Jones et al v. Comanche County Facilities Authority et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHARLES JONES, Individually and as 	)
Personal Representative of the Estate 	)
Of Matthew Tyler Jones, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-385-PRW
)
COMANCHE COUNTY FACILITIES 	)
AUTHORITY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Shon Erwin’s Report and
Recommendation (Dkt. 17), which recommends that the Court grant in part and deny in
part Defendant Comanche County Facilities Authority’s (“CCFA”) Partial Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 8). CCFA timely objected (Dkt. 18), and Plaintiff Jones responded to
CCFA’s Objection (Dkt. 19). For the reasons given below, the Court ADOPTS Judge
Erwin’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 17).
Background
This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Matthew Tyler Jones was an inmate at Comanche
County Detention Center (CCDC) in August of 2023 when he was fatally stabbed. Plaintiff
alleges that various “unlawful policies and customs[,]” were the impetus for his death,
specifically identifying (1) “continued overcapacity and overcrowding of inmates” both
overall and in their cells, inadequate monitoring of the jail population, and inadequate
Case 5:25-cv-00385-PRW Document 21 Filed 03/09/26 Page 1 of 4

2
staffing.1 CCFA filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 8) on April 11, 2025, arguing that
Plaintiff improperly brought a § 1983 claim in his individual capacity (which has since
been mooted by Plaintiff clarifying in his Response that he has not brought this action in
his individual capacity) and that CCFA is immune from Plaintiff’s state tort claims. Judge
Erwins recommends that the Court deny the Motion in part and grant it in part.
Legal Standard
The Court must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.”2 An objection is “proper” if it is both timely and
specific.3 A specific objection “enables the district judge to focus attention on those
issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.”4 Additionally, “[a]n
‘objection’ that merely reargues the underlying motion is little different than an ‘objection’
that simply refers the District Court back to the original motion papers; both are
insufficiently specific to preserve the issue for de novo review.”5 In the absence of a proper
objection, the district court may review a magistrate judge’s recommendation under any
standard it deems appropriate.6
1 Compl. (Dkt. 1, Ex. 3), at 6–7.
2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
3 United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996).
4 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Vester v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., No. 1:08-cv-01957-MSK-LTM, 2009 WL 2940218,
at *8 (D. Colo. Sept. 9, 2009) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d at 1060).
6 Summers v. State of Utah, 927 F.2d 1165, 1167–68 (10th Cir. 1991).
Case 5:25-cv-00385-PRW Document 21 Filed 03/09/26 Page 2 of 4

3
Analysis
Judge Erwin finds that § 153.1 of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act
(OGCTA) does not abrogate the immunity of public trusts that house federal inmates, like
CCFA. Section 153.1 states:
Nothing in the Governmental Tort Claims Act shall be construed as allowing
an action or recovery against this state, against any city, town or county that
is the sole beneficiary of a public trust, or against any employee of this state
or any city, town or county of this state due to the housing of federal inmates
or inmates from another state in facilities owned or operated by private prison
contractors. If a public trust that has as its sole beneficiary a city, town or
county has a facility that houses federal inmates or inmates from another
state, the immunity provided for in the Governmental Tort Claims Act shall
not apply to that trust.
CCFA battles the plain text of the statute. Plaintiff has pleaded that CCFA is a public
trust which houses federal inmates, and that Comanche County is the trust’s sole
beneficiary. CCFA, relying on appeals to the title of the statute and the legislative context
around the passage of this provision, argues that the legislature’s intent was to abrogate
immunity only for such government entities who are beneficiaries of a public trust and
which have in some way turned over operations of jails to private contractors. But Judge
Erwin quoted and analyzed the entirety of the statutory text, which contradicts CCFA’s
position. Indeed, courts in this District have previously rejected similar iterations of
CCFA’s argument.7 Ultimately, “purposive argument simply cannot overcome the force of
7 Bonilla v. Gerlach, No. CIV-23-1060-R, 2024 WL 457172, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 6,
2024).
Case 5:25-cv-00385-PRW Document 21 Filed 03/09/26 Page 3 of 4

4
the plain text.”8 Thus, the Court DENIES CCFA’s Motion (Dkt. 8) with respect to
Plaintiff’s claim for negligence in Plaintiff’s capacity as personal representative of the
Estate of Matthew Tyler Jones.
The Court reviews the unobjected-to portions of the Report and Recommendation
to confirm that there is no clear error on the face of the record.9 Finding none, the Court
concurs with Judge Erwin’s well-reasoned conclusions and analysis. Accordingly, the
Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim for negligence against CCFA in his individual
capacity.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 17) and
GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART CCFA’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt.
8).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9th day of March 2026.
8 Bowe v. United States, 607 U.S. ----, 146 S.Ct. 447, 465 (2026) (quoting Mohamad v.
Palestinian Authority, 566 U.S. 449, 460 (2012)).
9 Summers, 927 F.2d at 1167–68.
Case 5:25-cv-00385-PRW Document 21 Filed 03/09/26 Page 4 of 4