiff’s
proposed amended complaint demonstrates that they are entitled to qualified
immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields governmental officials from
civil liability so long as their conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). The qualified immunity inquiry has two parts. The
first asks whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to “make out a violation
of a constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The second
question is “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of [the]
defendant's alleged misconduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A court may
“exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis” to address first “in light of the circumstances of the particular
case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.
Against this standard, the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint does not
allege sufficient facts to make out a violation of a constitutional right. Indeed, an
essential element his malicious prosecution for unauthorized use of a vehicle is the
absence of probable cause. 6 Probable cause to arrest exists “whenever reasonably
6 In order to prove malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding
ended in plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;
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trustworthy information or circumstances within a police officer's knowledge are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has
been committed by the person being arrested.” U.S. v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 255 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). In conducting an inquiry
into whether probable cause to arrest existed, a court should consider the totality of
the circumstances presented, and “must assess the knowledge and information which
the officers possessed at the time of arrest, coupled with the factual occurrences
immediately precipitating the arrest.” United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 122 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Here, the exhibits attached to the plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint
indicate that the officers and prosecutors involved in the seizure of the car and
subsequent initiation of charges against him had probable cause to believe the
Camaro belonged to Oguejiofor. In fact, the title to the Camaro, which the plaintiff
purports proves he was the lawful owner of the Camaro at the time the car was seized
and he was charged, (Doc. 49-1, ⁋ 24, “The police report documents that Lt. Ditty
‘contacted Chief Deputy Prosecutor John Hamme’ who agreed to treat the Camaro
as stolen because it was registered to Oguejiofor, despite title and license plate
(4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff
to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the
concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Estate of Smith v.
Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)(emphasis added).
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evidence showing Plaintiff’s ownership.”), actually shows the exact opposite – that
the title lists Emeka Kinglsey Oguejiofor as the owner of the vehicle. (Doc. 49-5, at
3). Moreover, the affidavit of probable cause notes that the Newberry Township
Police Department received a call from Oguejiofor reporting his vehicle stolen, and
that the officers’ subsequent investigation revealed the car was registered to him.
(Doc. 49-8, “After running the VIN I was able to verify that the vehicle was in Mr.
Oguejiofor’s name.”). Given these facts, it cannot be said that the officers “violate[d]
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 11, since the plaintiff could not prove
ownership to the vehicle and the facts available to the officers at the time showed
Oguejiofor, who reported the vehicle stolen, was the registered owner of the vehicle.
This stubborn fact also defeats any unlawful seizure claim which would require
Sgagias to show he was the owner of the vehicle which, on the face of the complaint,
he simply cannot do. 7
7 His vague due process claim also fails under the more specific provision rule. The
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, and property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. However,
the more specific provision rule informs us that “if a constitutional claim is covered
by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the
claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not
under the rubric of substantive due process.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr.,
621 F.3d 249, 260 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,
272 n.7, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 137 L. Ed. 2d 432 (1997)). Here, the plaintiff's Fourteenth
Amendment claim arises from the very same conduct upon which he bases his
malicious prosecution claims, which fall under the Fourth Amendment's protections.
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Moreover, the plaintiff’s proposed abuse of process claim also fails. As this
court has noted, “a malicious abuse of process claim lies where prosecution is
initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by
the law.” Zerby v. Waltz, No. 1:16-CV-00383, 2017 WL 386616, at *10 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 27, 2017) (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 (3d Cir. 1989)) (internal
quotations omitted). But, “[t]here is no cause of action for abuse of process if the
claimant, even with bad intentions, merely carries out the process to its authorized
conclusion.” Id., (quoting Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F. Supp. 2d 391, 404 (E.D. Pa.
2002), aff’d sub nom. Douris v. Rendell, 100 Fed. Appx. 126 (3d Cir. 2004)). Here,
the plaintiff accuses the defendants of “misus[ing] criminal process for the collateral
purpose of coercing Plaintiff to abandon his civil claims,” (Doc. 49-1, at 16), which
indicates that the initiation of the charges against him was malicious, a claim that is
encompassed by his fatally flawed malicious prosecution claim, not abuse of
process. See Zerby, 2017 WL 386616, at *10 (Holding the plaintiff’s allegations that
the detective “continued the[] prosecution to save fac[e] and in the hope that Plaintiff
would take a plea deal” demonstrated that process was carried out to its authorized
conclusion); Williams v. Fedor, 69 F. Supp. 2d 649, 673 (M.D. Pa. 1999)
In such instances, the more specific Fourth Amendment claims control, and the
general due process claim should be dismissed. See Hitner v. Alshefski, 2020 WL
3288157, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (denying Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim
based on allegations of First Amendment access-to-courts and retaliation).
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(“Examples of actions that are recoverable under the abuse of process tort are
extortion by means of attachment, execution or garnishment, and blackmail by
means of arrest or criminal prosecution.”). 8 Having found that permitting the
plaintiff to file this fourth amended complaint would be futile since his amended
claims fail as a matter of law, we will deny his motion to amend. (Doc. 49).
As to his latest motion, with regard to his request to file a fifth amended
complaint when this Court has not yet ruled on his proposed fourth amended
complaint, the plaintiff has not attached the proposed amended pleading to his
motion. Thus, his motion runs afoul of Local Rule 15.1 which requires “the proposed
amended pleading must be retyped or reprinted so that it will be complete in itself .
. . and shall be filed . . . as an attachment to the motion.” L.R. 15.1. Local Rule 15.1
serves an important and salutary purpose by enabling the district court to assess the
merits of a motion to amend in the context of the actual proposed amended complaint
tendered by the plaintiff. Therefore, a “failure to comply with Local Rule 15.1,
standing alone, justifies denial of leave to amend in the exercise of this court's
discretion.” Turner v. Wetzel, No. 3:13-CV-2680, 2015 WL 5695305, at *3 (M.D.
Pa. Sept. 28, 2015) (citing Brooks–McCollum v. Emerald Ridge Serv. Corp., 563 F.
8 The plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint also includes a count under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(b) noted as “RCRA/Environmental” but states only that “Plaintiff has issued
notice and will pursue this count once the statutory period expires.” (Doc. 49-1, at
18). This claim is unexplained and fails to state any claim for relief against any of
the named defendants.
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App'x. 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2014); Glunk v. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Med., No. 1:14-
CV-659, 2015 WL 999135, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2015)). Sgagias has not complied
with Local Rule 15.1 by providing the court with an actual copy of this proposed
fifth amended complaint. This failure to comply with the local rule and submit a
proposed amended complaint hobbles our efforts to evaluate the merits of any such
supplemental pleading in a way that is prejudicial to the efficient administration of
justice. In such circumstances, dismissal of a flawed motion to amend is entirely
appropriate, especially where we have reviewed his proposed fourth amended
complaint and concluded it is futile. Simply put, consistent with longstanding
practice in this court, Sgagias’ “failure to submit a draft amended complaint is fatal
to a request for leave to amend.” Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors,
Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Ranke v. Sanofi–Synthelabo, Inc., 436
F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 2006); Ramsgate Court Townhome Ass'n v. West Chester
Borough, 313 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2002); Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 374 (3d
Cir. 2000); Kelly v. Del. River Joint Comm'n, 187 F.2d 93, 95 (3d Cir. 1951)).
Moreover, given Sgagias’ repeated attempts, and failure, to amend and retool
his claims and defendants, in our view the best course of action at this juncture would
be for the plaintiff to move forward with the claims which previously survived the
defendants’ motion to dismiss which, in the Court’s view, are the only claims upon
which relief can be granted on the facts presented by the plaintiff.
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C. The Stay Will Be Lifted On the Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims
Finally, although we conclude the plaintiff should not be granted leave to
amend his complaint, we previously concluded, in considering the defendants’
motions to dismiss, that Sgagias’ constitutional claims against Defendant Lieutenant
Braxton Ditty and his state law tort claim of conversion against the Lieutenant and
the police department, 9 would not be dismissed but would rather be stayed pending
the outcome of Sgagias’ state criminal case. Sgagias now informs the Court that his
state 	court 	proceedings 	have 	terminated 	in 	his 	favor. 	Commonwealth 	v.
Konstantinos G. Sgagias, Docket No. CP-67-CR-0000001978-2023 (Pa. Com. Pl. –
York Cnty.). Accordingly, we will lift the stay on these proceedings and allow the
plaintiff’s constitutional and state tort claims against Defendant Ditty and his state
tort claim against the police department to proceed to discovery.
9 While the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Torts Claims Act (PSTCA) grants
broad immunity to municipalities for the intentional torts of their employees, 42 Pa.
C.S.A. §§ 8541-8564; Dull v. W. Manchester Twp. Police Dep't, 604 F. Supp. 2d
739, 754 n.10 (M.D. Pa. 2009), our sister court has held that conversion is not
necessarily an intentional tort and, depending on the circumstances, could fall within
a Tort Claims Act exception. Conner v. Borough of Eddystone, Penn., No. CIV.A.
14-06934, 2015 WL 1021363, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2015) (citing L.B. Foster Co.
v. Charles Caracciolo Steel & Metal Yard, Inc., 777 A.2d 1090, 1095 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2001); 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(2)). Accordingly, out of an abundance of caution, we
declined to outright dismiss this claim against the police department to allow briefing
on this issue once the stay is lifted.
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An appropriate order follows.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: December 23, 2025
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