Maynahonah v. Maynard

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ROBERT T. MAYNAHONAH, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1461-D
)
GARY MAYNARD, )
)
Respondent. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner, a state prisoner appearing
pro se and
in forma pauperis, brings this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking habeas relief from a state court conviction.1 (ECF No.
1). Chief United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti has referred this matter to the
undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B). Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Petition
has been promptly examined, and for the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that
the action be DISMISSED on filing as untimely.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2009, in Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-2005-5643, Mr.
Maynahonah pled guilty to one charge of second-degree murder and one charge of a drive-
by shooting, and was sentenced accordingly.
See ECF No. 1:1;
State of Oklahoma v.
Maynahonah, Case No. CF-2005-5643 (Okla. Co. Dist. Ct. Jan. 9, 2005).2
1 Petitioner paid the full filing fee on December 18, 2025. ECF No. 6. The pending Motions for Leave
to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 2 and 7) are MOOT.
2
See United States v. Pursley, 577 F.3d 1204, 1214 n.6 (10th Cir. 2009) (exercising discretion “to
take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in [this] court and certain other courts concerning matters
that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”).
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Petitioner did not seek to withdraw his plea, and thus failed to perfect a direct appeal
in his case.
See State of Oklahoma v. Maynahonah, Case No. CF-2005-5643 (Okla. Co. Dist.
Ct.);
see York v. Galetka, 314 F.3d 522, 526 (10th Cir. 2003). Additionally, Mr. Maynahonah
failed to seek post-conviction relief in his state court case.
Id. On December 5, 2025, Mr.
Maynahonah filed a Petition for habeas relief in this Court, alleging a violation of Due Process
and the “imposition of an illegal sentence.” (ECF No. 1:2-5).
II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
District courts must review habeas petitions promptly and summarily dismiss a
petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner
is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Additionally, “district
courts are permitted, but not obliged, to consider,
sua sponte, the timeliness of a state
prisoner’s habeas petition.”
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006). However, “before
acting on its own initiative, a court must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to
present their positions.”
Day, 547 U.S. at 210. Petitioner has such notice by this Report and
Recommendation, and he has an opportunity to present his position by filing an objection
to the Report and Recommendation. Further, when raising the issue
sua sponte, the district
court must “assure itself that the petitioner is not significantly prejudiced . . . and determine
whether the interests of justice would be better served by addressing the merits or by
dismissing the petition as time barred.”
Day, 547 U.S. at 210 (internal quotation marks
omitted);
Thomas v. Ulibarri, No. 06-2195, 214 F. App’x 860, 861 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
Finally, a Court may dismiss a § 2254 habeas petition
sua sponte only if the petition is clearly
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untimely on its face.
Kilgore v. Attorney General of Colorado, 519 F.3d 1084, 1085 (10th Cir.
2008).
III. AEDPA LIMITATIONS PERIOD
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes a one-year
limitations period for claims of a habeas petitioner in state custody.
Rhine v. Boone, 182
F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). The one-year limitations period runs from the latest of;
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Unless a petitioner alleges facts implicating subsection (B),
(C), or (D), the limitations period generally begins to run from the date on which the
conviction becomes final.
See Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000).
Under subsection (A), Petitioner’s limitations period began to run from the date on
which the conviction became final.
See Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir.
2000). If a defendant does not timely move to withdraw a guilty plea or file a direct appeal,
Oklahoma criminal convictions become final ten days after sentencing.
See Jones v. Patton,
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619 F. App’x 676, 678 (10th Cir. 2015). Because Mr. Maynahonah did not appeal from his
plea, his conviction became final ten days following sentencing, on January 19, 2009.
See
supra. Petitioner’s one-year statute of limitations to file a habeas petition began the following
day, and, without tolling, expired on January 20, 2010. But Mr. Maynahonah filed the habeas
petition on December 5, 2025, over fifteen years after the limitations period had expired.
(ECF No. 1). Thus, absent any statutory or equitable tolling, the action is untimely.
IV. STATUTORY TOLLING
The AEDPA limitations period is tolled pending adjudication of a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Mr. Maynahonah did not file an Application
for Post Conviction Relief, thus this exception does not apply.
See supra. Accordingly, unless
equitable tolling is applicable, the § 2254 claim is untimely.
V. EQUITABLE TOLLING
The AEDPA limitations period may be subject to equitable tolling.
See Holland v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010). But this form of tolling is only available when an
extraordinary circumstance stood in the petitioner’s way and prevented timely filing.
See
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). And, even when the circumstances are
extraordinary, equitable tolling is only available when the petitioner has been diligent in the
pursuit of his habeas claims.
See Holland, 631 U.S. at 653. Under this standard, the
petitioner bears a “‘strong burden to show specific facts.’”
Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925,
928 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Petitioner does not argue that he is entitled to any
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type of equitable tolling.
See ECF No. 1. Thus, the Court should find that equitable tolling
would not extend his limitations period.
VI. ACTUAL INNOCENCE EXCEPTION
“[A] credible showing of actual innocence” based on newly discovered evidence “may
allow a prisoner to pursue his constitutional claims” as to his conviction, under an exception
to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)—established for the purpose of preventing a miscarriage of
justice.
See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386, 392 (2013). Successful actual-
innocence claims are rare due to the demanding evidentiary requirements for such claims.
See id. at 383, 392, 401;
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006). “[P]risoners asserting
innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, in light of new evidence, ‘it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.’ ”
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. at 536-37 (quoting
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 327 (1995));
accord McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. at 399 (applying the same standard
to petitions asserting actual innocence as a gateway to raise habeas claims that are time-
barred under § 2244(d)(1)). Such claims must be based on “factual innocence, not mere
legal insufficiency.”
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Petitioner does not
attempt to argue that he is actually innocent of the crime.
See ECF No. 1. Thus, the Court
should find that he is not entitled to benefit from any additional time under this provision.
VII. SUMMARY
Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s conviction became final on January 19, 2009 and
the one-year habeas limitations expired on January 20, 2010. Petitioner is neither entitled
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to any statutory or equitable tolling, nor is he entitled to any additional time under the
“actual innocence” exception. Ultimately, because Petitioner waited until December 5, 2025
to file his Petition, the Court should dismiss it as untimely.
VIII. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is recommended that the Petition be
DISMISSED as untimely.
Petitioner is advised of his right to file an objection to this Report and
Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by January 15, 2026, in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Petitioner is further advised that failure to make timely
objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both
factual and legal issues contained herein.
Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th
Cir. 2010).
IX. STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this
matter.
ENTERED on December 29, 2025.
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