Harris v. Taurasi et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CORNELIUS E. HARRIS, 	: 	CIV. NO. 1:23-CV-1974
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	(Judge Wilson)
:
v. 	: 	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
:
LEE ANN TAURASI, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Factual and Procedural Background
This pro se civil rights action stems from a demonstrably contentious and
acrimonious divorce and custody arrangement between the plaintiff, Cornelius
Harris, and his ex-wife, Priscilla Harris. Harris’ original complaint, (Doc. 1), alleged
that several law enforcement defendants, specifically Detective Lee Ann Taurasi,
brought a false charge of False Reports of Child Abuse against him in 2017. (Doc. 1,
⁋ 4). In the original complaint, Harris alleged that Detective Taurasi conspired with
his ex-wife Priscilla Harris, Ms. Harris’ attorneys in Maryland, who were not named
in this complaint, and Ms. Harris’ mother, Dyann Dagadu, with the purpose of
keeping him from attending his custody and divorce hearing and trial in Maryland.1
1 Priscilla Harris and Dyann Dagadu have since been dismissed from this action.
(Doc. 59).
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(Id.) His complaint averred that Detective Taurasi filed a false affidavit of probable
cause which caused him to be arrested and charged with False Reports of Child Abuse
and spend two months in jail before being released on bail. (Doc. 1, ⁋⁋ 5-6). He was
ultimately found not guilty at trial. (Doc. 1-1). Along with Defendant Taurasi, Harris’
original complaint named several other Susquehanna Township police officers, as
well as Judicial and County Defendants who were dismissed from this action with
prejudice. (Doc. 36). He alleged the defendants’ actions violated his constitutional
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various other civil and criminal statutes. At
various points in his original complaint Harris also alleged that the defendants
engaged in race, gender, and religious discrimination, harassment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, dereliction of duties, negligence, and slander. (Doc. 1).
On October 28, 2024, we recommended Harris’ complaint be dismissed,
without prejudice, as to all claims against the law enforcement defendants except the
false arrest and malicious prosecution claims he lodged against Detective Taurasi.
(Doc. 60). The district court adopted the report and recommendation on August 20,
2025, allowing the plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 66).
On September 16, 2025, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which is now the
operative pleading in this case. (Doc. 69). The plaintiff has pared down the defendants
in his amended complaint, naming Detective Taurasi, Officers Nelson, Kauffman,
Reitheimer, and Chief Robert Martin. (Id., at 2). The amended complaint is a civil
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complaint form which provides very little information regarding Harris’ factual
allegations and simply refers us back to his original complaint for more details. The
allegations in the amended complaint state only:
False Arrest and charges. Child Endangerment (Defendants). False
Arrest and charges daughter on multiple occasions was abused and
injured validated by state of MD child protective services investigation
which defendants dismissed and failed my daughter. Excessive bail
imposed for 2nd degree misdemeanor. Falsifying document based on
racism. Multiple calls and [illegible] with Susquehanna Township
Police Dept. See Original Complaint.
. . .
Due to conspiracy of Susquehanna Police Dept, judge, wife’s attorney,
wife’s mother, wife’s attorneys I missed my custody hearing. For the
past 5 years my daughter was moved to PA from MD hurting her and
my relationship as the bible and law states. See Original Complaint.
(Id., at 5). Thus, the amended complaint provides only general allegations without
any factual detail and does not identify any of the defendants or their actions within
the statement of facts. Instead, the plaintiff seemingly relies upon his original
complaint to state his cause of action. However, in following this course Harris runs
afoul of a settled legal tenet. As a matter of law, an amended complaint takes the
place 	of 	any 	prior 	complaint, 	effectively 	invalidating 	the 	prior 	complaint.
Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co. (In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co.),
226 F.3d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[A]n amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the
original and renders it of no legal effect"); see 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
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Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure ' 1476 (2d ed. 1990) ("A
pleading that has been amended Y supersedes the pleading it modifiesY. Once an
amended pleading is interposed, the original pleading no longer performs any
function in the caseY."). Therefore, it is incumbent upon Harris to set forth any well-
pleaded allegations in a single, coherent and comprehensive amended complaint.
On September 30, 2025, the remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the plaintiff’s amended complaint and on October 14, 2025, they filed a brief in
support of their motion. (Docs. 72, 73). The plaintiff has not responded to this motion
to dismiss and the deadline for responding has now passed. Therefore, given the
plaintiff’s inaction, this case will be deemed ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, we recommend the motion to dismiss be
granted.
II. 	Discussion
A. Motion to Dismiss—Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for
the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for legal
sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
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has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court,
stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards
have 	seemingly 	shifted 	from 	simple 	notice 	pleading 	to 	a 	more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the
possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a
plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than
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labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions
will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Id.
In 	keeping 	with 	the 	principles 	of 	Twombly, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which
relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss,
a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the
Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a
review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts
that they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations
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sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the
factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District
Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but
may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then
determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to
show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In other words,
a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
As the Court of Appeals has observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1861, 182 L.Ed.2d 644 (2012).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-
step analysis: “First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
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to state a claim.’ Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify
allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ Id.” Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,
attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,
268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s]
that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims
are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White
Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose
contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but
which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002); see also U.S. Express
Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a]lthough a
district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without
converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary judgment”). However, the court
may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss, or when
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determining whether a proposed amended complaint is futile because it fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien &
Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
It is against these legal guideposts that we assess the sufficiency of Harris’
claims.
B. The Complaint Violates Rule 8.
At the outset, dismissal of this amended complaint is warranted because this
pleading fails to comply with Rule 8’s basic injunction that, “[a] pleading that states
a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that
each averment be ‘concise, and direct.’” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F. App’ x
221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1)). Thus, when a complaint is
“illegible or incomprehensible”, id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy
length, but it is also largely unintelligible”, Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App’x 785,
787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly
appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F.App ’x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New
Jersey State Superior Court, 260 F.App ’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos, 236
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F.App’x at 787; Scibelli, 219 F.App’ x at 222; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents,
431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005).
Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants
having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],”
Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when
the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441
F.App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “those cases in
which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible
that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Id. at 110 (quoting Simmons v.
Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1995) (quotations omitted); see also Tillio v.
Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App'x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, a complaint may be
dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be
understood. See, e.g., Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 F. App ’x 205 (3d Cir.
2010); Moss v. United States, 329 F. App'x 335 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing illegible
complaint); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App’x 431 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing complaint
where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”);
Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., CIV.A. 05-5509 (MLC), 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar.
22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of mostly-
illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, CIV.A.06-0130, 2006
WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing illegible complaint).
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Here, while the plaintiff’s amended complaint is concise, it is bereft of well-
pleaded facts and instead refers the reader to the original complaint to discern the
factual allegations which form the cause of action. This runs afoul of the well-settled
principal that, “[i]n general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading
and renders the original pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended
complaint becomes the operative pleading.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69,
82 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing W. Run Student Hous. Assocs., LLC v. Huntington Nat'l
Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013); Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 220 (3d
Cir. 2017); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2019)).
On this score, it is well-settled that “liberal construction of a pro se amended
complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded pleadings.”
Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App'x 173, 175 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2019), Thus, Harris cannot
save this facially deficient pleading through the expedient of referring generally to
other filings which are now legal nullities. Here, the amended complaint itself, the
operative pleading, does not identify the parties or the specific factual allegations
against them but instead refers back to the original complaint. Thus, standing alone,
the plaintiff’s amended complaint is “so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise
unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised,” Tillio, 441 F. App’x
109, and “left the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed
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constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2011). Therefore,
the plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed.
C. Under The Rules of This Court This Defense Motion Should Be
Deemed Unopposed and Granted.
In addition to the flaws which compel dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims, under
the Local Rules of this Court the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in this motion,
since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motion or otherwise litigate this
case. This procedural default completely frustrates and impedes efforts to resolve this
matter in a timely and fair fashion, and under the rules of this Court warrants
dismissal of the action, since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an
affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary
judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after
service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not
required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the
motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not
to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit
the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the
prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement,
together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation,
shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant=s
brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
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In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules by filing a timely
response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel
the court to consider:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that the Federal
Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve
cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires
that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a
timely fashion.
Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v.
American Bd. Of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998)).
With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of
our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and
impose the sanctions mandated by the rules when such rules are repeatedly breached,
“would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our
system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever
possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed
before the court in a timely fashion.’” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one
party’s refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to
those parties who follow the rules.
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to
comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to this motion to dismiss.
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This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 and deem
the motion to be unopposed.
D. Dismissal of this Case Is Also Warranted Under Rule 41.
In addition, Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a
court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff
fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may
move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Decisions
regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of
the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v.
Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion,
however, while broad is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis
factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in
dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of
the 	following 	factors: 	(1) 	the 	extent 	of 	the 	party’s 	personal
responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure
to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).
Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
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In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula’ that we apply to
determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure
to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis
factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation’ to determine whether
a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff’s case.” Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).
Consistent with this view, it is well settled that 	“‘no single Poulis factor is
dispositive,’ [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in
order to dismiss a complaint.’” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d
218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the
broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing
these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders
where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not
amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v.
Mendelsohn, 256 F. App’x 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256
F. App’x 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x
728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily
in favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis
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factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, shows that the failure to
respond is entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has failed to address this
outstanding motion to dismiss.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor— the prejudice to the adversary caused by
the failure to prosecute—also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this factor is
entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight
in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of
N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74
(3d 	Cir. 	1994) 	(internal 	quotation 	marks 	and 	citation 	omitted).
Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the
inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and
possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing
party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). . . .
However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable”
harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d
Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Fidelity Ins. Co.,
843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden
imposed by impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and
complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.
Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60. In this case, the plaintiff’s failure to litigate this claim
now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. The defendants suffer
particular prejudice here, where the claims against most of the defendants in this
case have previously been found meritless yet these defendants must continue to
defend against the plaintiff’s renewed, yet undeveloped, claims in his amended
complaint. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff’s
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continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the
trial judge. Tillio, 256 F. App’x 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels
dismissal); Reshard, 256 F. App’x 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels
dismissal); 	Azubuko, 	243 	F. 	App’x 	728 	(failure 	to 	file 	amended 	complaint
prejudices defense and compels dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor—the history of dilatoriness on the
plaintiff’s part—it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In
this regard, it is clear that “‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes
a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . . , or consistent tardiness
in complying with court orders.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29
F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff, clearly aware of the
deadlines prescribed by the local rules, has let nearly a month pass without
addressing the core issues raised by the motion to dismiss.2 Thus, the plaintiff’s
conduct plainly displays “[e]xtensive . . delay,” favoring dismissal. Adams, 29 F.3d
at 874.
2 Moreover, the plaintiff has a history of noncompliance with the local rules in
opposing motions to dismiss. In responding to two separate motions to dismiss his
original complaint, the plaintiff filed a single brief, apparently opposing both
motions, one day after the motions were filed and before the brief in support of the
County Defendants’ motion to dismiss was filed. The plaintiff then did not file
another brief in opposition, but the Court broadly construed his single brief as
opposing both motions rather than finding him in violation of the rules.
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The fourth Poulis factor—whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was
willful or in bad faith—also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we
must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in
that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere
negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has continued
to name these defendants yet failed to include any factual allegations against them
and then has failed to respond to their motion to dismiss, we are compelled to
conclude that the plaintiff’s actions are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but
instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of
sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such
as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with
the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See,
e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such
a situation where the plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability
of the Court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses
in an orderly fashion. Thus, this factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the
meritoriousness of the plaintiff’s claims. In our view, however, consideration of this
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factor cannot save this particular plaintiff’s claims since the plaintiff is now wholly
noncompliant with the local rules. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply with the
rules which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims and then
assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for declining to dismiss the
case. Furthermore, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,’ [and
it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a
complaint.’” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964
F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the noncompliant plaintiff’s claims,
standing alone, cannot prevent dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute.
In any event, the Court has previously concluded that the majority of these
claims, which Cornelius Harris has chosen not to defend, fail on their merits.3
Indeed, the plaintiff’s amended complaint is completely bereft of any factual
allegations against the numerous previously dismissed law enforcement defendants.
Moreover, while this Court, out of an abundance of caution, previously allowed
Harris’ claims against Detective Taurasi to proceed to consider whether probable
cause existed to initiate his original arrest, his amended complaint now wholly fails
to allege any facts which would implicate this defendant in any wrongdoing.
3 Indeed, in considering Harris’ original complaint, we similarly found his unwieldy
and unfocused pleading violated Rule 8.
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Therefore, without any clear cause of action against any of the named defendants,
this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
Simply put, all of the Poulis factors now favor dismissal of this case.
Accordingly, we recommend this complaint be dismissed.
III. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the
defendants’ motion to dismiss, (Doc. 72), be GRANTED, and this case be
DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or 	recommendations 	made 	by 	the 	magistrate 	judge. 	The 	judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses, 	or 	recommit 	the 	matter 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	with
instructions.
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Submitted this 12 th day of November 2025.
S/ Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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