Abdul Khaliq v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
HEITHEM MOHAMMAD
ABDUL KHALIQ,
)
)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-1154-SLP
)
KRISTI NOEM, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Heithem Mohammad Abdul Khaliq, a noncitizen1 and Jordanian national
of Palestinian descent, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) challenging
his detention by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Doc. 1. United
States District Judge Patrick R. Wyrick referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C).2 Based on an expedited briefing
scheduled set by the Court, Respondents filed a Response, Doc. 10, and Petitioner filed a
Reply, Doc. 12. 	On November 4, 2025, after a status conference, the Court ordered
supplemental briefing on certain factual disputes. 	Doc. 15. 	Both parties submitted
supplemental briefs, Docs. 18, 20, and Petitioner responded to Respondents’ supplemental
brief, Doc. 21. On December 1, 2025, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion or Request
1 Unless quoted, this Report and Recommendation “uses the term ‘noncitizen’ as equivalent
to the statutory term ‘alien.’” 	Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578 n.2 (2020) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
2 Judge Wyrick subsequently recused himself and the case was reassigned to United States
District Judge Scott L. Palk. Doc. 11.
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for Expedited Handling Under 28 U.S.C. § 1657 (“Motion to Expedite”) to expedite a
decision on the Petition and to shorten the period for any objections to a Report and
Recommendation. Doc. 25. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends
that the Court deny the Petition and deny Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite as moot.
I. 	Background
Petitioner was born in Saudi Arabia in 1974 and immigrated to the United States as
a Lawful Permanent Resident in May 1990. Pet. at 4; Doc. 18 at 2. On January 23, 2018,
he pleaded guilty to several state charges in the District Court of Oklahoma County,
including driving under the influence, possession of a controlled dangerous substance,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving while privilege revoked. Pet. at 4; Resp. at
2; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 4. After these convictions, Petitioner entered ICE custody in April 2019,
and an immigration judge ordered him removed to Saudi Arabia. 	Pet. at 4; Resp. at 2;
Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 5. 	Petitioner’s appeal of his Order of Removal was dismissed on
February 20, 2020. Pet. at 4. After the denial of Petitioner’s motion to reopen on July 16,
2020, his case was sent to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) for
execution of the Order of Removal. Resp. at 2 n. 4.
On September 22, 2020, ERO sent a travel document request to Saudi Arabia
seeking to effectuate Petitioner’s removal. Resp. at 2; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 7. On December 9,
2020, the Consulate of Saudi Arabia notified ERO that Petitioner is not a Saudi citizen and
advised of several other issues that would prevent his removal to Saudi Arabia. Resp. at
2; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 8. Based on this information, ERO suspended efforts to remove Petitioner
to Saudi Arabia. Doc. 18 at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 8.
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On January 8, 2021, ERO requested assistance from the Jordanian consulate about
Petitioner’s country of birth and country of citizenship. Resp. at 2; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 9. After
investigation, ERO learned that Petitioner was born in Saudi Arabia and is of Palestinian
descent. Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 10. In addition, ERO learned that Jordan issues passports to certain
individuals of Palestinian descent, like Petitioner. 	Id. 	ERO also obtained Petitioner’s
temporary Jordanian passport, issued in 1989,3 which establishes Petitioner’s identity and
ties to Jordan as well as his Palestinian descent. Id.; Doc. 23 at 19-28. From the record,
the undersigned discerns that ERO at this point determined to try to remove Petitioner to
Jordan based on his ties to that country. 	On July 26, 2021, Respondents requested an
update on Petitioner’s travel request from the Embassy of Jordan. Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 11. There
is no record that Jordan ever responded to this request. Id. On August 10, 2021, Petitioner
was released from ICE custody on an Order of Supervision. Pet. at 4; Resp. at 2-3; Doc. 18-
1 at ¶ 12.4
Petitioner was re-detained by ICE on March 6, 2025. Pet. at 4; Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-
1 at ¶ 14. 	On April 13, 2025, ERO sent a travel document request for Petitioner to the
3 Petitioner maintains that he does not have a current Jordanian passport but does not
dispute that the expired passport was issued to him. Doc. 20 at 2-3.
4 Petitioner alleges he was released from detention because Respondents could not
effectuate his removal. 	Pet. at 4. ERO asserts that Petitioner was released from custody
because he had a validated COVID risk factor. Doc. 18 at 5; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 12; see also
Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 751 (C.D. Cal. 2020)
(granting a preliminary injunction requiring ICE to make timely custody determinations
for detainees with certain COVID risk factors), vacated by No. 19-CV-10546, 2022 WL
20212706 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 16, 2022). The reason for Petitioner’s release does not impact
the undersigned’s analysis on whether he is currently entitled to release.
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Embassy of Jordan, and that request included his Jordanian passport, his birth certificate,
and pages from his parents’ Jordanian passports. 	Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶¶ 15, 26;
Doc. 23. On May 23 and May 26, 2025, ERO requested a status update from the Embassy
of Jordan. Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶¶ 16-17. Respondents did not receive any response to
these requests. Doc. 18-1 at ¶¶ 16-17. On June 2, 2025, ERO determined that Petitioner’s
detention should be continued given his criminal history and that his removal is “highly
likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 18.
On June 17, 2025, ERO requested another status update from the Embassy of
Jordan. Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 19. The Embassy responded, stating that they were “still waiting
on approval from the Government of Jordan to issue a travel document.” 	Id.; see also
Doc. 18 at 5. On July 23, 2025, ERO requested another status update from the Embassy
of Jordan. 	Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 20. 	On July 31, 2025, the Embassy again stated it
was “still waiting on approval from the Government of Jordan” to issue a travel document.
Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 21; see also Doc. 18 at 5. 	On November 4, 2025, during this habeas
proceeding, ERO requested another status update from the Embassy of Jordan. Doc. 18-1
at ¶ 23. On November 5, 2025, an officer from the Jordanian Embassy responded, stating
that they would not be able to issue travel documents based on Petitioner’s temporary
Jordanian passport, but provided instructions for applying for a new passport. 	Id. ¶ 24.
The Jordanian officer stated “the process could take some time as they would need to get
approval from the Jordanian authorities since [Petitioner] is detained.” Id.
ERO Officer Aaron Nation asserts that an application for a new Jordanian passport
will be completed soon by Petitioner. Id. ¶ 26. Officer Nation further asserts that “because
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the Jordanian Embassy has responded to our requests for updates on the travel document,
and included instructions for a new passport, [he] believe[s] it is likely that they will renew
his passport and issue travel documents.” Id. ¶ 27 (citation modified). “Based on Jordan’s
acceptance of flights and the record of acceptance of individuals with Jordanian passports
to Jordan,” Officer Nation believes that Petitioner’s “removal is significantly likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. ¶ 28.
Separately, on September 23, 2025, ERO sent documents to Petitioner for him to
complete to request a travel document from Palestine. 	Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 22.
Respondents allege that Petitioner failed to complete these documents fully and filled out
portions incorrectly. 	Resp. at 3; Doc. 18 at 4; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 22. 	Petitioner asserts that
there was confusion surrounding a Power of Attorney form, and that “his failure to
understand the document and completing it incorrectly is not a refusal to comply with his
removal.” Doc. 20 at 4. Respondents claim that if the Jordanian Embassy does not issue
a travel document for Petitioner, ERO intends to submit a travel document request to the
Israeli Embassy for permission for Petitioner to travel to the West Bank based on evidence
of Petitioner’s Palestinian nationality. Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 30.
Petitioner filed his Petition on October 3, 2025, approximately seven months after
being detained and four months after ERO determined his removal was highly likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Pet. at 9. When he filed his Petition, Petitioner was detained
at Cimarron Correctional Facility in Cushing, Oklahoma. Id. at 3. He remains detained at
that 	ICE 	facility. 	See 	ICE 	Online 	Detainee 	Locator 	System, 	at
https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Dec. 2, 2025).
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II. 	Petitioner’s Claims
Petitioner asserts two counts in his Petition:
• 	Count I: Violation of Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process.
Petitioner alleges that his ongoing detention is not likely to end in the
reasonably foreseeable future and, therefore, violates his right to Due
Process. Pet. at 8.
• 	Count II: Violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 	Petitioner alleges that his
removal is not reasonably foreseeable, does not effectuate the purpose of
the statute, and is accordingly not authorized by § 1231(a). Pet. at 8-9.
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus “ordering Respondents to release Petitioner
immediately.” 	Id. at 9. 	In addition, he seeks a declaration that his ongoing detention
violates the Due Process Clause and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Pet. at 9.5
III. 	Standard of Review
To obtain habeas corpus relief, Petitioner must show that he is “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001)).
Petitioner asserts that his continued detention violates 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). 	Pet. at
8-9. 	Under this statute, “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
The 90-day period is known as the “removal period.” Id. After the removal period, ICE
5 Petitioner also requests oral argument. 	Pet. at 1. 	Oral argument would not materially
assist in determining these issues and is unnecessary for preparing this Report and
Recommendation. LCvR78.1.
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has discretion to detain inadmissible or criminal aliens. 	Id. § 1231(a)(6). 	However,
detention of an alien subject to a final order of removal may not be indefinite and is
presumptively reasonable for only six months beyond the removal period. See Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701; see also Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2005)
(reiterating that “the reasonable period of post-removal detention is presumptively six
months”). 	After that, a detainee may bring a habeas action to challenge his detention.
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688. 	“This 6–month presumption, of course, does not mean that
every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may
be held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701.
To obtain habeas relief, a petitioner has the initial burden to show the post-removal-
order detention has surpassed six months and to “provide[] good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.; see
also Soberanes, 388 F.3d at 1311 (“If removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court
should hold continued detention unreasonable.” (citation modified)). “After this 6–month
period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with
evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 	Further, “for
detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows,
what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id.
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IV. 	Analysis
A. 	Petitioner’s continued detention is lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).6
1. 	Petitioner has not met his initial burden.
It is undisputed that Petitioner has been re-detained since March 2025, beyond a
presumptively reasonable period of six months. 	See Pet. at 4; Resp. at 3. 	It is also
undisputed that Petitioner’s order of removal is to Saudi Arabia and that ERO is not
attempting to remove him to Saudi Arabia. Pet. at 1-2; Doc. 18 at 3; see also Doc. 18-1 at
¶ 8 (discussing that ERO suspended efforts to remove Petitioner to Saudi Arabia).
Petitioner, though, has not “provide[d] good reason to believe that there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
“To meet the burden of establishing this, Petitioner must demonstrate the existence of
either institutional barriers to repatriation or obstacles particular to his removal.” Dusabe
v. Jones, No. CIV-24-464-SLP, 2024 WL 5465749, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2024)
(R&R), adopted, 2025 WL 486679 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 13, 2025). 	Further, a noncitizen
“subject 	to 	an 	order 	of 	removal 	must 	present 	something 	beyond 	speculation 	and
6 Zadvydas applies here, though the undersigned acknowledges that in Zadvydas the
petitioners sought relief from their original detention by ICE whereas Petitioner seeks
relief from his re-detention. 	First, Respondents rely upon their statutory authority under
§ 1231(a)(6) to detain Petitioner. 	Second, all parties focus their briefing on whether
Petitioner’s detention is constitutional under Zadvydas alone. 	Finally, courts recently
addressing this issue have ruled that Zadvydas applies to re-detention cases. 	See, e.g.,
Momennia v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1067-J, 2025 WL 3006045, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27,
2025) (applying Zadvydas to petitioner released from detention on an Order of Supervision
“for over twenty years” and then re-detained by ICE in early 2025); Qui v. Carter, No. 25-
3131, 2025 WL 2770502, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding “petitioner’s release
[from re-detention] is warranted under the Supreme Court’s Zadvydas framework”).
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conjecture” to carry his burden. Al-Shewaily v. Mukasey, No. CIV-07-0946-HE, 2007 WL
4480773, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 18, 2007) (citation modified).
The undersigned concludes there are not “obstacles particular to [Petitioner’s]
removal” that demonstrate he will not be removed to a third country—Jordan—in the
reasonably foreseeable future.7 See Dusabe, 2024 WL 5465749, at *3. 	First, Petitioner
was previously issued a passport by the Government of Jordan. Doc. 23 at 18-28; see also
Doc. 20 at 3 (acknowledging that the expired Jordanian passport was issued by the
Government of Jordan to Petitioner). While the Embassy of Jordan has informed ERO that
“they would not be able to issue emergency travel documents based on [Petitioner’s]
temporary [and expired] passport,” the Embassy “gave instructions for submitting an
application for a new passport.” Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 24. Petitioner has not provided any reason
that Jordan would not or should not issue him a new passport. Nor has he alleged why the
Government of Jordan would have issued him a passport in 1989 but will not do so in 2025.
Second, ERO submitted additional evidence of Petitioner’s ties to Jordan, including
Jordanian passports of both of his parents and his brother’s birth certificate from Jordan.
Doc. 23 at 14, 29-32. Petitioner has not disputed this evidence or explained why it would
not support ERO’s request to Jordan to issue him a new passport, which, in turn, would
allow for his removal to Jordan.
7 Petitioner alleges that he is “essentially stateless” because he was born in Saudi Arabia to
non-Saudi citizen parents. 	Pet. at 1. 	Petitioner, though, has sufficient ties to Jordan to
show he is not “essentially stateless” like the Zadvydas petitioners.
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As such, Petitioner has “failed to present any facts indicating that ICE is incapable
of executing his removal to [Jordan] and that his detention will, therefore, be of an
indefinite nature.” Al-Shewaily, 2007 WL 4480773, at *5; see Santiago-Gomez v. Chertoff,
No. Civ. 05-2899, 2006 WL 572379, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2006) (rejecting petitioner’s
claim of no significant likelihood of removal because once immigration officials transmit
petitioner’s correct biographical information to Spain, “it is entirely possible” that Spanish
officials “will agree to issue a passport for [p]etitioner” (citation modified));8 cf. Alic v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y/Immigr. Customs Enf’t, No. 25-CV-01749, 2025 WL 2799679,
at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2025) (granting petitioner’s habeas petition because respondents
could not show why a renewed request for travel documents would have a different
outcome when the same country had previously denied petitioner’s travel document request
and “no additional documentation was provided with the renewed request”).
Petitioner contends that based on the timing of Respondents’ travel document
requests and responses from Jordan, his removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Doc. 21 at 2-3. However, Respondents are correct that “a mere delay
in receiving travel documents does not trigger the inference that an alien will not be
removed in the reasonably foreseeable future because the reasonableness of detentions
8 The petitioner in Santiago-Gomez subsequently filed a second successful habeas petition
less than a year later, alleging that his removal was not significantly likely because even
after receiving the correct biographical information Spain had refused to issue him a
passport. 	Santiago-Gomez v. Chertoff, No. CIV A 06-3608, 2007 WL 316454, at *6
(D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2007). Likewise, if Petitioner’s passport application to Jordan is denied or
other circumstances materially change, he may file a new habeas petition at that time if
there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
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pending deportation cannot be divorced from the reality of bureaucratic delays that almost
always attend such removals.” 	Resp. at 9 (quoting Head v. Keisler, No. 07-402-F, 2007
WL 4208709, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2007)) (citation modified); see also Manjulaben
v. Ice, No. 25-CV-02252, 2025 WL 2977713, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2025) (“Courts
have uniformly held that mere delay by the foreign government in issuing travel
documents, despite reasonable efforts by United States authorities to secure them, does not
satisfy a detainee’s burden under Zadvydas to provide good reason to believe that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” (citation
modified)).
Consistent with this principle, Petitioner cannot meet his burden only by showing a
delay in the issuance of necessary travel documents by the country to which ICE is seeking
to remove him. See Dusabe, 2024 WL 5465749, at *4 (finding petitioner failed to sustain
his burden by alleging delay when the delay was “a result of Rwanda’s slow machinations
and not a denial or refusal to accept him”); see also Manjulaben, 2025 WL 2977713, at *3
(finding petitioner has not met his burden in part because he “provides no indication that
the Indian consulate would not procure travel documents”); Atikurraheman v. Garland,
No. C24-262, 2024 WL 2819242, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024) (denying habeas relief
where petitioner had been held past six months but continued detention appeared to be
caused by the “nationality verification in India being a slow process, which does not
undermine the conclusion that removal remains foreseeable”); Derrick v. Barr, No. C19-
117, 2019 WL 3997505, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 2019) (finding a significant
likelihood that petitioner would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, given his
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passport 	application 	was 	still 	pending 	and 	both 	parties 	were 	actively 	addressing
outstanding issues) (R&R), adopted, 2019 WL 3996849 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2019);
Komlanvi v. Sessions, No. CV H-18-1058, 2018 WL 3348886, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 9,
2018) (finding petitioner had not “met his initial burden of showing that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the foreseeable future,” despite being detained for more
than a year, because “immigration officials are working with the government of Togo to
procure the necessary travel documents”).
Further, the fact that a foreign government has not yet issued travel documents to a
petitioner with a pending request and ties to that country does not mean that his removal is
not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. See, e.g., Tawfik v. Garland,
No. CV H-24-2823, 2024 WL 4534747, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2024) (finding allegations
of “a lack of visible progress” because petitioner’s native country had not issued travel
documents for him with no additional specifics about circumstances that would make
petitioner’s removal unforeseeable were not sufficient to meet petitioner’s burden); Edwin
A. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 24-CV-1363, 2024 WL 4654396, at *3 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 10, 2024) (finding petitioner had not met his burden because “ICE has presented
strong evidence of [petitioner’s] nationality to the Ghana Embassy and the Embassy is now
attempting to verify that information” and “ICE has taken affirmative steps to obtain travel
documents—and the Ghana Embassy has not denied the request”) (R&R), adopted, 2024
WL 4654449 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2024); Truong v. US Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 24-
CV-00397, 2024 WL 3155909, at *1 (W.D. La. May 17, 2024) (finding petitioner did not
meet his burden by making conclusory claims “that his removal was unlikely to occur in
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the reasonably foreseeable future because Vietnam had not yet issued travel documents”)
(R&R), adopted, 2024 WL 3155834 (W.D. La. June 24, 2024); Salim v. Sessions, No. CV
H-18-2287, 2019 WL 13218806, at *6-7 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 4, 2019) (“The mere fact that the
Pakistan Consulate has not yet responded to the request for travel documents does not mean
it will not do so in the future” because “the Government has taken affirmative steps to
obtain travel documents—none of which have been presently denied” (citation modified));
cf. Nibkakhsh-Tali v. Mukasey, No. CV 07-1526, 2008 WL 2328354, at *7 (D. Ariz. June 4,
2008) (“In light of the two denial letters, and [ICE’s] inability to even speculate as to when
travel documents might be forthcoming, [r]espondent[s] have not come forth with evidence
establishing that it is clear that there is a significant likelihood of removal, much less in the
reasonably foreseeable future.”).
Finally, the Jordanian Embassy’s indication that the process “could take some
time” alone does not impact the analysis because it is only when “the delays are so
extraordinarily long as to trigger an inference that travel documents will likely never issue
at all.” Chen v. Banieke, No. CIV-15-2188, 2015 WL 4919889, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 11,
2015) (finding allegations that ICE had not been able to obtain travel documents to
petitioner’s native country for nine months or “provide a definite indication as to when it
expects to obtain a travel document” were not sufficient to meet petitioner’s burden); see
also Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222, 1233 (9th Cir. 2008) (“That the detention did not
have a certain end date does not change the analysis.”); Joseph v. United States, 127
F. App’x 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding petitioner failed to meet his burden by merely
showing a lengthy delay in the issuance of travel documents, but noting that “at some point
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in time the inability to procure travel documents may provide good reason to believe that
removal is unlikely to be carried out” where it suggests more than “a case of bureaucratic
inertia and [that] the documents will be issued in due course” (citation modified)).
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to prove that his removal is
not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
2. 	Even if Petitioner had met his burden, Respondents have
sufficiently met their burden in response.
When a petitioner meets his burden and establishes “good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the
burden then shifts to the Government to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Even if Petitioner had met his burden, Respondents
have satisfied their burden in response.
Here, Respondents have indicated the Jordanian Embassy has provided instructions
for applying for a new passport for Petitioner and that “the process could take some time.”
Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 24. As discussed above, mere delay on the part of the receiving country is
not sufficient to prove that removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future. Accordingly, even if Petitioner had met his burden, Respondents have sufficiently
rebutted any showing with evidence that Petitioner’s removal is likely to occur and merely
delayed while Jordan processes the travel request. See Jarrett v. U.S. Att'y Gen., No. 23-
20790-CIV, 2024 WL 4165273, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2024) (“Respondent has rebutted
[petitioner’s] contention [that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable] by showing that
it is actively pursuing travel documentation and the Jamaican Consulate has not indicated
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that the travel document request will be denied.”); Zavier v. Barr, No. 20cv245, 2020 WL
12188699, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Sep. 2, 2020) (finding that if the consulate is processing
petitioner’s passport application and the process is advancing, then “the petition should be
denied because removal is significantly likely to occur,” notwithstanding “the fact that a
specific date cannot be provided”); Yaro v. Mukasey, No. 08-cv-593, 2008 WL 4816657,
at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2008) (finding respondents met their burden to show petitioner’s
removal is likely in the reasonably foreseeable future where his native country had not
refused to issue travel documents or failed to respond to ICE, but acknowledged receipt of
key documents and provided a general timeline for a decision) (R&R); Jaiteh v. Gonzales,
No. CIV-07-1727, 2008 WL 2097592, at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 28, 2008) (finding respondents
met their burden “where a foreign country ordinarily accepts repatriation, and that country
is acting on an application for travel documents,” and a delay of more than 14 months is
not long enough to show that travel documents are not forthcoming) (R&R), adopted, 2008
WL 2074163 (D. Minn. May 14, 2008).
Respondents have shown that ERO has taken numerous steps to secure travel
documents and effectuate Petitioner’s removal, including multiple communications with
the Embassy of Jordan to obtain the proper documents for Petitioner’s removal to Jordan.
See, e.g., Resp. at 10 (describing actions taken by Officer Nation to effectual Petitioner’s
removal); see also Tawfik, 2024 WL 4534747, at *4 (finding respondents sufficiently
rebutted petitioner’s showing because “ICE has been actively working on securing
[petitioner’s] removal since the removal order became final”); 	McAulay v. Taylor,
No. CIV-17-3290, 2017 WL 4842375, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2017) (finding respondents
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rebutted petitioner’s claim that his removal was not likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future because during petitioner’s year-long detention the government had been in direct
contact with and provided requested documents to the United Kingdom Consulate and
passport office, and his “removal awaits only the issuance of a travel document”).
Accordingly, Respondents have provided sufficient evidence to show Petitioner’s removal
is likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Thus, even assuming Petitioner met his initial
burden, 	Respondents 	have 	sufficiently 	demonstrated 	that 	his 	removal 	to 	Jordan 	is
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.9
The undersigned is mindful that “as the period of prior postremoval confinement
grows, what counts as the ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to
shrink,” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701, and recognizes that Petitioner has been detained post-
removal for nearly nine months this year. 	But the government is making reasonably
substantial efforts to remove him, and Jordan appears to be cooperating with those efforts.
Based on the current record, Petitioner is substantially likely be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future. 	The undersigned notes, however, that this may change in the future,
and Petitioner is not precluded from filing another habeas petition if removal to Jordan is
no longer significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future.
9 Respondents assert that if the Jordanian Embassy does not issue a travel document for
Petitioner, ERO intends to submit a travel document request to the Israeli Embassy for
permission for Petitioner to travel to the West Bank based on evidence of his Palestinian
nationality. 	Resp. at 3; Doc. 18-1 at ¶ 30. 	Because the undersigned concludes that
Petitioner’s removal to Jordan is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future,
this Report and Recommendation does not address Respondents’ alternative removal plan
of Petitioner to Palestine through Israel.
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B. 	Petitioner’s continued detention does not violate his due process rights
under the Fifth Amendment.
“A petitioner’s failure to establish that his detention violates Zadvydas negates a
substantive due process claim.” Dusabe, 2024 WL 5465749, at *6 (citation modified); see
also Mafukidze v. Gonzales, No. CIV-07-871-W, 2008 WL 395411, at *4 (W.D. Okla.
Feb. 11, 2008) (“Without providing good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood
of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, [p]etitioner cannot prevail on a
substantive due process claim based upon his continued detention.”). 	The Court should
therefore deny any substantive due process claim raised by Petitioner.
V. 	Petitioner’s Motion to Expedite
After the Petition was fully briefed, Petitioner filed a Motion to Expedite asking the
undersigned to (1) expedite his decision on the merits of the Petition and (2) shorten the
timeline for objecting to any Report and Recommendation from 14 days to five days. Doc.
25. 	Because this Report and Recommendation addresses the merits of the Petition, the
undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Motion to Expedite as moot. 	To the
extent Petitioner seeks a shorter timeline for objecting to this Report and Recommendation,
the undersigned has already shortened the objection period to seven days as a matter of
course with habeas cases like this.
VI. 	Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY the
Petition, Doc. 1, and DENY as moot the Motion to Expedite, Doc. 25. 	The parties are
advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of Court not later than December 9, 2025. See
id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If a party wishes to respond to the other party’s
objections, such response must be filed not later than December 12, 2025. 	See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual
and legal issues addressed in this Report and Recommendation. 	See Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2025.
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