Li v. Bondi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
LIANG LI, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-1480-J
)
PAMELA BONDI, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
ORDER
Petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed a verified petition for habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1]. Respondents filed a Response in Opposition to the Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 9]. Petitioner filed a reply [Doc. No. 10]. The matter was referred to
United States Magistrate Judge Amanda L. Maxfield who entered a Report and Recommendation
[Doc. No. 11] recommending that (1) the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be granted to the
extent it requests habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (2) Respondents release Petitioner from
custody immediately, subject to an appropriate Order of Supervision, and (3) Respondents certify
compliance by filing a status report affirming that Petitioner has been released from custody within
five business days of the Court’s order. The parties were advised of their right to object to the
Report and Recommendation by February 13, 2026. Respondents filed an objection [Doc. No. 12],
which triggers de novo review.
For the reasons below, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in relevant
part and GRANTS the Petition.1
1 	Respondents object to Judge Maxfield’s discussion of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) because the
Petition does not specifically allege a violation of subpart (i)(2). However, Judge Maxfield also
found an independent violation of subpart (i)(3), which is the portion of the Report and
Recommendation that this Court adopts.
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I. 	Background
The parties do not dispute the basic timeline of events. Petitioner, a native and citizen of
the People’s Republic of China, entered the United States in 1994 and filed an application for
political asylum [Doc. Nos. 1, 9]. 	In February 2011, Petitioner was taken into custody by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) but was released in July 2011 on an Order of
Supervision [Doc. Nos. 9–10]. Petitioner alleges that when he was detained during this period,
“China did not cooperate” and he was released with the United States government “implicitly
conceding that removal was not reasonably foreseeable” [Doc. No. 10].
In September 2025, Petitioner was re-detained without warning while he was attending a
routine check-in meeting at an ICE facility [Doc. Nos. 1, 9–10]. When Petitioner was re-detained,
he was not notified of the reasons for his revocation and ICE did not promptly conduct an informal
interview to afford Petitioner the opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation of his release
[Doc. No. 1]. Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not dispute, that Petitioner complied with all
conditions of release while on supervision [Doc. No. 10]. Moreover, it is undisputed that Petitioner
has no criminal history throughout his 31-year residence in the United States see [Doc. Nos. 1, 9–
10]. Petitioner further alleges that Respondents failed to appropriately determine that there is a
significant likelihood that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future
[Doc. No. 1]. In particular, Petitioner alleges ICE has not provided evidence that: (a) China has
agreed to accept Petitioner’s return; (b) any travel documents have been obtained or are
forthcoming; (c) any circumstances have changed making removal reasonably foreseeable; or
(d) that Petitioner poses a flight risk or danger to the community. Id.
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II. 	Legal Standards
It is well established that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025). It is
equally well established that the “fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
Consistent with these dictates, the Code of Federal Regulations sets forth mandatory,
minimum procedural requirements ICE must follow before revoking an individual’s release on an
order of supervision. Relevant here, the individual must “be notified of the reasons for revocation
of his or her release,” and ICE must “conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or
her return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to respond to the reasons for
revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) (2005). During that interview, the
individual “may submit any evidence or information that he or she believes shows there is no
significant likelihood he or she [will] be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he
or she has not violated the order of supervision.” Id. A majority of district courts have granted
habeas relief, finding that a violation of one or more federal regulations amounts to a due process
violation. See, e.g., Pham v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1157-SLP, 2025 WL 3243870, at *1 (W.D. Okla.
Nov. 20, 2025) (collecting cases); Ye v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1230-D, 2025 WL 3485420, at *3
(W.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2025) (same).
III. 	Analysis
In the Report and Recommendation, Judge Maxfield correctly concludes that Respondents
violated 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) by failing to notify Petitioner of the reasons for revocation of his
release, promptly conduct an informal interview after Petitioner’s return to custody, and afford
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Petitioner the opportunity to respond and challenge the Government’s conclusion that there is a
significant likelihood Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. This is not
a close case. Respondents have failed to demonstrate to the Court compliance with the procedures
in 241.13(i)(3)—let alone an attempt to comply. See, e.g., Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766,
772 (D. Minn. 2025) (granting habeas relief where ICE attempted to provided notice, but it was
deemed inadequate because it merely parroted the regulatory text). Indeed, Respondents do not
object to Judge Maxfield’s conclusion that Petitioner was denied the process required by
241.13(i)(3).
Lacking any evidence to the contrary, Respondents focus efforts elsewhere. 	First,
Respondents attempt to recast Petitioner’s claim as a substantive due process argument that should
be analyzed under a heightened standard requiring Petitioner to show a “‘high level of
outrageousness’” [Doc. No. 12 at 2–3 (quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir.
1995)]. 	According to Respondents, Petitioner’s allegation that ICE’s “abandonment” of its
regulatory procedures “shocks the conscience and violates fundamental fairness” is the hallmark
of a substantive due process claim rather than a procedural due process claim. Id. Respondents’
argument 	is 	unpersuasive, however, because Respondents themselves acknowledge that
“Petitioner’s Count One alleges violation of procedural due process” and that “Petitioner claims
that ICE ‘failed to follow required procedures under its own regulations.’” Id. (quoting Doc. No.
1 at 8).
Finally, Respondents cite a recent decision from a judge of this Court to argue that a
violation of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) does not warrant habeas relief because it is not “‘constitutional
in scale’” [Doc. No. 12 (quoting Bahadorani v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1091-PRW, 2025 WL
3048932, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2025)]. Consequently, Respondents assert the proper remedy
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in this instance is to compel the agency to follow its procedures. Id. Yet Respondents’ reliance
on Bahadorani is misplaced because it overlooks the fundamentally different circumstances
presented here. 	In Bahadorani, Judge Wyrick noted that while the individual may not have
received the initial notice, he was interviewed on the same day as his detention, informed of “the
reasons for his detention,” and was subsequently afforded a second post-detention interview where
he was permitted to “submit information concerning his custody.” 2025 WL 3048932, at *3. Here,
by contrast, Respondents have not provided any evidence to suggest an informal interview was
ever conducted—whether promptly as required by the Code or throughout the almost six months
that Petitioner has remained in custody—thereby denying Petitioner the very procedural
safeguards that § 241.13(i)(3) is designed to secure. That complete breakdown in process is not
comparable to the technical deficiency addressed in Bahadorani and squarely raises the
constitutional concerns that justify habeas relief in this case.2
To be certain, Respondents correctly explain that habeas corpus relief is available only if
Petitioner can show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). But Respondents are mistaken in concluding that this
Court may not grant habeas relief solely because the text of § 2241(c)(3) fails to contain an explicit
proviso authorizing the writ for violations of a federal regulation. The procedures required by
241.13(i) are more than a mere formality; they codify Zadyvas principles into the immigration
regulations governing detention review process. See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to
Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56967-01, 56968, 2001 WL 1408247(F.R.) (Nov. 14, 2001)
2 Even Judge Wyrick in Bahadorani acknowledges there are circumstances where a violation of
241.13(i)(2) and (i)(3) can warrant habeas relief where the violation rises to the level of a “serious
substantive defect . . . beyond a mere failure to follow the regulation to a T.” 2025 WL 3048932,
at *3.
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(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. Parts 3 and 241) (“This rule institutes procedures by which the Executive
Branch will make the necessary judgments regarding the likelihood of removal, in a regular and
consistent manner, based on a review of its experience with the country in question, the evidence
submitted by the particular alien, and other relevant evidence . . . . In light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zadvydas, this rule revises the Department’s regulations by adding a new 8 CFR 241.13
. . . . Specifically, the rule provides a process for the Service to make a determination as to whether
there is a significant likelihood that the alien will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future.”).
By mandating minimum procedures, the regulation ensures the individual is afforded the
basic due process protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. A wholesale failure to provide
the required notice and the mandated interview—thereby depriving the individual of any
meaningful opportunity to contest the revocation of release—implicates those constitutional
protections directly. “‘Ice, like any agency, has the duty to follow its own federal regulations . . . .
As here, ‘where an immigration regulation is promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived
from the Constitution or a federal statute . . . and [ICE] fails to adhere to it, the challenged [action]
is invalid.’” Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 152 (D. Mass. 2025) (citation omitted).
IV. 	Conclusion
Based on ICE’s violation of its own regulations, this Court concludes that Petitioner’s
detention is unlawful and that his release is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).3
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation in relevant part [Doc. No. 11],
GRANTS Petitioner’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the extent it requests habeas
3 Because this Court concludes that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated as a result of
Respondents’ failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3), this Court does not address
Petitioner’s remaining claims.
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relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc. No. 1], ORDERS Petitioner be released from custody
immediately, subject to an appropriate Order of Supervision,4 and ORDERS Respondents to
certify compliance by filing a status report affirming that Petitioner has been released from custody
within five business days of the Court’s order.
A separate judgment will enter.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 19 th day of February, 2026.
4 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 governs the issuance and conditions of orders of supervision.
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