Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIGUEL HERNANDEZ OJEDA,
v.
JAMISON, J.L., et al.
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CIVIL ACTION
No. 26-7628
MEMORANDUM
Judge Juan R. Sánchez October 14, 2026
Petitioner Miguel Hernandez Ojeda brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his detention by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
He argues his current detention violates his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment
because Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials did not make an individualized
custody determination. Additionally, he argues his warrantless arrest violates the INA and violates
the regulations set out in 8 C.F.R. § 236. The Government asserts Mr. Hernandez Ojeda is lawfully
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) in accordance with the Third Circuit’s ruling in Buele
Morocho v. Warden Philadelphia FDC, No. 26-1150, 2026 WL 2546223 (3d Cir. Aug 28, 2026).
Additionally, the Government argues Mr. Hernandez Ojeda was arrested without a warrant
pursuant to U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2), and that his claims are not cognizable in habeas.
The Government seeks to relitigate issues this Court previously decided in Dos Reis v.
McShane, No. 26-3775, 2026 WL 1746649 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2026). Because this Court has
already determined § 1226(a) requires an individualized custody determination, and because there
is no indication ICE did so here, the Court will grant his petition. Additionally, the Court agrees
with Petitioner that a warrant was required before ICE could arrest him under Section 1226(a) of
the INA. Because ICE officials lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Hernandez Ojeda without a
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warrant, arrest was not authorized under Section 1357(a)(2) either, and this Court may also grant
relief on that ground. Accordingly, this Court will order Mr. Hernandez Ojeda’s immediate release.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Hernandez Ojeda has resided in Norristown, Pennsylvania since 2009. Pet. ¶ 18, ECF
No. 1. He has four minor children, all of whom are United States citizens. Id. Prior to the arrest
that led to this petition, has had no previous interactions with immigration enforcement, and he
has no criminal history in the United States or otherwise. Id. ¶ 19; Gov’t’s Ex. D, ECF No. 4-4.
On October 1, 2026, Mr. Hernandez Ojeda was at the garage where he works as a mechanic
when four armed ICE officials entered the premises with guns aimed at him. Pet. ¶ 20. The officers
told Mr. Hernandez Ojeda to put his hands up, grabbed him, and threw him to the ground, injuring
his chin and shoulder. Id. ¶ 20. They placed him in handcuffs, without asking him any questions,
and took his phone and wallet from his pockets. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. After approximately ten minutes,
they lifted him from the ground and placed him in an ICE vehicle. Id. ¶ 21. ICE officers then
drove him to a parking lot in Conshohocken where they shackled his waist and feet. Id. They did
not present him with a warrant during the encounter. Id. Mr. Hernandez Ojeda is currently detained
at the Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Philadelphia.
Mr. Hernandez Ojeda filed a habeas petition on October 5, 2026 seeking a writ of habeas
corpus directing the government to immediately release him. Pet. 26, ECF No. 1. He argues his
arrest and detention without a warrant or any individualized custody determination violates due
process. The Government detained Mr. Hernandez Ojeda under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which it argues
gives the Government discretion to detain an individual who has been charged as removable.
Gov’t’s Resp. 3, ECF No. 4. The Government argues there are no constraints on its discretion to
detain a noncitizen pursuant to § 1226(a), and so it may arbitrarily stop and detain individuals
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suspected of being inadmissible or deportable without any individualized determination. Further,
the Government argues Mr. Hernandez Ojeda cannot seek relief in this Court, but instead he must
exhaust administrative remedies by seeking relief through an administrative custody
redetermination. Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal district court may grant habeas relief to a petitioner who is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Habeas is “regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context.”
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001). A petitioner seeking habeas relief has the burden to
demonstrate that they are being detained in violation of the Constitution or federal law. See Walker
v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286–87 (1941).
Habeas petitioners are normally required to exhaust administrative remedies. See Callwood
v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 1996). However, exhaustion may be excused when it would
be futile or where “the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or
constitutional rights.” See Lyons v. U.S. Marshals, 840 F. 2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988). 1 This Court
1 The Government acknowledges Petitioner cannot attend his scheduled bond hearing while
detained at FDC Philadelphia because that facility does not facilitate virtual hearings for ICE
detainees. A remedy that exists only if ICE elects to make it accessible is not an available remedy
Petitioner must exhaust. See Dos Reis, 2026 WL 1746649 at *3 (citing Gowen v. Winfield, 130
F.4th 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2025), in which the court concluded that, “in the context of the PLRA, an
administrative remedy is considered unavailable if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was
prevented from availing himself of it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Although courts in this district are divided on this issue, several judges in this district have
agreed that exhaustion is excused in cases such as this. See Sagbay v. Jamison, No. 26-cv-7265,
2026 WL 2875765 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2026) (Rufe, J.); Dzehtisarou v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-5060,
2026 WL 2211392 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2026) (Rufe, J.); Hernandez v. Blanche, No. 26-6195, 2026
WL 2569475 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2026) (Perez, J.); Perez Angeles v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-7167, Order
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2026) (Kearney, J.); Torres Guevara v. Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No.
26-cv-7077, 2026 WL 2838542 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2026) (Savage, J.).
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previously held administrative exhaustion was not required where, as here, the petitioner contests
the legality of their initial deprivation of liberty, or where the administrative remedy is not
presently available. Dos Reis, 2026 WL 1746649 at *3.
The Due Process Clause “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
[noncitizens]” in removal proceedings. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also
Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen., 859 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The Fifth Amendment protects
the liberty of all persons within our borders, including aliens in immigration proceedings who are
entitled to due process of law[.]”). In the civil immigration detention context, due process requires
procedures reasonably calculated to avoid erroneous deprivation of liberty. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976). Under Mathews, the Court balances: (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” Id. at 335.
DISCUSSION
This Court and others in this District have already resolved the issues in this case against
the Government: (1) whether a district-court habeas petition is the appropriate avenue for redress,2
(2) whether section 1226(a) of the INA requires a warrant, and (3) whether § 1226(a) requires ICE
to conduct an individualized determination of flight risk or dangerousness. The Government
2 This Court has consistently rejected that petitioners must exhaust administrative avenues
for relief in these cases and continues to do so now. See Dos Reis, 2026 WL 1746649; Perez
Contreras v. Rife, No. 26-cv-7358, 2026 WL 2908610 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2026); Laphachi v.
Jamison, No. 26-cv-7211, 2026 WL 2959610 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2026).
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acknowledges courts in this District, including this Court, have rejected its interpretation, though
it continues to press that position here. Gov’t’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 4.
The Government argues Mr. Hernandez Ojeda is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a), which permits the Attorney General to arrest and detain a non-citizen pending a decision
on their removal. However, the statute authorizes ICE to arrest and detain a noncitizen “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). The regulation
provides: “At the time of issuance of the notice to appear, or at any time thereafter and up to the
time removal proceedings are completed, the respondent may be arrested and taken into custody
under the authority of Form I–200, Warrant of Arrest.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1). Courts have
interpreted these regulations to require a warrant that is signed by an authorized immigration
officer who has probable cause to believe the named noncitizen is removable. See Tabora-Brizuela
v. Mullin, No. 26-7010, 2026 WL 2908095, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2026); Hernandez v. Blanche,
No. 26-6195, 2026 WL 2569475, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2026); N.S. v. Dixon, 141 F.4th 279,
282-83 (D.C. Cir. 2025); Sergio P. v. Bondi, No. 26-1538, 2026 WL 497290, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb.
23, 2026). Judges in this district have agreed Section 1226(a) requires a warrant for arrest and
detention. Juarez v. Mullin, No. 26-cv-7008, 2026 WL 2981947, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2026)
(citing Hernandez, 2026 WL 2569475, at *3 (collecting cases)).
Under Section 1357(a)(2), ICE make a warrantless arrest if they can demonstrate “probable
cause.” Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *2 (quoting Lee v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.,
590 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (authorizing an ICE officer to
arrest a noncitizen without a warrant where “he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is
in the United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest . . .”). Here, ICE agents did not have probable cause to arrest
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Mr. Hernanez Ojeda without a warrant. ICE officers were executing an arrest warrant for a
different individual when they encountered Mr. Hernandez Ojeda at his work. Gov’t’s Resp. 3,
ECF No. 4. They had no information to suggest Mr. Hernandez would be “likely to escape before
a warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
Because the Government has detained Mr. Hernandez Ojeda under Section 1226(a), he is
entitled to the “process due under that statute,. . . which in this case required a warrant before
arrest.” Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *3. The Matthews factors weigh in Mr. Hernandez
Ojeda’s favor. First, Mr. Hernandez has a clear liberty interest in being free from detention.
Second, there is a significant “risk of erroneous deprivation,” when ICE detains an individual
without a warrant as is required by Section 1226(a) or without the probable cause necessary to
support a warrantless arrest under Section 1357(a)(2). See Id. at *4; see also Torres Guevara v.
Warden of Fed. Det. Ctr. Phila., No. 26-7077, 2026 WL 2838542, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2026).
As to the third Matthews factor, the Government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws.
However, ICE must abide by the statute and regulations when they are enforcing immigration
laws, and requiring ICE to do so is not a burden on the Government. Therefore, Mr. Hernandez
Ojeda’s detention pursuant to a warrantless arrest that lacked probable cause violates the INA,
which is “grounds for habeas relief.” Tabora-Brizuela, 2026 WL 2908095, at *3.
Lastly, in Dos Reis, this Court held that § 1226(a) provides discretion to detain or release
a noncitizen while their removal decision is pending, but the agency must exercise that discretion
through an individualized custody determination. 2026 WL 1746649, at *4. This Court found the
first and second Matthews factors weighed in favor of the petitioner because freedom from
physical confinement “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects,”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, and the risk of erroneous deprivation is high when ICE detains a person
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without identifying why that person presents a danger or flight risk. The last Matthews factor, the
Government’s legitimate interest in ensuring appearance at removal proceedings or protecting the
community, does not outweigh the petitioner’s liberty interest, especially where the Government
fails to articulate why its interest in detention applies to the individual petitioner. Dos Reis, 2026
WL 1746649, at *5.
While the Third Circuit has not ruled on this specific issue, its recent opinion in Buele
Morocho only bolsters this Court’s previous determination that detention without an
individualized determination violates due process. See 2026 WL 2546223, at *9 (holding (1)
“mandatory detention implicates Petitioners’ ‘constitutionally protected interest in avoiding
physical restraint’”; (2) “the absence of an opportunity for a neutral decisionmaker to assess
whether Petitioners are dangerous or flight risks presents a high risk of erroneously depriving
Petitioners of their liberty interest”; and (3) “the Government’s legitimate interest in preventing
the release of dangerous noncitizens and those who might fail to appear at future hearings does not
outweigh the other two factors here” (internal citations omitted)); see also Regalado-Nauta v.
Jamison, No. 26-cv-6834, 2026 WL 2740528, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2026).
The record does not reflect that ICE made an individualized finding concerning Mr.
Hernandez Ojeda’s detention. The Government has produced a Form I-862 Notice to Appear
which identifies Mr. Hernandez Ojeda as “an alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or paroled.” See Gov’t’s Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1. Additionally, the Government has produced
a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien, notably dated after Mr. Hernandez Ojeda was arrested,
which cites as probable cause for his arrest the “execution of a document to initiate removal
proceedings against the subject,” as well as voluntary statements made by the Petitioner that
demonstrate he “either lacks immigration status or notwithstanding such status is removable under
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U.S. immigration law.” Gov’t’s Ex. C, ECF No. 4-3. The Government also produced a Form I-286
Notice of Custody Determination which indicates that “[p]ursuant to the authority contained in
section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and part 236 of Title 8, Code of Federal
Regulations, I have determined that, pending a final administrative determination in your case, you
will be… [d]etained by the Department of Homeland Security.” Gov’t’s Ex. B, ECF No. 4-2.
Lastly, the Form I-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien indicates Mr. Hernandez Ojeda
has no known criminal record nor does he have any outstanding wants or warrants, but that he is
“subject to President Donald Trump’s Executive Order titled, ‘Protecting the American People
Against Invasion.’” Gov’t Ex. D, ECF No. 4-4. No other grounds for detention were cited in any
of the documents provided to this Court. As the Court explained in Dos Reis, “[t]hat is not an
individualized custody determination.” 2026 WL 1746649 at *4. “It is a categorical detention
disposition.” Id.
Because Mr. Hernandez Ojeda’s present detention without an individualized determination
contravenes the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, his current detention is unlawful,
and he shall be immediately released.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, because exhaustion is excused, because ICE did not have a warrant to detain
Mr. Hernandez Ojeda, and because ICE did not make an individualized custody determination
before detaining Mr. Hernandez Ojeda under § 1226(a), in violation of his due process rights, the
Court will grant Mr. Hernandez Ojeda’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. An appropriate
order follows.
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BY THE COURT:
/s/ Juan R. Sánchez
Juan R. Sánchez, J.
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