Larios Lopez v. Grant et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CRISTHIAN JOSSUE LARIOS LOPEZ, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-134-G
)
CHRIS GANTT, Warden, Cimarron )
Correctional Facility, et al., )
)
Respondents.1 )
ORDER
On January 27, 2026, Petitioner Cristhian Jossue Larios Lopez filed a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition,” Doc. No. 1), challenging his detention by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Certain
Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. No. 10).2 Petitioner has filed a Reply (Doc. No. 13).
I. Background
The factual background is set forth in the Petition and not contested by Respondents.
As relevant here, Petitioner is a “native and citizen of Honduras”; he entered the United
States in December 2023. Pet. ¶ 5. Petitioner sought asylum and was then “processed,
released, and complied with all reporting requirements.” Id. ¶ 6.
1 Chris Gantt, Warden, Cimarron Correctional Facility, Markwayne Mullin, the current
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Todd Blanche, Attorney
General of the United States, are hereby substituted as respondents for Scarlet Grant, Kristi
Noem, and Pamela Bondi, respectively, pursuant to Rules 25(d) and 81(a)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 The appearing respondents are: Robert Cerna, Acting Field Office Director of Dallas
Field Office, ICE; Secretary Mullin; and Attorney General Blanche.
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In December 2025, Petitioner was detained in Tulsa, Oklahoma, when “voluntarily
presenting himself to [ICE] for a check in.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 34. “ICE did not set bond because
[Petitioner] was deemed an ‘applicant for admission’” and “subject to mandatory detention
under [8 U.S.C.] § 1225(b)(2).” Id. ¶¶ 34, 46. Petitioner is now housed at Cimarron
Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14.
II. Discussion
A. Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Bautista v. Santacruz, 813
F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2025), appeal docketed sub nom. Bautista v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 25-7958 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025). See Pet. ¶¶ 42-46.3 Petitioner also
argues that his continued detention without a custody determination violates the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., and the due process
rights afforded him by the Fifth Amendment. See Pet. ¶¶ 46, 48-55.
Respondents argue that Petitioner relies exclusively on Bautista and that Petitioner
has not adequately raised the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) is a lawful basis
for his detention. See Answer at 1-2. Petitioner replies that he has asserted, independently
3 According to Petitioner, the Bautista court “entered final judgment,” which “certif[ied] a
nationwide Bond Eligible Class” whose members, based on that court’s issuance of
declaratory relief, “are detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), and therefore, may not
be denied consideration for release on bond.” Pet. ¶¶ 23-24. On March 31, 2026, the Ninth
Circuit ordered a stay of the district court order on which Petitioner relies to the extent the
order “extend[s] beyond the Central District of California.” Bautista v. Exec. Off. for
Immigr. Rev., No. 25-7958 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (order).
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of any reliance on Bautista, that his detention is in violation of the INA. See Pet’r’s Reply
at 2-5.
In his second claim, Petitioner seeks relief for violation of the INA, asserting that §
1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), controls his detention due to his residence in the interior of the
United States for multiple years. See Pet. ¶¶ 48-55. Elsewhere in the Petition, he states:
By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he
is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate
Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, as Petitioner is not an arriving alien.
Id. ¶ 46.
Based on these allegations, Petitioner sufficiently alleged an INA claim. See
Puentes-Puentes v. Grant, No. CIV-26-192-J, 2026 WL 657199, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. Mar.
9, 2026) (“Petitioner discussed the framework under § 1226(a) and addressed why he was
eligible for a bond hearing. As such, the allegations in the Petition are sufficient to raise
the § 1225 and § 1226 issue, and thus sufficient for the Court to determine Petitioner’s case
on the merits.” (omission and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Akhalaia v.
Figueroa, No. CIV-26-133-R, 2026 WL 637620, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 6, 2026); Emigdio
v. Grant, No. CIV-26-135-SLP, 2026 WL 735462, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 16, 2026).
B. Petitioner’s Claim for Violation of the INA
Petitioner argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to his detention because
“he has resided in the interior of the country since December 17, 2023” and is not an “an
arriving alien.” Pet. ¶¶ 48-50. He argues that his detention should instead be governed by
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§ 1226(a), which permits release of a detained noncitizen on bond after an individualized
custody determination. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2).
Petitioner’s INA claim is controlled by the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in
Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, in which that court held that § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-
detention requirement “applies only to [noncitizens] seeking admission” at the border of
the United States. Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2026).
The Tenth Circuit further held “that noncitizens who entered the United States and were
thereafter detained in the interior of the country are,” instead, “usually subject to § 1226(a)
(and thus eligible for bond).” Id. at 1237; see also id. at 1232, 1251 (concluding that the
petitioner, who was detained at a traffic stop in the interior of the country, was “eligible for
release” and “entitled to a bond hearing”).
Here, as in Santillan Quiroz, Petitioner was taken into custody in the interior of the
United States after having entered the country. See Pet. ¶¶ 5-6, 34; Santillan Quiroz, 180
F.4th at 1233-34. And as in Santillan Quiroz, Petitioner has been held in detention without
a bond hearing or other “opportunity to argue for release.” Santillan Quiroz, 180 F.4th at
1233-34; Pet. ¶¶ 34, 46. Accordingly, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is inapplicable. See Santillan
Quiroz, 180 F.4th at 1246-51.4 Because Petitioner “can properly be subject to detention
under § 1226(a),” he is entitled to a bond hearing. Id. at 1251 n.13.
4 Based on this determination, the Court need not and does not reach Petitioner’s remaining
claims for relief.
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C. Petitioner’s Request for Fees and Costs
Petitioner also requests attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). See Pet. at 11.
The EAJA “unambiguously authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging
immigration detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025), petition for
cert. filed, No. 26-146 (U.S. July 30, 2026). Such attorney’s fees must be sought pursuant
to the EAJA and by separate motion, however. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), 81(a)(4);
LCvR 54.2. Any recovery of costs is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 2412(a), Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and Local Civil Rule 54.1.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1)
is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim for relief based upon a violation of the INA.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to, within seven (7) days of the date of this Order,
either provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or
release Petitioner into the United States.
2. Petitioner’s remaining claims for relief are DISMISSED without prejudice; and
3. Respondents shall file a declaration with the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746
within ten (10) days of the date of this Order affirming either that a bond hearing
was conducted or that Petitioner was released from detention into the United
States.
4. The Court will separately enter judgment but retains jurisdiction over this matter
to ensure compliance with this Order.
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 21st day of August, 2026.
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