Quesquen v. Figueroa et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
GIANFRANCO ANTONIO PISFIL 	)
QUESQUEN, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-1547-D
)
FRED FIGUEROA, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Gianfranco Antonio Pisfil Quesquen, a citizen of Peru proceeding with
counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”)
challenging his detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”).
(Doc. 1).1 	United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti referred the matter to the
undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	initial 	proceedings 	consistent 	with 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
636(b)(1)(B), (C). 	(Doc. 3). 	The matter is at issue. 	As fully set forth below, the
undersigned recommends that the Petition be GRANTED in part because Petitioner’s re-
detention violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), its regulations, and due
process. The Court should order Petitioner’s immediate release subject to the conditions
of his prior release on bond.
1 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF
pagination.
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I. 	Factual Background
The relevant facts in this matter are:
• 	Petitioner is a citizen of Peru who entered the United States on or about
January 30, 2023, and was charged with being removable from the United
States on the same day. (Doc. 1, at Ex. 1, at 1).
• 	Petitioner was issued an Order of Release on Recognizance (Form I-220A)
and released on January 30, 2023. (Id. at Ex. 2).
• 	Petitioner alleges he was re-detained by ICE on June 10, 2026, while
attempting to comply with an ICE check-in requirement. (Doc. 1, at 16).
• 	Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not contest, that he has not been
provided with a bond hearing. (Id. at 4).
• 	Petitioner’s immigration proceedings are ongoing. 	Petitioner was ordered
removed to Peru by an Immigration Judge. (Doc. 8, at Ex. 2). But Petitioner
has a pending appeal of his order of removal. 	EOIR Automated Case
Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last accessed
Oct. 7, 2026). Thus, he is not subject to a final order of removal.
• 	Petitioner is detained at Diamondback Correctional Facility in Watonga,
Oklahoma. (Doc. 1, at 2).
II. 	Petitioner’s Claims and Respondents’ Responses
Petitioner makes the following claims in support of his Petition:
1. 	His unlawful re-detention without process violates the Fifth Amendment.
(Doc. 1, at 17-18). 	The claim includes an argument that Petitioner was
impermissibly re-detained by the government “without identifying any
material change in circumstances.” (Id. at 18).
2. 	His continued detention violates the INA. (Id. at 18-19).
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As relief, Petitioner requests his immediate release from custody or that he be provided
“with a bond hearing in which DHS carries the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence.”2 (Id. at 19).
Respondents argue the Court does not have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s re-
detention claim under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g), 1226(e). (Doc. 8, at 3-4). Respondents then
argue that Petitioner’s due process claim fails on the merits. (Id. at 4-12). As to Petitioner’s
statutory claim, Respondents assert that Petitioner is held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
and is not entitled to a bond hearing, but they concede that the Tenth Circuit’s recent
decision in Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir. 2026), “compels a
different outcome.” (Id. at 1). “Respondents request that any order be limited to ordering
a bond hearing within seven days” and also be limited to Petitioner’s statutory claim. (Id.
at 1-2). And they argue the Court should not require Respondents to assume the quantum
and burden of proof at any hearing. (Id. at 12-13).
In reply, Petitioner asserts the Court has jurisdiction and that his due process claim
should be considered regardless of the applicability of § 1225 and § 1226. (Doc. 9).
III. 	Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2 Petitioner also seeks other relief unrelated to his release or bond hearing, (Doc. 1, at 19-
20), but the relief recommended is limited to what is described below. Petitioner’s request
for fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act is premature. See 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(B); Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025).
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2241(c)(3). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
IV. 	The Court Has Jurisdiction Over Petitioner’s Claims.
Respondents 	argue 	this 	Court 	lacks 	jurisdiction 	to 	consider 	Petitioner’s
impermissible re-detention claim based on 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(e) and 1252(g). (Doc. 8, at
3-4).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) provides that with certain exceptions, “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision
or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 	Congress narrowly confines §
1252(g) to “three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take.” Reno v. Am.-Arab
Anti Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). The Tenth Circuit asks whether a
claim is “connected directly and immediately” to one of the enumerated actions. Namgyal
Tsering v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 403 F. App’x 339, at *3 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Humphries v. Various Fed. USINS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 943 (5th Cir. 1999)). Claims that
have only a “weak, remote, or tenuous connection” fall outside the statute’s reach.
Humphries, 164 F.3d at 943. 	The question of whether an ICE official followed proper
procedures 	in 	revoking 	Petitioner’s 	bond 	is 	unrelated 	to 	the 	commencement 	of
proceedings, the adjudication of the matter before the immigration court, or an execution
of a removal order. See Skutar v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-0036-HE, Doc. 15, at *2 n.2 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 24, 2026) (rejecting jurisdictional argument based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) where
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petitioner challenged his detention and the government did not demonstrate changed
circumstances before re-detention). 	Thus, the undersigned finds that § 1252(g) does not
bar this Court’s jurisdiction.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) provides: “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set
aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention of any alien or the revocation or denial of bond or parole.” 	Petitioner’s claim
does not attack the discretionary judgment that was made to revoke his bond; rather it
attacks the failure to exercise any discretionary judgment. 	The Court retains jurisdiction
to determine whether the procedure by which bond was revoked violates federal law and
the Constitution. See Santiago v. Mullin, No. 26-CV-00186-CYC, 2026 WL 2969460, at
*2 (D. Colo. Oct. 2, 2026) (finding 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) did not serve as a jurisdictional bar
“over the petitioner’s claim that his release was unlawfully revoked and his detention is
therefore ultra vires” because the petitioner challenged “‘the nondiscretionary procedures
Respondents must use to revoke Petitioner’s previous release under § 1226’”) (quoting
Lopez Cruz v. Blanche, No. CIV-26-806-R, 2026 WL 1834408, at *4 (W.D. Okla. June 25,
2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-26-806-R, 2026 WL 2023591 (W.D.
Okla. July 13, 2026)); Ekenge v. Baltazar, No. 1:26-CV-00630-SBP, 2026 WL 617341, at
*3 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2026) (finding no jurisdictional bar where “Petitioner’s primary
challenge here is clearly to the lack of due process underlying his detention, not merely the
decision to revoke his detention” because it was “a constitutional challenge to the
procedures used in revoking parole” which included “considerations regarding notice and
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the opportunity to be heard, procedural steps that Petitioner argues were not provided to
him here”).
Thus, the undersigned finds the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim.
V. 	Respondents Violated the INA and its Regulations When They Revoked
Petitioner’s Bond Without Changed Circumstances.
On June 30, 2026, the Tenth Circuit decided Santillan Quiroz, holding “that
noncitizens who entered the United States and were thereafter detained in the interior of
the country are usually subject to [8 U.S.C.] § 1226(a) (and thus eligible for bond), not [8
U.S.C.] § 1225(b)(2)(A).” 180 F.4th at 1237. This statutory interpretation is binding on
this Court and applicable to Petitioner’s factual circumstances, as Respondents concede.
Because Petitioner is subject to § 1226(a) and has not received a bond hearing, Petitioner
has shown that he is in custody in violation of the INA, and he is entitled to habeas relief.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
The habeas relief prescribed by Santillan Quiroz is a prompt bond hearing. 	180
F.4th at 1251 n.13. However, when a non-citizen was previously released on bond under
§ 1226(a), as in this case, § 1226(b) is also implicated. Section 1226(b) provides that DHS
“at any time may revoke a bond or parole authorized under subsection (a), rearrest the alien
under the original warrant, and detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b). Regulations further
provide that “[w]hen an alien who, having been arrested and taken into custody, has been
released, such release may be revoked at any time in the discretion of the district director
[and certain other federal officers] in which event the alien may be taken into physical
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custody and detained. If detained, unless a breach has occurred, any outstanding bond shall
be revoked and canceled.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(9), 1236.1(c)(9).
However, “notwithstanding the breadth of [§ 1226(b)’s] statutory language, the
[BIA] has recognized an important implicit limitation on DHS’s authority. The BIA has
held that ‘where a previous bond determination has been made by an immigration judge,
no change should be made by a District Director absent a change of circumstance.’”
Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1196-97 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (quoting Matter of
Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. 637, 640 (BIA 1981)), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions,
905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). 	“DHS has incorporated this holding into its practice,
requiring a showing of changed circumstances both where the prior bond determination
was made by an immigration judge and where the previous release decision was made
by a DHS officer.”3 Id. at 1197 (emphasis added).
Judges in this district have recently applied the same principle, and when finding a
violation, have ordered immediate release under the previous bond conditions. In Singh v.
Cerna, No. CIV-26-1194-J, 2026 WL 2364443 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 14, 2026), Judge Jones
found that “because officials had previously released Petitioner on bond, 8 U.S.C. §
1226(b) . . . applies. 	Section 1226(b) prevents officials from interfering with a previous
bond determination ‘absent a change in circumstances.’ Respondents failed to provide any
evidence that such a determination had been made before Petitioner’s re-detention. . . .”
3 An ICE officer makes the initial detention or release determination, and the alien bears
the burden of “demonstrat[ing] to the satisfaction of the officer that . . . release would not
pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future
proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).
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Id. at *1. Accordingly, Judge Jones granted the habeas petition and ordered Petitioner’s
immediate release subject to an order of supervision. Id.4
In Skutar v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-0036-HE, Doc. 15 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 2026),
Judge Heaton concluded that “while the Attorney General has authority to revoke bond at
any time under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b), ‘if an immigration judge has determined the noncitizen
should be released, the DHS may not re-arrest that noncitizen absent a change of
circumstance,’” and he ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. 	Id. at 2-3 (quoting
Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, Case No. 25-cv-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025)). 	See also Singh v. Grant, No. CIV-26-289-R, 2026 WL
1483557, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2026) (reasoning that “along with the discretion
provided by § 236.1(c)(9) to revoke bond at any time ‘comes responsibility’ to follow
proper procedures when doing so;” finding there was no evidence that “Petitioner’s bond
was revoked by an authorized individual or that he was arrested pursuant to his original
warrant;” and ordering immediate release).5 Thus, where a DHS officer or an immigration
judge has previously granted a non-citizen bond under § 1226(a), ICE may only revoke
4 The undersigned notes that Judge Jones observed that “Respondents objected but did not
address the crux of [the magistrate judge’s] findings and have waived de novo review” Id.
at *1.
5 Other courts are in agreement. 	See, e.g., Singh v. Hale, 2026 WL 765623, at *3 (D. Vt.
Mar. 18, 2026) (finding no change should be made to a previous bond decision “absent a
change in circumstances”); Hernandez-Parrilla v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2025 WL 3632769, at
*5 (D.N.M. Dec. 15, 2025) (same); Panosyan v. Mayorkas, 854 F. App’x 787, 788 (9th Cir.
2021) (holding that “absent changed circumstances, such as reinvolvement with the
criminal justice system, ICE cannot redetain [the non-citizen]”) (citation modified) (citing
Sugay, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 640).
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that bond when it can show there are changed circumstances, and only certain immigration
officials may exercise that discretion.
Based on this record, the undersigned concludes Respondents violated the INA and
their own regulations when they revoked Petitioner’s bond. 	No evidence in the record
indicates that any authorized official chose to exercise his/her discretion to revoke
Petitioner’s release on bond. Additionally, there is no evidence that Petitioner was arrested
pursuant to his original warrant. 	Nor does the record reflect any material changes in
Petitioner’s circumstances; nor do Respondents argue any such changes have occurred.
Petitioner alleges that since the Authorized Officer released him on bond, he has had no
criminal convictions and he has attempted to comply with his check-in requirements. (Doc.
1, at 16). There is no indication that during this time, Petitioner has become a flight risk
or a danger to the community. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner
be granted immediate release subject to his previous bond conditions.
VI. 	Respondents Violated Petitioner’s Due Process Rights When They Summarily
Revoked His Bond.
Petitioner also claims that his due process rights were violated when he was re-
detained without notice or a right to be heard after being previously released on bond. (Doc
1, at 17-18). 	Petitioner claims, among other things, that the lack of an individualized
determination, “including identification of materially changed circumstances” in re-
detaining him violates procedural due process. (Id.) (emphasis in original).
“The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the Government to deprive
any person of liberty without due process of law. Freedom from imprisonment—from
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government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the
liberty that Clause protects.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted); cf. Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (“It is well established
that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal
proceedings.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court analyzes Petitioner’s procedural due process claim “in two steps: the first
asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by
the State . . . ; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation
were constitutionally sufficient.” Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)
(citations omitted). In examining the necessary process, the Court turns to the three factors
set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and
(3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Petitioner’s interest in physical freedom “is the most elemental of liberty interests.”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 	“Just as people on preparole, parole, and
probation status have a liberty interest, so too does [a non-citizen] have a liberty interest in
remaining out of custody on bond.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969-70 (N.D.
Cal. 2019) (first citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (parolee), and then
citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probation)). 	See also Sanchez v.
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LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (“When the government grants
[a non-citizen] parole into the country, it creates a liberty interest intimately tied to freedom
from imprisonment.”); Iza v. Arnott, 2026 WL 67152, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 8, 2026)
(“Individuals released on parole or other forms of conditional release have a liberty interest
in their ‘continued liberty.’”); Sahil v. De Anda-Ybarra, 2026 WL 560216, at *3 (D.N.M.
Feb. 27, 2026) (finding “that noncitizens acquire a liberty interest once released from
immigration detention”). Respondents deprived Petitioner of his liberty when they revoked
his bond and placed him in custody.
Turning to the Mathews factors, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has a
significant private interest in remaining free from immigration detention after spending
over three years released on bond. To be sure, “Congress may make rules as to aliens that
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003).
But that power remains “subject to important constitutional limitations.” 	Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 695. Respondents do not challenge Petitioner’s assertion that he was released on
bond. During his years of release, his interest in release grew even stronger as he “form[ed]
the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 	Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 	The first
Mathews factor favors Petitioner.
Second, the undersigned considers “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards.” 	Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	“Relevant to the second
factor is the fact that petitioner was previously released pursuant to an order of release on
recognizance. 	In 	releasing 	petitioner, 	the 	respondents 	necessarily 	determined 	that
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petitioner was not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” 	Gill v. Baltazar, No. 26-
CV-03171-PAB, 2026 WL 2149415, at *1 (D. Colo. July 27, 2026); see also Peña Becerra
v. Sparks, No. 2:26-CV-00212-JNP-DBP, 2026 WL 915439, at *5 (D. Utah Apr. 3, 2026)
(“At every juncture up to this point, Petitioner has been determined to not be a danger to
the community or a flight risk.”). 	The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s
liberty interest is considerable where he has received no notice of the reason for his bond
revocation or opportunity to challenge it, and simple procedures exist that would mitigate
those risks. 	“Constitutionally inadequate notice also often leads to constitutionally
inadequate opportunity to be heard, because opportunity to be heard must be meaningful
to be constitutionally sufficient.” 	Saqib v. Andrews, 2026 WL 350830, at *6 (E.D. Cal.
Feb. 9, 2026). 	Nothing in the record shows that Petitioner received any procedural
safeguards – including those in the INA and its implementing regulations – to determine
whether the revocation of his bond and his detention were justified, and thus Respondents
have detained him without any stated cause. This factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. See
E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the
Government may believe it has a valid reason to detain Petitioner does not eliminate its
obligation to effectuate the detention in a manner that comports with due process.”); see
also Gualpa-Lumbi v. Hoover, 2026 WL 452351, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2026)
(“[Petitioner] was previously released and permitted to go about living for years in the
United States during the pendency of his immigration proceedings before being detained
in 2025 ... [which] show[s] that [Petitioner] is at risk of being erroneously deprived of his
freedom.”).
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Finally, the undersigned considers the Government’s interest, including any fiscal
or administrative burdens. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. “While this Court recognizes that
the government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws, the government’s interest in
re-detaining [P]etitioner without adequate notice and an opportunity to challenge the
revocation of his release is low.” Saqib, 2026 WL 350830, at *6; see, e.g., Diaz v. Kaiser,
2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“[T[he Court concludes that the
government’s interest in re-detaining Petitioner ... is ‘low,’ particularly in light of the fact
that Petitioner[ 	] 	has 	long 	complied 	with 	his 	reporting requirements.”). 	And the
undersigned can discern no significant administrative or fiscal burden associated with
placing the burden on the government to follow its own regulations. 	See, e.g., Iza, 2026
WL 67152, at *3.
The undersigned concludes Respondents breached their own regulations and
violated Petitioner’s due process rights when they summarily revoked his bond. 	Under
these circumstances, it is not merely the denial of a post-arrest bond hearing that warrants
habeas relief but the improper re-detention itself. Therefore, an order for a bond hearing
would be an inadequate remedy for the ongoing violation of Petitioner’s liberty interest;
the proper remedy is Petitioner’s immediate release from detention subject to the same
conditions that governed his earlier release. See. e.g, Amefia v. Grant, No. CIV-26-975-R,
2026 WL 2569495, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2026) (adopting report and recommendation
where magistrate judge “found that because (1) Petitioner previously received a bond
hearing at which an Immigration Judge determined he was not a flight risk or danger to the
community, (2) Petitioner was thereafter released on bond, and (3) Respondents re-detained
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him without notice, a hearing, or a material change in circumstances, Respondents have
violated Petitioner’s due process rights” and ordering immediate release); Singh, No. CIV-
26-1194-J, 2026 WL 2364443, at *1 (granting immediate release); Singh, No. CIV-26-289-
R, 2026 WL 1483557, at *1 (same); Skutar, No. CIV-26-0036-HE, Doc. 15 (W.D. Okla.
Apr. 24, 2026) (same); Ewere v. Cerna, Case No. CIV-26-320-SLP, 2026 WL 1623419,
at *6-7 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 17, 2026) (applying Mathews factors to grant immediate release
when the petitioner had been re-detained without notice after being paroled), report and
recommendation adopted by 2026 WL 1207088.
VII. 	Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Petition,
(Doc. 1), be GRANTED in part. Specifically, the undersigned recommends the Court:
• 	order Respondents to immediately release Petitioner from their custody under
his previous bond conditions;
• 	enjoin Respondents from re-detaining Petitioner without notice of changed
circumstances and compliance with 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(9), 1236.1(c)(9);
• 	order 	Respondents 	to 	submit 	a 	declaration 	affirming 	they 	have 	released
Petitioner from custody.
The Court advises the parties of their right to object to this Report and
Recommendation by October 16, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2).6 The Court advises the parties that failure to make timely objection to this Report
6 Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has reduced the typical
objection time to Report and Recommendations. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory
committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that rule establishing 14-day response time
“does not extend to habeas corpus petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating
to proceedings under Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker,
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and Recommendation waives their right to appellate review of both factual and legal issues
contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge and terminates the referral unless and until the matter is re-referred.
ENTERED this 9th day of October, 2026.
484 F. App’x 227, 231, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may
be applied discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they need not be in every
instance – particularly where strict application would undermine the habeas review
process.”).
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