Akhalaia v. Figueroa et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ROMAN AKHALAIA, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-26-133-R
)
FRED FIGUEROA, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER
Petitioner, a citizen of Georgia, entered the United States on September 25, 2022,
and was paroled into the United States. He subsequently filed an Application for Asylum
with the Immigration Court [Doc. No. 1-2] and resided in the United States without
detention for approximately three years until he was detained by ICE in January of 2026.
Now before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1] claiming violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents filed a Response in
Opposition [Doc. No. 11]. Petitioner filed a Reply [Doc. No. 12]. Though he requests relief
primarily pursuant to the declaratory judgment of another court, Petitioner essentially
asserts the mandatory detention provision pursuant to which he is currently being detained,
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), does not apply to noncitizens like him who previously entered
the country.
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The crux of Petitioner’s Petition is Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-
01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3713987 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), wherein the court granted
class certification of:
All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have
entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or
will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject
to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the
Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.
Id. at *32. The Maldonado Bautista Court examined the Department of Homeland
Security’s Policy of
requir[ing] ICE employees to consider anyone arrested in the United States
and charged with being inadmissible as an ‘applicant for admission’ under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), ‘applicants for admission’
are subject to mandatory detention for proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)
and not entitled to the due process protections found within § 1226(a).
In so doing, the Maldonado Bautista Court declared DHS’s Policy violated the INA and
statutory Due Process with respect to the Bond Eligible Class. Id.
Petitioner asserts he is a member of the Bond Eligible Class and thus that his
detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) is unlawful because he is a noncitizen in the United
States who entered without inspection, was not apprehended upon arrival, and is not subject
to detention under § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231. Petitioner asserts he is being
detained in violation of the Maldonado Bautista declaration and the Court should order his
release unless Respondents provide a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a).
Respondents assert Petitioner is not entitled to relief pursuant to Maldonado
Bautista’s declaration and urge the Court to deny Petitioner’s Petition on this basis alone.
Respondents also argue that no other basis for relief is proffered and no further analysis of
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the § 1225 and § 1226 issue—an issue that has been extensively litigated in recent months
in situations akin to Petitioner’s—is stated. In Respondents’ opinion, Petitioner relies
solely on the Maldonado Bautista declaration and has thus failed to argue the legal merits
of his challenge to DHS’s interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court finds this reading of Petitioner’s Petition too restrictive. Petitioner claims
his detention violates both the INA and the Maldonado Bautista declaration and discusses
the detention framework under § 1226(a). In asserting that he is a member of the
Maldonado Bautista Bond Eligible Class, Petitioner claims he is a noncitizen who entered
the United States without inspection and has been residing in the country without detention
for several years. And in Petitioner’s Reply, he asserts he was arrested in the interior, has
resided in the country for years, is in full § 1229a proceedings, and is not subject to
expedited removal. Based on his status, Petitioner asserts he is entitled to a bond hearing
pursuant to § 1226(a). The Court finds the allegations in the Petition and arguments in his
Reply sufficient to raise the “§ 1225 and § 1226 issue,” as Respondents put it, and thus
sufficient for the Court to determine Petitioner’s case on the merits.
The key question is thus whether Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) or whether he must instead be detained pursuant to § 1226(a). The issue
is significant because § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for mandatory detention whereas § 1226(a)
provides for conditional parole or release on bond pending a decision in the removal
proceedings. The Court has addressed this same issue in prior orders. See Valdez v. Holt,
No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL 3709021, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025); Perez v. Grant,
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No. CIV-25-1560-R, 2026 WL 315065, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 5, 2026).1 The Court is also
aware of recent (nonbinding) authority contradicting 	the Court’s prior orders. 	See
Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026).
However, the Court continues to conclude that the better reading of the statutory
provisions is that § 1225(b)(2) applies to noncitizens “seeking admission into the country”
whereas § 1226 applies to noncitizens “already in the country.” See Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018); see also Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161
F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he difference in treatment between a noncitizen at
the border and one already in the United States fits within the broader context of our
immigration law.”). Further, the Court finds that Petitioner’s asylum application does not
render him subject to § 1225(b)(2). See Li v. Grant, No. CIV-25-1426-HE, 2026 WL
147438, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026) (concluding that § 1226(a) applies even though
Petitioner applied for asylum); Malacidze v. Noem, No. CIV-25-1527-D, 2026 WL 227155,
at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2026) (same); Toledo Santos v. Grant, No. CIV-25-1433-SLP,
2026 WL 184287, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 23, 2026) (same).
Here, Petitioner was detained nearly three years after arriving in the country. His
detention is controlled by § 1226(a) and he is entitled to a prompt bond hearing. This
conclusion is in accordance “with the vast majority of district courts in this judicial district,
in district courts within the Tenth Circuit and across the country to have addressed the same
issues as those raised by Petitioner.” Id.
1 The Court adopts the reasoning and conclusions set forth in these prior orders.
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Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED in part and Respondents are directed to
provide Petitioner with a prompt bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Because the Court
finds Petitioner is entitled to a prompt bond hearing based upon the merits of his Petition,
it declines to rule on the issue of whether Maldonado Bautista is an enforceable declaratory
judgment applicable to those like Petitioner. See also Bah v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00039-
CNS, 2026 WL 205642, at *1 n.* (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2026); Ramirez v. Noem, No. 2:26-cv-
00063-SMD-GJF, 2026 WL 381869, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026) (indicating that
declaring Maldonado Bautista binding would be “premature given the current splits among
districts and ongoing procedural uncertainties” and “reach[ing] its conclusion through an
independent statutory analysis”).
The remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6 th day of March, 2026.
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