Judka v. Emmel et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JEFFREY JUDKA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DENNIS EMMEL, et. al.
Defendants.
: 	NO. 1:24-CV-00531
:
:
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are motions to dismiss Plaintiff Jeffrey
Judka’s Second Amended Complaint (doc. 26) filed by Defendants Dennis
Emmel, Michael Smith, Maxine Moul, Greg Moul, Chadwell Keesee,
George Schruefer, Christopher Eberly (Individual Defendants) (doc. 27),
and Defendant Delta Cardiff Volunteer Fire Company (DCVFC) (doc. 49).
I. 	BACKGROUND 1
In 	this 	employment 	discrimination 	case, 	Judka, 	a 	volunteer
member of DCVFC and Fire Police Officer, sued DCVFC, a nonprofit fire
company in Delta, Pennsylvania, and several of its officers and firefighter
1 In considering this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual
allegations in the Complaint as true. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).
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members, the Individual Defendants. Second Amended Complaint, Doc.
26 ¶¶ 4-9.
Judka has served as a volunteer with DCVFC for over a decade. Id.
¶ 19. In 2017, Judka disclosed to some of the Individual Defendants that
he is Jewish. Id. ¶ 20. After Judka revealed his Jewish identity, he was
“subjected to a pattern of anti-Semetic remarks, ridicule, and exclusion”
by his fellow members. See id. ¶ 21. From 2017 through 2022 and 2023,
Judka objected to anti-Semetic comments and raised concerns about the
discrimination 	he 	faced. 	Id. 	¶¶ 21-22. 	In 	August 	2023, 	following 	a
disciplinary 	hearing, 	DCVFC 	suspended 	and 	demoted 	Judka. 	Id.
¶¶ 23-24.
Judka filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and on
February 13, 2024, received notice of a right to sue. Id. ¶ 14. On March
29, 2024, Judka filed a complaint against the Individual Defendants. Doc.
1. The Individual Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, doc. 8, which the
Court granted, but allowed Judka to file an amended complaint. See docs.
17, 18. Judka filed an amended complaint, adding DCVFC as a named
defendant, and the Individual Defendants again moved to dismiss. Docs.
20, 23. Before the Court could rule on that motion, Judka filed a second
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amended complaint. Doc. 26. Finding the second amended complaint
warranted, 	the 	Court 	deemed 	the 	second 	amended 	complaint 	as
operative. July 17, 2025, Order, Doc. 28.
In the second amended complaint, Judka alleges four counts: (1)
Title VII – Retaliation; (2) PHRA – Retaliation; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 –
First Amendment Retaliation; and (4) § 1983 – Due Process. Doc. 26
¶¶ 28-42. Judka brings counts three and four against the Individual
Defendants, 	and 	all 	counts 	against 	DCVFC. 	Id. 	The 	Individual
Defendants 	and 	DCVFC 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	second 	amended
complaint, docs. 27, 49, and the parties have fully briefed the motions,
docs. 31, 33, 36, 52, 56, 58.2 The parties consented to the jurisdiction of a
2 Both the Individual Defendants and DCVFC also included in their
motions to dismiss motions to strike a portion of the second amended
complaint. See Docs. 31, 52. As they highlight, paragraphs 26 and 27
discuss events that do not relate directly to Judka’s claims. See Doc. 26
¶¶ 26-27. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), the Court “may
strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous 	matter.” 	Relief 	under 	Rule 	12(f), 	however, 	is 	generally
disfavored, and will be denied unless the allegations “have no possible
relation to the controversy and may cause prejudice to one of the parties,
or if the allegations confuse the issues in the case.” Fiorentino v. Cabot
Oil & Gas Corp., 750 F. Supp. 2d 506, 509 (M.D. Pa. 2010). As these
paragraphs do not affect the outcome of the defendants’ motions to
dismiss, and finding no prejudice, the Court will deny the motions to
strike. Because the Court grants Judka leave to file a third amended
complaint, Judka is advised to plead only relevant factual allegations.
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United States Magistrate Judge to conduct all proceedings in this case,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73,
including entry of final judgment. Doc. 47. The motions to dismiss are
thus ripe for disposition.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation modified).
A 	district 	court 	must 	conduct 	a 	three-step 	analysis 	when
considering the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v.
George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must identify
“the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009). Second, the court must identify all of the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, accept them as true, and
“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
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Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The court
can discard bare legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations
that merely state the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Third, the court must
determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d
at 211, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A facially plausible claim “allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210, quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no
claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750
(3d Cir. 2005).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and,
“however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 	94 	(2007), 	quoting 	Estelle 	v. 	Gamble, 	429 	U.S. 	97, 	106 	(1976).
Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their
complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
Judka brings claims under Title VII, PHRA, and § 1983. Doc. 26
¶¶ 28-42. The Court begins with the § 1983 claims as they are alleged
against all the defendants, before turning to the Title VII and PHRA
claims, which are alleged against only DCVFC.
A. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983—State Action Requirement
The threshold issue in a § 1983 case is whether a defendant acted
under color of state law in depriving a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“The
color of state law element is a threshold issue.”). This is because § 1983
“excludes 	from 	its 	reach 	‘merely 	private 	conduct, 	no 	matter 	how
discriminatory or wrongful.’” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526
U.S. 40, 50 (1999), quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982).
All defendants argue that Judka’s § 1983 claims fail because they
did not act under color of state law to deprive Judka of his constitutional
rights. Doc. 31 at 8; Doc. 52 at 21. Judka, in opposition, argues that he
has alleged sufficient facts which “plausibly support the inference that
DCVFC operated under color of state law and exercised power derived
from state authority.” Pl.’s Br., Doc. 56 at 20-21; see also Pl.’s Br., Doc. 33
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at 3 (arguing that the Second Amended Complaint alleges that DCVFC
and Delta Borough were “structurally and operationally intertwined”).
To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, a
litigant must establish that they were deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution 	or 	laws 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	and 	that 	the 	alleged
deprivation was committed under color of state law. Sullivan, 526 U.S.
at 49-50. In § 1983 cases, “under color of law” has been “treated as the
same thing” as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.
Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995) (collecting
cases). The state action principle requires that “constitutional standards
are invoked only when it can be said that the [government] is responsible
for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. at 1141-42
(emphasis in original), citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 632 (1991). The central question, then, is whether the state is
responsible for DCVFC’s conduct in demoting and suspending Judka.
The Court finds that Judka has not alleged any facts to indicate
that DCVFC’s conduct in demoting and suspending Judka was carried
out with state authority. The only allegation that addresses the state
action requirement is a legal conclusion. See Doc. 26 ¶ 37 (“Defendants,
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acting under color of state law, retaliated against Plaintiff[.]”). The Court
must discard such bare legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Judka additionally argues that courts have “repeatedly recognized
that volunteer fire companies may qualify as state actors where they
perform delegated governmental responsibilities or are intertwined with
municipal authority.” Doc. 56 at 21. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has determined that a volunteer fire company was a state
actor under § 1983. Mark, 51 F.3d at 1148. That holding, however, was
narrowly confined to the factual circumstances of that case. Id. (“In the
circumstances, we hold that Enterprise is a state actor for purposes of
this case.”). And Mark is readily distinguishable from this case.
The plaintiff in Mark sought to recover losses from a fire, alleging
a constitutional deprivation that arose from a firefighter setting fire to
the plaintiff’s property. Id. at 1140. Under that factual circumstance, the
Mark 	court 	determined 	that 	“the 	allegation 	of 	an 	unconstitutional
deprivation 	is 	related 	directly 	to 	the 	Borough’s 	agreement 	with
Enterprise that the latter would be the official provider of fire services.”
Id. at 1144 (emphasis added). No such facts are alleged here.
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The crux of Judka’s § 1983 claim is that he was demoted and
suspended after raising concerns that he suffered discrimination for
being Jewish. Doc. 26 ¶¶ 35-42. His demotion and suspension do not even
remotely relate to the volunteer fire company’s arguable state action in
providing fire services. Because Judka has pleaded no facts to allege that
any of the defendants acted under color of state law, and DCVFC’s
provision of public services does not relate to the constitutional violation
that Judka alleges, Judka’s section 1983 claims fail at the threshold, and
will be dismissed.
B. 	Title VII and PHRA Retaliation and Discrimination
Turning to Judka’s retaliation claims under Title VII and PHRA,
the Court first addresses DCVFC’s objection that Judka’s Title VII claim
is time barred.
1. 	Judka’s Title VII claim is not time barred.
DCVFC argues that Judka’s Title VII claim is time barred for
failure to bring suit within 90 days of the receipt of EEOC’s right to sue
letter. DCVFC’s Br., Doc. 52 at 7. DCVFC contends that although Judka
filed the initial complaint within the 90-day time period, Judka did not
name DCVFC as a defendant until June 20, 2025, well beyond the 90-day
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deadline. Id. at 11. It further argues that Judka has asserted no equitable
basis for tolling. Id. at 12. In opposition, Judka argues that the operative
complaint naming DCVFC relates back to the original complaint as
DCVFC reasonably should have understood that it was an intended
defendant and that its omission in the caption was the result of a mistake
by the Plaintiff, who filed the initial complaint pro se. Pl.’s Br., Doc. 56 at
12.
To bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must file a charge of
discrimination with the EEOC and procure a notice of the right to sue.
Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 163 (3d Cir. 2013). This
procedural 	requirement 	ensures 	that 	a 	plaintiff’s 	claims 	fall 	“fairly
within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation
arising therefrom.” Id., citing Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir.
1996). Once a plaintiff procures a notice of the right to sue, if he chooses
to bring a private action, “it must be filed within 90 days of the date on
which the complainant has notice of the EEOC’s decision not to pursue
the administrative charge.” Burgh v. Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465,
470 (3d Cir. 2001), citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). The Third Circuit has
strictly construed the 90-day time limit and has held that, without an
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equitable 	basis 	for 	tolling, 	a 	civil 	suit 	filed 	“even 	one 	day 	late 	is
time-barred and may be dismissed.” Id.
Although the Third Circuit strictly construes the 90-day time limit
to file suit, Title VII “does not contain a statute of limitations applicable
to joinder.” Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs. Inc., 360 F.3d 173, 180
(3d Cir. 2004). “The Act does not address . . . whether an additional
defendant may be joined after the 90–day period has expired.” Id. And
while courts have strictly construed the 90-day limitations period against
plaintiffs who either misnamed the appropriate party in their complaint
or have otherwise entirely failed to meet the filing requirements in the
statute, those cases are “distinguishable from the litigation here where
the original complaint was timely filed.” Id.
Here, as was the case in Brzozowski, Judka has filed the initial
complaint, as DCVFC concedes, within the 90-day time period. Doc. 1;
Doc. 	52 	at 	11. 	Judka 	has, 	therefore, 	met 	Title 	VII’s 	procedural
requirement. And because Title VII does not set any time limit on joining
additional defendants once the complaint is timely filed, Rule 15(c)
relation 	back 	doctrine 	has 	no 	application 	here. 	“The 	relation 	back
provisions of Rule 15 are primarily concerned with alleviating unfair
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prejudice in circumstances involving statutes of limitations.” Brzozowski,
360 F.3d at 182. In a case where no statute of limitations applies, the
doctrine “has no controlling force.” Id.
Nonetheless, 	were 	Rule 	15(c) 	to 	apply 	here, 	Judka’s 	second
amended complaint does relate back to the date of the original pleading.
See Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 180. Under that rule, an amendment to a
complaint relates back to the date of the original pleading when: (1)
permitted by the statute of limitations applicable to the action; (2) the
claim or defense arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth in the original pleading; or (3) the amendment changes a party and
the foregoing (2) is satisfied. Id., citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). When
relation back is based on the third option, the party to be joined must also
have received notice of the suit within the 120-day period under Rule
4(m), must not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense, and should have
known that, but for a mistake in identity, the suit would have been
brought against it. Id.
Under either the second or the third factor of Rule 15(c)(3), Judka’s
second amended complaint relates back to the date of the original
pleading. The second factor is easily satisfied as Judka’s claim arises out
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of the same conduct, transaction, and occurrence set forth in the original
complaint. Docs. 1, 26. The third factor is also satisfied as the second
amended complaint adds DCVFC and the second factor is satisfied. Id.
And DCVFC knew or should have known that the suit would be brought
against it as Judka filed an EEOC charge against it and named DCVFC
in the original civil cover sheet in this case. See Doc. 1-1 at 1; Doc 1-2 at
1. Additionally, Judka served the original complaint on several DCVFC
board 	members, 	named 	as 	defendants, 	including 	the 	Company’s
President, CEO and Vice President, and Secretary, within the time
period allowed by Rule 4(m), so the company had the requisite notice.
Neither 	is 	DCVFC 	prejudiced 	in 	maintaining 	a 	defense. 	Therefore,
Judka’s Title VII claim is not time barred.
2. 	Judka has sufficiently pleaded Title VII and PHRA
retaliation claims.
Having determined that Judka’s Title VII claim is not time barred,
the Court examines whether Judka’s retaliation claims under Title VII
and PHRA survive the motions to dismiss. 3
3 The Court addresses retaliation claims under Title VII and PHRA
together as they fall under the same analytical framework. Qin v. Vertex,
Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2024). As DCVFC acknowledges (doc. 52
at 13), so long as the Court has original jurisdiction over the civil action,
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DCVFC argues that Judka fails to plead sufficient facts to support
his retaliation claims. Doc. 52 at 13. It asserts that Judka fails to
“establish 	a 	prima 	facie 	case” 	of 	retaliation 	because 	he 	fails 	to
demonstrate a causal connection between his objections to discriminatory
conduct and subsequent demotion and suspension. Id. at 13-14. DCVFC’s
argument starts on the wrong foot.
At the pleading stage, a plaintiff is not “required to establish a
prima facie case.” Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 791 (3d
Cir. 2016); Gavura v. Pa. State House of Reps., 55 F. App’x 60, 65 (3d Cir.
2002) (“McDonnell Douglas standard is an evidentiary standard, not a
pleading requirement.”). To plead a retaliation claim, Judka must allege
sufficient facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of the following elements: (1) he engaged in conduct
protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse action against him;
and (3) a causal link exists between his protected conduct and the
employer’s adverse action. Connelly, 809 F.3d at 789. Judka’s factual
the Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state PHRA claim,
which arises from the same case and controversy. See Burgh, 251 F.3d at
469 (“The District Court had original federal question jurisdiction over
the Title VII claim, . . . and supplemental jurisdiction over the PHRA
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).”).
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allegations raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of these three elements.
To begin with, DCVFC concedes the first two elements and only
challenges whether Judka has sufficiently pleaded causality. See Doc. 52
at 14 (“Moving Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff engaged in
protected activity . . . . Further, it is not disputed that a suspension and
demotion are . . . adverse employment actions.”).
As for causality, Judka has pleaded that throughout 2022 and 2023,
he 	raised 	concerns 	about 	discriminatory 	practices. 	Doc. 	26 	¶ 22.
Following 	his 	protected 	activity 	in 	raising 	concerns 	about 	the
discrimination he faced, DCVFC conducted a disciplinary hearing in 2023
and 	took 	the 	adverse 	employment 	action 	against 	Judka. 	Id. 	¶ 23.
Although Judka did not allege a detailed date of when he last made
complaints about the discrimination, at this stage, he is not required to
plead “detailed factual allegations.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008), quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “In any
case, 	the 	question 	of 	temporal 	proximity 	does 	not 	render 	[Judka’s]
retaliation 	claim 	facially 	implausible.” 	Connelly, 	809 	F.3d 	at 	792.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Judka has alleged facts that could
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support 	a 	reasonable 	inference 	of 	a 	causal 	connection 	between 	his
protected 	activity 	throughout 	2022 	and 	2023 	and 	the 	adverse
employment action in August 2023. See id. at 793.
Accordingly, the Court will deny the motion to dismiss as to both
the Title VII and PHRA claims.
3. 	Religious Discrimination Claim
In his brief in opposition to DCVFC’s motion to dismiss, Judka
argues, apparently for the first time, that he has alleged a religious
discrimination claim and that by failing to address it, DCVFC has
forfeited any arguments on this claim. Doc. 56 at 15-16. Indeed, DCVFC
has not made any argument against Judka’s religious discrimination
claim. See Doc. 52. But Judka did not include a religious discrimination
claim in his causes of action in the second amended complaint. See Doc.
26. The only causes of action he has alleged are the § 1983 claims, and
Title VII and PHRA retaliation claims, discussed above. See id. ¶¶ 28-42
(alleging four causes of action which do not include a claim of religious
discrimination).
Judka, however, was proceeding pro se at the time he filed the
operative complaint and did state in the introductory paragraph that he
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“brings this civil rights action . . . for religious discrimination in violation
of Title VII[.]” Doc. 26 at 2. But that statement alone helps neither
DCVFC nor the Court as there are several different theories of liability
for religion-based discrimination available under Title VII, including
disparate treatment and impact, and hostile work environment. And the
evidence required to prevail on a religious discrimination claim under
Title VII depends upon the theory of liability, and on the facts of a
particular case. Korman v. Settlers Hosp. Grp., LLC, No. 22-1579, 2024
WL 5430600, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2024), citing Jones v. Sch. Dist. of
Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 411 (3d Cir. 1999), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 22-1579, 2025 WL 608628 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2025). Given
the lack of specificity regarding what type of religious discrimination
claim Judka intended to bring, and the lack of specific factual allegations
regarding 	such 	a 	claim, 	the 	Court 	cannot 	construe 	the 	operative
complaint to include such a claim, even under the generous standards
applicable to a pro se complaint. To do so would necessarily require a
finding that DCVFC had sufficient notice of such a claim and should have
addressed it in its motion to dismiss.
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Because Judka was proceeding pro se when he filed the second
amended complaint, the Court will grant Judka leave to file a third
amended complaint to allow him an opportunity to fully plead any
potential claims of religious discrimination if he wishes to do so and to
cure, if possible, the deficiencies in the § 1983 claims noted above.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss, doc. 27,
is granted in its entirety, and DCVFC’s motion to dismiss, doc. 49, is
granted 	in 	part 	and 	denied 	in 	part. 	The 	plaintiff 	may 	amend 	his
complaint, but if he does not do so, the only claims that will go forward
are the Title VII and PHRA Retaliation claims against DCVFC. An
appropriate order follows.
Date: January 21, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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