Lawrence v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STACY L., 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	No. CIV-25-906-SM
)
FRANK BISIGNANO, 	)
COMMISSIONER 	)
OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Stacy L.1 (Plaintiff), seeks judicial review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s final decision that he was not “disabled” under the Social Security
Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). The parties have consented to proceed
before the undersigned for disposition. Docs. 8, 9; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).2
Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision and
remand the case for further proceedings, arguing that the Administrative Law
1 	The Court refers to Plaintiff by first name and last initial only to protect
Plaintiff’s privacy because of the sensitive nature of medical and personal
information disclosed in Social Security cases.
2 	Citations to the parties’ pleadings and attached exhibits will refer to this
Court’s CM/ECF pagination. Citations to the administrative record (AR) will
refer to its original pagination.
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Judge (ALJ) failed to account for functional limitations relating to Plaintiff’s
obstructive 	sleep 	apnea, 	failed 	to 	account 	for 	Plaintiff’s 	mild 	mental
limitations, and failed to adequately and properly evaluate and account for
Plaintiff’s alcohol use disorder. Doc. 12, at 6-25.
After careful review of the AR, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant
authority, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s 	decision. See 	42 	U.S.C.
§§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).
I. 	Administrative determination.
A. 	Disability standard.
Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income under the Social
Security Act. AR 16; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq., 1381, et seq.
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the inability “to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less
than [twelve] months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “This twelve-month duration
requirement applies to the claimant’s inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity, and not just [the claimant’s] underlying impairment.” Lax v.
Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535
U.S. 212, 218-19 (2002)).
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B. 	Burden of proof.
Plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing a disability” and of “ma[king]
a prima facie showing that he can no longer engage in his prior work activity.”
Turner v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 326, 328 (10th Cir. 1985). If Plaintiff makes that
prima facie showing, the burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner to
show Plaintiff “retains the capacity to perform” a different type of work and
that such a “specific type of job exists in the national economy.” Id. (quoting
Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 579 (10th Cir. 1984)).
C. 	Relevant findings.
1. 	ALJ’s findings.
The ALJ assigned to Plaintiff’s case applied the standard regulatory
analysis 	to 	decide 	whether 	Plaintiff 	was 	disabled 	during 	the 	relevant
timeframe. AR 17-36; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); see also Wall v. Astrue, 561
F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing the five-step framework). The ALJ
found Plaintiff:
(1) 	had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September
23, 2021, the application date;
(2) 	has the severe medically determinable impairments of right fourth
digit fracture with degenerative changes, obstructive sleep apnea,
and hypertension;
(3) 	had no impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment;
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(4) 	had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full
range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R § 416.967(b);3
(5) 	has no past relevant work and no transferable job skills;
(6) 	was a younger individual on the date the application was filed, but
subsequently 	changed 	age 	category 	to 	closely 	approaching
advanced age;
(7) 	has at least a high school education;
(8) 	there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that Plaintiff can perform; namely, merchandise marker,
Dictionary 	of 	Occupational 	Titles 	(DICOT) 	209.587-034;
housekeeping cleaner, DICOT 323.687-014; and mail clerk, DICOT
209.687-026;
(9) 	had not been under a disability since September 23, 2021.
AR 19-35.
2. 	Appeals Council’s findings.
The Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request 	for 	review, 	see 	id. 	at 	1-6, 	“making 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	the
Commissioner’s final decision for [judicial] review.” Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d
1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2011); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.
3 	“[R]esidual functional capacity is the most [a claimant] can still do
despite [a claimant’s] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a).
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II. 	Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision.
A. 	Review standard.
The 	Court 	reviews 	the 	Commissioner’s 	final 	decision 	to 	determine
“whether substantial evidence supports the factual findings and whether the
ALJ applied the correct legal standards.” Allman v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326,
1330 (10th Cir. 2016). “An agency decision that either applies an incorrect legal
standard or is unsupported by substantial evidence is subject to reversal.”
Staheli v. Comm’r, SSA, 84 F.4th 901, 905 (10th Cir. 2023).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Wilson v.
Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010)); see also Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084
(defining substantial evidence as “more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance”). “[T]he threshold . . . is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S.
97, 103 (2019). The Court “will not reweigh the evidence or substitute [its]
judgment for the Commissioner’s.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Hackett v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005)). Thus, “[t]he possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative 	agency’s 	findings 	from 	being 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence.” Id. (quoting Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir.
2004)).
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“[T]he 	failure 	to 	apply 	proper 	legal 	standards, 	may 	under 	the
appropriate circumstances, be sufficient grounds for reversal independent of
the substantial evidence analysis.” Hendron v. Colvin, 767 F.3d 951, 954 (10th
Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). This Court “consider[s] whether the ALJ
followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in weighing particular
types of evidence in disability cases, but we will not reweigh the evidence or
substitute our judgment for the Commissioner’s.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084
(quoting Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1172). But the failure to apply the proper legal
standard requires reversal only where the error was harmful. Cf. Shinseki v.
Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (placing the burden to show harmful error
on the party challenging an agency’s determination).
B. 	The 	ALJ 	properly 	accounted 	for 	Plaintiff’s 	functional
limitations associated with his severe obstructive sleep
apnea in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Plaintiff’s
obstructive sleep apnea in determining the RFC because the RFC “contains no
limitations addressing the functional impact of ‘obstructive sleep apnea’, such
as environmental restrictions, fatigue-related limitations, or concentration
deficits.” Doc. 12, at 8-9 (internal citation omitted). To successfully challenge
the RFC determination, a plaintiff must articulate a specific limitation he
experienced 	from 	his 	impairments, 	severe 	or 	otherwise, 	that 	the 	ALJ
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erroneously failed to include in the RFC. See, e.g., McAnally v. Astrue, 241 F.
App’x 515, 518 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e agree with the magistrate judge that,
with regard to her hypertension, loss of vision or skin problems, the claimant
has shown no error by the ALJ because she does not identify any functional
limitations that should have been included in the RFC assessment or discuss
any evidence that would support the inclusion of any limitations.” (quotations
and 	alterations 	omitted)); 	Denman 	v. 	Saul, 	No. 	CIV-18-640-G, 	2019 	WL
4059185, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 28, 2019) (affirming the ALJ’s RFC where the
plaintiff “fail[ed] to identify the specific limitations he believes were . . .
[erroneously] omitted from the RFC”).
At step two, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and
concluded that Plaintiff had severe physical impairments that included sleep
apnea and nonsevere mental impairments of psychosis NOS (not otherwise
specified), alcohol use disorder, depressive disorder, and trauma and stressor-
related disorder. AR 19-29. At step three, the ALJ found that although Plaintiff
suffers from obstructive sleep apnea, he “does not have chronic pulmonary
hypertension . . . , chronic heart failure . . . , or disturbances in mood, cognition,
and behavior[.]” Id. at 30. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his]
symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
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evidence in the record” and specifically noted that Plaintiff’s sleep apnea was
“stable” with use of a CPAP machine and that Plaintiff “was fully alert to time,
place, and person. Recent memory was fully intact. Mood was pleasant and
sociable.” Id. 31-32.
The Court concludes the ALJ adequately discussed and considered
Plaintiff’s obstructive sleep apnea in determining his RFC. The ALJ did not
have to impose any limitations in the RFC unless the record bore out those
limitations. 	Plaintiff 	himself 	did 	not 	offer 	any 	evidence 	at 	the 	hearing
concerning the limitations imposed by his sleep apnea, and the medical record
does not support any such limitations.4 And Plaintiff does not suggest any
limitations the ALJ should have included in the RFC assessment even now.
The 	Court 	has 	considered 	the 	cases 	cited 	by 	Plaintiff 	and 	finds 	them
4 	Plaintiff 	represented 	himself 	at 	the 	hearing 	and 	the 	ALJ 	did 	not
specifically ask Plaintiff about any limitations related to his sleep apnea. AR
43-61. “ALJs are not required to exhaust every possible line of inquiry in an
attempt to pursue every potential line of questioning. The standard is one of
reasonable good judgment.” Wall, 561 F.3d at 1062 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). However, “even if the ALJ should have specifically
inquired about Plaintiff’s [sleep apnea], the Court finds any error harmless[]”
in light of the medical record. Gibson v. Saul, No. CIV-18-1122-G, 2019 WL
4045662, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 3, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 4045651 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 27, 2019).
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distinguishable. So Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ erred by disregarding his
sleep apnea at step four lacks merit.
C. 	The 	ALJ 	properly 	accounted 	for 	Plaintiff’s 	functional
limitations associated with his mild mental limitations in
determining Plaintiff’s RFC.
Plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the 	ALJ 	failed 	to 	either 	include 	limitations
resulting from Plaintiff’s mild mental limitations in the RFC or “explain the
omission.” Doc. 12, at 14. At step two, the ALJ extensively reviewed the
medical evidence relating to Plaintiff’s mental impairments. AR 19-26. The
ALJ then proceeded to “consider[] the [four] broad functional areas of mental
functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders
. . . known as the ‘paragraph B’ criteria.” Id. 26-29. In each area, the possible
ratings 	are 	none, 	mild, 	moderate, 	marked, 	and 	extreme. 	20 	C.F.R.
§ 416.920a(c)(3). Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had “mild”
limitations in all four functional areas and concluded that “the evidence does
not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in the
claimant’s ability to do basic work activities[.]” AR 29.
Specifically, the ALJ noted:
• 	Plaintiff’s “abilities to maintain a job while he was incarcerated
which 	shows 	his 	ability 	to 	understand 	and 	learn 	terms,
instructions, and procedures.”
• 	Plaintiff’s interactions with peers and medical providers ranged
from 	“typically 	unremarkable 	with 	a 	few 	exceptions[]” 	to
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“generally cooperative” to “good” to “pleasant and sociable[,]”
with periods of “[m]ild anger, irritability, and frustration with
mood swings” or “poor interpersonal skills[.]”
• 	Plaintiff’s “symptoms have been more pronounced when he is
not fully compliant with medication[,]” but “treatment records
during incarceration also show [him] doing well even when he
was not compliant with medication as prescribed.”
Id. at 27-29.
At 	step 	four, 	the 	ALJ 	specifically 	referenced 	Plaintiff’s 	“medically
determinable 	mental 	impairment 	[sic]” 	and 	“multiple 	Mental 	Status
Examinations[]” in concluding that Plaintiff can perform light duty work. Cf.
Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Thus, the ALJ accounted
for Vigil’s moderate concentration, persistence, and pace problems in his RFC
assessment by limiting him to unskilled work.”); Suttles v. Colvin, 543 F. App’x
824, 826 (10th Cir. 2013) (“mental limitations noted in the threshold inquiry
at steps two and three do not apply at later steps”); Beasley v. Colvin, 520 F.
App’x 748, 754 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The ALJ was under no obligation to include
limitations in social functioning in Ms. Beasley’s RFC based solely on his
finding that she had ‘moderate difficulties’ in social functioning as part of the
distinct step-three analysis.”). Notably, Plaintiff did not respond to requests
from two state reviewing physicians tasked with reviewing his mental function
limitations, but the ALJ obtained additional records from Plaintiff’s mental
health treatment provider before rendering his decision. AR 33 (“[A]dditional
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evidence 	received 	at 	the 	hearing 	level 	provides 	sufficient 	evidence 	for
evaluation of the claimant’s mental condition[].”), 64-66, 70-72, 517. “As such,
it is clear that the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s mental impairment in making an
RFC determination and did not improperly rely on the step-two assessment in
place of an RFC analysis.” Williams v. Berryhill, No. CIV-17-1199-G, 2019 WL
1199861, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 14, 2019).
“To be sure, the ALJ’s discussion here was brief; nevertheless, to succeed
in his argument, Plaintiff must direct the Court’s attention to some evidence
that was apparently overlooked by the ALJ showing additional functional
impairments based on” his mild mental impairments. Montano v. Saul, 2021
WL 1169982, at *6 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 2021). “The burden to prove disability in
a social security case is on the claimant, and to meet this burden, the claimant
must furnish medical and other evidence of the existence of the disability.”
Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir. 2004). “[A] claimant
cannot simply allege he has an impairment; he must show how the impairment
results in functional limitations.” B.A.Y. v. Comm’r, SSA, 2024 WL 2844697,
at *3 (10th Cir. June 5, 2024) (citing Howard v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 945, 947
(10th Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiff cites to specific reports that he contends “support the existence
of 	functional 	limitations 	flowing 	from 	Plaintiff’s 	non-severe 	mental
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impairments.” Doc. 12, at 19-20 (citing AR 395, 397-98, 405, 409-410, 412, 414,
424, 426, 429-30, 446-48, 469, 488, 499, 501-02, 504, 506, 527-531, 558, 634-35,
638, 643, 646). Notably, several of these records indicate that while he was in
prison, Plaintiff maintained good job performance and relationships with peers
and/or staff and had no disciplinary problems despite his mental impairments.
AR 395, 411-12, 426, 430; cf. id. 529 (9/27/2023: “Client reports he is not
working at this time because he is wanting to get SSI.”). Plaintiff has the
burden to provide evidence of work-related limitations due to his mental health
impairments, yet none of the evidence Plaintiff cites supports his argument
that the ALJ erred. See Maestas v. Colvin, 618 F. App’x 358, 361 (10th Cir.
2015) (“As part of [the plaintiff’s] burden, he must provide evidence of his
functional limitations.”). Accordingly, “the ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported
by substantial evidence.” Beasley, 520 F. App’x at 755.
Alternatively, “[b]ecause the evidence in this case does not support
assessing any functional limitations from mental impairments,” any error the
ALJ committed at step four was harmless. Alvey v. Colvin, 536 F. App’x 792,
794 (10th Cir. 2013). A reviewing court considers whether the agency decision
provides “a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles have
been followed.” Byron v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984) (citation
modified). The ALJ must articulate his reasons for the decision “with sufficient
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particularity to allow for judicial review.” Gorian v. Colvin, 180 F. Supp. 3d
863, 868 (D.N.M. 2016) (citing Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir.
1996)); see also Spicer v. Barnhart, 64 F. App’x 173, 177-78 (10th Cir. 2003)
(requiring that “the ALJ’s decision be sufficiently articulated so that it is
capable of meaningful review”). Because this Court “can follow the [ALJ’s]
reasoning” and can determine that correct legal standards have been applied,”
the Court finds that “mere[] technical omissions in the ALJ’s reasoning do not
dictate reversal.” Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156, 1166 (10th Cir.
2012).
D. 	The ALJ properly considered all of Plaintiff’s impairments,
including 	his 	alcohol 	use 	disorder, 	in 	determining
Plaintiff's RFC.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to properly and adequately assess
and account for limitations related to Plaintiff’s alcohol use disorder . . . . [and]
failed to account for the combined effect of all impairments, including alcohol
use disorder[.]” Doc. 12, at 23 (internal quotations omitted). At step two, the
ALJ considered Plaintiff’s diagnosis of alcohol use disorder, moderate, and
concluded that when, “considered singly and in combination [with Plaintiff’s
other mental impairments], [it] do[es] not cause more than minimal limitation
in [Plaintiff]’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and [is] therefore
nonsevere.” AR 19, 25-26. Plaintiff himself did not cite his alcohol use disorder
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as an impairment limiting his ability to work. Id. at 30-31. So Plaintiff has not
met his burden to show that a remand would produce a different outcome. See
Zavala v. Kijakazi, No. CIV-20-1139-STE, 2021 WL 6051107, at *4 (W.D. Okla.
Dec. 21, 2021) (“Mr. Zavala has not demonstrated that either his IBS or GERD
results in functional limitations greater than those included in the RFC. Thus,
the Court concludes any error the ALJ made in failing to discuss nonsevere
impairments is harmless.”); Perez v. Saul, No. CIV-19-1100-SM, 2021 WL
1177587, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2021).
III. 	Conclusion.
Based on the above, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
ENTERED this 27th day of March, 2026.
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