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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RICHARD GERENZA,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, 1
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
: 	NO. 1:24-CV-00154
:
:
:
: 	(CAMONI, M.J.)
:
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking
judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff Richard Gerenza’s claim for disability and disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court
has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3)
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference). For the reasons stated
herein, the Court affirms the decision of the commissioner.
1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on
May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Frank Bisignano should be substituted as the defendant in
this suit. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason
of the last sentence of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
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I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
On February 22, 2022, Gerenza applied for disability benefits,
alleging disability beginning March 18, 2020. Transcript, Doc. 10-5 at 2.
Following an initial denial, Gerenza submitted an appeal, requesting a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Doc. 10-4 at 19. The
ALJ conducted the hearing and determined that Gerenza is not disabled.
Doc. 10-2 at 25, 40.
Gerenza filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision, which the
Appeals Council denied. Id. at 2. The ALJ’s decision, therefore, became
the final decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Pending
before this Court is Gerenza’s action seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision. Complaint, Doc. 1. This case is fully briefed
(docs. 11, 13, 14) and ripe for resolution. The parties consented to the
jurisdiction 	of 	a 	United 	States 	Magistrate 	Judge 	to 	conduct 	all
proceedings in this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 73, including entry of final judgment. Consent Form,
Doc. 7.
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B. 	The Disability Determination Process
To receive disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“Act”),
a claimant must be unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable . . . impairment which can . . .
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Under the Act, a claimant is disabled “only if his . . . impairments are of
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in
any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy.” 	§ 423(d)(2)(A). 	An 	impairment 	is 	one 	that 	“results 	from
anatomical, 	physiological, 	or 	psychological 	abnormalities 	which 	are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” § 423(d)(3).
Social 	Security 	regulations 	provide 	a 	“five-step 	sequential
evaluation process” to determine if a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through
step four, while at step five, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show
that the claimant can perform substantial gainful employment other
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than the claimant’s past relevant work. Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d
1178, 1181 (3d Cir. 1992), citing Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(1987)).
At the first step, the claimant must establish that he has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset of the alleged
disability. See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At the second step, claimant must
establish that he suffers from a “severe medically determinable . . .
impairment that meets the duration requirement . . . (“impairment . . .
must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of at
least 12 months”).” § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the claimant
must provide evidence that his impairment “meets or equals one of our
listings in appendix 1.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant demonstrates
his impairments meet those listings, he is considered to be disabled. See
id.; § 404.1520(d). If he cannot establish severity of impairment at the
third step, the eligibility analysis proceeds to step four in which the ALJ
determines whether the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
allows 	the 	claimant 	to 	continue 	his 	previous 	employment.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). RFC “is the most [a claimant] can still do despite”
impairments. 	§ 404.1545(a)(1). 	To 	prevail 	on 	step 	four, 	claimant’s
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“impairment(s) must prevent [him] from doing . . . past relevant work.”
§ 404.1520(f). At the fifth step, the Commissioner bears the burden to
demonstrate that the claimant’s RFC and his “age, education, and work
experience . . . [allows] adjustment to other work.” § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If
the Commissioner cannot satisfy this burden, the claimant’s claim is
granted. See § 404.1520(g).
C. 	The ALJ’s Decision
Here, the ALJ determined that Gerenza “has not been under a
disability, . . . from March 18, 2020, through the date of this decision.”
Doc. 10-2 at 25. 	The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding
through the five-step sequential analysis required by the Social Security
Act. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); see Doc. 10-2 at 13-25.
At step one, the ALJ determined that Gerenza “has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since March 18, 2020, the alleged onset date,”
of disability. Doc. 10-2 at 13. At step two, the ALJ found that Gerenza
has the following severe impairments: bipolar I disorder; schizoaffective
disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; and major depressive disorder. Id.
at 13. At step three, the ALJ determined that Gerenza “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
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equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in” 20 C.F.R. part
404, subpart P, appendix 1. Id. at 14.
Between steps three and four, the ALJ found that Gerenza has the
following RFC:
[T]o perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but
with the following non-exertional limitations: the claimant
could understand, retain, and carry out simple instructions
with occasional workplace changes. He would be capable of
occasional 	decision-making 	with 	respect 	to 	work 	related
activities. He should avoid interaction with the public, except
for 	incidental 	contact, 	such 	as 	providing 	directions 	to 	a
restroom or a department in a larger facility. He could engage
in occasional interaction with co-workers and supervisors, but
should avoid occupations that involve group, team, or tandem
work activities.
Id. at 16.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Gerenza “is unable to
perform any past relevant work.” Id. at 23. At the fifth and final step, the
ALJ denied Gerenza’s disability claims because, after considering his
“age, education, work experience, and [RFC], there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can
perform.” Id. at 24.
D. 	Issues on Appeal
Gerenza raises two issues on appeal:
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(1) 	Whether the ALJ erred by creating a deficient RFC that
did 	not 	account 	for 	the 	moderate 	limitations 	in
concentration, persistence, and pace, that the ALJ found
were present?
(2) 	Whether the ALJ erred by failing to resolve an apparent
conflict between the reasoning level requirements of the
jobs he found that Plaintiff can perform at step five and
Plaintiff’s limitation to “understand, retain, and carry
out simple instructions”?
Pl.’s Br., Doc. 11 at 12. In essence, Gerenza argues that the ALJ failed:
(1) to properly determine Gerenza’s RFC limitations; and (2) to properly
identify jobs that align with the RFC determination. See id. at 10, 13. The
Court, adhering to the deferential standard of review outlined below,
affirms the decision of the Commissioner.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision denying a claimant’s
application for benefits, the Court is limited to determining whether the
findings 	of 	the 	final 	decision-maker 	are 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence 	in 	the 	record. See 42 	U.S.C. 	§ 1383(c)(3) 	(incorporating 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) by reference); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d
198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D.
Pa. 2012). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court examines an
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existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient
evidence 	to 	support 	the 	agency’s 	factual 	determinations. 	Biestek 	v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019). Substantial evidence does not mean a
large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 103; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565
(1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence
but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ
ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by
the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an
adequately developed factual record, however, substantial evidence may
be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent
[the 	ALJ’s 	decision] 	from 	being 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “In
determining if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v.
Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). In reviewing the
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record for substantial evidence, “[n]either the district court nor [the Third
Circuit] is empowered to weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions
for those of the fact-finder.” Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. To reverse the
ALJ’s findings and decision, the Court “must find that the evidence not
only 	supports 	[a 	contrary] 	conclusion 	but 	compels 	it.” 	Immigr. 	&
Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992).
The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether Gerenza is
disabled, but whether the Commissioner’s finding that Gerenza is not
disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based
upon a correct application of the relevant law. See Arnold v. Colvin, No.
12-2417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been
held 	that 	an 	ALJ’s 	errors 	of 	law 	denote 	a 	lack 	of 	substantial
evidence.”); Burton 	v. 	Schweiker, 	512 	F. 	Supp. 	913, 	914 	(W.D. 	Pa.
1981) (“The [Commissioner]’s determination as to the status of a claim
requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright
v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of
review on legal matters is plenary); Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“[T]he
court 	has 	plenary 	review 	of 	all 	legal 	issues 	decided 	by 	the
Commissioner.”). In determining that question, the Court must evaluate
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whether the ALJ’s decision meets the burden of articulation necessary to
enable judicial review; that is, the ALJ must articulate the reasons for
his decision beyond stating bare conclusions. Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Gerenza challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination on two grounds:
(1) the ALJ deficiently crafted his RFC by failing to account “for the
moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace that the
ALJ found were present at step three;” and (2) the ALJ failed to resolve
a conflict between the ALJ’s RFC determination which limited Gerenza
to “understand, retain, and carry out simple instructions,” with the jobs
the vocational expert provided. Doc. 11 at 13, 16. The Court addresses
each argument in turn.
A. 	The 	ALJ’s 	RFC 	determination 	is 	supported 	by
substantial evidence.
In Hess v. Commissioner Social Security, 931 F.3d 198, 208 (3d Cir.
2019), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit confronted a nearly
identical argument and factual circumstances as those presented here.
Applying Hess, the Court finds that Gerenza’s first argument fails.
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1. 	Functional limitation findings do not require particular
language to appear in the statement of the limitation.
Gerenza contends that the “RFC does not contain any limitations
accounting for moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, and
pace.” Doc. 11 at 13; see Pl.’s Reply Br., Doc. 14 at 3 (“ALJ . . . did not
appear to include any corresponding limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC.”). But
the ALJ need not add specific words from a step three finding to his RFC
determination.
In Hess, the Third Circuit held that RFC “functional limitation
findings do not require particular language to appear in the statement of
the limitation.” 931 F.3d at 208 (citation modified). The 	Hess 	court
explained:
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, social security
regulations permit, and indeed require, an ALJ to offer “a
narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports
each” limitation at step four of the disability analysis. That
suggests a wide range of limitation language is permissible,
regardless of what the ALJ found at earlier steps of the
analysis, 	so 	long 	as 	the 	chosen 	limitation 	language 	is
explained.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added), quoting SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 375184, at *7.
The test, therefore, is not whether the ALJ directly references the
language of the “moderate limitation” found at step three in the RFC
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assessment 	or 	in 	the 	hypotheticals 	posed 	to 	the 	vocational 	expert.
Instead, the ALJ’s step three findings “need only be ‘adequately conveyed’
in the ALJ’s statement of the limitation, not recited verbatim.” Id. at 210,
citing Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546, 552, 554 (3d Cir. 2004). Here,
the ALJ’s step three findings were adequately conveyed in the statement
of the limitation through the ALJ’s “narrative discussion describing how
the evidence supports each” limitation. Doc. 10-2 at 16; Hess, 931 F.3d at
209.
2. 	By 	providing 	a 	valid 	explanation, 	the 	ALJ 	has
adequately conveyed Gerenza’s moderate difficulties in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
Gerenza tries to distinguish Hess by arguing that the ALJ in this
case failed to provide a valid explanation. Doc. 14 at 4. Specifically,
Gerenza argues that the ALJ only provided “a conclusory statement”
which “is insufficient to review why the ALJ believed that this [RFC]
limitation 	accommodated 	Plaintiff’s 	moderate 	impairment 	in
functioning.” Id. The ALJ here provided a valid explanation.
The Third Circuit in Hess evaluated an ALJ’s RFC analysis to hold
that an RFC limitation “to jobs requiring understanding, remembering,
and carrying out only simple instructions . . . was supported by a valid
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explanation.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 215. The Hess court found that the ALJ
provided a valid explanation by reviewing and explaining that the RFC
limitation was consistent with the claimant’s: (1) self-reported activities
of daily living; (2) progress notes from treating and examining sources;
and (3) mental status examinations and reports. Id. at 214. Like the ALJ
in Hess, the ALJ in this case has fully conducted a “meticulous analysis
of the record,” providing a detailed explanation. Id.
First, the ALJ reviewed Gerenza’s self-reported activities of daily
living, referencing Gerenza’s hearing testimony. Doc. 10-2 at 16. The ALJ
noted the difficulties in concentration, discussing Gerenza’s ability to
read for short periods, his experiences with fatigue in the morning hours,
and 	anxiety 	around 	people. 	Id. 	The 	ALJconcluded, 	however, 	that
Gerenza’s self-reported limitations were “not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Id. at 17.
Second, 	the 	ALJ 	examined 	progress 	notes 	from 	treating 	and
examining sources, which consistently showed that Gerenza had intact
memory, attention, and concentration, see id. at 17-20, leading the ALJ
to conclude that the “record does not support extending any greater
limitation . . . or support finding that the claimant would have any
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marked or extreme limitations under the paragraph B [step three]
criteria.” 	Id. 	at 21. And third, the mental status examinations and
reports 	likewise 	demonstrated 	intact 	memory, 	attention, 	and
concentration. Id. at 17 (normal speech, thought and intact memory,
attention and concentration); id. at 18 (alert and oriented, good memory);
id. at 19 (normal attention, alert and oriented); id. at 20 (attention,
concentration, and memory intact).
Thus, Contrary to Gerenza’s contention that the ALJ only provided
“a conclusory statement” (doc. 14 at 4), the ALJ, after reviewing “all the
evidence 	of 	record, 	including 	the 	claimant’s 	history 	of 	inpatient
hospitalizations 	and 	subsequent 	improvement 	with 	medication
management, and the generally consistent and normal findings from
outpatient mental status examinations,” concluded that Gerenza can
“perform unskilled work within the [RFC limitation].” Doc. 10-2 at 21.
Under Hess, therefore, the ALJ’s explanation is valid. 931 F.3d at 214-15.
Granting Gerenza’s requested relief, under these circumstances, would
be akin to requiring the ALJ to “chant every magic word correctly,” in the
RFC 	statement 	of 	limitation. 	Id. 	at 	200, 	quoting 	United 	States 	v.
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Hickman, 	991 	F.2d 	1110, 	1115 	(3d 	Cir. 	1993). 	The 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence.
B. 	There is no conflict between the RFC assessment and
the jobs identified by the vocational expert.
Gerenza next argues that the ALJ’s RFC limitation to “understand,
retain, and carry out simple instructions,” is inconsistent with the jobs
the ALJ identified at step five which “all had reasoning level of 2.” Doc.
11 at 16. Gerenza contends that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles
defines 	reasoning 	level 	two 	as 	the 	ability 	to 	apply 	commonsense
understanding to carry out “detailed but uninvolved written or oral
instructions,” which conflicts with the ALJ’s RFC limitation that Gerenza
could perform only simple instructions. Id. at 16-17. Gerenza’s analysis
is incorrect.
The Third Circuit has recognized that while a claimant who is
limited to “very short and simple instructions” or “short and simple
instructions” cannot perform jobs identified at reasoning level two, a
claimant, like Gerenza, who is only limited to “simple instructions” can.
Money v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that
jobs at reasoning level two does not contradict the mandate that work be
simple, routine, and repetitive); see also Lawrence v. Saul, 941 F.3d 140,
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143 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding no conflict between an RFC to carry out
simple instructions and jobs that require reasoning level two). Because
Gerenza is limited to “simple instructions” rather than “very short and
simple” 	or 	“short 	and 	simple 	instructions,” 	the 	jobs 	that 	the 	ALJ
identified at step five which require reasoning level two are consistent
with the RFC limitation. Substantial evidence, therefore, supports the
ALJ’s decision at step five.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED.
An appropriate order follows.
Date: January 5, 2026 	s/Sean A. Camoni
Sean A. Camoni
United States Magistrate Judge
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