Macias Emigdio v. Grant et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ISAEL MACIAS EMIGDIO,
Petitioner,
v.
SCARLET GRANT, et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. CIV-26-135-SLP
O R D E R
Petitioner, Isael Macias Emigdio, a citizen of Mexico proceeding with counsel, filed
a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his
detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Before the Court is
the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 14] (R&R) of United States Magistrate Judge
Amanda L. Maxfield. Petitioner has filed an Objection [Doc. Nos. 15] and Respondents
have filed a Response [Doc. No. 17]. Upon de novo review and for the reasons that follow,
the Court DECLINES to ADOPT the R&R and GRANTS in PART the Petition.
I. Introduction
In 1998, Petitioner first entered the United States. He has resided in the United
States continuously for over twenty-one years. In August 2025, ICE detained Petitioner,
charging him as someone who is “present in the United States without being admitted or
paroled” under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Petitioner was denied bond on the ground that
his detention was governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and the Immigration Judge (IJ) lacked
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jurisdiction to provide a bond hearing.1 Petitioner is currently being held at the Cimarron
Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma.
II. Discussion
This Court and courts across the country have been inundated with review of § 2241
claims virtually identical to those brought by Petitioner. He claims his immigration
detention is not governed by § 1225(b)(2) but instead by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that he is
entitled to immediate release from detention unless he is provided a bonding hearing.
In addition to claiming that his current detention violates his statutory rights under
§ 1226(a), Petitioner claims a violation of his right to due process under the Fifth
Amendment pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). In support of his
requested relief, Petitioner seeks enforcement of a class-action declaratory judgment issued
in Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, No. 25-CV-1873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), in which a federal judge in the Central District of California declared
that that all members of the certified class were detained in immigration custody under
§ 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).2
1 Petitioner’s detention without bond is a consequence of Matter of Hurtado, 29 I.&N. Dec. 216
(BIA 2025), a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals which held that those who entered
the United States without admission or parole are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and are
ineligible for a bond hearing.
2 The certified class is comprised of all noncitizens without lawful status present in the United
States who (1) entered without inspection, (2) were not apprehended upon arrival, and (3) are not
subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 when the initial custody
determination is made. See Bautista v. Santacruz, -- F.Supp.3d --, No. 25-CV-1873-SSS-BFM,
2025 WL 3713987 at * 32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025).
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As set forth by the Magistrate Judge: “[t]he overwhelming majority of courts” have
concluded that individuals, like Petitioner, who have been admitted into the United States
and have lived in the country for extended periods are entitled to individualized bond
hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). R&R at 2. Nonetheless, the Magistrate Judge has
recommended denying § 2241 relief to Petitioner. The Magistrate Judge found that
Petitioner did not properly raise a claim for relief under § 1226(a), instead finding
Petitioner only sought enforcement of the declaratory judgment issued in Maldonado
Bautista. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that Maldonado Bautista does not
provide any basis upon which § 2241 relief can be granted because Petitioner is not a class-
member located within the boundaries of the Central District of California and Petitioner
“fails to demonstrate how relief under habeas is appropriate to enforce another court’s
declaratory judgment.” See R&R at 10-12.
In his Objection, Petitioner argues that the “Petition raises a broader statutory
challenge to the legal authority for detention” and that “[w]hile the Petition cited
Maldonado Bautista as authority addressing the same statutory interpretation question, the
underlying claim remains that Petitioner’s custody violates the [INA] because detention
authority lies, if at all, under § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(2).” Obj. at 4. Alternatively,
Petitioner seeks leave to amend to “clarify” that statutory argument. Id. at 5.
Although the Petition is certainly framed with Maldonado Bautista at its center, the
Court respectfully disagrees with the Magistrate Judge that the Petition does not
sufficiently state a § 1226(a) statutory claim for relief. See, e.g., Pet. at 2 (seeking, in the
conjunction “an order directing Respondents to immediately comply with the governing
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detention statute and the declaratory judgment in Maldonado Bautista by releasing
Petitioner from custody or, in the alternative, by providing a prompt bond hearing under
§ 1226(a)” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 6-7 (setting forth the “governing bond and
detention framework under INA § 1226(a)”); id. at 11 (“By denying Petitioner a bond
hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the
Court’s judgment in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz.”). Petitioner’s counsel certainly
could have developed the § 1226(a) claim more robustly, but upon de novo review, the
Court finds the issue of whether Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A)
or whether he must instead be detained pursuant to § 1226(a) is properly before the Court.
The Court has extensively addressed the merits of the § 1226(a) issue in prior orders.
See, e.g., Lopez v. CoreCivic Cimarron Corr. Facility, No. CIV-25-1175-SLP, 2026 WL
165490 at *3-7 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 21, 2026). Upon review of the factual record in this case,
and adopting the prior reasoning in Lopez, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is
governed by § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2)(A). In doing so, the Court joins the decision
reached by the vast majority of district courts in this judicial district,3 in district courts
3 See, e.g., Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1236-HE, 2026 WL 94641 at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan.
13, 2026) (collecting cases in this judicial district finding that § 1252(g) does not present a
jurisdictional bar); Lopez, 2026 WL 165490 at *5 (collecting cases in this judicial district
concluding that §1225(b)(2) does not govern the petitioner’s detention).
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within the Tenth Circuit4 and across the country5 to have addressed the same issues as those
raised by Petitioner.6 The Court’s decision is also in accord with the Seventh Circuit, which
rejected the statutory interpretation of §1225(b)(2) as urged by Respondents. See
Castañon-Nova v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025); but
see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
Accordingly, because the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention,
he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing.7
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Court DECLINES to ADOPT the Report
and Recommendation [Doc. No. 14] and GRANTS in PART the Petition [Doc. No. 1] as
to Petitioner’s entitlement to a bond hearing. Respondents are DIRECTED to provide
Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within seven (7) business
4 See, e.g., Aguilar Tanchez v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-1150, 2026 WL 125184 (D. Utah Jan. 16, 2026);
Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-CV-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025).
5 See, e.g., Lopez, 2026 WL 165490 at *7 (collecting cases concluding that §1226(a) is the
governing statutory framework).
6 The Court is certainly aware of authority to the contrary, including two decisions entered in this
judicial district. See Gutierrez Sosa v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1257-PRW, 2026 WL 36344 at **3-5
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2026); Montoya v. Holt, No. CIV-235-1231-JD, 2025 WL 3733302 at **5-12
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 26, 2025).
7 Petitioner has apprised the Court that during a custody redetermination hearing on March 6, 2026,
the IJ denied bond solely on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction, treating Petitioner as
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). See Obj. at 2. But the IJ made an alternative finding
that if jurisdiction existed, then Petitioner would be eligible for release because he did not pose a
danger to the community and any potential flight risk could be mitigated through the setting of a
bond. Id.
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days of this Order, or otherwise release Petitioner if he has not received a lawful bond
hearing within that period.8
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall certify their compliance with
this Order by filing a status report within ten business days of this Order. The status report
shall detail whether Petitioner was released or provided a bond hearing (and the results of
any bond hearing), including the associated dates with either action.
A separate judgment shall be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of March, 2026.
8 Based on the relief granted by the Court, directing that Petitioner be given a bond hearing
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s other grounds for relief
under the Fifth Amendment and Zadvydas or whether he is entitled to declaratory relief as a class
member under Maldonado Bautista. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Noem, No. 26-CV-00063-SMD-GJF,
2026 WL 381869 at * 6 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026) (concluding that petitioner was entitled to relief
through the court’s “independent statutory analysis” of § 1226(a) rather than “declaring
[Maldonado Bautista] binding” as such a course would be “premature given the current splits
among districts and ongoing procedural uncertainties”).
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