Becerra Perez v. Grant et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOSE LUIS BECERRA PEREZ, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-1560-R
)
SCARLET GRANT, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER
Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico that entered the United States without inspection, is
currently in the custody of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. His removal
proceedings are ongoing and he is currently detained pursuant to the mandatory detention
provision contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). He filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1] contending that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does
not apply to noncitizens like him who previously entered the country without inspection
and that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights.
Respondents filed a Response in Opposition [Doc. No. 10] and Petitioner replied [Doc. No.
12].
The key question in this case is whether Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) or whether he must instead be detained pursuant to § 1226(a). The issue
is significant because § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for mandatory detention whereas § 1226(a)
provides for conditional parole or release on bond pending a decision in the removal
proceedings.
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However, before reaching the merits, the 	Court addresses two jurisdictional
challenges 	asserted 	by 	Respondents. 	Respondents 	first 	argue 	that 	this 	Court 	lacks
jurisdiction to consider the Petition because 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) channel
claims related to removal orders to the appropriate court of appeals. Section 1252(a)(5)
provides that a petition for review with the court of appeals “shall be the sole and exclusive
means for judicial review of an order of removal” and § 1252(b)(9) provides that “[j]udicial
review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of
constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought
to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in
judicial review of a final order under this section.” However, because Petitioner is
challenging his order of detention, and not an order of removal, these provisions do not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)
(holding that “§ 1252(b)(9) does not present a jurisdictional bar” because habeas petitioners
“are not asking for review of an order of removal” or “challenging the decision to detain
them in the first place or to seek removal”).
Respondents next argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) precludes district courts from
considering challenges to the basis on which the government chose to commence removal
proceedings. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the
Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly indicated that this provision is to be read narrowly and applies only to the three
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discrete actions referenced in the statute, i.e. the “decision or action” to “commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294
(2018) (“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that can technically be
said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the
language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.”); Dep't of Homeland Sec.
v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1907 (2020) (“Section 1252(g) is
similarly narrow.”)
Here, Petitioner is not challenging the discretionary decision to commence a
removal proceeding or the process by which his removability will be adjudicated. Instead,
he is challenging the legal question of whether he is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) or detention under § 1226(a). As such, his claims do not fall within the
narrow jurisdictional bar stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). See Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-
D, 2025 WL 3645176, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025) (“Accordingly, because Petitioner
does not challenge Respondents’ decision to commence or adjudicate proceedings or
execute 	removal 	orders, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1252(g) 	does 	not
jurisdictionally bar consideration of the Petition.”); Martinez Diaz v. Holt, No. CIV-25-
1179-J, 2025 WL 3296310, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2025) (“Because Petitioner does
not challenge Respondents’ decision to commence or adjudicate proceedings or execute
removal orders, the Court concludes that § 1252(g) does not jurisdictionally bar his
Petition.”).
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Turning to the merits of the dispute, Respondents contend that Petitioner is properly
detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). This provision states:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that
an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of
this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Respondents contend this provision applies to Petitioner because
he is plainly an “applicant for admission,” which is defined as “an alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). Petitioner counters that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to recent arrivals and those
seeking admission at a border and that a different provision, § 1226(a), applies to aliens
that have been unlawfully living in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant
issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision
on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”).
In a prior case that raised this same issue, the undersigned previously concluded that
that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs Petitioner’s detention. See Valdez v. Holt, No.
CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL 3709021, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025). In reaching this
conclusion, the Court found the analysis in Casañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.,
161 F. 4 th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025), to be persuasive. The Seventh Circuit, relying on the text
and structure of the two provisions, concluded that the government’s argument was likely
to fail on the merits:
That’s because § 1225(a)(1) defines an “applicant for admission” as “an alien
present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). And while a noncitizen arrested in the
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Midwest might qualify as “an alien present in the United States who had not
been admitted,” § 1225(a)(1), the mandatory detention provision upon which
Defendants rely, limits its scope to an “applicant for admission” who is
“seeking admission,” § 1225(b)(2)(A). Put another way, “U.S. immigration
law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission
into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the
outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).”
Id. at 1061 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289). The Court again concludes that
“§ 1225(b)(2)(A) unambiguously requires that an ‘applicant for admission’ also be
‘seeking admission’ for the section to control.” Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-D, 2025
WL 3645176, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025).
The Court also rejects Respondent’s argument that the statute’s reference to “aliens
seeking admission” is just another way of referring to aliens who are “applicants for
admission,” as that reading would render the phrase “seeking admission” redundant. See
Castanon-Nava, 	161 	F.4th 	at 	1061 	(“Defendants’ 	construction 	would 	render 	§
1225(b)(2)(A)'s use of the phrase ‘seeking admission’ superfluous, violating one of the
cardinal rules of statutory construction.”); Medina-Herrera, v. Noem., No. CIV-25-1203-
J, 2025 WL 3460946, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2025) (“[I]f all applicants for admission
are also ‘seeking admission,’ then § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s inclusion of the phrase ‘seeking
admission’ would be redundant.”); Corona Diaz v. Olson, No. 25 CV 12141, 2025 WL
3022170, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 2025) (“Because of § 1225(a)(1), the universe of
‘applicants for admission’ is not coextensive with noncitizens ‘seeking admission.’ If the
categories overlapped perfectly, there would be no need for Congress to have used the
phrase ‘seeking admission’ in § 1225(b)(2)(A).”).
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Here, Petitioner has been unlawfully living in the United States for many years
without seeking admission and was present in the country when he was detained.
Accordingly, the mandatory detention provision contained in § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not
apply to him. Instead, Petitioner’s detention is controlled by § 1226(a) and he is entitled to
a prompt bond hearing.1 This conclusion is in accordance “with the vast majority of district
courts in this judicial district, in district courts within the Tenth Circuit and across the
country to have addressed the same issues as those raised by Petitioner.” Toledo Santos v.
Grant, No. CIV-25-1433-SLP, 2026 WL 184287, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 23, 2026)
(footnotes omitted).
Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED in part2 and Respondents are directed to
provide Petitioner with a prompt bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or otherwise
release Petitioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5 th day of February, 2026.
1 	The 	Court 	also 	rejects 	Respondent’s 	argument 	that 	Petitioner’s 	application 	for
cancellation of removal means that he is seeking admission within the meaning of the
statute. 	See 	Medina-Herrera, 	2025 	WL 	3460946, 	at 	*4 	(finding 	that 	“Petitioner’s
application to cancel his 2024 removal does not transform him into a person “seeking
admission” within § 1225(b)(2)’s context”).
2 Given that the Court has granted Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing, the Court
declines to address Petitioner’s due process claim at this time.
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